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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the attempts by the leadership of the GDR 
to devise a concept of the nation which suited their objectives 
regarding the future of the state and of Germany as a whole, from 
1949 until 1989. A simple analysis of official pronouncements on 
the subject over the years reveals serious inconsistencies and 
dramatic U-turns. This thesis considers various factors which may 
have shaped the official line, including the influence of Bonn and 
Moscow, public opinion and personal convictions. In particular it 
examines the input of experts from academic institutions in order 
to answer the question of whether or not the official line on the 
nation had a clear theoretical basis, or was purely determined by 
pragmatic considerations.
In order to investigate what lay behind official policy, extensive 
use has been made of material from the SED's Central Party 
Archive, and interviews were conducted with leading theorists. 
In this way it was possible to gain a better understanding of the 
interaction between the political and theoretical aspects of the 
National Question in the former GDR.
The findings reveal that the official concept of the nation was 
prim arily determ ined by pragm atic, or even opportunistic 
considerations, and was viewed by the SED leadership as a means 
to legitimise the GDR in the absence of alternative methods. 
Initially the intention was to reinforce the claim that the GDR was 
a model for a future united socialist Germany, but later a concept 
was fashioned to support the idea that it was an independent 
sovereign state, and in no way linked to the Federal Republic. 
However, the regime was heavily reliant on the skills of theorists 
to provide credible (M arxist-Leninist) justifications for policy 
changes, and to modify policies in order to make them more 
acceptable and therefore more effective as a means to legitimise 
the state.
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CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION
Recent events in the former Eastern Bloc have shown that the key 
factor ensuring the stability of states and their systems is popular 
legitimacy. While an outside guardian, the threat of force from 
within and without, and even barbed wire and concrete can 
uphold a state artificially, they are no substitutes for legitimacy 
from below, and we now know what happens once these supports 
are withdrawn.
Three factors can be identified as vital if a state is to enjoy the 
total allegiance of its population, and a deficiency in any one of 
them may well have disastrous consequences. The first is 
democracy, that is to say, the right of all citizens to give or 
withhold their assent to their state's system and regime and to 
participate in the decision-making process. The denial of that 
right suggests a belief on the part of the regime that it would not 
get the approval of the population, if they were given the 
opportunity to voice their opinions.
The second factor is economic success, demonstrated by the 
fulfilment of what are perceived to be the minimum requirements 
for an acceptable standard of living, which will differ according to 
expectations. In the developed world, this will be based on 
material well-being, or more precisely, the ability of the state to 
satisfy demand for food, clothing, housing, transport and 
consumer durables - not just in terms of quantity, but of quality 
also.
The third essential factor is what we might describe as 
identification of the state with a defined group and its interests, 
which may be a nation or a class, but (in theory) not both. 
Sometimes states do represent more than one group, but this can 
easily lead to discrimination, internal rivalry, even civil war, and 
may result in the division of the state as occurred in 
Czechoslovakia and could happen in Belgium or Canada. By 
appearing to represent a nation and to protect national interests
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from outside competition and threats, a regime can draw on the 
powerful forces of national sentiment, even nationalism, to gain 
support and therefore legitimacy for itself and the state. Where 
the interests of the state and the nation are successfully fused 
together, causing national and state-consciousness to become 
inseparable, an extremely resilient entity, a true nation-state will 
become established.
Alternatively, a genuine Marxist-Leninist regime should justify a 
socialist or communist state's right to exist on the basis of its 
social and economic system, that is to say, on the claim that the 
state represents the interests of the masses, since power is 
(theoretically) in the hands of the working class themselves. 
Clearly this claim is fundamentally incompatible with the claim to 
represent a group bound together by their nationality, regardless 
of class.
Once a state has secured the loyalty of its citizens, or popular 
legitimacy, it is likely to be recognised as legitimate by the 
international community, which in turn will further encourage 
popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the state.
The GDR was a state born illegitimate. Whereas many states are 
created in response to a claim to the right to political autonomy by 
an established nation, the GDR was founded not due to the will of 
its population, but as a result of the breakdown in relations 
between the wartime allies, and therefore seemed artificial and 
only likely to last as long as the rift between the allies continued, 
which more or less proved to be the case. Furthermore, its 
population was not originally a nation in its own right, but part of 
the broader German nation, which also included the population of 
the neighbouring Federal Republic, plus minorities elsewhere. 
Thus, right from the start, the ruling communist party, the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), was faced with a 
serious legitimacy problem.
However, as we have seen, there were three ways to remedy the 
situation. The SED's attitude towards the first of these, namely
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dem ocracy, im plies that they either had a very unusual
understanding of the word, or simply failed to appreciate the
importance of this factor for the legitimacy of the state, or maybe 
even both. The to ta l dom inance of the party  was
undemocratically imposed when the state was created, and was
never put to the test of democracy. It is hard to believe that 
anyone was fooled by the facade of the block parties and sham 
elections. Therefore, we can hardly say that the SED failed to 
bring the GDR democratic legitimacy, since this was never their 
intention.
Turning to the second factor, namely economic success, 
particularly under the leadership of Erich Honecker, the SED was 
well aware of the beneficial effects of material well-being to 
enhance the image of the state, both in the eyes of its own 
population and of the outside world. However, there is no point in
trying to use economic success to legitimise the state and its
system if that success cannot be guarantied.1 While food and 
housing was cheap though basic, consumer durables were of poor 
quality and in short supply, and a 15 year wait was not unusual
for a new car, (and only a Trabb i  at that). People also had to
tolerate the dowdy clothes which made them so easily 
distinguishable from their West German cousins during the 
reunification process - perhaps still even today. However, the 
ultimate contradiction was the fact that in the supposedly 
egalitarian GDR, luxury goods could be obtained in special shops 
with ’real money,' i.e. Deutschmarks, and were regularly available 
to the ruling elite. 7  ^ ;
What made matters worse was the fact that East Germans were 
fully aware of the shortcomings of the East German economy, 
thanks to West German television, with the exception of those in
1 Harold James, A German Identity 1770-1990 (London, 1989), p.4.
2 According to his-^)ersonnl assistant,- this was true o f Politburo member 
Hermann Axen,--who got a shock on a rare-occasion when he entered shops
in the- 'real- world' in East Berlin. Interview with Manfred Uschner, Berlin,
2-3 July 1993.
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the Dresden area, who as a consequence became known as 'the 
clueless’ (die Ahnungslosen). Naturally television included not 
only programmes, but also advertisements, and East Germans 
constructed an image in their minds of what they believed 
capitalism  automatically delivered. Furtherm ore, there were 
naturally historic and emotional reasons why they compared their 
modest standard of living with that of the prosperous Federal 
Republic, and not with that of their 'inferior' socialist brothers and 
sisters in Eastern Europe, compared to whom they lived quite a 
comfortable life. In short, in spite of the over-optimistic claims 
and predictions of the SED, the socialist system in the GDR failed to 
deliver the goods, therefore the economy did not provide a means 
to compensate for the inherent lack of legitimacy of the state.
At the heart of the SED's claim that the GDR was a legitimate state, 
indeed, the legitimate German state at first, was a fundamental 
belief in the justice of the Marxist-Leninist system in a moral 
sense. Unfortunately, however, 'really existing socialism' in the 
GDR was very noticeably unjust. In practice, the ordinary people 
had very little freedom and control over their own lives, and due 
to the economic short-comings mentioned earlier, the leadership's 
claim that the socialist system was the best alternative was not 
borm out by the evidence. Furthermore, due to overt sovietisation, 
socialism seemed alien and under external control. Together these 
factors undermined the SED's claim that the GDR was legitimate by 
virtue of its socialist political and economic system.
Having chosen to base the legitimacy of the state on socialism, the 
SED should not have concerned itself with the nation and 
nationalism at all, since one either believes that people form 
communities based on their common nationality or their class 
identification, and that either national consciousness or class 
consciousness determines relations with others. However, due to 
the peculiar circumstances of the GDR, the SED could not ignore the 
question of nationhood, thus facing an additional problem which 
was not shared by the other Eastern Bloc regimes as they too 
attempted to take advantage of the beginning of a new era to 
establish socialism.
4
The main reason for this was the simple fact that the population 
of the GDR had previously been part of the broader German
nation, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, there was another 
state which claimed to be the one true German state, the Federal 
Republic, which threatened to undermine the similar claim made 
by the SED. As we shall see, the foundation of the GDR was 
originally perceived by the Party as the first step towards a
unitary socialist Germany and not as an end in itself, and in order
to make socialism appeal to all Germans, the SED had little choice 
but to make it seem synonymous with the national interest and 
indigenous to Germany. This confirms the fact that socialism 
alone was not sufficient to legitimise the state.
In spite of the fact that classical Marxism viewed nationalism as a 
device used by the bourgeoisie to weaken the class consciousness 
of the working class, the SED could justify its actions by pointing 
out that Marx and Lenin had condoned the manipulation of 
national sentiment as a means to advance the revolution,
providing it was vanquished once that objective had been 
ac h ie v e d .3 In fact, as we shall see, the leadership continued to 
make use of the vocabulary of nationalism even after they had 
abandoned its all-German aspirations, though from then on, it was 
portrayed as a form of nationalism  unique to the GDR. 
Furthermore, it masqueraded as (socialist) patriotism, and was 
apparently acceptable because it was inextricably linked to 
proletarian internationalism, though in real terms, these two 
ideologies were mutually exclusive.
For these reasons, the SED did not resist temptation to use national 
sentiment to its own advantage. However, for several reasons, 
this strategy could either have been the fledgling state's salvation, 
or its ruin. Firstly, the SED faced a serious dilemma. On the one 
hand, by emphasising the nation, the SED might remind people 
that the political division of Germany was unnatural, reinforcing
3 Walker Connor, The Nation in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy 
(Princeton, 1984), pp.XIII, 7. On this subject in general, see also Klaus 
Motschmann, Sozialismus und Nation (Munich, 1979).
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their desire to be reunited with the population of the Federal 
Republic, and the Party could not be certain that the GDR's 
political system would be the most popular model for a future 
united German state. This danger was exacerbated by the fact 
that the Federal Republic was larger, better endowed with natural 
resources and soon noticeably more prosperous. On the other 
hand, if the Party leadership claimed to represent a separate 
nation in the GDR, it could be accused of treachery, of abandoning 
the national cause of the German people and their right to self- 
determination. Furthermore, while there are several examples of 
firmly established states consisting of various peoples who have 
gradually developed a common or national identity, for example, 
the United States, it was unusual for one nation to be represented 
by two states. While a similar situation arose in Korea,4 there are 
still far more cases of states consisting of more than one 
nationality.
The second problem with appealing to national sentiment to 
legitimise the state was the fact that the SED was identified with a 
foreign power, namely the Soviet Union, hence the leadership's 
nationalist rhetoric sounded extremely hollow. Indeed, even 
before the GDR was established, the SED had already given up the 
'particular German road to socialism,' in favour of the Soviet one.
Therefore, the German Democratic Republic was not only not
democratic - it also hardly seemed German.
Thirdly, the SED undermined its own arguments by attempting to 
appeal to national and class consciousness sim ultaneously. 
Indeed, the leadership never did satisfactorily resolve the 
problem of the role of nations under socialism, since the ideas 
behind nationalism and socialism are basically irreconcilable, but
then nor did Marx, Engels or Lenin. Nevertheless, as we shall see,
scholars in the GDR did try to do so.
4 See for example, Roland Bleiker, 'Global Systemic Change, Spatial 
Mediation and Unification Dynamics in Korea and Germany,' A sian  
Perspective 16 (1992): pp.70-79; Myoung-Kyu Kang and Helmut Wagner, 
Korea and Germany: Lessons in Division (Soeul, 1990); Steven W. Mosher, 
Korea in the 1990s: Prospects for Unification (New Brunswick, 1992).
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Fourthly, the nation was not a new problem for the Germans, 
indeed both the GDR and the Federal Republic inherited a legacy 
of disagreement over the precise definition and character of the 
German nation which had been raging for centuries. The problem 
was naturally made worse by the recent example of extreme 
German nationalism, which made the subject taboo, when it really 
needed to be addressed.
In short, due to the unusual situation which had given birth to the 
GDR, what the SED desperately needed was 'a basic legitimising 
idea .'5 Neither democracy nor economic success was an option, 
and the socialist system and class identification alone could not fill 
the gap, partly due to the short-comings of the system, but also 
because people’s class consciousness was undermined by their 
national consciousness. Therefore the Party had little alternative 
than to try to use the concept of the nation and nationalism to its 
own advantage, even if it was a gamble, since if it ignored the 
issue, and allowed the Federal Republic to seize the initiative, then 
it was sure to be the loser. How they went about this is the main 
subject of this thesis.
n  AIMS OF THE INVESTIGATION
As we shall see, if one were to examine statements by the SED 
leadership regarding the German nation at various points during 
the history of the GDR, one would immediately be struck by the 
contradictions and dramatic changes in policy that occurred over 
the years. The primary task of this thesis is to explore the 
rationale behind policy changes - sound theoretical arguments, or 
more sinister political motives. Only by doing so can we hope to 
make sense of the apparent inconsistency and illogicality of 
official policy.
From this starting point, other questions arise. Firstly, was policy 
regarding the nation carefully thought out and deliberate? Which
5 Harry Krisch, 'Official Nationalism,' in The GDR - a developed socialist 
society, ed. Lyman H. Legters (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), p. 110.
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individuals and bodies were involved? Who was ultimately 
responsible? Where did they get their ideas from?
Secondly, to what extent was policy influenced by external
factors? Is there any evidence of interference from Moscow? To 
what extent was the SED's stance a response to the actions and 
statements of governments in Bonn, or did the Party attempt to 
keep one stage ahead? Which other events outside the SED's 
control affected policy?
Thirdly, which internal factors played a part? Did the regime 
endeavour to find out what the population thought about the state 
of the nation? If so, were their feelings taken into account? Or 
did the SED simply attempt to change them?
Fourthly, did the official line on the nation have a theoretical 
basis? If so, was it rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory? Were any 
other, non-Marxist theories taken into account? Did theoretical 
work determine official policy or vice versa? How could those
who were academically qualified to tackle the subject get their
ideas across? Were they listened to?
In order to answer these questions, both Party material and the 
work of East German scholars on the concept of the nation has 
been consulted. While our primary concern is to identify exactly 
why the SED's position regarding the German nation changed so 
dramatically, a major by-product of this study is a better 
understanding of the relationship between academia and the 
Party to be gained by contrasting academic work on the subject of 
the nation in the GDR with Party material. Finally, while it was 
not the author’s intention to explain why the GDR collapsed, this 
examination of the SED's N at ionskonzep te  may unintentionally 
shed some light on the matter.
The hypothesis to be tested is that the SED always regarded the 
concept of the nation as a means to an end, hence it was 
consistently determined by political objectives, even opportunism. 
Even so, the Party relied on professional academics to provide
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theoretical justifications for changes in policy, to fill in the details, 
and even to modify the official line when necessary. This was not 
due to a commitment to theoretical debate, but in order to make 
those changes more acceptable, and as a consequence, more 
effective as a means to achieve wider political objectives 
concerning the status of the GDR. Unfortunately, however, the 
leadership tended to change its position before a rationale for 
doing so had been worked out.
The fact that the regime went to such lengths to ensure that the 
scholarly community worked for it and not against it is an 
indication of the importance attached to 'science* or scholarship as 
a means to legitimise individual policies and to reinforce the 
scientific nature and validity of Marxism-Leninism in general. 
Clearly it could help the Party achieve its most important and 
long-standing objective, namely to legitimise a state that was not 
legitimate in itself, neither in the eyes of her own population, nor 
of the international community. However, as a result, both the 
SED's various official concepts of the nation and the theoretical 
explanations devised to support them sound distinctly contrived. 
They have little in common with western ideas of what constitutes 
a nation, and at times even contradict the fundamental principles 
of Marxism-Leninism. Since the state never was entirely accepted 
as legitimate, we can tentatively assume that even with scholarly 
backing, the SED's various concepts of the nation failed as a 
legitimising strategy.
2) TERMINOLOGY
In this thesis, the distinction is made between the influence of 
'theory' and of 'pragmatism' on the official line regarding the 
nation. Here, 'pragmatism' is used to refer to the political factors 
and objectives, maybe even opportunism, which may have 
influenced the leadership of the SED, including both internal and 
external events and considerations. The term 'theory' denotes 
scholarly arguments, which were usually devised by East German 
academics, as opposed to members of the ruling elite. As in all 
societies, both capitalist and communist, the relationship between
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the regime and 'its' experts was extremely complex. Not 
surprisingly, in the latter case, they had to operate within a 
Marxist-Leninist framework and within the practical constraints 
of the system, hence such work was by no means objective in a 
non-Marxist sense, hence it is impossible to draw a definite line 
between scholarship and propaganda in the GDR. Even so, 
theoretical material differed from the statements of the Party 
leadership, firstly because it was more detailed, and composed by 
those academically qualified to do so, and secondly because they 
had different motives to the leadership - personal motives as 
opposed to political ones, although this by no means cast them in 
the role of dissidents.
Throughout the thesis, those who were engaged in detailed 
consideration of the concept of the nation in the GDR are usually 
referred to as 'theorists,' because they were occupationally 
engaged in the provision of well-founded, theoretical justifications 
for changes in the official line on the subject. The individuals we 
are concerned with were historians, philosophers and social 
scientists, and were all members of the top state-run academic 
institutions of the GDR, such as the Academy of Sciences and 
Academy for Social Sciences, the primary function of which was 
not to encourage objective scholarship, but to serve the needs of 
the Party, both in the natural and social sciences. We could also 
refer to them as 'scholars’ or 'academics,' indeed, they would call 
themselves 'W i s s e n s c h a f t l e r ' , but these terms are somewhat 
imprecise and fail to encapsulate the specific function of the 
individuals concerned. Furthermore, the direct translation of 
'Wissenschaft ler,' namely 'scientist,' is avoided because in English 
usage it implies natural scientists only.
Some might call such people 'intellectuals,' but this term was also 
rejected for this dissertation, primarily because nowadays, it is 
often associated with dissident writers and thinkers, such as 
Vaclav Havel, as opposed to institutionalised scholars, who were 
Party members and were not so much opponents as collaborators 
with the regime. In the case of the GDR, they may privately have 
been critical of the leadership, but they were not necessarily
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opposed to the socialist system. A second reason was that the 
precise definition of 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia' in the broader 
Soviet and East European context has been disputed throughout 
the post-war period.6 Some people would define them as people 
who were occupationally involved in the production of ideas,7 
while others would include all those who had completed higher 
education .8 Other people would define them as all those engaged 
in mental work (technical personnel, teachers, doctors, office 
employees, scientists, writers, etc.),9 while others still would 
identify several different types of intellectual, some amateurs and 
others professional.10 According to some of these definitions, the 
intelligentsia would include a significant proportion of the 
population, while according to others they would be a small elite 
group.
However, whether those who toed the Party line and did not, or 
could not, conduct their research freely should count as 
intellectuals at all is questionable.11 Furthermore, if one were to 
exclude all those in nomenclatura positions, those remaining 
would be few in number, since, as we shall see, to challenge the 
official line and dominant ideology was extremely difficult and 
risky in all communist states. Therefore, although those who 
seriously contemplated the concept of the nation in the GDR would 
certainly qualify as 'intellectuals' according to definitions based on 
either occupation or education or both, the term is insufficiently 
precise and possibly misleading.
6 For a discussion of the debate see for example, Michael D. Kennedy,
'Eastern Europe’s Lessons for Critical Intellectuals,' in Intellectuals and 
Politics. Social Theory in a changing world, ed. Charles C. Lemert (Newbury 
Park, London, New Delhi, 1991), pp.110-111, note 1; L.G. Churchward, The  
Soviet Intelligensia. An essav on the Social Structure and Roles of Soviet 
Intellectuals during the 1960s (London and Boston, 1973), pp.1-14; Vladimir 
Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power. The Post-Stalinist Era 
(London and New York, 1990), pp.IX-X.
7 Robert J. Brym, Intellectuals and Politics (London, 1980), p. 12.
8 Hannelore Belitz-Demiriz and Dieter Voigt, Die Sozialstruktur der 
promovierten Intellipenz in der DDR und in der BRD 1950-1982 (Bochum,
1990), p.l; Churchward, The Soviet Intelligensia. p.6.
9 Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia.' p.3.
10 Kennedy, 'Eastern Europe's Lessons,' p.99.
11 Kennedy, p.99.
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Other possible terms were 'strategists,' though this was felt to 
imply participation in an overall plan and therefore not entirely
O
appropriate, 'ideologues,' and 'academ icians,'12 the latter being 
reasonably fitting but rather unusual. In the end, it was decided 
that 'theorists’ was the most appropriate term ,13 because it best 
encapsulated their function in the East German system, though 
admittedly it is not ideal, particularly in the case of historians. 
Since the 'theorists' were by occupation scholars and academics, 
these terms are also used in the thesis where appropriate.
a) Scholarship under Marxist-Leninist Regimes
In order to be able to assess the influence of theoretical work on 
the Party line, it is necessary to understand the role of scholarship 
as perceived by ruling Marxist-Leninist parties. Although we are 
only concerned with the GDR, and with the subject area of the 
nation in particular, the situation was similar for all scholars, from 
natural scientists to historians and artists, and in all the states of 
the Soviet Bloc. Consequently we will take a brief look at the role 
of scholars, particularly in the Soviet Union, which served as a 
model for its satellites, and about which the most information is 
available.
According to Marxism-Leninism, the dominant ideology in any 
society inevitably influences scholarship, with the result that it 
serves the ruling class in that society. Where the dominant 
ideology is Marxism-Leninism, such influence is regarded as 
perfectly acceptable, even to be encouraged, because in theory, 
scholarship then serves the interests of the working class, though 
in practice, it serves the party claiming to represent them. 
Therefore, the claim that Marxist-Leninist scholarship is objective 
does not mean non-partisan, but socially just, according to class-
12 The term used by Alexander Vucinich, The Soviet Academy of Sciences 
(Stanford, 1956), and by Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia.
13 Also the term used by Max Weinreich to mean 'those who supplied the 
academic formulae and scholarly backing,1 in Hitler's Professors. The Part 
of Scholarship in Germany's Crimes against the Jewish People (New York, 
1946), pp.239-240.
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based criteria. According to Stalin, in socialist societies, scholars 
and intellectuals were not a separate class, but merely a social 
stratum, drawn from the people to serve the people.14 He added 
that although the ’old,’ pre-revolutionary intelligentsia should be 
distrusted and challenged, because it had served landlords and 
capitalists, the ’new’ intelligentsia was to be respected and 
assisted in the interest of the working class.15
In contrast, where the dom inant ideology is capitalism , 
scholarship apparently serves a very different ruling class, 
namely big business and the owners of the means of production, 
therefore in such societies, ideological bias in scholarship should 
be condemned.
Ruling Communist parties in the Eastern Bloc quickly recognised 
the potential usefulness of loyal academics and intellectuals, 
particularly economists and those involved in military projects,16 
both to help modernise society and to gain international prestige 
for the state. Therefore, scholarship was an important form of 
propaganda, providing a vast quantity of material of a higher 
quality than Party apparatchiks could produce themselves. Social 
scientists in particular were required to give 'scholarly publicity' 
to whatever the leadership wanted publicised.17 However, they 
could also pose a threat to the regime if they actively opposed it. 
Consequently, all kinds of intellectuals were encouraged to 
become members of their respective communist parties, to reduce 
the chances of this happening.18 Rigid academic structures with 
built-in control mechanisms were created, which brought rewards 
for those who conformed and disadvantages for those who did not.
14 Joseph Stalin, 'The Old and the New Intellegensia,' in The Intellectuals 
ed. George B. de Huszar (Illinois, 1960), p.407; Churchward, The Soviet 
In te llegen sia . p.3. On the relationship between the working class and the 
intellegensia, see Gunther Erbe, Arheiterklasse und Intelligenz in der DDR 
(Opladen, 1982).
15 Stalin, 'The Old and the New,' p.409.
16 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, p.9.
17 Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.44.
18 Kennedy, 'Eastern Europe's Lessons,' p.99.
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In order to be able to make a living as an academic of any 
discipline, individuals either had to be university lecturers or 
m em bers of exclusive sta te-con tro lled  academ ies, which 
monopolised resources for research - not that the situation is so 
different in capitalist societies today. It is im portant to 
comprehend the way in which academic life was institutionalised 
in states such as the GDR, in order to understand the tasks and 
constraints facing those who tackled the problem of the nation.
USSR
The A Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union was the prototype 
for numerous smaller institutes and equivalent institutions in 
Moscow’s satellite states, including the Academy of Sciences and
Academy for Social Sciences of the GDR, where the individuals 
responsible for the most significant material on the concept of the 
nation in the GDR studied and worked. The Soviet Academy
served as a model for their internal organisation, <a»d—was 
recognised—as—the—supreme—authority—on—ideological—m atters,19 
hence it warrants closer attention. According to Alexander 
Vucinich, 'To understand the dynamics of this institution is to
understand the interplay of the political, social and cultural forces 
that have shaped the realities of Soviet science.'20 (Here 'science' 
included all academic disciplines.) The Academy's 'basic social 
function' was 'to safeguard the unity o f  science and ideology/21 It 
was ultimately answerable to the Council of Ministers and like any 
industry, what it was required to produce was laid down in a
central plan. In short, 'the academy was intended to serve not as 
a forum for the free exchange of scholarly ideas, but as a
government agency  It is therefore clear that the Academy, with
its institutionalised Party guidance, government authority and 
fictitious self-government, is a typical Soviet institution. It is also 
clear that science in the Soviet Union is actually "Party science" - 
as, indeed, it is frequently referred to in communist literature.'22
19 Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.74.
20 Alexander Vucinich, Empire of Knowledge. The Academy o f Sciences of 
the USSR 1917-1970 (Berkeley and London, 1984), p.IX. Here the term 
’science' includes social sciences, humanities etc.
21 Vucinich, Em pire, p .l, my italics.
22 Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.35. Here Vucinich gives a detailed 
account of the structure of the Academy.
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The Academy and its East European counterparts were a valuable 
resource for the Party leadership, but various mechanisms 
ensured that the solutions and theories produced were those 
acceptable to the party. They included strict criteria for 
membership, Party representatives in the administration, control 
of resources, actual or threatened censorship, and perks or 
punishments for members, depending on their performance. Such 
academies were not teaching institutions like the universities, 
though they did award doctorates and were intended to train an 
academic elite whose expertise could then be harnessed to 
provide the Party leadership with scholarly arguments in all 
subject areas.
Demonstrations of political loyalty were vital for a successful 
academic career and social advancement.23 Party membership 
alone, though obligatory, was not sufficient. Instead it was 
necessary for candidates to have participated more actively, for 
example, by holding office in a Party organisation. Unfortunately 
this inevitably resulted in nomenclatura appointments, i.e. people 
accepted more due to their political track record than their 
academ ic achievem ents.24 However, it should not be assumed 
that all were reluctant Party members. Indeed, many were 
convinced communists, though they may have hoped to make the 
system function better.
For scholars who were accepted by the prestigious state-run 
academies, there were numerous privileges, primarily in terms of 
financial and material resources for research, but also prestige, a 
comfortable lifestyle and opportunities to travel. Presumably 
self-interest and a desire to climb the academic career ladder 
persuaded the majority to conform. A small proportion may have 
hoped to gain influence and get closer to the decision-makers, in 
order to create a better GDR or Soviet Union, etc., but in order to 
do so, they had to abide by the rules, which inevitably encouraged 
conservatism .
23 See Belitz-Demiriz and Voigt, Die Sozialstruktur. pp.466-473.
24 Vucinich, Empire o f Knowledge, p.364.
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However, the disadvantages of being a member of the academic
elite were also considerable. All areas of academic life were 
regulated at the highest level,25 an indication of the importance 
attached to it. Members of the Academies were subject to 
numerous control mechanisms, designed to ensure that their work 
was ideologically acceptable and in no way contradicted the most 
recent declarations from the Party leadership. Middle-ranking 
functionaries tended to enforce these control mechanisms
particularly rigidly, in order to gain the approval of their own 
bosses.26
The advisory role of academics consisted less of helping the
leadership reach decisions, and more of providing scholarly 
arguments to support what had already been decided. If expert
opinions did not suit the leadership, they could always be 
replaced by others which did.27 Challenging an opinion from on 
high, however absurd, was not advisable, and it was important to 
keep up to date with current Party thinking on a subject, in order 
to avoid accidently contradicting it as a result of a sudden change 
in the Party 's position .28 The fact that central planners 
determined which subjects needed to be researched and which 
should take priority over others29 and allocated resources
accordingly made it difficult for scholars to undertake
research in areas the leadership considered insignificant or which 
it preferred not to know about. Furthermore, the general
reluctance of all communist regimes to hear bad news and to 
acknowledge that problems existed often made it difficult for
academics to propose solutions that might actually help solve
those problems. Finally, because the demands of the Party were 
time-consuming, scholars were left with little time to devote to 
projects of their own.30
25 Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia. pp. 130-134.
26 A view supported by several East German theorists and Shlapentokh, 
Soviet Intellectuals, p.22.
27 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, p.21.
28 See Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.68.
29 See Vucinich, pp.35-36.
30 Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia. pp. 130-134.
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While controversial issues could be debated within institutions, 
there was a great difference between what could be discussed and 
what could be published,31 and there was always a danger that 
dissident views would be conveyed to the authorities. Since 
appointments had to be approved by the Party, there was 
considerable pressure to conform , and overtly  po litica l 
appointments no doubt caused resentment among those who took 
their work more seriously.
As mentioned earlier, those in the GDR concerned with the concept 
of the nation included philosophers, historians and social scientists 
- disciplines which for ideological reasons, were subject to 
particular restrictions under communism, more so than natural 
sciences, resulting in excessive caution and conservatism.32 The 
social sciences in particular were considered to be 'ideological' or 
'class' sciences, because 'they reflect, embody and paraphrase the 
social myths of the dominant social class.'33 According to one 
official Soviet writer, 'The work of our scholars - economists, 
philosophers, jurists - must clearly reveal the advantages of the 
socialist state and the socialist social system, depict the greatness 
of our culture and the remarkable qualities of our people, their 
love for work, fortitude, resourcefulness and heroism .’34 
However, the reality in most Eastern Bloc states was somewhat 
different: 'Economists could not plan and manage factories on the 
basis of false and incomplete statistics.... Writers were supposed to 
describe realistically non-existent socialism and celebrate an anti­
social system.... Philosophers, instead of dialectical materialism, 
were obliged to handle subjective and idealistic Party dogmas and 
find proper sounding formulae for nonsense.' Therefore, at the
31 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993; interview with Jurgen 
Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
32 Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p. 119; Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals.
p.6.
33 Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.66.
34 According to A.V. Topchiev, cited in Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.67.
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end of the day, a choice had to be made between truth and reality 
on the one hand, and cynicism and power on the other.35
Similarly, historiography was not considered to be ideologically 
neutral, but part of the ideological struggle between materialism 
and idealism, and between scientific and unscientific thought, 
therefore it was right for historians to take sides.36 In practice, 
however, 'Historians felt lost in the labyrinth of constantly 
changing Party lines about the past and present,'37 and as a result 
risked contradicting the official line quite by accident, which could 
earn an individual the damning label of 'revisionist' or 'bourgeois,' 
which would have disastrous consequences for their career. In 
short, historiography in communist states was also a 'political' or
'social' science, because it was not only supposed to record, but 
also to mould society, and as a consequence, had an important 
propaganda function.38
What effect did this system of constraints and rewards have on
scholarship in the former Soviet Bloc in practice? Firstly, its effect
on the daily lives of individual scholars was to create a climate of
sfear that conditioned them to practice self-censorship, in order to 
ensure work would be published. This led them to practice
'Ketman.' 'Ketman' has been defined as 'a political strategy of
dualism, whereby individuals avow in public what the powerful 
want to hear, while in private maintaining a different, more 
genuine, perhaps creative, intellectual life.'39 Particularly in the 
GDR, the Party's control mechanisms functioned very successfully, 
resulting in a high level of conformity. As a result, it could be said 
that, 'While the intellectual was guarantied prominence in the new 
(post-war) order, and the prospects of becoming a full time 
intellectual improved, the distinction of the intellectual was
35 Peter Hruby, Fools and Heroes: The Changing role of Communist
Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia (Oxford, 1980), pp.232-233.
36 Andreas Dorpalen, German History in a Marxist Perspective (Detroit, 
1985), p.46. On the role of the Marxist historian as both scholar and 
propagandist see pp.46-61.
37 Hruby, Fools and Heroes, p.232.
38 Dorpalen, German History, p.59.
39 Kennedy, 'Eastern Europe's Lessons,' p.99. See also Shlapentokh, S ov ie t  
In tellectua ls, pp.80-84.
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u n derm ined .'40 By accepting the life of an intellectual as defined 
by the Party, they more or less sold their souls to it, and in effect,
ceased to be true intellectuals at all. However, before accusing
scholars of collaboration and cowardice, it should be remembered 
that those who were determined to have an academic career did
not have very much choice, in view of the Party's control of
appointments and resources, though as in any society, some 
curried favour with the authorities in return for rewards, while 
others did the minimum necessary for a quiet life.
Secondly, the nature of the academic system had a serious effect
on the fruits of their labours. Scholars always had to ensure that 
their work displayed sufficient par t i inos t , or in the East German 
case, Parteil ichkeit , in other words, Party bias. Indeed, it could be 
argued that Soviet and East European science in all its forms was 
hardly science at all, if what was meant by the term was objective 
research .41 The unfortunate result was the suppression of radical 
views, the perpetuation of mistakes and untruths, and serious 
limitations on the ability of academics to facilitate changes for the 
better. Vladimir Shlapentokh sums up the situation thus:
In a centralised society, where the political elite
commands resources and where private support for 
intellectual activity assumes only very limited and 
illegal forms, intellectuals must co-operate with [the 
state] and accept the roles imposed on them by the 
state. That is, they are required to serve the political 
elite as makers of weapons, as ideologues, and as 
promoters of national prestige as m usicians and 
artists. Those who accept these roles are handsomely 
rewarded by the authorities; those who do not face
direct coercive means, which the state willingly uses 
against them. These two factors contribute to the 
readiness of intellectuals to collaborate with the state
and to accept the resulting privileges.42
40 Kennedy, ’Eastern Europe's Lessons,' p.98.
41 See Vucinich, The Soviet Academy, p.45.
42 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, p.4.
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In other words, they would have been unwise to bite the hand 
that fed them. At the end of the day, scholars belonged not to the 
rulers but to the ruled in com munist societies, and the 
relationship between the Party apparatus and academics was not 
an equal one. Even so, it was still a two-way relationship, and 
even the most authoritarian regimes relied on loyal scholars to 
help them achieve their goals. In spite of the constraints, those 
academics who maximised their opportunities, and who knew how 
best to exploit the system, were sometimes able to influence Party 
policy, or at least improve or modify it, providing the Party 
leadership could see how it might benefit from the work. Several 
channels of influence existed, for example, through active Party 
membership, participation in public meetings and debates at 
institutions and via their advisory role.43 Their ability to do so 
was determined by their status, their political credentials, and the 
level of the Party apparatus they were hoping to influence.44 In 
short, academics in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
did make a valid contribution. Simply to regard them as 
insignificant would be to ignore the importance attached to them 
by their leaders, highlighted by the efforts made to control them.
b) East German Theorists
In the GDR, detailed theoretical work on the concept of the nation 
was dominated by a very small number of individuals, who were 
all prominent members of the Party’s top academic institutions, in 
particular, the Academy for Social Sciences (Akademie fu r  
Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED or AfG)t or the 
Academy of Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR o r 
A d W ,  until 1970, known as the Deutsche  Akademie der  
W isse n s c h a f t e n ) .  Like their Soviet counterparts, the primary 
purpose of these institutions was not to encourage independent 
thought, but to serve the needs of the Party, especially by 
providing the arguments that members of the leading elite were
43 See Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia. pp. 122-123.
44 Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia. p.111. Churchward does rather 
underestimate the inequality in the relationship between the Party and its 
sch o lars.
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not capable of formulating themselves, to add credibility to 
policies.
All academic institutions in the GDR were controlled by the 
Department of Sciences, and were ultimately the responsibility of 
Kurt Hager, the State Secretary for ideology and culture from 
1955 until 1989. However, members were unlikely to encounter 
him personally, for between them stood the head of the 
Department of Sciences (A b te i lungs le i te r ), Hannes Hornig. All 
heads of departments had the power to ensure that material 
never landed on the desk of their boss in the Politburo. They 
were generally reluctant to pass on bad news, because the State 
secretary concerned would then have to admit to the rest of the 
Politburo that there was a problem in his area of responsibility, 
which would make the others ask why he had allowed such a 
thing to happen. Naturally the Politburo member concerned 
would then blame the head of department, hence it was easier for 
the latter not to pass on unwelcome information in the first 
place.45
The Academy for Social Sciences (AfG) was attached to the Central 
Committee and its director from 1962 until 1989 was Otto 
Reinhold, who was himself a member of the Central Committee, 
and had the unenviable task of serving the interests of both 
scholarship and the Department of Sciences. While he did 
apparently attempt to improve the image and independence of 
the AfG,46 like everyone else, he was constrained by the fear of 
antagonising his superiors that was so typical in the GDR.
According to the authoritative West German DDR Handbuch , the 
AfG’s most important activities were the provision of theoretical 
justifications for the SED's policies, the implementation of the 
Central Research Plan for the Social Sciences, the education of the 
nomenclatura, especially the younger generation, cooperation with 
the AfG of the Soviet Union, and the production of propaganda and 
other publications, including textbooks for students and teachers.
45 According to Helmut Meier, interview, Berlin, 28 May 1993.
46 According to Alfred Kosing, interview, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
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Members, who included sociologists, philosophers, and historians, 
were required to 'achieve sound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, 
a good all-round education, and deep-rooted knowledge in a 
specialist area; to grasp the strategy and tactics of the Party 
scientifically; and to increase their willingness to realise the 
policies of the Party with all their personal strength and ability.'47 
The AfG had an impressive library where its members had 
privileged access to many leading western social science journals.
The selection of potential members was highly political and the 
final decision rested with the Department of Sciences and the 
personnel department of the central Party machinery. In addition 
to the necessary academic qualifications, candidates had to be 
Party members of at least five years’ standing and have held 
positions of responsibility.
Historians at the Academy of Sciences (AdW) were affected by 
changes in the Party line on the nation, since they could hardly 
ignore the issue when writing the history of the state. With 
24,000 staff, 18,000 of whom were directly involved in 
re se a rc h ,48 the AdW was the largest research institution in the 
GDR, though only a tiny elite achieved the status of fellow or 
associated fellow, and naturally not for their academic brilliance 
alone.49 The AdW was answerable to the Council of Ministers, and 
sub-divided into institutes, covering a very broad range of subject 
a re a s ,50 but functioned in a similar way to the AfG, hence its 
members were subject to the same constraints.
47 Hartmut Zimmermann, ed., DDR -H andbuch. 3rd ed. (Cologne, 1985), 
pp.34-36.
48 Birgit Gebhardt, 'Reform, Evaluation, Abwicklung. GDR Science in the 
process o f unification: the example of the Academy of Sciences,' in S tudies  
in GDR Culture and Society 11/12, eds. Margy Gerber and Roger Woods 
(Lanham/London, 1993), p.212. See also Zimmermann, ed., DDR Handbuch. 
pp.31-33.
49 In 1981, there were 153 fellows and 76 visiting fellows. Zimmermann, 
ed., DDR Handbuch. p.32. It is worth noting that the most prominent 
theorist on the concept of the nation in the GDR, Prof. Alfred Kosing was 
one of the few who achieved the position of fellow of the AdW.
50 See Zimmermann, ed., DDR Handbuch. pp.32-33.
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The importance of history as an ideological weapon in the GDR was 
illustrated by the relatively large size of the Institute for History 
at the AdW, and there was also a history section at the AfG. As 
was the case with other disciplines, research was highly 
centralised to ensure it was in keeping with the political and social 
needs of the state.51 Paraphrasing M arx, East German 
functionaries reminded historians that their task was not merely 
to interpret the world, but to change it.52 They were to develop a 
version of history that was truly ’national' in the sense that the 
working class was accorded its due place in history, as opposed to 
the traditional approach, which concentrated on the actions of a 
tiny elite, such as wars and diplomacy,53 and also to show how 
capitalist elites were the true enemies of the nation. Particularly 
from the late-1970s, their services were deemed very useful by 
the SED leadership in its campaign to legitimise the state, hence 
top historians were rewarded for their loyalty with elite 
priv ileges.54
As was the case for their Soviet counterparts, East German 
scholars were constantly under pressure not to 'rock the boat' if 
they wanted to climb the academic career ladder and a quiet life. 
It was not the case that the privileges of seniority were 
particularly significant - though trips abroad were welcome, a 
salary increase was hardly a cause for celebration in a country 
with little to spend money on. It was more due to the fact that 
the penalties for non-conformism were high - ranging from 
harassment, unsuccessful visa applications, lack of research 
funding and d ifficu lties in getting work published, to 
discrimination against one’s children, for example, in their choice 
of career. Even though the full extent of surveillance in the GDR 
was not known until after the collapse of the state, they were 
aware that opinions that were out-of-step with the Party line 
would be reported, hence self-censorship was inevitable. As a
51 Dorpalen, German History, pp.49-51.
52 Ernst Engelberg, 'Uber Gegenstand und Ziel,1 cited in Dorpalen, p.54.
53 Dorpalen, p.52.
54 G. Iggers, Marxist Historiography in Transformation. New Orientations 
in recent East German History, trans. Bruce Little (New York and Oxford,
1991), p.8.
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result of these collaborative acts, leading East German academics 
find them selves permanently unemployed in post-unification 
Germany.
In retrospect, the leading theorists on the nation in the GDR claim 
that the difference between their work and m aterial that 
originated directly from the Party leadership was that their 
arguments were well thought out and theoretically justified,
whereas official statements tended to be brief and motivated by 
expediency, with scant regard for the consequences. Even so, they 
were obliged to include familiar quotes from speeches by the First 
S e c re ta ry ,55 which somewhat blurred the distinction between 
Party material and works of scholarship. Though by no means
dissidents, they now claim to have wanted a better GDR - a GDR
which was accepted by its citizens and respected by the 
international community.56 They claim to have been horrified by 
some of the crazier pronouncements on the nation from the
leadership, which played into the hands of the Federal Republic, 
made the GDR a laughing stock on the international stage, and 
confused and alienated the population.
In view of the constraints of the system, their main problem was
how to influence the leadership and how to propagate their ideas.
Obviously this was true for all scholars, but all the more so
because the national question had such important implications for
the status of the GDR. The need for extreme caution, and the risks
involved, discouraged individuals from tackling it. To suggest that
the population did not share the Party line on any topic was
particularly risky because it would be interpreted as criticism of
those responsible for agitation and propaganda.57 Thus self-s
censorship was not only practiced to avoid trouble, but also to 
ensure that the results of academic research did not simply 
disappear into a Giftschrank (literally ’poison cupboard,' where 
’dangerous’ material was stored), due to excessive cautiousness on 
the part of a middle-ranking functionary, but did at least reach
55 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
56 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993; interview 
with Walter Schmidt, Berlin, 3 June 1993.
57 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
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the desk of whoever had commissioned it or who might take
notice of it within higher echelons of power.58
In spite of the constraints, East German theorists who tackled the 
concept of the nation did have some room to manoeuvre, 
providing they obeyed the rules, for example, by producing 
standard text books, including the obligatory quotes, and by
phrasing their ideas carefully so as not to appear to criticise the 
leadership. Instead criticism had to be directed towards the 
Federal Republic. They could in itiate projects them selves, 
providing they conformed to the needs and interests of the 
leadership, but resources were very scarce for topics that were
considered either taboo or simply irrelevant, which made research 
almost impossible. To suggest that the Party was wrong to let a 
topic drop would count as criticism of the leadership and give an 
individual a reputation for being a trouble-maker, hence it was 
not advisable. Even so, historians in particular have been 
criticised for not using opportunities to express themselves more
fre e ly .59 Today they claim that there was a radical or critical 
message to their work if one read between the lines,60 though it 
was usually so well hidden that no one outside their immediate 
circle of colleagues would be aware of it.
However, while the activities of the academies were controlled by 
the SED, it will become apparent from this thesis that the Party 
was considerably reliant on them to make up for the intellectual 
short-comings of the leading elite, especially when it was 
necessary to justify a dramatic or incomprehensible change in 
policy. It was often the case that theorists were given the task of 
filling in the details after a declaration of a change in the official 
line. However, there is evidence to suggest that they did have 
some influence, especially from the mid-1970s, when the Party 
line was m odified, and their usefulness was increasingly 
recognised by the leadership in the 1980s.
58 According to Helmut Meier, interview, Berlin, 5 May 1993.
59 Iggers, Marxist Historiography, p.9.
60 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
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In short, theorists who elaborated on the concept of the nation in 
the GDR had to perform a delicate juggling act between four 
factors which all had to be taken into account. Firstly, the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism on the subject and ideas coming 
from the Soviet Union; secondly, the uniqueness of the East 
German situation, arising from the origins of the state; thirdly, the 
most recent expression of opinion on the subject from the Party
leadership; and finally, their own personal convictions. Thus, in
the circumstances, it is hardy surprising that the results often 
sounded contrived.
Four individuals played a particularly significant role in the 
formulation of theory concerning the nation in the GDR, all of 
whom have been interviewed by the author. All held senior 
academic positions at top Party institutions, not only due to their 
academ ic achievem ents, but also their fu lfilm ent of the 
requirem ents of the Party. F irstly  and most im portantly, 
Professor Alfred Kosing (born 1928), was a philosopher and a 
Party member since the late 1940s. Kosing achieved prominence 
in the fields of epistemology and historical materialism, though 
inevitably much of his early work was closer to propaganda than 
scholarship. He took up the subject of the nation more or less by 
accident, when he was required to rewrite a section on the nation 
in an elementary philosophy text-book. His work on the subject 
from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s established him as the 
leading theorist on the nation in the GDR, in particular, his book
’The Nation Past and Present,’61 published in 1976, (which he
claims was written to clear up misconceptions arising from 
changes in the official line62), which became the definitive work 
on the subject. Through a combination of academic ability and 
services to the Party, Kosing joined the elite group of fellows of 
the Academy of Sciences during the 1970s, and won the 
prestigious National Prize of the GDR in 1975. In the 1980s, he 
achieved the prestigious position of director of research at the 
AfG’s Institute for Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. He was also on
61 Alfred Kosing, Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart (East Berlin, 1976).
62 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 11 February 1993.
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the editorial board of the journal Deutsche Zeitschrif t  fixr 
Philosophie.
Secondly, Professor Walter Schmidt, (born 1930), was a historian, 
who eventually became a fellow of the Academy of Sciences in the 
1980s and director of its prestigious Institute for Historical 
Research from 1984. A Party member since 1952, Schmidt played 
a leading role in debates on the historical roots of the nation and 
the effects of the political division of Germany on it. He 
collaborated with others including Kosing, and also won the 
National Prize. In the 1980s, he benefited from the regime’s 
sudden interest in German history, and co-edited an important 
collection, 'Heritage and Tradition in the GDR' with Professor 
Helmut Meier in 1988.63 The latter, also a historian, rose to 
become a deputy director of the Institute for the History of the 
German Workers' Movement at the AfG. From 1969 till 1984, he 
was responsible for research into historic consciousness as a 
component of national consciousness in the GDR and published 
widely on the subject.
Finally, Dr Jurgen Hofmann, (born 1943), was also originally a 
historian, and a protege of Kosing and Schmidt, who supervised 
his dissertation on the concept of the nation in the early 1980s.64 
He also became a deputy director of the Institute for the History 
of the German Workers' Movement at the AfG, and published 
many articles on the nation, culminating in a book 'A New 
Germany it will be,'65 only published in 1989, and the first major 
work since Kosing's book in 1976. He pursued the subject of the 
nation with much enthusiasm and set up a new interdisciplinary 
academic council for research into the subject in the late 1980s, 
and was also academic secretary of a working party to investigate 
the issue, chaired by Politburo member, Hermann Axen.
63 Walter Schmidt and Helmut Meier, eds., Erbe und Tradition in der DDR. 
Die Diskussion der Historiker (East Berlin, 1988).
64 Jurgen Hofmann, 'Studien zur Entwicklung der sozialistischen  
deutschen Nation und zur Nationspolitik der SED' (Doctoral thesis, IfGA, East 
Berlin, 1983).
65 Jurgen Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland soli es sein (East Berlin, 1989).
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S') METHOD
In order to answer the questions raised earlier, a wide range of 
sources has been consulted, including Party documents, archive 
material, personal interviews and published work, in order to 
facilitate a thorough investigation of all the possible influences on 
policy regarding the nation, both political and theoretical. It is 
perhaps also worth mentioning that the author is inevitably 
w riting from a non-German perspective, which may have 
influenced the result, though possibly for the better, since she 
does not have any emotional involvement with the topic or West 
German preconceptions regarding the German nation.
a") Party Material
Before describing the Party sources used, it is necessary to 
identify the key actors at the political level. As was the case in 
the Soviet Union,66 power was in the hands of a very small elite in 
the GDR, hence those who influenced policy in any area were few 
in number and the official line on the nation was no exception. 
Indeed, being a philosophical matter, it was of little interest to 
most leading functionaries, who were more concerned with the 
practicalities of 'building socialism.' At the very top was the First 
or General Secretary, whose authority was unquestionable and 
who was answerable only to the occupant of the Kremlin. His 
pronouncements on the state of the nation formed the basis of 
party policy at any given time, though neither Ulbricht nor 
Honecker was sufficiently interested or intellectual to go beyond a 
superficial treatment of the subject. Consequently, this task was 
left to the Department of Sciences (Abteilung Wissenschaften), and 
in particular, to the State Secretary for ideology and culture, Kurt 
Hager. Hager (born 1912) had a reputation for being relatively 
bright and open-minded compared to other Politburo members.67 
However, he seemed to lack the courage to challenge Honecker's 
views, even though he must have recognised that they were
66 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, p.21.
67 According to Helmut Meier, interview, Berlin, 28 May 1993, and Alfred 
Kosing, interview, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
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reckless and unsubstantiated, and towards the end of the GDR's 
existence, his mind began to show the effects of old age.
Nevertheless, due to the fact that he and his department were
ultimately responsible for ideology and set the academic agenda,
they played a significant role in the creation of a concept of the 
nation in the GDR.
Also involved were the Agitation and Propaganda Departments.
Even after sciences and propaganda became two separate 
departments in 1956, they continued to work closely together, one 
department responsible for the production of propaganda material 
and the other for disseminating it. Until 1978, the State Secretary 
for Agitation and Propaganda was the relatively enlightened 
Werner Lamberz, but following his premature death, he was 
succeeded by the hard-liner, Joachim Herrmann.
Other members of the leading elite seemed to judge the 
significance of a topic according to how often the First Secretary 
addressed it, which in the case of the nation, was not very often 
once Honecker had assumed power. Only two individuals paid
very much attention to the subject of their own initiative. The
first was Albert Norden, a prominent functionary and professor of 
philosophy until his death in 1985, who took a hard-line Marxist- 
Leninist approach to the subject in several books and articles 
published during the 1970s. The second was Hermann Axen, 
(born 1916), State Secretary for International Affairs from 1966 
until 1989, who also addressed the subject in the 1970s, and again
during the belated revival of official interest in the issue in the
late 1980s. His original motive seems to have been personal 
interest, followed later by a desire to carve out a niche for 
himself, particularly once Honecker had more or less taken over 
international affairs.
In order to establish the official line on the nation at any given 
time, one could start by consulting published documents such as 
the constitution and Party Programme, speeches by leading 
functionaries, the volumes of Party conference proceedings, or the 
Dokumente der SED series, which numbered 22 volumes by 1988.
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These documents and collections were published in large print-
runs by the state press, Dietz Verlag. They were cheap and 
w idely d istributed as an im portant com ponent of Party 
propaganda, and one wonders who they thought read such mind- 
numbingly dull material. Even so, they are useful reference 
works for researchers wishing to find out the Party line in a 
nutshell, and they are frequently referred to in this thesis.
However, due to the brevity of references to the nation, and 
sudden, unexplained changes in the Party’s position from one 
document or Party Conference to the next, they only reveal the 
bare bones of Party policy on the subject. Such treatment speaks 
volumes about the leadership's attitude towards the problem of
the nation, indicating a belief that it could be treated just like any 
other area of policy. Other published sources include articles 
written by leading functionaries for the Party's theoretical journal, 
E in h e i ty preparatory material for Party Conferences and Central
Committee meetings, and occasional items from the state rtm 
newspaper, Neues Deutschland.
Until 1989, only published material was available to researchers, 
hence it was impossible to establish precisely what the leadership 
meant by certain concepts, and why dramatic changes occurred. 
In order to do so, this thesis makes extensive use of the recently 
opened Central Party Archive of the SED in East Berlin, (Zentrales  
P a r te ia r c h iv  or ZPA), now incorporated into the Stiftung der 
Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO), and since 
1993, taken over by the Bundesarchiv .  By 1992-93, the majority 
of files had become accessible, and it was the intention of the 
author to examine all those of possible relevance, which was no 
easy task since the indices were extrem ely prim itive. 
Consequently, it was necessary first to identify the periods when 
the issue of the nation was likely to be on the political agenda, and 
which individuals and departments were likely to be involved. 
Inevitably a great deal of material turned out not to be relevant, 
but the main intention was to ensure that nothing significant was 
m issed.
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Admittedly such archive material has its limitations. Firstly, due 
to the total dominance of a very small elite in the decision-making 
process, very little debate took place. Secondly, meetings were 
not fully minuted, hence files do not always contain everything 
one would expect. Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, the leadership 
tended either to turn a blind eye to bad news or received a 
version already modified by junior functionaries who were afraid 
to annoy them. Nevertheless, by examining the files not only of 
the Politburo and Central Committee, but also those of several 
departments and individual members of the leading elite, the 
author has endeavoured to conduct the best possible analysis of 
the official concept of the nation in the GDR, given the material 
available. As other researchers have noted, many of the gaps in 
the m aterial can be filled if one takes into account the 
circumstances at the time and the position and intentions of the 
w riter.68 As a result, the thesis goes far deeper than was possible 
before the Central Party Archive became accessible.
The most relevant collections of files were as follows. Firstly the 
Politburo and Central Committee files. Since the collapse of the 
GDR, several members have admitted that the Politburo had long 
ceased to be a forum of debate on policy.69 According to one 
insider, ’With this form of decision-making, democratic elements 
and genuine debate with experts were practically non-existent. 
The opinion of the General Secretary and his close circle decided 
ev e ry th in g .’70 Even so, the Politburo files include much useful 
preparatory material, for example, on the subject of relations with 
Bonn, especially concerning the negotiation of the Basic Treaty, 
and Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic, and also in
68 Stefan Wolle, *Im Labyrinth der Akten. Die archivalische 
Hinterlassenschaft des SED-Staats,' in Deutschland - eine Nation - Doppelte 
G eschichte. ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Cologne, 1993), p.262. Wolle quite 
rightly points out that the more important a decision, and the higher the 
decision-making body involved, the briefer the records, and that in spite of 
kilometers o f files which record trivia, many questions remain 
unanswered, (pp.259-260).
69 As testified by Egon Krenz and Gunther Schabowski. See Krenz, W enn  
Mauem Fallen (Vienna, 1991); Schabowski, Das Politburo. Ende eines 
Mvthos. Eine Befragung (Hamburg, 1990).
70 Manfred Uschner, Die zweite Etage. Funktionsweise eines 
M achtapparates (Berlin, 1993), p.73.
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preparation for each Party Conference and Central Committee 
mSeSng, including first drafts of speeches and documents. Rather 
less useful are the files of the Central Committee which soon 
became powerless to challenge the ruling elite, but the files do 
contain some unpublished reports and draft speeches.
Much more enlightening are the files from individual Politburo 
members and their departments, which include reports and 
letters which provide a more accurate picture of the situation. 
Particularly helpful were the files of Walter Ulbricht, especially 
relating to the drafting of a new constitution in 1968, and 
Hermann Axen, in connection with the belated investigation into 
the nation and national consciousness in the GDR which began in 
the late 1980s. The files from Kurt Hager's office and of the 
Department of Sciences are particularly relevant to this study, for 
example, on the subject of the Central Research Plan for the Social 
Sciences, on the composition of a new Party Programme, and for 
their reports on discussions at academic institutions.
Collections from the Departments of Agitation and Propaganda, the 
Agitation Commission, and from Werner Lamberz' office shed a 
considerable amount of light on the propagation of the official
concept of the nation. Particularly useful are the results of 
surveys conducted by the reputable Institute for Public Opinion 
Research. The latter, founded in 1965, was attached to the Central 
Committee, but in practice an autonomous institution. Its methods 
were sound and its findings, not surprisingly, top secret. Its
function was to monitor public opinion on a whole range of issues, 
from perceptions of German history to abortion, in order to 
identify areas where Party propaganda needed to be made more
effective. Consequently, the results were sent to the Department 
of Agitation to be analysed. During the early 1970s, a particularly 
in teresting  period for this investigation , this was the
responsibility of Hans Modrow, who later became leader of the 
GDR for the short period between the collapse of communist rule 
in 1989 and the first and only democratic election in 1990. Sadly 
the Institute for Public Opinion Research was abolished once 
Joachim Herrmann took charge of Agitation and Propaganda in
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1978, on the grounds that the Party was responsible for the 
formation of public opinion.
U nfortunately, for various reasons, it was not possible to 
interview the key actors at the political level. Many have died, 
quite recently in the case of Albert Norden and Hermann Axen. 
Others, such as Kurt Hager and former prime minister, Willi Stoph, 
have withdrawn from society and are unavailable for interviews, 
and the late Erich Honecker was in prison at the time, not that he 
would have granted an interview. It is questionable whether 
interviewing those who remain would be a useful exercise 
anyway, since they are all extremely old and naturally bitter 
about the fate of the GDR since 1989, and which mirrors their own 
fate. Attempts to contact other important actors were in vain. 
Hans Modrow, proved impossible to reach due to his commitments 
in Bonn as a member of the German Parliament. The former head 
of the Department of Sciences, Hannes Hornig, did not reply to 
requests for an interview.
However, it was possible to speak with two members of the ruling 
elite. Firstly, Alfred Neumann, (born 1909), a member of the 
Politburo from 1958 until the collapse of the GDR. With a genuine 
working-class background and only an elementary education, 
Neumann became a committed communist at an early age, which 
wrecked his chances of competing in the 1936 Olympic games in 
Berlin. He became a dedicated anti-facist and fought in the 
Spanish Civil war, and suffered several periods of imprisonment 
due to his convictions. Although close to Ulbricht and primarily 
concerned with the economy, Neumann was marginalised by 
Honecker, and never held an important ministerial post. Now in 
his 80s, he is clearly bitter about the total obliteration of the GDR 
from the map of Europe, and has had to swap his villa and 
privileged lifestyle for oblivion and a tiny flat in East Berlin.
Secondly, the author spoke with Egon Krenz, (born 1931), the 
Politburo member responsible for youth and sport since 1983. 
Krenz was Honecker’s 'crown prince,' though his period as General 
Secretary lasted only a matter of weeks and coincided with the
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collapse of the Berlin Wall and of the state itself in 1989. 
Certainly no intellectual, Krenz was not able to shed very much 
light on the topic at hand, however. Also interviewed was Dr 
M anfred Uschner, (born 1937), personal assistant to State 
Secretary Hermann Axen from 1974 until 1989, and deputy-head 
of the Central Committee's Department for International Affairs. 
Uschner was an insider and expert on GDR foreign and defence 
policy, and a member of the unique joint working party on
or
nuclear arms control composed of representatives A the SED and the 
West German SPD in the late 1980s. He was removed from his 
post in 1989 for his over enthusiasm for the policies of Mikhail 
Gorbachev.
bl Theoretical Material
In order to assess the influence of theoretical work on the official 
concept of the nation in the GDR, a good starting point was to read 
published work including journal articles and books from the 
state-run press. Numerous articles which appeared in the 
theoretical journal E in h e i t  (1946-1989) are examined in this 
thesis, but it should always be born in mind that it was strictly 
editorially controlled by the Party. Due to their fear of political 
repercussions, the editors tended to cut and alter articles before 
they appeared, which made serious scholars reluctant to write for 
the journal. Alfred Kosing thought it ironic that the editor was 
Jorg Vorholzer, since 'Holzer'  means a person who chops down 
trees, and his editorial style was apparently reminiscent of one 
who left just a skinny trunk from a flourishing leafy tree. As a 
result, contributors had to tailor their ideas to match the most 
recent statement by the leadership in order to ensure they were 
accepted for publication. For this reason, and because nolxly read 
it anyway, Kosing became reluctant to write for Einheit . 71
Other written sources include articles in the slightly less partisan 
Deutsche Zeitschrift fu r  Philosophie and the in-house journal of 
the AfG, Thematische In form at ion  und D o k u m e n ta t io n ,
71 Interviews with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 5 and 11 February 1993.
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contributions to standard reference books,72 dissertations,73 and 
papers commissioned by the SED which are to be found in the 
Party Archive. All these were subject to the general restrictions 
placed on scholarship in the GDR. As such, they form part of the 
m aterial under investigation in this thesis and cannot be 
considered to be objective work on the subject of the nation in the 
GDR. In order to go beyond their officially sanctioned work, 
extensive interviews were conducted with the leading theorists on 
the subject who have been introduced earlier. Naturally material 
gained through personal interviews should be handled with 
caution, due to its subjective nature, the difficultyA verifying 
information, and the tendency for individuals to try to justify 
their actions after the event.
c) Structure
This thesis is arranged chronologically in order to show just how 
dramatically the SED's position regarding the nation changed, and 
also to facilitate an examination of the political factors at play at 
any given time. The main body of the thesis is divided into four 
sections corresponding to four distinct phases of official policy 
regarding the nation. During each period, official statements on 
the subject of the nation provide the starting point, and there 
follows an in-depth examination of the motivation behind them, 
taking into consideration both political factors and theoretical 
influences.
Briefly, the first period, from the foundation of the GDR in 1949 
until 1966 is a relatively straightforward period when the 
leadership of the SED expressed the belief that a unitary German 
nation continued to exist, in spite of its division into two states. 
The second, from 1967 until the autumn of 1970, is a transition 
period during which time differences of opinion regarding the 
state of the nation emerged within the Party leadership. During
72 For example, various editions o f the Kleines politisches Wfirterbuch 
published by Dietz Verlag.
73 Several doctoral students were supervised by the leading theorists at 
Party institutions, hence their objectivity was limited, including Klaus-Uwe 
Koch, Wilfried Trompelt and Peter Rentsch.
35
the third period, December 1970 until 1975, the official line was 
that the unitary German nation no longer existed and a socialist 
nation was developing in the GDR. The final period, from the mid- 
1970s until the collapse of the GDR in 1989 saw a return to the 
idea of a socialist German nation in the GDR with renewed 
emphasis on its German heritage.
4) LITERATURE REVIEW
This thesis attempts to make an important contribution to existing 
literature in both German and English on the concept of the nation 
in the GDR (which is reviewed below). This is achieved in three 
ways. Firstly, instead of just quoting official statements on the 
subject of the nation, this thesis explores what lay behind stated 
policy  - pragm atism /opportunism , or genuine theore tica l 
consideration; secondly, through its extensive use of primary 
sources only made available since the collapse of the GDR, which 
enabled this author to dig beneath the surface of Party 
propaganda and thus to identify the real motives of the 
leadership; thirdly, it is the first work to offer a complete 
treatment of the problem from the establishment of the GDR in 
1949 until its remarkable collapse 40 years later, which enables 
the author to show that behind the superficial inconsistencies in 
the official line on the nation lay one constant objective, namely to 
legitimise the GDR. In addition, as the only work on the subject to 
date which acknowledges the role of theorists in the GDR, the 
thesis may also contribute to the wider debate concerning the role 
and influence of scholars on official policy in communist states.
It was not the intention of this author to examine the historical 
problem of the German nation in general, about which a great deal 
has already been written, and which has been adequately listed 
and reviewed elsew here.74 Instead, we will concentrate on
74 See for example, Reiner Koenen, Nation und NationalbewuBtsein aus der 
Sicht der SED (Bochum, 1975), p .136-137; Gebhard Schweigler, 
NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR (Diisseldorf, 1973), pp.200- 
215. On the problem of the German nation in historical context see among 
others, James, A National Identity: C.S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past 
History. Holocaust and German National Identity (Cambridge M.A., 1988);
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literature which addresses the concept of the nation in the GDR, a 
subject about which considerably less has been written, although 
it inevitably crops up in more general works about the East 
German state. In particular, Anglo-American scholars have paid 
very little attention to the subject, for reasons which remain 
unclear, though this reflects the fact that there were relatively 
few GDR specialists in total, compared with the number who 
studied either the Federal Republic or other countries in the 
Soviet Bloc. One reason may have been the general lack of 
information available until recently, which made it difficult to do 
more than just report what the SED leadership said regarding the 
nation, which was what most Western commentators did.
During the 1950s and 1960s, neither official statements from the 
SED, nor theoretical debate from within the GDR on the subject of 
the German nation attracted much attention from outside 
observers. This may have been because the issue was yet to 
become controversial in the GDR. Due to the lack of inside 
information, they could not have known that as early as 1967, the 
issue was causing unprecedented divisions within the ruling elite 
itself, and appear not to have recognised the signs that this was 
the case. However, Brandt’s Ostpolitik , and Honecker's subsequent 
denial of the unity of the German nation in 1971, following the 
removal of Ulbricht, triggered off a sudden increase in interest in 
the SED's concept of the nation among West German GDR- 
w atchers.75
Most noteworthy was the work of the eminent D D R -o lo g e , Peter- 
Christian Ludz. Like other West German commentators, he 
accepted that the leadership of the GDR was using a class-based 
definition of the nation which did not correspond to West German
Eberhard Schulz, Die Deutsche Nation in Europa. Internationale und 
historische Dimensionen (Bonn, 1982); Helmuth Plessner, Die VerspStete 
N ation (Frankfurt, 1974).
75 Articles from this period include Ilse Spittmann, 'Honecker und die 
nationale Frage,' Deutschland Archiv 5 (1972): pp. 1-2; Jens Hacker, 'Der 
Begriff der Nation aus der Sicht der DDR,' G egenwartskunde 4 (1972): 
pp.391-403; John Sturrels, 'Nationalism in the GDR,' Canadian Review of 
Studies in Nationalism 10 (1974): pp.23-37.
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in te rp re ta tions.76 To his credit, Ludz acknowledged that the SED 
used whatever meaning of words such as 'nation' and 'V olk ' best 
suited their current political objectives, though he did not 
elaborate, and noted that Ulbricht had denied the unity of the 
German nation before Honecker in 1970.77 However, the common 
claim in the early 1970s that in spite of A b g r e n z u n g , the SED's 
principal objective remained a united socialist Germany78 seems 
to have been incorrect, as highlighted by the new constitution of 
1974. Admittedly functionaries and theorists expressed the view 
that things would be different if the political situation in the 
Federal Republic changed, but the vast majority of official 
statements and documents, and the actions of the Party leadership 
suggested that the SED had recognised that their earlier hopes 
regarding reunification were now unrealistic.
One longer work by Reiner Koenen concentrated on the nation and 
national consciousness from the point of view of the SED, but the 
result was merely a tedious compendium of quotes from journals 
such as Einheit. He neglected to examine important Party 
material such as speeches and documents, and gave no political 
background or explanation for the changes in the official line. 
Although Einheit  was a Party organ, like others, the writer failed 
to distinguish between pure propaganda and more detailed 
theoretical material, or to consider the positions and motivations 
of those responsible for the material he examined. Furthermore, 
writing in 1974, he still claimed that the SED had all-German 
in te n tio n s ,79 although the evidence suggests that this was no 
longer the case, since by this stage, the Party's attention was 
firmly focused on the GDR.
76 Peter-Christian Ludz, 'Zum Begriff der Nation in der Sicht der SED - 
Wandlungen und politische Bedeutung,' Deutschland Archiv 5 (1972):
pp. 17-27; Peter-Christian Ludz, The SED's Concept of the Nation: deviations 
and political meanings,' Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 13 
(1977): pp.206-224. See also Dettmar Cramer, 'Einheitspartei und Nation,' 
Deutschland Archiv 5 (1972^: p.460.
77 Ludz, 'Zum Begriff,’ pp.20, 26.
78 For example, Ludz, 'Zum Begriff,' p.26; Cramer, 'Einheitspartei'; Dietmar 
Kreusel, Nation und Vaterland in der Militarpresse der DDR (Stuttgart- 
Degerloch, 1971).
79 Koenen, Nation, pp.8, 147.
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Rather better is a study which concentrated on the concepts of 
nationhood and fatherland portrayed in the East German military 
press, albeit only from the late 1950s until the late 1960s. Its 
author, Dietmar Kreusel, recognised that the SED was devising a 
concept of the nation to suit its political intentions, in particular, 
its D eutsch landpoli t ik ,  which at the time still aimed to achieve a 
united socialist German state, hence the SED's 'national concept' 
was part of the class struggle taking place on German soil. The 
w riter believed that the Party 's m essage was severely 
contradicted and undermined by its promotion of proletarian 
internationalism and friendship with the Soviet Union, and that it 
had little in common with the fundamental elements of Marxist- 
Leninist teaching.80
A reduction in interest in the official concept of the nation in the 
GDR by western commentators for almost a decade from the late 
1970s reflected the SED's neglect of the subject during that period. 
Instead the Party and its loyal scholars focused their attention on 
the GDR's relationship to German history, which aroused much 
interest in the West. While some writers continued to consider 
the actual effect of the long-standing division on the national 
consciousness of the population,81 analysis of the official concept 
of the nation in the GDR tended to feature only in general works 
about the German nation82 or as a chapter in basic books on the 
G D R .83 Though by no means all bad, their brevity inevitably leads 
to a somewhat superficial treatment of the subject, mainly
80 Kreusel, Nation und Vaterland. p.280.
81 For example, H. Rudolph, 'Wie sieht das Selbstverstandnis der DDR- 
Gesellschaft aus?' in Die Identitat der Deutschen. ed. Werner Weidenfeld 
(Munich and Vienna, 1983), pp. 193-209; Antonia Grunenberg, ’Die 
gespaltene Identitat,' in Die Identitat. ed. Weidenfeld, pp.210-225.
82 For example, James, A German Identity. James' two main arguments 
were firstly, the danger of an excessive focus on economics in the life of 
the nation, and secondly, the effects of Germany's place in the 
international system on her national development, (p. 10).
83 For example, Ulrich Scheuner, 'The Problem of the Nation and the GDR's 
relationship with the FRG,' in GDR Foreign Policy, -eds. E. Schulz et al. (New 
York and London, 1982), pp.39-66; Krisch, 'Official Nationalism,' pp.103-131.
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composed of familiar quotes from readily available sources, and 
sometimes featuring inaccuracies regarding who said what first.84
Since reunification, few writers have so far made use of the SED 
archive to explore the Party's positions on the nation further. An 
exception is Der Flop mit der DDR-Nation, which describes the 
transformation of the SED's policy regarding the nation between
Ok.sv&
1966 te  1971.85 Over half of the book, written by two historians 
who were themselves members of the academic establishment in
the GDR, comprises extracts from documents, and it is not clear
precisely what the authors are arguing, although the title implies 
that basically, the SED got it wrong. They pay absolutely no 
attention to the theoretical level and only examine this particular 
five year period. Much more thorough is a paper by two other 
East German scholars, entitled 'The National Question in the SED’s 
Policies at the end of the 1980s,' which is a good attempt to
explain why the SED was suddenly interested in the nation in the
late 1980s.86 One final recent work worth mentioning is 'The 
Secret W estpol i t ik  of the SED, 1960-1970: from a Pan-German 
Orientation to the Socialist Nation,’ which examines the SED's 
attempts to infiltrate and destabilise the Federal Republic in the 
1960s, during which time the Party's main objective changed from 
the form ation of a unitary (socialist) German state to 
Abgrenzung .87
Inevitably official policy regarding the nation does feature in 
general histories of the GDR, but they tend only to state the facts 
and do not advance any important theories or offer explanations. 
Consequently, most only appear where relevant in the main text 
of the thesis. For example, Sigrid Meuschel examines how the
84 Particularly noticeable in Carl Pletsch, 'The "Socialist nation o f the GDR" 
or the Asymmetry in Nation and Ideology between the two Germanies,'
Comparative Studies in Society and History 21 (1979): p.326.
86 Gerhard Naumann and Eckhard Triimpler, Der Flop mit der DDR-Nation 
1971 (Berlin, 1991).
86 Gerd-Riidiger Stephan and Daniel Kiichenmeister, 'Die nationale Frage 
in der Politik der SED am Ende der achtziger Jahre,' unpublished paper 
given to the author, Spring, 1993.
87 Jochen Staadt, Die Geheime Westpolitik der SED. 1960-1970. Von der 
gesamtdeutschen Orientierung zur sozialistischen Nation (Berlin, 1993).
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Party tried to balance A bgrenzung  from, and co-operation with, 
the other German state, and how this was translated into claims to 
legitimacy and appeals to the population by propagandists and 
a c ad e m ics .88 In a section on the SED's efforts to create an East 
German national identity, she acknowledges that it was the task of 
social scientists to conceive a theory and history for the nation 
that conformed both to accepted theories within the Eastern bloc 
and the specifics of the German situation.89 She looks in 
particular at the work of Alfred Kosing,90 but does not elaborate 
on the relationship between such individuals and the Party.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether she believes that the Party's
policy regarding the nation contributed to the legitimacy and
stability of the GDR or not, which was, after all, the central issue 
under investigation.
German reunification has not surprisingly aroused great interest 
in the state of national consciousness in the two halves of
Germany today, but we will not concern ourselves with the 
rapidly increasing amount of literature on the subject here, since 
we are only concerned with the period of the GDR's existence, and 
with the nation as a problem for the SED. Nevertheless, the events 
of 1989/90 may tell us something about the effectiveness of 
official policy regarding the nation, even without consulting 
empirical data, hence we will briefly consider this question in the 
final chapter.
5) WIDER IMPLICATIONS
The above discussion has highlighted the need for a thorough 
investigation into the motivation behind the official concept of the 
nation in the former GDR. This should not only be of interest to 
scholars of nations and nationalism. By examining the role of 
theorists in the process of policy formulation, it also serves as a 
good case study of the inter-relationship between the SED and 'its'
88 Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum 
Paradox von Stabilitat und Revolution in der DDR (Frankfurt, 1992), p.273.
89 Meuschel, L egitim ation , p.280.
90 Meuschel, pp.280-283.
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scholars in the GDR, and as such, is an important addition to
existing literature on the subject of scholarship under communist 
regimes. In particular, comparisons could be made with the 
function and degree of influence of their counterparts in the 
Soviet Union, on which the East German system was modelled. It 
is clear that it was not only the skills and knowledge of scientists 
involved in technological and military projects that were seen as
potentially beneficial by communist regimes.91 Social scientists, 
historians, etc., were also viewed as a valuable resource, providing 
they worked for the state and not against it, hence leaders sought 
to ensure that such expertise was firmly under their control.
While it must be recognised that it is difficult to assess exactly
how much influence academics had in communist states, we can 
assume that it diminished when power was in the hands of
h a rd lin e rs , and increased  during periods of re la tiv e  
lib e ra lisa tio n .92 This is born out by the Soviet example. In the 
Stalinist era, scholars were denied a role in the policy-making
process, and were merely called upon 'to provide elaborate
support for officially prescribed interpretations. Conclusions 
already established were thus to be confirmed by research.... In
short, Soviet social scientists served m ainly as official 
id e o lo g u e s . '93 Following the death of Stalin, academics and
intellectuals began to play an increasingly active and influential 
role in decision-making, though they only progressed from being 
propagandists to apologists, but were still expected to substantiate 
policies already made at higher levels.94 During the post-
Krushchev period, their influence even began to extend into 
foreign policy, due to the Kremlin's new, more pragmatic approach
91 The few examinations of the role of East German scholars in the 
establishment have tended to concentrate on the so-called 'scientific- 
technical' intelligensia. Though they had to provide what the regime 
required, at least one commentator has recognised that the leadership was
in fact reliant on the technical expertise of this group. See Erbe,
A rbeiterklasse. p.210.
92 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, p.280.
93 Richard B. Remnek, Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy. A Case 
Study o f Soviet Foreign Policy towards India (Durham, North Carolina,
1975), forward, p.IX.
94 Churchward, The Soviet Intellegensia. pp. 108-109; Remnek, S ov iet  
Scholars, p.292.
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in this area.95 In the most liberal period in the history of the 
Soviet Union - the Gorbachev era - the new approach resulted in 
the need for experts in all fields to find new solutions for old 
problems. However, during relatively liberal periods, scholarly 
activity was not encouraged simply due to benevolence on the 
part of the regime, but also because it was very much needed to 
modernise and improve the system.
In spite of the lack of periods of liberalisation in the GDR, and the 
SED’s refusal to embrace g la s n o s t  and p e r e s t r o i k a , several 
parallels are visible in the case of the concept of the nation in the 
GDR. As we shall see, political considerations, as opposed to 
existing theories initially determined policy, but like later Soviet 
leaders, the leadership of the SED eventually realised that for its 
increasingly pragmatic policies to be successful, it needed more
detailed scholarly backing to support and justify its actions. As 
one commentator concludes,
On the one hand, the political elite supports the 
intellectuals as those necessary for the implementation 
of the elite’s goals. On the other hand, the political 
elite sees the intellectuals as a group regularly in 
opposition to the current regime. The history of the 
USSR, as well as that of other socialist countries,
exhibits cyclical oscillations in the attitudes of the elite 
towards the intellectuals - from harsh repression, to 
treatment of intellectuals as allies in the process of 
modernising society. 96
In short, by putting flesh onto the bare bones of policies which 
had been decided at the highest levels, scholars did have a vital 
role to play, which should not be underestimated, in spite of the
constraints affecting their work and daily lives.
While we have concentrated on the situation in a communist state, 
it should be mentioned that political control over scholarship is 
not confined to communist systems. Though no-one would 
seriously suggest that scholars in capitalist societies face anything
9  ^ Remnek, p.VII, and p.294.
96 Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, pp.28-29.
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like the restrictions encountered by those in totalitarian states 
such as the former GDR and Soviet Union, through their control of 
financial resources, governments (and big business) are able to 
encourage types of research that they see as useful at the expense 
of others.97 The current increase in commercially or government- 
sponsored research in Britain also raises serious questions 
concerning objectivity.
Perhaps the most interesting comparisons with the position of 
scholars in the former GDR are to be made with Nazi Germany. 
Members of the SED's academies were certainly not the first 
Germans to provide scholarly arguments to support the aims of 
the ruling party. While engineers and scientists provided the 
technical know-how to implement the Final Solution, philosophers, 
historians and other theorists 'supplied Nazism with ideological 
w e a p o n s '98 in the form of scholarly arguments or 'intellectual 
rationalisations' to justify racist policies.
6) CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have attempted to give a brief introduction to 
one of the most controversial and potentially damaging problems 
facing the leadership of the GDR, namely what to do about the 
German nation. The nation was the key to the legitimacy of the 
state. Handled badly, it could completely undermine the GDR, but 
handled skillfully, it could be used to the SED's advantage. What 
was required was a convincing new Nationskonzept,  around which 
a national consciousness would develop, and a new definition of 
the national interest, politically embodied by the GDR. However, 
this was easier said than done, partly due to the dynamics of 
nations in general, and partly due to the bizarre situation on 
German soil. Even so, the SED never gave up trying to reduce the 
GDR's legitimacy deficiency by appealing to national sentiment in
97 Similar points are raised in Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals, pp.4-5.
98 Weinreich, Hitler's Professors, p.239. See also Wilhelm ROpke, 'National 
Socialism and Intellectuals,' in The Intellectuals, de Huszar, ed. pp.346-363; 
Alice Gallin, Midwives to Nazism. University Professors in Weimar 
Germ any: Michael Burleigh, Germany turns Eastwards. A study of 
Ostforschung in the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1988).
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various forms, even though this contradicted the fundamental 
principles of Marxism-Leninism.
However, even the most brilliantly conceived ’national idea,' 
enhanced by the arguments of top theorists, could not compensate 
for the absence of the other criteria which are required to 
legitimise a state, namely sound democratic credentials and a good 
economic track record. In retrospect we know that neither the 
SED's initial attempts to convince people that the GDR was the true 
representative of the entire German nation, nor the later claim 
that a new and separate nation had become established in the 
socialist German state was accepted by the majority of the 
population. The events of 1989/90 not only proved that the 
German national bond had not been entirely severed, but also that 
the Federal Republic was seen as the best representative of 
German national interests.
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CHAPTER 2; THE UNITY OF THE NATION
In order to appreciate just how much official GDR policy regarding 
the nation changed, we shall begin with a brief examination of the 
SED's original line on the state of the German nation, firstly during 
the late 1940s and 1950s, and then during the period
immediately after the construction of the Berlin Wall. Although 
this event did not mark a complete change in the official line, it
was the catalyst for increased theoretical contemplation of the
issue, once it was evident that reunification was not about to occur 
in the foreseeable future. We shall also take a brief look at the 
basis of the Party's D e u ts c h la n d p o l i t i k  which will facilitate a 
better understanding of the motivation behind the leadership's 
firm belief in the unity of the nation during the immediate post­
war period.
n  FROM THE BIRTH OF THE STATE TO THE BUILDING OF THE 
WALL
During the late 1940s and 1950s, no important speech by a 
prominent party functionary failed to stress the unity of the
German nation, and the SED's intention to preserve that unity.1 
Indeed, when the party was formed in 1946, it proclaimed itself 
to be 'the true national party of the German people,'2 and the 
word 'national' was frequently included in the names of Party and 
state institutions, for example, 'National People's Army,’ 'National 
Defence Committee,' 'National Front for a Democratic Germany ’ 
(the latter being the bloc of parties allied to the SED). 
Furtherm ore, the Party portrayed itself as the defender of 
national assets, such as culture,3 and attempted to associate both
1 For example, Walter Ulbricht, 'Die Gegenwartige Lage und die neuen 
Aufgaben der SED,1 Einheit 7 (1952): p.756; ZK der SED, 'Die Griindung der 
SED - ein historischer Sieg des Marxismus-Leninismus,' E inheit 16 (1961): 
p.351.
2 'Manifest an das deutsche Volk,’ 21 April 1946, Dokumente der SED. vol. 1, 
pp.27-28 .
3 See 'Manifest an das deutsche Volk,' pp.27-28; and Franziska Rubens, 'Die 
Nation ist nicht zu zerstdren!' Einheit 6 (1951): pp. 125-127.
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it and the GDR with historical German figures such as Goethe,4 
B eethoven5 and Schiller6 by means of lavish commemorations. It 
also claimed to be fighting to preserve the German language, 
which was apparently under attack from  ’Anglo-Am erican 
imperialists,' who were accused of attempting to create a linguistic 
divide between the two German states.7 In short, the SED was 
portrayed as a truly national party, which genuinely represented 
the national interest in the sense of the interests of the majority 
of the population, i.e. ordinary working people - not only in the 
GDR, but also in the Federal Republic, who it claimed to support in 
their 'liberation struggle' against the allied occupation forces.8 
However, in practice, this equation of German national interests
with those of the working class undermined the image of the SED 
as the Party of the entire German people on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain.
In contrast, West German politicians were portrayed as mere
agents of foreign powers, who served the interests of the latter. 
Obviously this was ironic, coming from a party which was clearly 
under the thumb of a foreign power itself. Of West German 
politicians, President Wilhelm Pieck commented, 'These people 
who call themselves Germans, but in reality no longer are, are 
agents of enemy imperialist forces.’9 Furthermore, they were 
committing 'the worst form of betrayal of the national interests of 
the German people by their support for the policies of the
Western pow ers.'10 When the Federal Republic was founded, the
Politburo declared, 'The 7th September 1949 is a day of national 
shame and will go down in the history of the German people as a
4 See 'Unsere Aufgaben in Goethe-Jahr,' Dokumente der SED. vol. 2, pp.230- 
231.
5 See Dokumente der SED. vol. 3, pp.751, 757.
6 See Dokumente der SED. vol. 5, p.224.
7 See Joanna McKay, The SED's Interpretation o f Marxist-Leninist Theory 
regarding the Nation; the Problem of Language,' in Contemporary Political 
Studies 1994. eds. Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffery Stanyer (Belfast, 1994),
pp.973-984.
8 Ulbricht, 'Die gegenwartige Lage,' p.736.
9 Wilhelm Pieck, Protokoll der 22. Tagung des Parteivorstandes der SED, 4. 
Oktober 1949. ZPA IV 2/1/72.
10 Wilhelm Pieck, Protokoll der 10. Tagung des Parteivorstandes der SED, 12- 
13. Mai 1948. ZPA IV 2/1/46.
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day of humiliating betrayal for the German nation.'11 It was the 
foundation of this 'imperialist West German state' which had made 
it necessary to found the GDR as a 'peaceful German state,'12 with 
a 'truly German government.’13
Not only were the so-called 'Anglo-American imperialists' blamed 
for the political division of Germany, they were even accused of 
trying to destroy the German nation altogether. They were cast 
in the role of the 'enemy of the German nation’ (Feindbild) ,  and 
were accused of denying West Germans the right to self- 
determination, which in effect deprived the German nation as a 
whole of that right. Consequently, it was the duty of all German 
patriots to join in the campaign for 'national salvation’ and 'the 
liberation of the nation from the clutches of imperialism,'14 led by 
the SED.
Such language sounds surprisingly nationalistic for a Marxist- 
Leninist party, especially in view of the fact that nationalism had 
acquired such a negative image due to its abuse by the Nazis. At 
first the SED took the view that 'We need not worry about 
parading our national policies because we then find ourselves in 
harmony with the masters of scientific socialism, with Marx and 
Engels, Lenin and Stalin.'15 However, it soon became usual for a 
distinction to be made between patriotism, which was encouraged, 
and nationalism, which was totally condemned. Correspondingly, 
true upholders of the unity of the nation were patriots as opposed 
to nationalists. In this way, the Party leadership aimed to take 
advantage of nationalism without appearing to do so, thus 
avoiding undesirable reminders of the Third Reich. Nationalism 
was denounced as chauvinist and aggressive, and a tool used by 
the bourgeoisie to gain the support of the masses for their own
11 Dokumente der SED. vol. 2, p.338.
12 Gerhard Kegel, 'Zur Deutschlandpolitik der beiden Deutschlands,' E inheit  
23 (1968): p.737.
13 Bericht der Kommission zur Ausarbeitung der EntschlieBung iiber die 
Nationale Front, 4 October 1949, ZPA IV 2/1/72.
14 Dokumente der SED. vol. 2, p. 180.
15 Pieck, Protokoll der 10. Tagung des Parteivorstandes der SED. ZPA IV 
2 /1 /4 6 .
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selfish interests, and to prepare them for war. This was 
apparently what the Nazis had done, taking advantage of 
Germans' typical Prussian submissiveness and deference to 
au th o rity ,16 submerging the class-consciousness of many workers 
under fascism .17 In contrast, patriotism (of the socialist variety) 
had only peaceful intentions and emphasised the need for active 
participation in the reconstruction of Germany and solidarity with 
one's fellow workers.18 The working class were described as the 
best patriots of all, because they furthered the interests of the 
nation as a whole, unlike capitalist owners and bosses who were 
driven by self-interest.19
It was also argued that unlike chauvinism or nationalism, socialist 
patriotism did not pose a threat to other nations because it was 
complemented by proletarian internationalism. Obviously there is 
a fundam ental incom patib ility  betw een patrio tism  and 
internationalism, but the link was justified with the argument that 
people should admire the positive and progressive qualities of 
other nations as well as their own (and of the Soviet Union in 
p a r t ic u la r ) .20 However, the emphasis placed on proletarian 
internationalism, and the influence of Moscow, illustrated by the 
brutal crushing of the popular uprising in East Berlin in 1953 by 
Soviet tanks,21 severely weakened the SED's national, i.e. all- 
German, credentials.
Between socialist states, proletarian internationalism  meant 
friendsh ip , m utual assistance, co-operation  and friendly  
competition and was therefore the exact opposite of nationalism
16 Walter Ulbricht, Whither Germany? (East Berlin, 1962), p. 117.
17 Stefan DOmberg, Kurze Geschichte der DDR. 1st ed. (East Berlin, 1964), 
p .39.
18 Anton Ackermann, 'Der Kampf gegen den Nationalismus,' E inheit 5 
(1950): p.492.
19 Rudi Wetzel, 'Was ist Patriotismus?' Einheit 8 (1953): p.314.
20 Wetzel, p.317.
21 For an analysis, see Amulf Baring, Der 17. Juni 1953 (Stuttgart, 1983); 
Meuschel, Legitim ation, pp.l 16-122; Dietrich Staritz, Geschichte der DDR 
1945-1985 (Frankfurt, 1985), pp.78-95. For an official East German account 
see Domberg, Kurze Geschichte. 4th ed., pp.227-241.
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and imperialist warmongering.22 It had nothing in common with 
cosmopolitanism, which apparently ’denies the love of one's home 
and fatherland. It is the ideological weapon of the current 
American world conquerors, through which they undermine the 
n a tio n a l co n sc io u sn ess  o f p e o p le s . . . . '23 P roletarian  
internationalism applied not only to socialist states, but also to 
their citizens, who were required to demonstrate solidarity with 
workers in other states before loyalty to an ethnic or cultural 
group. Above all, this meant solidarity with the proletariat in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc states, and also with progressive 
liberation movements all over the world. During the 1970s, once 
the SED had declared the national bond between the two German 
states to be broken, working-class solidarity became the only 
acceptable link between the populations of the two German states.
Together socialist patriotism  and proletarian internationalism  
were important components of socialist consciousness, though in 
practice this was constantly undermined by German national 
consciousness. In the end, the Party's failure to make patriotism 
and internationalism seem compatible reflected the fact that they 
were trying to achieve two fundamentally incompatible aims, 
namely to both reunite and revolutionise Germany.
While there was no shortage of scholarly articles regarding the 
political aspects of the national question during this period, their 
authors had not yet begun to question the theoretical unity of the 
nation. They adhered to Stalin’s definition of a nation, which 
dated back to 1913, and used it to support the official view that a 
unitary German nation continued to exist for as long as the Party 
leadership considered it desirable to do so. It stated, 'A nation is a 
stable community that has arisen historically on the basis of a 
common language, territory, economic system and psychological 
character, which is revealed in a common culture.'24 H o w ev er,
22 Committee for German Unity, GDR: 300 Questions. 300 Answers. (East 
Berlin, 1959), p.55.
23 Wetzel, 'Was ist Patriotismus?' p.313.
24 Josef Stalin, Der Marxismus und der nationale und koloniale Frage. 2nd 
ed. (East Berlin, 1952), p.327, cited in Koenen, Nation und
N ationalbew uB tsein . p. 12.
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already there appeared to be some confusion. Although Stalin had 
stated that all the above listed criteria needed to be present for a 
nation to exist, some East German commentators rejected the idea 
that Marxist-Leninist theory should be applied mechanically in 
every case,25 in order to justify the adaptation of his definition to 
fit the unique circumstances of the GDR.
There are several reasons why so little theoretical attention was
paid to the effect of political division on the German nation until 
the early 1960s. Perhaps the most obvious is that so soon after 
the war, the idea that the German nation might suddenly cease to 
exist due to the Cold War was unthinkable, and it was recognised 
that the people themselves had certainly not yet come to terms 
with the division.26 Therefore, at this stage, the 'national
question' remained a political question, that is to say, a question of
what form a new post-war German state would take, or rather, 
what type of social and economic system it would have, and what 
its position would be within an increasingly divided Europe. 
However, by the beginning of the 1960s, there was a clear
discrepancy between the SED's verbal adherence to the unity of 
the nation on the one hand, and their actions on the other. 
Furthermore, tangible differences were developing between the 
populations of the two German states due to their very different 
lifestyles and experiences. As a consequence, theorists in the GDR 
began to question both the validity of Stalin's basic definition of 
what constituted a nation in general, and the state of the German 
nation in particular.
A more likely reason for the lack of theoretical debate regarding 
the nation was the fact that the Party had no reason to encourage 
such a debate since the notion of a unitary German nation 
complemented their Deutschlandpolitik at the time, to which we 
shall now turn. Two factors played an important role here.
Firstly, since Moscow guarant^bd both the continued existence of 
the GDR and the positions and prospects of the Party leadership,
25 Rubens, 'Die Nation,' p. 124.
26 Rubens, p. 125.
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the D e u t s c h la n d p o l i t i k  of the latter had to conform to Soviet 
objectives in Europe. As a consequence, they faced not only the 
problem of how to make socialism appear compatible with 
German unity, but also how to represent German national 
interests (as they saw them), and the interests of Moscow 
simultaneously. In fact, Stalin had greeted the birth of the GDR as 
’the foundation stone for a united, democratic, peace-loving 
G erm an y ,'27 and we now know that he saw communist control of 
Eastern Germany as the first step towards a communist united 
Germany, which would provide a starting point for the spread of 
communism throughout Western Europe.
However, originally the SED was not conceived as a Leninist or 
Soviet-style Party, but a German Marxist party with a programme 
'corresponding to the interests of the German people and the 
peculiarities of the German economy, politics and culture,'28 hence 
the original intention was not to impose a replica of the Soviet 
system on Germany. Indeed, the idea of a 'specific German road 
to socialism,’ originally advocated by Anton Ackermann in 1946,29 
was supported by a large proportion of Party members. However, 
due the Yugoslav experience, from 1948, Moscow made it clear 
that there was only one road to socialism, namely the Soviet road, 
and Ackermann was forced to admit publicly that he had been 
w rong.30
Secondly, there was the 'Ulbricht factor.' Walter Ulbricht quickly 
acquired such a firm grip on power that his opinion was 
inevitably the last word on any subject. As a veteran German
communist, he saw the solution of the national question in the
27 Quoted in Gottfried Zieger, Die Haltung von SED und DDR zur Einheit 
Deutschlands 1949-1987 (Cologne, 1988), p. 13.
28 Protokoll des Vereinigungsparteitages der SPD und KPD (East Berlin, 
1946), p .12.
29 Anton Ackermann, 'Gibt es einen besonderen deutschen Weg zum 
Sozialismus?’ Einheit 1 (1946): pp.22-32. On the original nature of the SED, 
see Wolfgang Leoimrd, Child of the Revolution (London and Glasgow, 1957), 
pp.350-357. *
30 Neues Deutschland. 24 September 1948.
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socialist reorganisation of the nation,31 which had failed during 
the 1930s due to divisions within the workers' movement, hence 
the Nazis had not been prevented from gaining pow er.3 2 
However, 1945 provided a fresh start and it was vital that this
time, the workers' movement remained united. To lead a united
socialist Germany was Ulbricht's dream, hence he constantly 
stressed the need to protect German interests and to defend the 
unity of the nation. Indeed, it seems that he really did believe 
that a united socialist Germany could be created, based on his 
belief that the working class in the Federal Republic could be won 
over to the SED's socialist cause,33 and that the proletariat in both 
East and West Germany formed a national bond that could not be 
broken. Just nine months before the construction of the Berlin 
Wall, Ulbricht stated that in spite of its temporary division, the re­
establishm ent of the unity of the nation was 'historically 
inevitable,’ and described the view that two separate German 
nations could emerge as a 'false perspective.'34
However, in spite of his convictions regarding the national 
question, Ulbricht remained a pragmatist first and foremost,
resulting in contradictions between his words and deeds.
Furtherm ore, he slavishly served Soviet interests, especially 
under Stalin, seeing himself as Moscow's right-hand man in 
Germany. One could almost say that he personally embodied the 
fundamental dilemma facing the SED, namely how to convince the 
population that it could simultaneously serve the national interest 
on the one hand, and Soviet interests, under the guise of 
proletarian internationalism, on the other.
31 This idea dated back to the KPD's 'Programmatic Statement on the 
National and Social Liberation of the German People' of 1930. Interview 
with Politburo member, Alfred Neumann, Berlin 7 April 1993 and 4 May 
1993.
32 See Walter Schmidt, 'The Nation in German History,’ in The National 
Question in Europe in Historical Context, eds. Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter 
(Cambridge, 1993), pp. 165-166.
33 ZPA IV 2/1/122 (ZK, 17-19 September 1953).
34 Ulbricht to the Central Committee, December 1960, cited in Zimmermann, 
edv DDR Handbuch. 3rd ed. vol. 2, p.924.
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When the SED was formed in a forced merger of the KPD and SPD 
in the Soviet Zone, its leaders made it clear that their long-term 
objective was a united socialist Germany,35 indeed, the defeat of 
Nazism and the subsequent need for a new kind of German state 
seemed to provide the ideal opportunity for them to realise this 
dream. Four years later, the manifesto of the newly formed bloc 
of parties, the 'National Front,' contained all the main aspects of 
the regime's early Deutsch landpoli t ik :  the objective of a united, 
'democratic' Germany; adherence to the unity of the nation; the
portrayal of the GDR as the turning point for the whole of
Germany; and the western allies' responsibility for its temporary 
d iv is ion .36 The first Prime Minister of the GDR, Otto Grotewohl, 
called the foundation of the GDR 'an expression of the fact that the 
democratic forces of our people are not willing to come to terms 
with the division of our fatherland or with the enslavement of the 
western parts of it.’37 The first president, Wilhelm Pieck, 
declared, 'We will not rest until the portion of Germany which was
illegally torn off and subjected to occupation law is united with
the core of Germany, the GDR,’38 and maintained that the GDR 
would never recognise the division of Germany.39 Thus, far from 
destroying the unitary German state, the GDR was supposed to be 
'the bastion of the national liberation struggle of the German 
people against im p eria lism .'40 This was enshrined in the 
constitution of 1949, which described Germany as an indivisible, 
democratic republic, composed of Lander ,41 though this was not to 
remain the case for long.
By portraying itself as the defender of the unity of the nation, the 
SED hoped to arouse support for its own conception of a future
35 See Protokoll des Vereinigungsparteitages der SPD und KPD.
36 Programm der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, 15th 
February 1950, cited in Gebhard Diemer, ed. Kurze Chronik der deutschen 
Frage. (Munich, 1990), pp. 179-180.
37 Otto Grotewohl, 12 October 1949, quoted in Zieger, Die Haltung. p.11.
38 Wilhelm Pieck, quoted in Dieter Blumenwitz, What is Germany?
Exploring Germany's Status after World War Two (Bonn, 1989), p.36
39 Wilhelm Pieck, quoted in DDR Handbuch. 2nd ed. (Cologne, 1975), p.265.
40 Protokoll der Verhandlungen der 2. Parteikonferenz. p.32.
41 Constitution of the GDR, 7 October 1949, cited in Blumenwitz, What is 
Germany? p.125.
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united German state, that is to say, a socialist German state, and at 
first, they seemed genuinely to believe that this goal was 
attainable. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we know that 
when a choice had to be made between a unitary German state 
with a multi-party system on the one hand, and securing socialism 
on at least one part of German soil on the other, the SED chose the 
latter. Until 1952, the pursuit of socialism was played down, the 
emphasis being placed on the need for an 'anti-fascist democratic 
order.' Although the commitment of most members of the the SED 
to anti-fascism was very genuine, both the early actions of its 
leaders, and soon their words too, suggested that the 'anti-fascist 
democratic order' was just a means to an end, namely to pave the 
way to socialism ,42 albeit initially with a German face. 
Furthermore, in spite of the nationalist rhetoric, in practice, the 
Party leadership made little effort to prevent the division 
deepening, or to negotiate with the West, though naturally the 
onset of the Cold War limited the possibility of a settlement 
between the leaders of the two German states.
While the regime maintained that all the objectives of its 
D e u t s c h la n d p o l i t i k  were entirely compatible, in practice the 
pursuit of the more immediate goals within East Germany worked 
against the long-term goal of reunification. While it is possible 
that the Party leadership was simply being disingenuous 
regarding its true intentions, it seems more likely that at this 
stage, they were blinded by 'socialist idealism ' and being 
unrealistic about the level of support for their objectives.
During the 1950s, the SED's Deutschlandpolitik  was dealt three 
major blows. The first was the establishment of the Federal 
Republic in 1949, and in retaliation, the Soviet Zone was 
transformed into the German Democratic Republic, marking the 
beginning of the SED's struggle to prove that the GDR was a 
legitimate sovereign state, even the one true German state - a 
struggle they continued to fight throughout the state's forty-year 
life-span, and one which they would eventually loose. As we have
42 See the records of the Second Party Conference, September 1947, 
Dokumente der SED. vol. 1, p.230.
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already seen, this claim was based not solely on the alleged
superiority of the socialist system, but also on the state’s apparent
embodiment of the interests of the German nation.
The second blow to the SED’s all-German ambitions was 
A denauer’s w illingness to jo in  a W est European Defence
Community in 1952, which was a clear indication that the Federal
Republic was firmly anchored in the Western alliance, and that
the division of Europe, and therefore between the two German 
states, was deepening. In response, the SED declared ’building 
socialism' to be its primary concern, though the long-term goal 
rem ained German state-unity.43 Indeed, Ulbricht argued, ’The
construction of socialism in the GDR and in Berlin can only have a 
favourable effect on the struggle for a united, democratic, peace- 
loving and independent Germ any.'44 Clearly the leadership 
thought it better to build socialism in at least part of Germany, 
even if it delayed reunification, than to put the socialist system in 
the GDR at risk by trying to achieve too much too fast. Even so, in 
1954, the ever hopeful Ulbricht still maintained that,
We want German unity because the Germans in the 
western part of our homeland are our brothers, 
because we love our fatherland, because we know that 
the restoration of German unity is an unavoidable 
aspect of the logic of history and cannot be 
overturned. 45
The declaration of the primacy of 'building socialism' concurred
with the new Soviet twin-track strategy regarding Germany,
introduced in response to Adenauer's rejection of the famous 
'Stalin Note' in 1952, which was Moscow's final offer of a united,
43 Ulbricht, 'Die gegenwUrtige Lage,' p.750. See also The Grand Ideas of 
Socialism are becoming Reality in the GDR,' in Walter Ulbricht, O n 
Questions o f Socialist Construction in the GDR (Dresden, 1968). pp.202-234; 
DOmberg, Kurze Geschichte. 4th ed., p.210-227; Staritz, Geschichte der DDR, 
pp.73-77.
44 Protokoll der Verhandlungen der 2. Parteikonferenz. p.38.
4 5 Ulbricht, 4th Party Conference, March 1954, quoted in Zimmermann, ed., 
DDR Handbuch. 3rd ed., p.924
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though neutral, Germany.46 From this point, the immediate goal 
of the Kremlin was to strengthen the GDR as a means to increase 
its own influence in one part of Germany, in order to gain a 
foothold in the struggle for Germany as a whole.47 Thus the 
apparently contradictory aims of recognition of the GDR on the one 
hand, and reunification on the other, were merely the short-term 
and long-term manifestations of Moscow’s overall policy, to which 
the SED naturally had to adhere.
The third blow to the SED's hope of a united socialist Germany was 
the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO in May 1955. Shortly 
afterwards, the GDR was admitted into its communist equivalent, 
the Warsaw Pact, and a treaty was signed with the Soviet Union in 
September 1955, in which Moscow recognised the sovereignty of 
the GDR. Thus Moscow was simultaneously granting the GDR 
sovereignty, while also ensuring it would remain in the Soviet 
sphere of influence, thus placing severe limitations on that 
sovereignty. By the mid-1950s, the situation on German soil had 
developed into a microcosm of the Cold War, although the treaty 
signed with the Soviet Union still included the aim of German 
r e u n if ic a t io n .48 From this point onwards, it seems that the 
construction of socialism, and also the recognition of the GDR as a 
sovereign state took precedence over reunification, and the phrase 
'the two parts of Germany' was replaced by 'the two German 
states' in official parlance.49 Although these objectives were still 
portrayed as compatible, recognition was eventually to become 
less of a means to an end than an end in itself.
As a consequence of this shift in priorities, the SED took up 
K hrushchev's 'two state thesis,' which spoke in terms of 
confederation as opposed to reunification, and demanded the
46 For details, see Carola Stem, Ulbricht: a political Biography. (London, 
1965), pp. 182-184; Zieger, Die Haltung. pp.47-50; Motschmann, Sozialism us 
und Nation, pp.226-234.
47 Zieger, Die Haltung. p.9.
48 Diemer, Kurze Chronik. p. 187.
49 Otto Grotewohl, 26 September 1955, quoted in Ulrich Scheuner, 'The 
Problem of the nation and the GDR’s relationship with the FRG,' in G D R  
Foreign Policy, eds. Eberhard Schulz et al. (New York, London, 1982), p.50.
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preservation of the political and economic achievements of the 
G D R .50 The assumption was that if socialism was firmly 
established in the GDR, in the event of a confederation, the SED 
would be in a position to exert influence westwards until power 
was in the hands of communists across Germany. It was even said 
that reunification would only take place via step-by-step 
rapprochem ent between the two German states,51 - a whole 
decade before Willy Brandt’s administration advocated a similar 
idea to preserve the German national bond. In fact, towards the 
end of the 1950s, the SED proposed several confederation plans,52 
all of which were dismissed by the government of the Federal 
Republic. Just how genuine these proposals were is hard to judge. 
By adhering to the ultimate goal of a unified state, while 
simultaneously strengthening the GDR, the SED was keeping its 
options open.
From the late 1950s, socialism began to penetrate not just the 
economic and political spheres, but also people’s private lives. For
to
example, an ideological campaign was waged ^encourage socialist 
consciousness among the population, culminating in Ulbricht's ’Ten 
Commandments of Socialist Ethics and M orals,'53 according to 
which, correct behaviour was that which furthered socialism, and 
incorrect behaviour was that which hindered it. In addition, 
writers and artists were called upon to contribute towards 
’building socialism' by using 'art as a weapon’ and adhering to the 
principles of socialist realism. Thus the seeds of a socialist 
consciousness were being sown that would one day be advocated 
as an alternative to German national consciousness. Such changes 
indicated that the regime was not prepared to compromise on 
socialism just to help bring about reunification. The erection of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961 was the ultimate proof of this fact.
50 Khrushchev in East Berlin, June 1955. Source: Diemer, Kurze Chronik. 
p.56. For an analysis, see Jens Hacker, 'Der Rechtsstatus Deutschlands aus 
der Sicht der DDR,' Qstrecht 13. (1974): pp.133.
51 Committee for German Unity, 300 Questions, p.5.
52 See for example ZPA IV/ 2/1/220; Committee for German Unity, GDR: 300 
Questions, pp.45-48.
53 For details see Hermann Weber, Kleine Geschichte. (Cologne, 1980), p.93.
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Bearing in mind the above mentioned political factors, let us now 
return to the official line regarding the nation during this period. 
If, as the SED claimed, the GDR was the model for a future unitary 
German state, indeed, even if it was to be accepted in its own 
right, it needed to appear legitimate, both in the opinion of its 
citizens, and also of the outside world. While the leadership 
claim ed legitim acy through democracy and the anti-fascist 
credentials of the GDR, especially compared with those of the 
Federal Republic, Ulbricht's main concern was that it should ’look 
d em o cra tic .'54 In reality, the multi-party 'National Front' hardly 
concealed the SED's hegemony, hence the claim of legitimacy 
through democracy was hardly credible. Furthermore, the SED's 
economic policies failed to provide the legitim acy through 
prosperity which was to underpin the Federal Republic, especially 
in the eyes of its population. Finally, in spite of the SED's attempts 
to enhance the GDR's image by conducting diplomacy on behalf of 
the German nation, for example, by signing a treaty with Poland, 
recognising the Oder-Neisse Line as their common border,55 the 
international community remained unconvinced.
The only remaining device which could potentially legitimise the 
GDR and its regime was nationalism. The equation of 'socialist' 
with 'national,' or 'German' was viewed by the leadership as the 
solution to the problem of how make the goals of building 
socialism and German reunification compatible. This was not just 
a tactic - as stated earlier, the leadership really did hope to 
introduce socialism nationwide. Consequently, they stressed the 
continued existence of the German nation and the importance of 
patriotism. Obviously there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between socialism and nationalism, but the latter was not an end 
in itself, but a device to achieve the former on a wider scale. 
However, the middle classes were unlikely to view a communist 
party as the best representative of their interests or those of the 
nation as a whole. Furthermore, in spite of the SED's nationalist 
rhetoric, the GDR's relationship with the Soviet Union undermined
54 Stem, U lbricht. p. 100.
55 For the official justification for this, see the declaration o f the Party 
executive, 19 July 1950, Dokumente der SED. vol. 3, p.72.
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both her claim to be an independent sovereign state and to be the 
true representative of the German nation. Thus, by 1960, popular 
legitimacy was clearly lacking and people were voting with their 
feet in their thousands, regarding the Federal Republic as the true, 
or at least the best German state. The increasing permanence of 
the GDR by the late 1950s was merely a result of the deepening 
division within Europe, and its right to exist depended on the 
continuation of the Cold War, a fact proved by its subsequent fate 
once the thaw began.
2  ^THE GERMAN NATION IN THE SHADOW OF THE WALL 
a.) The Political Dimension
Until the late 1960s, official Party documents still stated that in 
spite of the political division of Germany, the German nation 
continued to exist in some form. Furthermore, it was argued that 
the GDR remained the true political representative of that nation 
because there power was (theoretically at least) in the hands of 
the working class, hence the GDR was genuinely 'national* in a 
Marxist sense. However, a change in the precise meaning of 
words such as 'nation' and 'national' can be perceived from the 
beginning of the decade, with 'national' tending to be used to 
mean 'GDR-wide' as opposed to all-German, and being increasing 
used in connection with class-based arguments. Also a tendency 
to mix Marxist-Leninist and non-Marxist concepts often renders it 
difficult for us to grasp precisely what was meant by such terms, 
and no doubt caused confusion at the time, if indeed ordinary 
people paid attention to such things. At the end of the day, the 
SED was still trying to use a concept of the nation to support 
mutually exclusive objectives, namely to cement socialism and 
gain international recognition of the GDR on the one hand, and to 
demonstrate its German credentials and achieve reunification on 
the other (albeit not unconditionally).
The main reason for this continued adherence to the notion of a 
unitary German nation was because the long-term objectives of 
the Party's Deutschlandpolitik remained essentially the same, in
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spite of the construction of the Berlin Wall. However, the Wall did 
signify a reordering of priorities, with increased emphasis on the 
need for international recognition and the further construction of 
socialism, which diminished the Party's chances of achieving its
long-term objective of reunification. Also, we can assume that a 
decade of division had affected official perceptions of what could 
realistically be achieved.
The new Party Programme of 1963 concentrated on inner 
consolidation and completing the construction of socialism, which, 
it was believed, would strengthen the SED's position in the event 
of a confederation. While the hope of a 'dem ocratic
transformation' of the Federal Republic was put to one side, the 
Party's long-term objective remained to advance 'the socialist 
revolution and reconstruction' in the GDR in order that 'socialism 
might be victorious in one part of the country, thus establishing
the basis for the future inevitable victory of socialism in all of the
co u n try .'56 The Berlin Wall was supposed to have 'positive all- 
German implications' by protecting the foundations of a future 
united Germany (i.e. the GDR) from attacks by the 'enemies of the 
nation ' (i.e. the West).57 As the Party Programme stated, 'A new 
era in the history of the German people has begun - the era of 
socialism.... The future belongs to socialism - not only in the GDR 
but throughout G erm any.’58 Even so, patience was clearly 
required. As Ulbricht himself admitted, 'If we insist on a policy of 
all or nothing right now, we will certainly end up with nothing.'59
The construction of the Wall proved that the regime was aware of 
the state's lack of popular legitimacy - after all, most states do not 
literally have to fence their citizens in to prevent mass defection. 
Reports of the views of scholars and students concerning the 
national question, which were monitored by the Department of
56 Hermann Axen, 14th session of the Central Committee, December 1961, 
quoted in Melvin Croan, 'East Germany: a lesson in survival,' Problems o f  
Communism 11 (1962): p.10.
57 Motschmann, Sozialismus und Nation, pp.244-245.
58 Programm der SED. Dokumente der SED. vol. 9, pp. 171, 174.
59 Neues Deutschland. 1 August 1963, cited in McAdams, East Germany and 
Detente. Building Authority after the Wall (Cambridge, 1985), p.59.
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Sciences and reported to Ulbricht by the State Secretary, Kurt 
Hager, revealed that scholars believed ’the measures of 13th 
August 1961 ' (i.e. the construction of the Wall), had deepened the 
division of Germany. They were worried about the future of 
'German scholarship’ if collaboration with West German academics 
were no longer possible, and stressed the indivisibility of human 
knowledge. On a more general note, they accused the Party of 
stressing the differences between the two German states while 
ignoring what they had in common.60
Such views were condemned by the Party for assuming that the 
relationship between scholars from both German states had 
nothing to do with class relationships or the ideological conflict 
between socialism and capitalism. However, it was acknowledged 
that generally, people did not accept the official explanation of 
why the Berlin W all had been necessary. In addition, 
m isunderstandings concerning 'the nature of the national 
question ' (i.e. that it was a class conflict), had been highlighted by 
a dramatic increase in the number of applications to emigrate to 
the West since the end of 1961.61
In order to remedy the situation, a legitimacy campaign was 
launched, directed towards both the population of the GDR, and 
the international com m unity, not least the W est German 
government, who still referred to it as 'the so-called GDR' or 'the 
Soviet Zone,' or at best, 'the GDR’ in bold inverted commas. The 
basis of the SED's claim that the GDR was the legitimate German 
state was that:
The socialist developments in the GDR correspond 
with all the needs of the German nation. They 
correspond with all the essential interests of the 
German people.... In all areas of politics and communal 
life, the GDR is the national and social alternative to 
the imperialism that rules West Germany.62
60 ZPA IV 2/2024/1 (Biiro Hager).
61 ZPA IV 2/2024/1
62 Programm der SED, Dokumente der SED. vol. 9, p.208-209.
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However, several factors continued to discredit these claims, 
including the obvious lack of democracy, overt Sovietisation, and 
the relatively weak economy compared with that of the Federal 
Republic. Unwilling to tackle the first two factors, and unable to 
deal with the third, the regime other ways to increase
people’s allegiance to the GDR. Although it could be argued that 
this was hardly necessary once people could no longer leave, the 
SED no doubt recognised that a sense of state-pride would 
encourage social participation and hard work, and also that it
would enhance the claim  to in te rna tiona l recogn ition . 
Consequently, the regime actively sought to make socialism seem 
more appealing and more traditionally German, earning the GDR 
the title of ’Red Prussia.'63
These efforts were accompanied by accusations that the Federal 
Republic was 'a false pretender to German nationality' because it 
was an imperialist state, while the GDR was 'the true heir to the 
th ro n e .'64 The former was apparently highly americanised and
therefore incapable of representing the interests of the German 
nation. Its leaders were portrayed as mere puppets of the 
Western allies, and the SED made good use of any evidence of
right-wing activity and revanchism, such as the rise of the neo-
fascist National Democratic Party (NPD), and the dubious war-time 
records of politicians.
An integral part of the Party's legitimacy campaign was a more 
active attempt to nurture a form of 'GDR-consciousness,' officially 
known as 'socialist national consciousness.' A 'spontaneous 
national consciousness' was considered inadequate,65 hence, like 
everything else in the GDR, 'socialist national consciousness' was 
designed according to the specifications and needs of the Party. 
Far from reflecting the actual feelings of the population, it 
concentrated on what ought to bind them together, namely 'a love
63 Welles Hangen, 'New Perspectives behind the Wall,' Foreign Affairs 45 
(1966): p .138.
64 Neues Deutschland. 19 May 1962, quoted in McAdams, East Germany, p.35.
65 Wolfgang Heise, 'Um die Zukunft der Nation,' Deutsche Zeitschrift fur 
Philosophie 9 (1961): p.1036.
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for the GDR and pride in the achievements of socialism.'66 In 
addition, it included more subjective and cultural and ethnic 
elements - an indication that the leadership realised that the 
ra th e r ob jec tive  notions of so c ia lis t p a trio tism  and 
internationalism alone would not create a sense of total allegiance 
to the state.67
'Socialist national consciousness’ was portrayed as the first truly 
German consciousness in the history of the German people which 
had not been imposed or distorted by the ruling classes.6 8 
Apparently it had nothing in common with the bourgeois 
consciousness or 'Junker  bourgeois chauvinism' typical of the 
Federal Republic,69 which was labelled 'anti-national,' because it 
was the consciousness of only a small proportion of the 
population, namely the bourgeoisie. The latter was also equated 
with German nationalism of the past, hence the claim that 'Any 
German wishing to demonstrate a fundamental change in German 
national consciousness would never choose to be a citizen of the 
F R G ’70 - not that East Germans had the choice from 1961. 
Furthermore, it was hoped that 'socialist national consciousness' 
would counteract the influence of the 'ideological attacks by 
western im perialism ,'71 especially 'the anti-socialist propaganda
broadcast from the Federal Republic and West Berlin,'72 which 
sought to discredit the GDR in the eyes of its own citizens.
As the 1960s progressed, the regime began to place more 
emphasis on socialist patriotism  as opposed to proletarian
internationalism . The intention was not only to encourage
allegiance to the GDR as the only legitimate German state, in
66 Programm der SED, Dokumente der SED. vol. 9. p,247.
67 Noted by F. Kopp in 1962, in Die Wendung zur 'nationalen' 
Geschichtsbetrachtung in der scw^etischen Zone (Munich, 1962), pp.5-6, 
reviewed in Kreusel, Nation und Vaterland. p.278.
68 Heinrich Homann, 'Der 8. Mai 1945 und die Entwicklung des 
Nationalbewufitseins in Deutschland,' Einheit 19 (1965): p.41.
69 Heise, 'Um die Zukunft,' p.1036.
7® Homann, 'Der 8. Mai,' pp.32, 39.
71 Lothar Berthold, 'Unser nationales Geschichtsbild,' E inheit 21 (1966): 
p.229.
72 DOmberg, Kurze Geschichte. 4th ed., p.531.
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contrast to the inauthentic Federal Republic, but also to 
distinguish it from other Eastern bloc states, since the word 
'German' was synonymous with successful and economically 
superior. This was mainly due to the SED's disapproval of the new 
Soviet leadership, and was manifested in the encouragement of 
pride in the state's not inconsiderable economic achievements, 
compared with her allies, and willingness to participate in 
increasing her economic success. Here the regime was reasonably 
successful, although this was mainly due to the fact that since 
people could no longer leave, they resigned themselves to 
improving their lot in the GDR.
To enhance the cultural dimension of 'socialist national 
consciousness' a nationales Geschichtsbild (meaning national view, 
version or interpretation of history), was devised with the help of 
historians. The intention was to prove that the true roots of the 
German nation were socialist, and that its destiny had finally been 
realised in the establishment of the GDR, thus supporting the 
Party's claim that the GDR was the only legitimate German state.73 
Discussion of an appropriate view of history for the GDR began in 
June 1962 with the publication of an important document entitled 
Grundrifi der Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung  
(Outline of the History of the German Workers' Movement).74 It 
had been drawn up by a commission chaired by Ulbricht himself, 
which was an indication of its significance, and was debated for 
ten months before being accepted by the Central Committee. 
Reports of discussion of the 'Outline' at academic institutions 
revealed much confusion concerning the national question. People 
frequently asked about the position of the West German ruling 
class in relation to the nation, and even questioned whether or not 
there was still one German nation. A report from the Institute for 
Marxism-Leninism conceded that such confusion showed that
73 On the 'national view of history' see 'GrundriB der Geschichte der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung,' in Dokumente der SED. vol. 9, pp.401-594; 
Ddmberg, Kurze Geschichte. 4th ed., pp.478-9; Stefan DOmberg, 'Zum 
nationalen Geschichtsbild,’ Einheit 18 (1963): p.148; Homann, 'Der 8. Mai,' 
p.31; Berthold, ’Unser nationales Geschichtsbild,' pp.225-231; Ernst 
Engelberg, 'Vom Werden des nationalen Geschichtsbildes der deutschen 
Arbeiterklasse,' Einheit 17 (1962): pp.110-121.
74 Reprinted in Dokumente der SED. vol. 9, pp.401-594.
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’many com rades have serious d ifficu lties  grasping the 
interrelationship between the national question and the class 
question in Germany since 1945,'75 which was hardly surprising.
The ’national view of history' of the GDR was compared to the 
imperialist view of history of the FRG. The former was the 
’scientific view of history of the working class,’ therefore it alone 
'was capable of forming the basis for a genuine national 
consciousness of all German patriots.'76 According to leading East 
German historian, Stefan Dornberg, 'The national view of history 
of the working class is the true view of history, the view of 
history of the whole German nation,’ thus in the GDR, history was 
apparently becoming ’the common property of the whole 
people.'77
The campaign to create a new 'national view of history'
culminated in the publication of the officially sanctioned, eight 
volume Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung which was a 
chronicle of the development of the German working-class 
movement from its origins in the 19th century to the Sixth Party 
Conference of the SED in 1963.78 Its overt aim was to
demonstrate, 'a continuity in the development of the German
workers' movement from its birth to the SED,'79 and to describe 
how the Party had become 'the leading force of the German
nation .'80
This renew ed in terest in German history  also led to 
commemorations of various historical German figures, including 
Goethe, Hegel and Feuerbach. Also, in Party propaganda, Stalin 
was replaced by German role models for the young to identify
76 ZPA IV 2/2024/1
76 Homann, 'Der 8. Mai,' p.31.
77 Dijmberg, 'Zum nationalen Geschichtsbild', pp. 152, 150.
78 Institut fiir Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Geschichte der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. 8 vols.(East Berlin, 1966). For a description 
of the content, see Koenen, Nation und NationalbewuBtsein. pp.82-105.
79 Zimmermann, ed. DDR Handbuch. 3rd ed., p.52.
80 Berthold, 'Unser nationales Geschichtsbild,' p.226.
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with, such as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht,81 and the 
centre of East Berlin received a major face-lift to make it appear 
more traditionally German, which indeed it did in contrast to the 
flashy materialism of the Kurfiirstendamm  in West Berlin.82
All in all, ’socialist national consciousness' was an odd combination 
of M arxist and non-Marxist aspects of popular consciousness, 
which reflected the Party's mutually exclusive political objectives. 
In the words of one western observer, the SED was trying to 
create 'a national mystique composed of classical German 
humanism, discipline, self-denial Prussian tradition, anti-nazism 
and socialist patriotism.’83 However, once people had no choice 
but to make the best of things in the GDR, a unique GDR- 
consciousness did begin to develop, although it did not necessarily 
correspond to the official 'socialist national consciousness' devised 
by the party.
Naturally the same factors which reduced the GDR's popular 
legitimacy also reduced her standing internationally, in particular, 
the fact that she remained under Moscow's thumb 84 (in spite of 
the brief period of assertiveness within the Eastern Bloc in the 
mid-1960s), and the construction of the Berlin Wall hardly gave 
the outside world the impression that the state was stable and 
consolidated. Furthermore, all the efforts of the regime were 
further undermined by the fact that the Federal Republic had 
become accepted by the West as the only legitimate German state. 
Consequently, the Party stepped up its campaign to gain 
recognition of its equal status with the Federal Republic - a 
subconscious acceptance of the existence of two separate German 
states, and by implication, of the fact that that the Party's attempt 
to reunite Germany under socialism had failed. This was 
demonstrated by symbolic assertions of the GDR's sovereignty, for
81 For example, in the ’Nationales Dokument' of 1962. See Weber, K leine  
G eschichte. p . l l l .
82 Hangen, 'New Perspectives,' p. 138-9.
83 Hangen, p. 139.
84 See Ilse Spittmann, 'Soviet Union and DDR,1 Survey 61 (1966): p. 165; Ludz, 
'Zum Begriff,' p. 19-20; Welles Hangen, The Muted Revolution (London,
1967), p.42; Hangen, 'New Perspectives,'p. 144.
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example, in 1964, new identity cards were issued, for the first 
time bearing the words ’citizen of the GDR,’ and in 1965, a 
separate East German team was accepted by the International 
Olympic Committee to compete in the 1968 games.
In spite of the fact that legitimising the state now appeared to 
take precedence over reunification, official policy documents such 
as the Party Programme still mentioned the ultimate aim of a 
unified socialist German state, re-enforced by a firm belief in the 
continued unity of the nation. The 'National Document,' published 
in 1962, stated that 'the essential interests of the nation' could 
only be realised 'in a united German nation-state', and described 
the GDR as the model for a future unitary Germany.85 There were 
two prerequisites for reunification, namely the victory of 
socialism in the GDR and the defeat of West German militarism 
and imperialism by the working class and other democratic 
forces.86 However, the erection of the Berlin Wall naturally raised 
questions about the SED's sincerity regarding the goal of German 
unity. Even so, there can be little doubt that Ulbricht himself still 
hoped to bring about a united socialist Germany.87 For the time 
being, however, the best solution to the German Question was a 
relationship of peaceful co-existence based on the recognition of 
the equal status of the two German states.88
However, from 1966, measures were introduced to limit contact 
between East and West Germans. For example, the regime 
imposed stricter rules governing visits by West Berliners to the 
GDR, banned participation by East German ministers in activities 
organised by the pan-German protestant church, the EKD, and 
terminated the regular dialogue between the SED and the West 
German SPD. This was the first indication that a change in the 
SED's Deutschlandpoli t ik  was on the cards, which in turn would
85 See Ddmberg, Kurze Geschichte. 4th ed, p.476, and Diemer, K urze  
Chronik. p.73.
86 DOmberg, Kurze Geschichte. 1st ed., p.451. In the 4th edition, published 
5 years later in 1969, Ddmberg alleged that the first of these had been 
ach ieved .
87 Ulbicht in a letter to Karl Jaspers, 1 June 1966, ZPA NL182/1306.
88 Programm der SED, Dokumente des SED. vol. 9, p.204.
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raise questions regarding the official line on the state of the 
German nation.
b) The Theoretical Dimension
From 1962, the concept of the nation began to receive theoretical 
attention, resulting in a marked increase in publications on the 
subject. There appear to have been several reasons for this. 
Firstly, after twelve years, the political and psychological divide 
between the two German states seemed to be widening, not 
narrowing, and not surprisingly, there was concern about the 
actual effect of this situation on the German nation as a cohesive 
entity. Secondly, a rethink was necessary in order to reconcile the 
Party's continued adherence to the unity of the nation, recently 
reaffirmed in the 'National Document,' with the construction of the 
Berlin Wall. Thirdly, the regime now seemed to be focusing on 
gaining the allegiance of the population of the GDR as opposed to 
the entire nation. Fourthly, prompted by Moscow, a general policy 
of destalinisation was being implemented, which was also applied 
to Stalinist teaching.
The results are interesting for various reasons. Firstly, they 
demonstrate just how difficult it was to reconcile and justify the 
different strands of the SED’s Deutschlandpolitik  th e o re tic a lly . 
Secondly, while theorists could not openly challenge the Party 
line, there is evidence to suggest that their ideas were noted by 
the leadership. Thirdly, for the first time, the simple notion of a 
unitary German nation was no longer taken for granted.
Most significant was a new, more class-based definition of a 
nation developed by Alfred Kosing, a philosopher from the 
Academy for Social Sciences, who soon became the leading East 
German authority on the state of the German nation, and whose 
original theories are evident in later work by other scholars.89 
They were also taken up by the SED, firstly to prove that one
89 See for example, Albert Norden, ’Arbeiterklasse und Nation,' Einheit 21  
(1966): p.461; Karl Polak, 'Uber fehlerhaften Auffassungen in Fragen 
unseres Kampfes um Frieden und nationale Wiedergeburt,1 E inheit 17 
(1962): p.121; Heise, ’Um die Zukunft,' p.1030.
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German nation still existed, and later to prove that it did not. 
However, in the mid-1970s, he had to perform an act of 
Selbstkritik (self-criticism), admitting publicly that he had been 
wrong in the early 1960s, and accepting that there were indeed 
two separate nations of German soil.90 This was a reflection of 
changes in the Party line, implemented for political reasons, as we 
shall see.
The spark which ignited the smouldering theoretical debate on the 
state of the nation was a book by the West German thinker, Karl 
Jaspers, in which he claimed that two separate German nations 
were developing, in the same way as the German and Austrian 
nations had done.91 Alfred Kosing totally rejected Jaspers’ view 
and claimed, ’The current division of the nation into two states 
cannot lead to the formation of two nations. Instead it will 
eventually be overcome via the establishment of a united socialist 
n a tio n .’92 Using a Marxist-Leninist, class-based concept of the 
nation, he set out to prove that a unitary German nation did still 
exist.
Kosing believed that a nation was defined first and foremost by 
class structures, and that it was neither a condition, nor a rigid 
structure, but developed and changed as part of a historical 
process. He challenged Stalin's basic definition of a nation 
because it im plied  tha t nations w ere ’c la ss-n eu tra l' 
(K la s  sen  i n d i f f e r e n t ) .93 Furthermore, it omitted the class 
differences between nations, neglected the tradition of national 
struggle, which helped build national character, and failed to 
consider the relationship between different nations. Finally, as it 
stood, Stalin’s definition could be used to prove that there was no 
longer a unitary German nation.94 However, Kosing believed it
90 Kosing, Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart. pp. 101-105.
91 See Karl Jaspers, Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung (Munich, 1960).
92 Alfred Kosing, 'Illusion und Wirklichkeit in der nationalen Frage,' 
Einheit 17 (1962): pp. 19-20.
9  ^ Kosing, p. 15. See also Peter-Alfons Steiniger, 'Das 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht im allgemeinen Volkerrecht der Gegenwart,’ 
Einheit 21 (1966): p.1227.
94 Steiniger, 'Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht,' pp. 1226-1227.
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was still valid if expanded upon to include more class-based 
elements, hence modified versions of it continued to feature in 
reference books even in the early 1970s.
Turning to the German case, Kosing argued that the national bond 
was maintained by the working class in both German states, who 
together constituted the German nation, which was, according to 
this argument, a socialist nation. Thus the 'fate of the German 
nation' was 'inextricably bound to the struggle of the working 
class for peace, democracy and socialism '95 and he predicted that 
eventually, the German working class would be reunited within a 
unitary socialist German state.96
If the working class formed the core of the German nation, it 
followed that the GDR, as a state of the working class, embodied 
'the future of the German nation /97 hence it represented the 
national interest in a Marxist sense. In contrast, the Federal 
Republic was described as riddled with class conflict, like the 
former unitary German state prior to 1945, and according to 
M arxist-Leninist theory, its population could not possibly 
constitute a united nation. It failed to represent the true national 
interest because power was in the hands of a few, i.e. capitalists. 
Therefore, the West German working class formed a nation with 
the population of the GDR, and the latter state was their true 
fa th e rla n d .98 In short, there were now apparently two German 
states, two German populations in the sense of S taa tsvd lker , but 
one German nation, albeit at two different levels of development.
Regarding the question of why the long-promised reunification of 
the two German states under socialism had still not taken place, 
the blame was laid firmly at the door of the so-called 'enemies of 
the nation namely the Western allies and the government in 
B o n n .99 According to Kosing, 'The most important aspect of the
96 Kosing, 'Illusion,' p.21.
96 Kosing, p. 19.
97 Kosing, p. 14.
98 Norden, 'Arbeiterklasse,' p.461.
99 '15 Jahre DDR: Thesen der ideologischen Kommission beim Poltibiiro der 
ZK der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Griindung der DDR,’ Einheit 19 (1964): p.28.
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national question is to deprive the enemies of the nation of power. 
This is the most vital matter for the German people, the most 
fundamental question for the German nation.'100 In short, the 
way to achieve German reunification was 'via the victory of 
socialism in the GDR,' 'peaceful co-existence' and 'the elimination 
of the author of the division, namely imperialism.'101
To the non-Marxist observer, and with the benefit of hindsight, 
there appear to be many flaws in this class-based explanation of 
the state of the German nation. In particular, it is hard to ignore 
the fact that like the SED, theorists including Kosing mixed socialist 
ideas with nationalist arguments, and took advantage of the fact 
that something more than proletarian solidarity bound together 
the working class in both German states, such as ethnicity, 
tradition and culture. The position of the West German population 
also remained inadequately explained. On the one hand the 
'bourgeois nation' in the Federal Republic was frequently referred 
to as class-divided, implying that it comprised both the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it was claimed that the 
former were in fact members of the socialist nation, which was 
politically represented by the GDR. It may have been more logical 
to refer to the West German state as class-divided, compared to 
the GDR, where everyone was supposed to live together in 
harmony. Furthermore, it tended to be assumed that everyone in 
the GDR was working-class. In the end, theorists were trying to 
justify the unjustifiable, namely verbal adherence to the nation on 
the one hand, and the implementation of measures which in 
reality deepened the division on the other. Thus it was becoming 
clear that a choice would have to be made between a socialist 
German state and a reunified German state.
100 Kosing, 'Illusion,' p.21.
101 Kosing, p.20.
3^  CONCLUSION
Was the SED’s adherence to the unity of the German nation from 
the 1950s until the mid-1960s genuine? Did the professed aim of 
reunification demonstrate a lack of realism, or was it just plain 
hypocrisy to conceal separatist intentions? It seems that the 
leadership's adherence to the unity of the nation based on the 
unity of the German working class was genuine - after all, they 
did hope that a united socialist German state would be established 
one day, hence it was claimed that there was no contradiction 
between the goals of reunification and the construction of 
socialism. However, by the 1960s, the only way to achieve these 
aims was perceived to be by permanently establishing the GDR as 
a sovereign state - not (yet) as a separate entity, but as a model 
for a future united German state.102 But in practice of course, this 
worked against reunification, and the SED would eventually have 
to accept socialism in only part of Germany, or not at all.
In spite of the SED’s claim to be the defender of the unity of the 
German nation, socialism in the GDR seemed neither German nor 
national, but Soviet, hence the state was not seen as the true 
representative of the German nation either by its population, or 
by the outside world beyond the Eastern Bloc. While the Party 
leadership seemed to be more realistic about what could be 
achieved in the 1960s, and recognised the significance of national 
consciousness, it was still being unrealistic in assuming that the 
masses would automatically be sympathetic to their socialist 
agenda for Germany, especially since Moscow was clearly setting 
that agenda. In the end, the idea of using nationalism and 
traditional Germanness to make socialism seem 'national' was 
seriously flawed, because it contradicted the basic principle that 
class determines the relationship between communities.
Although accurate data on public opinion in the GDR was no longer 
available, Western observers recognised that the construction of
102 Kreusel also agreed that the SED did not yet have separatist intentions. 
Kreusel, Nation und Vaterland. p.298.
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the Berlin Wall marked a turning point in the population's 
relationship to their state,103 and that a state consciousness 
unique to the GDR had begun to develop. However, it was not the 
'socialist national consciousness' designed by the Party to support 
its political objectives, most notably because it did not include 
socialist internationalism. Instead real GDR-consciousness was 
based on the experiences unique to the population of that state, 
such as post-war reconstruction and solidarity in the face of 
hardship, although this did not mean total acceptance of the state 
and its political system, especially bearing in mind the lack of 
personal freedoms and the confusion caused by the W all.104 
However, according to Western observers it was still little more 
than a 'self-consciousness' (Se lb s tbew u f t tse in ) ,105 or a 'tenuous 
state-consciousness’ or 'unconscious state consciousness,' and 
remained very much a 'Teutonic consciousness,'106 a fact which 
the regime exploited selectively.107
Thus, assuming the population did still believe that after less than 
20 years, one German nation did still exist, it seems unlikely that 
this conviction was based on the bond of the German working 
class, as the SED claimed, but on the kind of elements which 
featured in Stalin's original definition, such as shared traditions, 
culture, language and history. In spite of an embryonic state 
consciousness in the GDR, it is probable that German national 
consciousness in a non-Marxist sense, which transcended the 
border, was still stronger at this stage, and the regime was naive 
to believe that a new 'socialist national consciousness' could easily
103 Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler, National Consciousness in Divided 
G erm any. (London and Beverley Hills, 1975), pp. 119-120. Influenced by 
Karl Deutsch, Schweigler’s is the most comprehensive attempt to assess 
national consciousness in the GDR, though he often accepts the non- 
scientific nature of his evidence and warns against reading too much into 
mere observations. See pp. 106-132.
104 Hans Apel, DDR 1962 1964 1966 (West Berlin, 1967), pp.373, 401.
103 Theo Sommer, 'Kommunisten oder Deutsche?' in Reise in ein Femes 
Land, eds. Marion Grafin Ddnhoff, Rudolph W. Leonhardt, Theo Sommer 
(Hamburg, 1964), pp. 129, 104.
106 Han gen, The Muted Revolution, p. 184.
107 Jean Edward Smith, 'The Red Prussianism of the GDR,' Political Science 
Quarterly 82 (1967): p. 380.
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be fashioned to replace it. In short, the SED's adherence to the 
unity of the German nation actually undermined the legitimacy of 
the GDR, hence by the late 1960s, a rethink was necessary.
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNITY OF THE NATION IN DOUBT
This chapter describes the process of change from a belief in the 
continued existence of one German nation by the leadership of the 
GDR, to its denial, during the years 1967 to 1970. The principal 
question it seeks to answer is why the SED dramatically changed 
course, in particular, to what extent policy was influenced by 
theory on the one hand, and pragmatism on the other. The first 
section examines the Seventh Party Conference in 1967 where 
two lines on the National Question began to emerge within the 
leadership. The campaign for recognition was starting to take 
precedence over reunification, and adherence to the unity of the 
nation was undermining this campaign, hence it was time to re­
assess the situation. However, not all members of the leadership 
recognised this, which led to the emergence of two contradictory 
positions, which made it increasingly difficult for theorists to 
know what the official line was. The second section examines the 
new constitution’s traditional approach to the nation, and the 
reasons behind it. The third section looks at what finally made 
even U lbricht change his position regarding the nation, in 
particular, the challenge posed by Brandt’s O stp o l i t ik .  What 
emerges is that the eventual change in policy resulted from the 
need for a more pragmatic approach, and was not based on 
theoretical arguments or deeply held convictions.
11 TRADITIONALISTS VERSUS PRAGMATISTS WITHIN THE 
RULING ELITE
a.) The Seventh Party Conference. 1967
At the Seventh Party Conference, for the first time, two distinct
lines on the national question began to emerge within the SED's 
leading elite, that of the traditionalists, who adhered to the goal of
reunification and the continued existence of one German nation,
and that of the pragmatists or realists, who had given up that goal
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and took a more GDR-centric view, which would eventually evolve 
into a claim that a separate socialist (German) nation had become 
established in the GDR.1 Furthermore, the SED reaffirmed its 
commitment to the aim of a united socialist Germany, but also to 
the normalisation of relations between the two German states 
which would pave the way for mutual recognition. However, not 
all functionaries had decided which camp they were in, especially 
regarding such a sensitive and potentially explosive issue. 
Ulbricht himself combined aspects of the traditional line with a 
more pragmatic approach, resulting in noticeable contradictions. 
Only a few, for example Werner Lamberz, had totally adopted the 
new view, but they could not enforce it while Ulbricht remained 
in power. However, we should not automatically assume that the 
views expressed by functionaries were their genuine convictions, 
and should always consider their real objectives.
What is certain is that by the spring of 1967, the leadership had 
changed tactics on the national question, which would soon give 
rise to a reassessment of their goals. However, the more 
immediate result of the emergence of two lines was confusion 
within the Party and the population. In fact, the Seventh Party
Conference was unique in that differences of opinion were
actually visible - a rare occurrence in the history of the GDR.
JL/W
At the 13th meeting of the Central Committee in September 1966, 
in preparation for the Seventh Party Conference, Ulbricht defined 
the prerequisites required for reunification. Firstly 'revanchism 
and m ilitarism ' in West Germany had to be defeated, and
secondly, the two German states had to normalise their relations
on the basis of their equal status as sovereign states, and then 
gradually grow closer together. Ulbricht did not view recognition 
( A n e r k e n n u n g )  and drawing closer together ( A n n a h e r u n g )  as 
mutually exclusive. According to his logic, recognition was a 
prerequisite for peaceful coexistence, which would facilitate 
cooperation, which could eventually lead to unification, once the
1 Some writers argue that a change of position by the entire Politburo took 
place, led by Ulbricht himself, but the evidence suggests otherwise. 
Naumann and Triimpler, Der Flop, p.21.
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'democratic transformation' of West Germany had taken place. By 
refusing to recognise the GDR, he argued, Bonn was hindering 
peaceful coexistence and the good relations necessary for a 
solution of the German question. This step-by-step approach 
gradually took over from the idea of starting with the formation 
of a confederation, although the latter was still mentioned in his 
New Year message for 1967.2 However, Ulbricht did at last 
recognise that due to the situation in 'Germany,' and in Europe as 
a whole, one had to reckon with a 'langeren Nebeneinander' i.e . 
with two German states existing side-by-side for a long time.3
As usual, all the speeches at the Party Conference received 
rapturous applause. U lbricht repeated his commitment to 
reunification: 'A unity of the German nation under the leadership
of im perialists is im possible, but we are w hole-heartedly 
striving.... for unity under the leadership of the working class.' 
However, for the first time, he seemed to be distinguishing 
between short-term and long-term goals. The former were the 
norm alisation  of relations between the two states, the 
renunciation of violence, recognition of borders and peaceful 
coexistence, but the long-term goal remained reunification. He 
accused those who no longer believed it to be a possibility of 
playing into the hands of the very capitalists who he blamed for 
the division, and who feared a 'united, peace-loving, progressive, 
anti-im perialist German state,' adding, 'Our greatest pioneers, 
Marx, Engels and Karl Liebknecht were the best German
patriots  What imperialism has broken apart, the working class
in both German states, in close alliance, will reunite.'4
Ulbricht made direct reference to the German nation which had 
been mishandled and dishonoured by the the Grofibourgeoisie  but 
was, nevertheless, still one German nation in his opinion. Pre­
empting Brandt by two years, he explained, 'Today the nation 
essentially consists of the German people in two German states
2 Neues Deutschland. 1 January 1967.
3 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1178
4 Walter Ulbricht, Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung der DDR bis zur 
Vollendung des Sozialismus (East Berlin, 1967), p.51.
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which are independent of each other, the socialist GDR and the 
militaristic, imperialist West German Federal Republic.’5
Although the view expressed by the First Secretary was officially 
accepted as the position of the SED, other members of the 
Politburo contributed to the Party Conference and its preparation, 
although there is no record of any heated debate. Erich Honecker, 
who was already gaining prominence, claimed, The SED is the only 
party in Germany with a complete concept for the social 
development and prospects for Germany as a whole. We are in 
the position to show the German people a way to a future of 
peace, socialist progress and democracy.' He also stressed the 
need for democratic transformation in West Germany if the 
reunification of Germany were to be possible.6 In retrospect it is 
surprising to hear Honecker using such all-German language as 
late as 1967. However, he seemed to avoid direct use of the term 
'nation' and by the Party Conference itself, he had toned down his 
enthusiasm for reunification. In the report of the Central 
Committee (which was written by a commission under his 
chairm anship), the goals of peaceful coexistence and the 
normalisation of relations were stressed, but the question, 'What 
should the future unitary Germany look like?' was also raised.7
During the conference, however, Ulbricht’s traditional line was 
somewhat contradicted by the more GDR-orientated view of a 
worker from East Berlin, Klaus Teschendorf. He repeated a phrase 
first used by students at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig,8 
though it probably originated from the Party apparatus, 'We are 
bound in every way to our socialist GDR, but we are in no way
bound to the imperialist West Germany  However, through the
many things we have in common, we are bound to the West 
German working class.'9 This was no spontaneous outburst, but 
the view held by several members of the leading elite, who did
5 Ulbricht, p.52.
6 ZPA IV 2/1/347
7 Bericht des Zentralkomitees, Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 7.
Parteitaes (East Berlin, 1967), p.20.
8 Neues Deutschland. 21 January, 1967.
9 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 7. Parteitaes. p .152.
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not yet dare to question openly the official line according to 
Ulbricht.
b) The Political Background
Until 1966, the factors which had shaped the SED's position on the 
national question had remained pretty constant. Suddenly, 
however, new factors arose which certain members of the ruling 
elite could not ignore, especially the challenge posed by Bonn's 
new approach to inner-German relations. The SED leadership's 
confused and inconsistent response indicates that they were 
caught off-guard and were divided on the issue of how to 
reconcile long-held tenets with an effective response to the new 
Ostpolitik, as the Seventh Party Conference had shown. In 
particular, the traditional line on the unity of the nation seemed 
increasingly out of step with demands for recognition which 
were acquiring a distinctly separatist tone.
i) Developments in West Germany
The key to understanding the SED’s policy regarding the nation 
during the late 1960s, was the leadership's dogged determination 
to acquire international recognition. Obviously the main obstacle 
was the existence of another state which also claimed to be the 
true home of the German nation, and it was the attempts by the 
Federal government to alter the status quo that finally forced the 
SED leadership to re-examine its position and to take a more 
pragmatic stance on the national question. Already Bonn seemed 
to be calling the shots, forcing the SED to respond. During 1966, 
there had been an exchange of views with the opposition Social 
Democrats, known as the 'national dialogue,' the initiative for 
which, according to East German accounts, came from the SED.10 
But the SPD's line was not so very different from that of the 
CDU/CSU. Contrary to the SED's wishes, they refused to renounce 
the Federal Republic's 'A l l e i n v e r t r e t u n g s a n s p r u c h ' or the 
continued existence of Germany in the borders of 1937, and as a
10 See Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, pp.203-210.
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consequence, there was little room for negotiation and the contact 
ceased.
The first turning point in relations between the two states, which 
would eventually lead to the Basic Treaty and the denial of a 
unitary German nation by the SED, was the entry of the SPD into 
the Grand Coalition in December 1966. Previously, the SED had 
laid the blame for the lack of progress in the national question
firmly at the door of the CDU/CSU. Now the SPD, who the SED
leadership could not so easily blame for the division, had a share 
of power, and individuals such as Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr 
demonstrated an interest in compromise and co-operation. Until 
this point, the German Question had been on hold, due to both 
sides' refusal to give any ground. Suddenly the SED was faced 
with the challenge of a new approach which was either a golden 
opportunity or a serious threat. The Party leadership appears to 
have interpreted it as the latter, hence they began to build a 
barricade of conditions for progress towards reunification, and 
stated that there would be no further rapprochement without
recognition.
Since the SED leadership claimed that the national question was a 
question of class, it could hardly ignore the party that was the
most credible representative of the West German working class. 
However, in spite of this fact, the SED put self-interest before pan- 
German class solidarity, choosing not to regard the SPD as an ally. 
Without first consulting Moscow,11 Ulbricht criticised the party's 
entry into the coalition for ideological reasons, and specifically 
condemned its new Ostpolitik,  due to the continued adherence to 
the claim to the sole right of representation of the German nation 
and the refusal to grant the GDR recognition.12 According to 
Ulbricht, 'In view of joint policies by the SPD leadership and the 
CDU/CSU and West German monopoly capitalists, the process of 
Anndherung  by the working class in both German states becomes
11 Melvin Croan, The Development of GDR Political Relations with the 
USSR,’ in GDR Foreign Policy, eds. Schulz et al., p.201.
12 For details see N. Edwina Moreton, East Germany and the Warsaw 
Alliance: the Politics of Detente (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), pp.54-55, 67-68.
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far more difficult and the division deeper. It can be proved that 
every condition for the reunification of both German states is 
lacking and that the FRG is neither capable of negotiation nor 
confederation.' Consequently, for the time being, the main aim 
could only be the preservation of peace.13 Here a shift in 
priorities can be perceived, together with the realisation that the 
situation might not change for a long time. Brandt sent an open 
letter to the Seventh Party Conference suggesting SPD-SED 
negotiations, but the SED leadership declined, on the grounds that 
Brandt had failed to recognise that the National Question was a 
class struggle, and because SPD functionaries and members 
needed to be 'cured of their nationalism.'14
Due to what they viewed as the SPD's betrayal of the working 
class, the SED leadership committed a rather petty act of revenge 
by referring to the SPD as 'SP' for a while, dropping the word 
D eutsch lands .  It is difficult to know exactly what this act was 
supposed to prove - maybe that the SPD was no longer worthy of 
Germany and that the SED was still the only true party of the 
entire German working class.
Rather more significant was the renaming of the State Secretariat 
for All-German Affairs, which became the State Secretariat for 
West German Affairs. Its tasks included the production of 
propaganda directed at the Federal Republic, monitoring the 
political situation there, and examining her policies towards the 
GDR. However, such activities, and the phrase 'all-German Affairs’ 
in itself, had implied that a special link between the two states 
still existed and underm ined the claim  that they were 
independent of each other. The Secretary of State concerned, 
Joachim  Herrmann - a hard-liner, totally opposed to any 
compromise with Bonn - blamed 'the new situation in West 
Germany’ (i.e. the Grand Coalition) for the name change,15 and 
claimed that 'all-German' had come to mean different things to 
each German state: 'Unlike the ministry in Bonn, the State
13 ZPA IV A2/903/2
14 ZPA IV 2/1/356
15 ZPA IV A2/2028/122
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Secretariat in Berlin does not use the word ’’all-German" as 
propagandist camouflage for a policy which stubbornly rejects 
negotiations and deepens the split in Germany through the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons.' Bonn's claim  to sole 
representation of the nation apparently 'denies the existence of 
the GDR and therefore inevitably makes every all-German concept 
a farce and excludes any genuine all-German policies.'16 The 
name change was even sanctioned by Ulbricht himself, who 
stated, 'The term "all-German" has become redundant because the 
Kiesinger-StrauB government rejected the GDR’s suggestions 
concerning the normalisation of relations between the two German 
states via governm ental negotiations, and even the future 
formation of a confederation. Until further notice, it can only be a 
matter of creating a relationship of peaceful coexistence between 
the two German states.'17 If the phrase 'all-German' had become 
meaningless, then surely the unity of the German nation was in 
doubt and there could be no reunification? Such changes received 
much coverage in the West German media. Die Welt in terp reted  
the new name as more appropriate to what it claimed was the 
Secretariat's true role, namely the infiltration of the Federal 
Republic.18
It should be noted, however, that policy on the national question 
by no means changed overnight, nor was the leadership united on 
how to deal with Bonn's advances. Even so, a response was 
necessary, which would initially require a change of priorities, and 
would eventually have consequences that would bring the 
existence of one German nation into doubt. An important catalyst 
was Kiesinger's governmental declaration on 13th December 1966, 
in which he had adhered to the aim of reunification and refused to 
recognise the GDR, but also expressed a willingness to intensify 
human, economic and cultural ties, and repeated the offer of a 
renunciation of force between the two German states. (The offers 
were repeated in April 1967 and eventually rejected by Willi 
Stoph after a further exchange of correspondence in September).
16 BArchP, D-2/2
17 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1202
18 ZPA IV A2/2028/122
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The SED leadership was suspicious of Kiesinger's motives. A 
report stated, ’It is clear that the enemy wants to accelerate his 
nationalistic pace in the German question. That can be
concluded  from the use of such concepts as ’’national substance,"
"national question," "primary national concern," etc.'19
The real bombshell dropped at the end of January 1967, when oRum ania and the Federal Republic established diplom atic 
relations, ’thereby upsetting the "spheres of influence" theory and 
marking what was potentially a qualitatively new phase in the 
political development of the [Warsaw] Alliance.'20 It marked the 
death of the Hallstein doctrine, indicating a chance for greater 
flexibility towards the GDR, and also challenged the so-called 
'Ulbricht Doctrine,' whereby the GDR attempted to stop its allies 
establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn, so long as the latter 
refused to recognise the GDR.21 Even the leadership of the SED 
admitted that the development was ’a success for their [Bonn's] 
presumption to be the sole representative of the nation.'2 2 
Ulbricht personally criticised Bucharest for interfering and for 
claiming that this action would speed up the reunification of 
Germany, adding, 'No one asked them to conduct such 
negotiations. It is nothing to do with them.'23 Ceausescu probably 
did not think the German Question was anything to do with him 
either, but was more concerned with winning friends outside the 
Soviet Bloc to benefit his country and his own image.24 The event 
marked the beginning of a period during which the German 
question, which had previously united the Eastern bloc countries, 
became 'an object of political bargaining.'25
19 BArchP, D-2/37
20 Moreton, East Germany, p.51.
21 Croan, 'The Development,' p.201.
22 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1211
23 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1211
24 On Ceausescu's motives see Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and 
Elena Ceausescu (London, 1992), pp.103-104; Julian Hale, C eausescu's 
R um ania. (London, 1971), p.48; Aurel Braun, Rumanian Foreign Policy 
since 1965 (New York, 1978).
25 Moreton, East Germany, p.5.
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In order to keep up with the FRG diplomatically, the GDR needed 
to gain recognition from members of the western alliance, and to 
achieve this she would have to prove her permanence and 
sovereignty, indeed her very legitimacy. Though they may have 
not realised or admitted it at the time, the leadership was setting 
off on the path that would eventually lead to an unavoidable 
choice between recognition and reunification. From the beginning 
of 1967, it became clear that the former was the leadership's most 
immediate goal. Since there was no way that Kiesinger's
government would agree to recognition, and the SED would accept 
nothing less, little progress could be made, neither side got what 
they wanted, and the division appeared to be becoming 
perm anen t.
As recognition and the strengthening of the GDR both economically 
and internationally rose in importance, all-German objectives 
inevitably became secondary, in spite of rhetoric concerning the 
so-called national bond of the German working class. In a radio 
programme by the State Secretariat for West German Affairs
entitled 'Answer from the GDR,’ the question was posed of 
whether recognition would cement the division of Germany. The 
response was that the division was a result of Bonn’s separatist 
efforts, the GDR was a reality, and since non-recognition had failed 
to overcome the division, there was no reason to suppose that
recognition would deepen it.26 The Secretariat viewed the West
German media as a tool used by the enemy to infiltrate the GDR. 
The latter were apparently trying to prove that the two states 
belonged together and that there was a will for reunification, 
denying the alienation between the two, inventing common bonds, 
and trying to prevent the development of a separate state 
co n sc iousness.27 Consequently, East German propaganda would 
have to convey the opposite message if recognition was to be 
achieved. However, at this stage, the SED's propaganda regarding 
the N ational Question lacked sophistication and rem ained 
unconvincing.28
26 BArch P, D-2/16
27 ZPA IV A2/2028/122
28 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
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ii) Soviet Influence
One constant factor which continued to shape policy, was the 
'Soviet Factor,’ since the German Question was never merely an 
issue between the two German states themselves, but remained a 
microcosm of the wider struggle between two political systems 
and military alliances. However, while the 'Soviet factor’ was ever 
present, the priorities of Soviet foreign policy shifted, and the 
policies of the SED had to adjust accordingly. At this stage, 
Moscow's main aims were firstly, the formal sanctioning of the 
territorial status quo in Europe, and secondly to preserve the 
unity of the Eastern Bloc, particularly in the realm of foreign 
policy. Rom ania had already stepped out of line and 
Czechoslovakia was about to, hence firmer Bloc discipline was
imminent, including ensuring East German interests remained 
synonymous with those of the Soviet Union.29
Towards the end of 1966, a declaration of the Warsaw Pact 
members had stated that the road to German reunification ran via 
detente, the growing together or A n n d h eru n g  of both sovereign 
German states and agreements between them.30 However, there 
is considerable evidence to suggest that the new Soviet leadership 
favoured a change of course by Ulbricht regarding the German 
Question. In fact it was Moscow which first introduced the
concept of Abgrenzung  (or 'fencing off) between the two German 
states in a governmental declaration in January 1967.31 In March 
1967, Brezhnev rather ambiguously stated that other countries
wanted good, friendly relations with 'Germany,' providing it was a 
peace-loving, democratic Germany, but added that Bonn must 
recognise the GDR in its existing borders and fulfil the other
conditions laid down by Ulbricht.32 But for economic reasons,
29 Croan, The Development,' pp.200-201.
30 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1178
31 Neues Deutschland. 30 January 1967, cited by Klaus-Uwe Koch, 'Die 
Vaterlandsdiskussion am Vorabend des 7. Parteitags,' T hem atische  
Information und Dokumentation 42 (1984): p. 104.
32 ZPA IV 2/1/357. The remarks from March are omitted from Hofmann's 
officially sanctioned version o f events. Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland.
p .218
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some East European states wanted to keep their options open with 
Bonn. At a conference of World Communist Parties in February 
1968, Honecker tried to generate solidarity against Bonn’s 
O s t p o l i t i k  and criticised parties who allowed 'nationalistic 
tendencies' to interfere with their obligations to world socialism.33
iii) Divergent Views among the Ruling Elite
The first time that challenges to the traditional Ulbricht-style line 
were visible was the so-called Vater landsdiskuss ion  (fatherland 
discussion) in January 1967, a discussion among secretaries for 
agitation and propaganda from all over the country, which was 
followed by a major campaign among the population. It was 
initiated by Politburo members, Werner Lamberz and Hermann 
Axen, both of the emerging Honecker faction, and has been 
interpreted as an attempt to break with the policy of reunification 
via confederation behind Ulbricht's back.34 The emphasis was on 
the 'nationalstaatliche Eigenstandigkeit der DDR,' ('the GDR as an 
independen t n a tio n -s ta te ') ,35 and the GDR as fatherland, as 
opposed to Germany as a whole. Axen, the Politburo member who 
was to become most involved with the issue of the nation, boldly 
sta ted , 'In these circum stances, one cannot speak of
reunification  To solve these basic problems, we can no longer
tolerate all-German positions. "All-German" no longer fits in with 
our scene ( L a n d s c h a f t ) .' Axen also saw the normalisation of 
relations between the two German states as vital for European 
security, hence a special relationship should be rejected.3 6 
(Ironically in the mid-1980s Honecker more or less reversed this 
policy when he sought a V e r a n t w o r t u n g s g e m e i n s c h a f t  or 
community of responsibility with the FRG).
In addition, the need for a unique GDR-consciousness based on the 
GDR’s socialist system was recognised by Werner Lamberz,37 who,
33 McAdams, East Germany and Detente, p.79. See also Moreton, East 
Germany, pp.53-54.
34 The view of Jiirgen Hofmann, interview, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
35 Koch, 'Die Vaterlandsdiskussion,' p.99.
36 Koch, p.101.
37 Koch, p.102.
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by Politburo standards, was relatively young and in touch with 
reality. Although he did not go so far as to claim that a separate 
socialist German nation existed in the GDR, the implication was 
there. However, a report in Neues Deutschland  stated, 'In our 
sovereign socialist republic, which is a whole historical epoch 
ahead of the western zones, we are building up the new socialist 
nation .'38
Were they just adhering to the theoretical distinction between 
bourgeois and socialist nations of the 1960s or was the German 
nation once and for all divided? One East German academic later 
claimed that the V ater landsd iskuss ion  was 'an essential step on 
the road to the national concept of the Eighth Party Conference,'39 
where Honecker publicly denied the existence of one German 
nation. This provokes speculation as to why the concept of the 
nation was not directly questioned at the Seventh Party 
Conference. Three possible reasons spring to mind. Firstly, the 
general confusion surrounding the whole issue of the future of 
'Germany,' following the shock of the formation of a Grand 
Coalition in Bonn; secondly, Ulbricht’s all-German aspirations, 
which could not be criticised openly; and thirdly, the risk of 
reinforcing Bonn’s claim to sole representation of the nation.
Functionaries such as Lamberz were astute enough to mention 
that reunification  would be possib le, should the right 
circumstances arise, but added that it could take a very long time. 
This gave them the best of both worlds. It prevented criticism 
that they had been wrong about what was possible or had simply 
failed to achieve their goals. Also, even though they may have 
secretly abandoned the aim of reunification, it was not too 
obvious, hence they did not seem to be directly contradicting 
Ulbricht, but simply had different priorities. Meanwhile, they 
could concentrate on what they really wanted, namely to 
strengthen the GDR, both internally and internationally.
38 Neues Deutschland. 30 January 1967, cited in Hofmann, Ein neues 
D eutschland, p.217.
39 Koch, 'Die Vaterlandsdiskussion,' p. 104.
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The fact that at the Seventh Party Conference, the new, more 
'GDR-centric' line, with emphasis on the national question as a 
class question, was expressed not by a functionary, but by a 
worker added credibility to their stance. However, contrary to 
appearances, he was not representing a new feeling among the 
working population, since Teschendorf's speech was written by 
P o litbu ro  member, Paul Verner - a hard-liner regarding relations 
with the Federal Republic - who had especially selected him to 
speak, possibly because he was well educated for a worker. It 
was agreed in advance that the presidium of the Party Conference 
would express agreement with Teschendorf's speech, after 
pretending to discuss it,40 but they also had to accept Ulbricht's 
speech, in spite of the fact that it was based on 'the illusion of the 
victorious working class.'41
Concern that Ulbricht might be willing to negotiate with Bonn also 
caused a rift within the leadership. Politburo member Alfred 
Neumann objected to negotiations with Kiesinger due to his Nazi 
p a s t ,42 and Albert Norden called the chancellor 'Goebbels' 
propagandist' and accused the current rulers of the Federal 
Republic of continuing German imperialism's policy of conquest, 
which had been started by Hitler.43 Others, such as Lamberz and 
Axen, simply took a more realistic view of both the current 
situation and what could be achieved in the future. Whatever 
the ir reasons, all these dissenters recognised that the 
prerequisites for a united socialist Germany did not exist, and 
were not likely to in the near future, hence they took a more 
pragmatic line, concentrating on improving the GDR's status and 
the ultimate aim of recognition. Since they had given up thinking 
in all-German terms, it was logical that they would soon also 
question whether one could continue to speak of one German 
nation.
40 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1218
41 Interview with Jtirgen Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
42 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 7 April 1993.
43 ZPA IV A2/2028/14
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iv) Public Opinion
In preparation for the Party Conference, the Department of 
Agitation organised lectures all over the country to publicise the 
ideas of the Vaterlandsdiskussion.  People raised questions which 
dem onstrated considerable confusion regarding the German 
situation, for example, why is travel between the two Germanies 
restricted? Why is the state called the sovereign socialist GDR? 
What are the prerequisites for reunification? Would it not be 
better to work towards improved relations before recognition? 
What about the working class in West Germany?44 What is the 
difference between the German Question and the National 
Question? Are there now two states, two populations, and also 
two nations?45 Clearly clarification was required.
However, the level of acceptance of the GDR and its political 
system had increased considerably, as the results of research 
conducted by the reputable Institute for Public Opinion Research 
(IMF) show. In polls carried out in January and February 1967, 
respondents were asked 'Which social order does the future 
belong to in a united Germany?' 74.8% of respondents from Berlin 
said the socialist social order, 83.4% in Halle and 78.9% in Erfurt. 
Only about 5% chose the capitalist social order, though up to 16% 
could not give an answer to the question.46 To the question 'What 
is possible in the development of D eutsch landpo li t ik  in the near 
future?' an average of 6.2% said reunification; 2.9% confederation; 
25.9% A n n a h e r u n g \  and 59.6% thought nothing was likely to 
change.47 However, the overall picture was confused. On the one 
hand the majority of respondents questioned in the autumn of 
1966 thought that young people had better opportunities in the 
GDR than in the Federal Republic, and saw Bonn's claim to sole 
representation of the nation as unjustified. On the other hand the
44 ZPA IV A2/902/3
45 BArchP, D-2/13
46 ZPA IV/A2/902/31
47 ZPA IV A2/902/31
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majority thought that it was right and necessary to negotiate a 
confederation plan with the West German government.
Therefore it can be seen that at this stage, the SED still monitored 
popular opinion regarding the national question, though not with 
the intention of taking it into account, but in order to mould it to 
support the Party's political objectives. In spite of confusion 
regarding the state of the German nation, an embryonic 'GDR- 
consciousness' of some sort had begun to form by the late 1960s, 
and East Germans did have plenty to be proud of, such as the 
tangible signs that the GDR had become a well-established, 
modern state. The potential benefits for the legitimacy of the 
state that could be obtained by nurturing this 'GDR consciousness' 
were recognised by some leading functionaries, notably Werner 
Lamberz, who controlled agitation and propaganda.
v) Recognising Reality
While pressure from Bonn and opportunism were the most 
obvious reasons for the East German regim e to begin 
reconsidering its position regarding the state of 'Germany,' there 
can be no doubt that after nearly 20 years of separate 
development, in both the political and personal spheres, the two 
German states had grown apart, hence a reassessm ent of 
possibilities for the future was only natural. A confederation had 
long since ceased to be an option because opposing social orders 
had become entrenched and were guaranteed by outside powers. 
The reality of the independent development of the two states, and 
the fact that a bond between their respective proletariats existed 
only in (Marxist) theory, inevitably raised questions about the 
continued existence of the unitary German nation. Certainly it is 
hard to imagine that the diminishing West German working class, 
who already enjoyed affluence and left the most undesirable jobs 
to G astarbe i ter , felt a sense of solidarity with their East German 
counterparts, if indeed one can call them that.
One sign that the regime was starting to assert the independence 
of the GDR and moving away from pan-German objectives was the
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passing of a new citizenship law shortly before the Seventh Party 
Conference. According to surveys, this action provoked confusion 
among the population.48 The Interior Ministry claimed it was 
justified due to 'the existence of the sovereign GDR and the 
development of new socialist relationships between the citizens of 
the GDR and their socialist state, as well as our consistent rejection 
of the W est German governm ent's presum ption to sole 
representation.' In case anyone pointed out that this new law 
seemed incompatible with the constitution, the Ministry continued 
(somewhat unconvincingly): 'The stipulation in the constitution, 
"there is only one German citizenship" ( S ta a t s a n g e h d r ig k e i t )  
relates to the area in which the constitution of the GDR is 
operative .'49 It was also pointed out that a de facto East German 
citizenship had in fact existed since 1949 when the GDR was 
founded.
vi) Ulbricht's Personal Convictions
Clearly, by 1967, there were numerous reasons why the SED 
needed to rethink its Deutschlandpolitik, and as a result, its stance 
regarding the German nation. However, one other factor also 
remained constant, namely the personal influence of Ulbricht. The 
flaws in his arguments regarding the National Question were 
becoming increasingly obvious, as he attempted to adapt to a new 
situation without surrendering convictions and hopes he had held 
since the foundation of the GDR. In trying in explain them, we 
should not only examine the external influencing factors but also 
remember his own background. Ulbricht could recall the days of 
the KPD as a Reichsparte i , and continued to speak of Deutschland  
when others no longer used the word. He still believed that the 
working class would reunite what 'imperialism' had divided, and 
no doubt dreamt of being leader of a united socialist German state. 
In spite of signs of diverging views on the National Question at the 
Seventh Party Conference, the drafting of a new constitution in 
the following year would show that he was still able to exert his 
authority, at least, so long as it pleased Moscow for him to do so.
48 ZPA IV/A2/902/3
49 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1205
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c) The Theoretical Level
The official line on the German nation was becoming increasingly 
anachronistic, and the Seventh Party Conference did little to 
remedy the situation. Though not directly involved in the 
preparations, philosophers and social scientists in particular had 
begun to discuss the effects of the political division on the German 
nation at academic institutions, even before the Party leadership
h a d .50 The fact that the leadership had not made up its mind 
actually encouraged discussion of various alternatives, which was 
no longer possible once Honecker declared that history had 
decided the national question in 1971.51 Until this point, Alfred 
Kosing's theory of one German nation at two separate stages of
development dating back to 1962 had remained the standard 
view, as had the notion that the division of the nation into two 
states was undesirable and only temporary. The only topic for 
discussion during the mid-1960s had been the relationship of the 
Sorb minority in the GDR to the German nation.52
In fact academia itself faced the same problem as the East German
state. Just as the West German government was making a claim to 
sole representation of the German nation, West German academic 
institutions were also making a claim to sole representation of 
German knowledge, and tried to undermine their East German 
counterparts at in ternational conferences. Consequently, 
academics from the GDR demanded equal status and tried to raise
o-S
the international standing of their institutions, just like the Party 
leadership was trying to do for the state itself. Contact with West 
German academic institutions which would not recognise the equal 
status of those from the GDR was severed.
Though the masses may have had more interesting and important 
things to do than to scrutinise Party documents, the ambiguous 
message of the Seventh Party conference regarding the National
50 Interview with Walter Schmidt, Berlin, 3 June 1993.
51 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
52 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
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Question was visible to scholars, who had a duty to take note of 
policy changes announced at such events. No doubt a student at 
the ’Karl Marx Party Training College' was speaking for many 
when he wrote 'In connection with Ulbricht's explanation of the 
German nation, the question arises again as to whether we can 
still speak of a unitary nation.'53 His comments ended up in the 
files of the Propaganda Department, which took note of public 
uncertainties. Discussions of topical questions were also held at all 
academic institutions, even those specialising in subjects such as 
natural sciences, and divergent views were noted in reports to the 
Department of Sciences.
The State Secretariat for West German Affairs also had an 
academic commission, which included prominent scholars such as 
Otto Reinhold (rector of the Academy for Social Sciences), and the 
historian, Stefan Dornberg. In 1967 it suggested that since the 
'working class' was interpreted differently in each German state, 
maybe it was no longer possible to speak of a united German 
working class. It also questioned the appropriateness of terms 
such as 'unitary German culture' and 'German national literature.' 
The dilemma was how to avoid conjuring up incorrect and illusory 
concepts in the minds of the population, 'without handing over 
essential concepts to the enemy.'54
Historians could hardly avoid the subject of the German nation, 
and at the time, were busy occupied writing a new 'History of the 
German People.' The project involved historians from universities 
and the Academy of Sciences (AdW), supervised by Kurt Hager, 
and had Ulbricht's personal approval. At the end of 1967, the 
AdW outlined the 'political and academic objectives’ of the work. 
It was to be 'an extensive history of the German people on the 
basis of historic materialism' and was intended to help secure the 
'socialist national consciousness' of the people of the GDR and to 
fill them with pride in their achievements. It was also supposed 
to reach the working class in West Germany to explain to them 
that their interests and those of the entire nation were best
53 ZPA IV A2/903/2
54 BArchP, D-2/67
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served by the GDR. The foundation of the GDR was to be 
portrayed as the turning point in German history and the
completion of socialism its high point so far. Her working-class
population had learnt the lessons of German history in its entirety 
and thus represented the true interests of the German nation.55
Hager's Department insisted that certain points be stressed which 
bore the hallmark of Ulbricht's approach to the National Question, 
for example, the idea that socialism would one day be victorious 
in West Germany and then the working class would reunite what 
imperialism had divided. Further work was necessary to show 
how the nation had arisen under feudalism, developed into a 
bourgeois nation under capitalism , and finally  had been 
transformed into a socialist nation in the GDR. Some historians 
suggested the title should be simply 'German History,' but the
Department of Sciences rejected this on the grounds that the true
hero was 'the people,' and also because the work was distinct from 
bourgeois West German historiography.56 Around the same time, 
historians began to debate the so-called 'basic national conception’ 
(nationale Grundkonzeption), including which class, party and 
forces had harmed or benefited the nation most, though still based 
on the assumption that one German nation existed.57
Published work on the nation was tricky due to the obligation to 
adhere to an official line that was becoming increasingly 
fragmented, hence relatively few books and articles on the subject 
appeared during the late 1960s. Shortly after the Seventh Party 
Conference, the first edition of the Kleines politisches Worterbuch 
appeared, which was the official directory of political terms in the 
GDR. The entry for 'nation' was composed by Alfred Kosing. 
Following the debate earlier in the decade, Stalin’s original 
definition of a nation was now only applied to emerging nations in 
the early stages of their development and he was not credited for 
the defin ition.58 The basis of Kosing's argument was that the
55 ZPA NL182/1362
56 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1315
57 Interview with Walter Schmidt, Berlin, 3 June 1993.
58 Kleines politisches Worterbuch. 1st ed. (East Berlin, 1967), p.427.
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character of a nation was determined by her ruling class, hence 
there were two types of nation. Socialist nations were apparently 
based on a socialist means of production and were characterised 
by the political and moral unity of the whole population, which 
made them more stable than bourgeois nations. The working class 
was the dominant force in a socialist nation, under the leadership 
of the Marxist-Leninist Party. The relationship between various 
socialist nations was allegedly based on rco-operation in solidarity, 
mutual support, friendship, and increasing closeness.’ In contrast, 
bourgeois nations were based on a capitalist means of production 
and their dominant power was the bourgeoisie. Consequently 
they were divided into antagonistic classes and shaken by class 
struggles and social conflicts. Only through a socialist revolution 
could a bourgeois nation be transformed into a 'qualitatively 
higher type of national community, the socialist nation.’5 9
However, the position of the working class in capitalist states 
remained rather unclear.
On the subject of the German nation in particular, the writer 
attempted to combine sound Marxist-Leninist arguments with the 
official line according to Ulbricht: 'The German nation currently
consists of the populations of two states  By completing the
construction of a socialist society, the GDR represents the interests 
of the entire German nation.... and smooths the way into a socialist 
future for the whole nation.... The unification of the German nation 
can only be achieved via a long, not yet specifiable process of
d e v e lo p m e n t . '60 Since the interests of monopoly capitalism
contradicted those of the nation, the democratic transformation of 
West Germany was still the precondition if the two German states 
were to reach an understanding, and it was made clear who was 
to blame for the current situation: 'The forceful expansionist 
policies of West German imperialism threaten the future and 
existence of the German nation.'61 Under 'National Question,’
current objectives were outlined, namely strengthening the GDR
59 Kleines politisches WQrterbuch. 1st ed., pp.427-428.
60 Kleines Politisches Wfirterbuch. 1st ed., pp.428-429.
61 Kleines Politisches Worterbuch. 1st ed., pp.428-429.
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and the normalisation of relations between the two German states 
on the basis of peaceful co-existence.62
A philosophical description of the components of national 
consciousness in general followed, probably also penned by 
K o s in g .63 He adhered to the idea that since the character of a 
nation was determined by the class that ruled it, so was the 
character of national consciousness. Consequently, one could 
distinguish between socialist and bourgeois national consciousness 
in the same way that one could distinguish between socialist and 
bourgeois nations. The result seems to have more in common 
with socialist consciousness than what is generally understood by 
national consciousness. At the heart of this so-called 'socialist 
national consciousness' was 'the proletariat's claim  to the 
capturing of political power, which at the same time means the 
final liberation of the entire nation from exploitation, repression, 
ignorance, lack of rights and war, and the renewal of the life of 
the nation.' Bourgeois national consciousness, on the other hand, 
amounted to nationalism.64
Turning to the specific case of the GDR, the writer attempted to 
combine the idea of a unique 'socialist national consciousness' 
developing there, while at the same time maintaining the 
existence of one German nation. Thus the 'socialist national 
consciousness' was rooted in an awareness that:
a) the anti-imperialist and socialist renewal of our 
nation which was necessary in our time has already 
been successful in the GDR; the GDR embodies the 
realisation of the national interests of our people; b) 
the solution of the German question can only take 
place under the leadership of the working class and 
free M arx ist-L en in ist Party; c) W est German 
imperialism is the chief enemy of the German Nation; 
d) the completion of socialism does not only lie in the 
interest of the population of the GDR but is their best
62 Kleines Politisches WQrterbuch. 1st ed., p.435.
63 See Kleines Politisches Wfirterbuch. 1st ed., p.429.
64 Kleines Politisches WQrterbuch. 1st ed., p.429-30.
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contribution to the conquest of im perialism  and 
militarism in West Germany.65
An entry for 'socialist national culture' in the same volume called 
the GDR the 'protector of both the cultural heritage and the 
current progressive democratic culture of the entire German 
people,' and claimed that the GDR's socialist national culture 
represented the 'future path of the culture of the entire German 
nation.’66
Whether intentionally or not, many aspects of the entries for 
'nation' and 'national consciousness’ in the Kleines Polit isches  
W orterbuch  seem to support the view of the realists within the 
Politfburo, implying that there was no longer a unitary German 
nation or one national consciousness, but instead a 'socialist 
German nation' and a 'bourgeois German nation' existing in 
separate states. Although the link to the West German working 
class was maintained, keeping open the possibility of reunification 
in the event of a socialist transformation of the Federal Republic, 
such all-German language sounded distinctly unrealistic, as did 
the objectives still advanced by Walter Ulbricht.
d) The Aftermath of the Seventh Party Conference
Following the acceptance of two approaches on the national 
question at the Seventh Party Conference, differences of opinion 
within the Party leadership intensified, especially between 
Ulbricht and the senior functionary Professor Albert Norden. In a 
letter to the latter, Ulbricht confirmed his ultimate objective: 'The 
West German Press claims I want socialism in Germany. That has 
been the goal of the progressive forces of the German working 
class since Karl Marx, is also contained in the programme of the 
Social Democrats and was clarified by Bebel.'67 However, in 
December 1967 an article by Norden in Neues D eutsch land  
challenged Ulbricht's line for the first time and raised doubts
65 Kleines Politisches WQrterbuch. 1st ed., p.429-30.
66 Kleines Politisches Wftrterbuch. 1st ed.,p.603
67 Internes Parteiarchiv NL2/31
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about the unity of the nation. Norden criticised Bonn's 'not a
foreign country (kein Ausland) tr ic k ,' saying, 'For the Bonn
propagandists who created the formula "kein Ausland" it is totally 
irrelevant that a person is a citizen of the GDR, because for those 
in power in the Bonn state, every person of German nationality is 
a native (Inlander) ' .  He called the formula 'a new disguise for 
Bonn's intensified annexation policies towards the socialist 
German peace-state,' and accused the 'German im perialists,' 
together with the Anglo-American occupation forces, of dividing 
Germany, creating a West German separatist state, and through its 
membership of NATO, of breaking up the German national bond 
for good. He thought it a bit much that those who had torn apart 
the nation, should call people who acknowledged the factual 
existence of the divide 'enemies of the German people.'68 The
article highlighted the fact that the idea of a unitary nation 
undermined the regime's claim to sovereignty and legitimacy.
In retaliation, Ulbricht . commissioned an academic, Wolfram 
Neubertj to write a response, which appeared nine days later. 
Neubert argued that the reality of the German situation was that 
two states existed on German soil, but this did not mean that the 
German nation had ceased to exist However, they were not 
merely 'two German constituent states ' (G liedstaaten)  as Bonn 
claimed but two sovereign states, and this fact was of greater
importance than the existence of one nation. With classic 
Ulbricht-style logic, he concluded, 'If equal status and mutual 
recognition of sovereignty are increasingly used as sensible and 
progressive principles between states of different nationalities, 
why shouldn’t they also be valid, if not more so for inter-state 
contact within one nation?'69 It is worth mentioning that after the 
Eighth Party Conference this article became such a source of 
embarrassment for Neubert that he left the Academy for Social 
Sciences.
A few symbolic changes took place in an attempt to reinforce the 
GDR's independence from the FRG, thus prioritising Abgrenzung
68 Neues Deutschland. 19 December 1967.
69 Neues Deutschland. 28 December 1967, p.4.
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before A n n a h eru n g .  For example, what until then had been the 
'German Issuing Bank,' was renamed ’State Bank of the GDR’ in 
December 1967, and the currency, previously the 'Mark of the 
German Issuing Bank,' became the 'Mark of the GDR.' This was 
apparently done so that 'the fact that we are dealing with the 
currency of our sovereign state of workers and farmers is clearly 
exp ressed .'70 Around the same time, two separate German teams 
entered the winter Olympics in Grenoble and later the summer 
games in Mexico City. As the Department for Sport commented, 
'This visibly underlined the existence of two German states and 
dealt a blow to Bonn’s claim to sole representation of the nation. 
The team has justified the trust placed in it through politically 
aware behaviour and good sporting achievements, and in this way 
contributed to raising the profile of the GDR.'71
However, regular reports by the Agitation Department entitled 
'Information about Questions, Arguments and Discussion among 
the Population,' highlighted the fact that the Party Conference had 
failed to clarify the national question.72 All-German opinions 
were viewed by the department with criticism, presumably due to 
the fact that individuals responsible for agitation, such as
Lamberz, did not share Ulbricht's view. Much confusion 
surrounded inner-Germ an relations, with both U lbricht's 
traditional line and the new fGDR-centric* line represented. On the
one hand, according to a report, 'The conclusion of the Party
Conference "What imperialism has broken up, the working class in 
both German states will reunite," is doubted. People are saying it 
will never happen.' Even the concept of 'Germany' was being
questioned and people were asking whether one could even still 
speak of 'Germany' at all. On the other hand, people also said 'We 
should not exaggerate the danger from the West German side too 
much. How will we reach an understanding if both sides 
constantly stress negative aspects?' There was further evidence
of confusion concerning the purpose of the exchange of 
correspondence with K iesinger, with some East Germans
70 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1265
71 ZPA NL182/1179
72 ZPA IV A2/902/44
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(mistakenly) believing the aim was to achieve reunification. But 
other people apparently thought it wrong to negotiate with a 
’confirmed Nazi.' The role of the SPD was also unclear and people 
had noticed that Ulbricht had reverted to the full name SPD, while 
only ’SPf appeared in the press.
A poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research on 
the subject of the population's willingness to defend the GDR 
militarily led to the conclusion that 'Opinion regarding West 
Germany is contradictory.' When asked whether they would be 
prepared to shoot at soldiers of the Bundeswehr  in the event of an 
attack by the Federal Republic, only about a third of respondents 
said they would. The accompanying commentary concluded,
'Obviously it can be seen from these figures  that amongst the
population the image of the enemy (Feindbild)  is not clear enough, 
and that certain illusions still exist, for example, that "they are 
also Germans," and there is still the belief that members of the 
B u n d esw e h r  cannot be equated with the government in Bonn or 
with West German imperialists.'73 According to reports from June 
1967, people did not understand why they could not freely travel 
to the Federal Republic. It is hard to believe that people really 
expressed the view, 'Let us just go over there. We want to 
propagate our example there,' as was claimed. More credible is 
the reports' admission that many people had not been taken in by 
propaganda and still believed that 'Everything is better in West 
Germany - an unemployed person there lives better than a 
worker here.’74
Following the Party Conference external developments occurred 
which were obviously beyond the SED's control. Correspondence 
between the two German governments continued to be fruitless 
due to both sides' unwillingness to give any ground. The SED 
officially adhered to Ulbricht's line, i.e. that only the normalisation 
of relations between the two states would ensure peaceful 
coexistence, which was a prerequisite for Anndherung, w h ic h  
would eventually lead to reunification on the basis of what they
73 ZPA IV A2/903/32
74 ZPA IV A2/903/32
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called democracy and socialism. In a letter to members of the 
CDU/CSU, the leadership alleged that the GDR had always acted in 
the interest of the nation and continued to deny any responsibility 
for the situation: 'Today the German nation would not be divided, 
and there would not be what is called the German question if 
presumptuous, imperialistic power-politicians had not put the 
nation on the line through bellicose adventures.'75 The ambiguous 
use of the term 'nation' here is noteworthy. It could either be 
taken at face value, i.e. that the nation was irreversibly split in 
two, or that although it was divided for the time being, one nation 
still existed, which remained Ulbricht's interpretation. An earlier 
draft of the letter mentioned above contained the phrase 'the two 
German nation states' though this was queried.76 The idea of one 
nation cropped up again in January 1968, when the Politburo 
drew up a treaty for the renunciation of force between the two 
German states, 'in order that an understanding.... in the interest of 
the future of the nation, could be encouraged.'77
Contact between the two governments continued in the form of 
letters exchanged between Stoph and Kiesinger, but in spite of 
their claims to have the same goal, namely reunification, their 
understandings of the word, and how it should be achieved, were 
so totally irreconcilable that no progress could be made. The 
government in Bonn undermined the East German regime by 
referring to it as 'Pankow.' In March 1968, Ulbricht attacked 
Kiesinger's 'Report on the state of the Nation '. Somewhat 
mockingly he said, 'To wait 23 years after the end of the Second 
World War before a West German Government put the state of the 
German nation onto the political agenda for the first time - that 
shows their shortcomings. All the more so, since as early as 1946, 
the state of the nation stood at the centre of the programme of the 
KPD, later the SED, and also all other anti-fascist parties and 
organisations.' He added, 'In the end, it is a matter of peace or 
war, of the existence or non-existence of the nation.'78 The speech
75 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1232
76 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1228
77 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1273
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was typical of U lbricht, stressing both the need for the
normalisation of relations and the goal of reunification. The claim 
to be acting in the interest of peace was often used to justify
policies in the 1960s, and Bonn's refusal to normalise relations
was portrayed as a danger to peace.79 The SED seemed to want it 
both ways. On the one hand they accused Bonn of a lack of 
commitment to genuine all-German objectives by simply looking
after their own interests and adhering to their claim to sole 
representation of the nation, while on the other hand denouncing 
all-German thinking among East Germans: 'Many academics,
artists, etc., are not yet tuned in to the class struggle; all-German
illusions have not yet been overcome.'80
By now, however, it was clear to the SED leadership that the SPD 
was not going to lead a socialist transformation of the Federal 
Republic. But what about 'the historic mission of our GDR, as the 
first socialist state on German soil, to be the example and bastion 
for the liberation from imperialism and militarism of the whole of
G erm any '?81 What about the bond of the entire German working
class? From this point, the emphasis was placed on the bond with 
the West German proletariat themselves, as opposed to their 
'right-wing Social Democrat leaders.’ The Central Committee wrote 
an open letter to the West German population, still using very 
pan-German language, but stating the usual prerequisites if the 
two states were to draw closer together, 'until the day when - 
under the leadership of the working class, in alliance with other 
workers - the whole German nation will show what Germans are 
capable of when they devote themselves totally to peace and 
social progress.'82 In December 1967, the State Secretariat for 
W est German Affairs drew up suggestions for cooperation 
between the GDR and 'progressive forces' in the Federal Republic 
and it was claimed that a so-called A n n e r k e n n u n g s p a r t e i ,  a 
movement for recognition, was growing.83
79 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1302
80 BArchP, D-2/16
81 BArchP, D-2/67
82 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1281
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Not surprisingly, the contradictions in the SED's proposals did not 
go unnoticed in the West. After Ulbricht’s new year message for 
1968, one West German journalist wrote:
With the formula "normalisation of relations between 
the two German states," the SED is making two totally 
irreconcilab le  dem ands. They are dem anding 
recognition in accordance with international law, as 
though they are a foreign country in order to complete 
their consolidation and the final division of Germany.
At the same time they do not want to be a foreign 
country, in order to use their status as a recognised 
independent state more energetically in an attempt to 
spread their power over the whole of Germany. Thus 
recognition is not the final goal for the SED, but a
halfw ay-house  The short term goal of the
recognition of the GDR and the long-term goal of a 
united communist Germany are at present running 
side-by-side. 84
A report from the State Secretariat for West German affairs seems 
to confirm this in response to the question, 'What does the
national mission of the GDR consist of?' The answer was at 
minimum peace and peaceful coexistence, and at maximum a 
socialist Germany.85
2: THE ’SOCIALIST STATE OF THE GERMAN NATION’ 
a") The New Constitution of 1968
In 1968, the old anti-fascist constitution, dating back to 1949, was 
replaced by a new ’socialist’ constitution. The latter was hailed by
Ulbricht as the most democratic constitution Germany had ever
h a d .86 At the Seventh Party Conference, it was decided that a
commission should draw up a draft version on behalf of the 
V o l k s k a m m e r , taking into account suggestions from the 
population. That the commission was chaired by Ulbricht, was
84 Renate Marbach, 'SED Nation,' Stuttgarter Nachrichten. 8 January 1968, 
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reflected in the finished product. The commission examined other 
constitutions, including those of the former East German Lander ,  
and looked at the work of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the subject. 
The leadership attempted to involve the population in the drafting 
of the constitution (for example, by holding discussion meetings 
and publishing articles in the press), and public interest was 
considerable. When the third constitution was ratified, a mere six 
years later, it was a different story.
In spite of diverging views within the ruling elite, which had 
emerged the previous year, the new constitution was a triumph 
for the traditionalist wing of the Party, and emphasised the aim of 
reunification and the unity of the German nation, based on the 
Marxist-Leninist belief in the unity of the German working class. 
Of relevance to this thesis are changes to the preamble and to 
articles one and eight. The new preamble began,
Impelled by the responsibility of showing the ent ire  
German nation the path into a future of peace and 
socialism  - in view of the historic fact that
imperialism  has split Germany in order to construct
West Germany as a base for imperialism and for the 
fight against socialism, which is contrary to the 
essential interests of the German nation - the people of 
the GDR have given them selves this socialist 
Constitution 87
Article 1 described the GDR as 'a socialist state o f  the German 
n a t io n ,’ replacing the original clause which stated that Germany 
was an indivisible democratic republic, composed of L a n d e r .  
However, it still maintained that there was only one German 
nationality. Article 8 contained the ultimate goal of reunification:
The establishment and cultivation of normal relations 
and cooperation between the two German states on the 
basis of equality are the national concern of the GDR.
The GDR and its citizens are striving beyond that 
towards overcoming the division of Germany forced 
upon the German nation by imperialism, and towards
87 Blumenwitz, What is Germany? pp.125-126, my italics.
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the step-by-step rapprochement of the two German 
states until their unification on the basis of democracy 
and socialism. 88
Thus the constitution made it clear that adherence to the unity of 
the German nation remained official policy, in spite of its division 
into two states,89 and appeared to demonstrate the pre-eminence 
of the traditional, all-German line over a more GDR-centric 
a lternative .
The referendum on the constitution held in April 1968 could 
hardly be called impartial, but then referenda rarely are. The 
Party encouraged people to vote in favour with slogans such as ’Do 
you want peace? Then vote yes to the socialist constitution of the 
GDR!’ or ’If you want your children to have a happy future, then 
say yes to the socialist constitution of the GDR!' The ballot paper 
was designed with a large circle labelled 'yes’ in the centre, and a 
small one labelled 'no' in the bottom right hand corner.90 The 
constitution was accepted by 94.49% of the electorate in the 
referendum ,91 which the SED portrayed as a sign of democracy in 
the GDR, in contrast to the West German Basic Law, which had 
never been put to the people.92 The decisive yes-vote was also 
used to show that the GDR was consolidated compared to the 
Federal Republic, which was experiencing serious unrest in 
1 9 6 8 .93 The referendum was followed by a campaign to 
popularise the constitution, which aimed to emphasise the 
importance of the first socialist state of the German nation for 
peace and security, to demonstrate socialist democracy in action, 
and to highlight the aggressive role of the West German SPD.94
The result was hailed as a socialist constitution for a sovereign 
socialist state which had become a permanent reality on the map
88 Blumenwitz, pp.125-126, my italics.
89 Confirmed by Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 4 May 1993.
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91 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.223
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93 Gerhard Kegel, 'Zur Deutschlandpolitik der beiden Deutschlands,' E inheit  
23 (1968): pp.734-43.
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of Europe.95 In view of the fact that 19 years had passed since 
the first constitution was ratified, during which time the existence 
of two German states had more or less become an accepted 
feature of the status quo in Europe, many of the changes were 
perfectly justifiable and long overdue. As Ulbricht noted, the 
conditions of 1949 clearly had been overtaken,96 and references 
to Germany as an indivisible republic contradicted the reality of 
the situation.
However, while the regime claimed that the GDR was a legitimate, 
sovereign state, its adherence to the long-term  goal of 
reunification somewhat contradicted this, implying that the 
current situation was only temporary. Also apparent was the 
fundamental problem of the GDR as both a socialist state and as a 
German state, and the incompatibility between socialist objectives 
and German ones. The constitution of 1968 was the only one to 
combine all these elements, resulting in visible contradictions, and 
it was becoming clear that a choice would have to be made
between socialism and a united Germany. In short, the 
constitu tion  reflected the divergent aims of the SED's
Deutschlandpoli t ik , and unresolved questions regarding the nature 
and future of the socialist German state.
Article 8 proved that overcoming the division remained official 
policy, at least so long as Ulbricht remained in charge. As he 
himself said, 'This article expresses our strong conviction that 
socialism will not make a detour around West Germany and that 
the day will come when West German workers and their allies,
together with us, will tread the road towards a united socialist
G e rm a n y .'97 Although the constitution was designed to fit the 
current stage of development of the GDR, it also functioned as a 
model for a future united Germany under the appropriate 
co n d itio n s.98 Unlike the realists among the ruling elite, Ulbricht 
could never be satisfied with total domination in only one zone of
95 ZPA NL182/1105
96 ZPA NL 182/1106
97 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1275
98 ZPA NL182/1106
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Germany, although he would not compromise and accept anything 
less than the socialist transformation of the Federal Republic just 
to bring about reunification. However, it seems that even he 
recognised the fact that this was not likely in the near future, 
hence the primary aim for the time being was to attain equal 
status for both German s ta tes ."
As a result, the constitution continued to challenge Bonn's claim to 
be the only true representative of the German nation: 'The draft 
constitution expresses a consciousness of the responsibility of the 
first socialist German state and its citizens to show the whole 
German nation the way to a future in peace, democracy, 
humanism and socialism .'100 Any suggestion that there was a 
separate nation in the GDR would have played into Bonn's hands 
and given the impression that the leadership had surrendered the 
West German proletariat and any claim to be their rightful rulers. 
However, the leadership denied that it was making any claim on 
the Federal Republic, on the grounds that it would never interfere 
with the internal affairs of the West German state. It was up to 
the working class there to bring about a 'dem ocratic 
transfo rm ation .'101
Even so, it could not be ignored that the regime had failed to 
achieve the reunification it had claimed was inevitable. To repel 
criticism, they denied responsibility for causing and maintaining 
the division, instead blaming it entirely on the so-called Anglo- 
American and West German imperialists. Apparently, their idea 
of reunification simply meant 'NATO tiber alles, '102 and due to 
their actions, the phrase 'Germany is an indivisible republic' had 
to be removed from the preamble of the constitution 'against our 
w ish e s .'103 That the new constitution would deepen the division 
and intensify tension was vehemently denied, indeed Bonn's 
failure to acknowledge reality, i.e. the existence of two sovereign 
German states, was portrayed as the main hindrance to
99 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 4 May 1993.
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d e ten te .104 In spite of the fact that the SED claimed to regret the 
existence of ’two independent states of the German nation, with 
opposing political and social orders,1 they claimed it was a 
historical fact that Bonn had to acknowledge, as the new 
constitution of the GDR had.105 Consequently, the normalisation of 
relations in the interest of peaceful coexistence remained the most 
pressing goal for the time being, as Article 8 stated.
During public discussion of the draft constitution, some people had 
even gone as far as to suggest that an independent nation had 
evolved in the GDR. Ulbricht tackled the issue at a meeting in East 
Berlin entitled 'Yes indeed, there is a German nation!1 which is 
worth looking at in detail. He explained,
Since the West German separatist state was formed 
and was detached from the German confederal state 
through the Paris Treaties, two states of the German
nation exist  Now the question is being asked in
public, what does the common ground of the nation 
consist of? It consists of the language - but there are 
also already different nuances - and the common past
of belonging to one state  If the question is raised as
to whether the German nation has a future, I reply, 
yes indeed, the German nation has a future - in the 
establishment of unity in one socialist Germany.106
Ulbricht went on to address the concept of the 'socialist state of 
the German nation':
The assumption that the GDR is a socialist state of the 
German nation precisely grasps what is historically 
new in the development of the German nation. This 
formula contains the decisive historical progress that 
determines the present in one part of the nation and
will determine the future of the whole nation.....
Therefore the time has come to fix in the constitution 
that our republic is a socialist state of the German 
nation, the first state in the history of Germany 
that acts entirely in the interest of the nation. But at
104 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1275
105 ZPA NL182/1106
106 ZPA NL 182/1107
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the same time, these words bear in mind that an 
imperialist state of the German nation exists in the 
form of the West German Federal Republic, which is 
contrary to the national interest. Thus the assumption 
of the constitution expresses the current reality in the 
struggle between socialism  and im perialism  on 
German so il.107
However, by this stage others wanted to take leave of the all- 
German orientation, not because they were against it in principle, 
but because it had become impractical.108 Even so, it is doubtful 
that even Honecker would have openly challenged Ulbricht at the 
t im e ,109 hence there is little evidence to suggest that the more 
pragmatic members of the Politburo - those who had initiated the 
V a ter la n d sd isku ss io n  and left their mark on the Seventh Party 
Conference - had much influence on the new constitution. They 
could at least console themselves with the fact that the 
constitution clearly stated that reunification was conditional on 
the ’democratic transformation’ of the Federal Republic, and it was 
implied that the preservation of the GDR’s social and political 
system would not be sacrificed in order to achieve reunification. 
Sceptics such as Paul Verner continued to stress the well-used 
phrase that East Germans were in every way boundt® the West 
German working class, but in no way bound to the imperialist 
regime in Bonn.110 Those who took the more GDR-centric view 
also knew that in 1968, there was little danger of Bonn giving any 
ground, and consequently little risk to the status quo. Generally, 
the line on the nation enshrined in the new constitution proved 
that Ulbricht was still not willing to abandon his dream of a united 
socialist Germany, and was still sufficiently powerful to get his 
own way. However, events would soon force him to change his 
mind, and challenge his very position of power.
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b) The Political Factors at Work
The new constitutional line on the nation seems like a regression 
to the days before the Seventh Party Conference, and out of step 
with other more pragmatic pronouncements of the period. Even 
so, there is no evidence to suggest that any member of the ruling 
elite disapproved of the phrase, 'socialist state of the German 
n a tio n .’111 The key factors were Ulbricht's personal convictions 
regarding the future of Germany, and his dominant role in the 
preparation of the constitution. Two other factors which appear to 
have helped shape the new constitution were the SED's need to 
win the allegiance of the population of the GDR, and to enhance 
the claim that it was a sovereign state.
Superficially at least, the Party tried to involve the population in 
the process of drafting the constitution, and it appears that they 
took considerable interest in the project, especially the sections on 
the future of Germany. In total, the Constitutional Commission 
received 10,237 suggestions from the public, which resulted in 
118 changes.112 However, the suggestions may well have been 
initiated by Party organisations, and such figures do not reveal 
the qualitative influence of the general public on the end result.
Even if an embryonic GDR-consciousness was developing, 
presumably the majority of the population did still consider 
reunification to be desirable. The Constitutional Commission 
stated that, 'The new socialist constitution's assertion that the GDR 
and its citizens are striving for the step-by-step A n n a h e r u n g  of 
both German states, until they unite on the basis of democracy 
and socialism, found broad support among the population.'113 For 
the leadership, this was fine, so long as people believed that 
socialism offered them a better chance in life than capitalism, that
111 According to Alfred Kosing, interview, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
^ 2  ZPA NL182/1107. For an extensive examination of the submissions from 
the public, see Jurgen Hofmann, ‘Studien zur Entwicklung der 
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it guarantied peace, and consequently, that the GDR provided the 
best model for a united German state. But according to reports, 
people continued to voice confusion regarding numerous issues 
such as how reunification could be achieved, the prospects for a 
confederation, whether the constitution deepened the division, the 
immediate future of German-German relations, and the question 
of the unity of the nation,114 which the leadership would have 
been foolish to ignore. Such doubts, many raised quite late in the 
propaganda campaign, prove that the ambiguous declarations of 
the leadership and its attempts to keep its options open failed to 
satisfy those who expected concrete answers.
During February and March 1968, shortly before the referendum, 
the Institute for Public Opinion Research undertook research into 
people’s views on the draft constitution. Two questions are of 
particular relevance to this study. Firstly, 'Does Article 8 of the 
constitution express your concept of reunification?' In February, 
80% of respondents said yes, in March 85%. According to the 
report, 'We can assume that an im portant reason for the 
agreement with Article 8 is to be found in the population's 
knowledge of the legitimacy of our social development and of the 
superiority and benefits of the socialist system.'115 A more likely 
explanation is that people approved of Article 8 because it 
supported reunification. Certainly the result of the next question 
suggests that, namely 'Which do you consider to be your 
fatherland, the GDR or all of Germany?' At first, 60% replied the 
latter, and later on in the campaign, 42% still did. It could hardly 
be denied that many people, especially the elderly, still retained 
'all-German illusions.' Polls in March suggested that the message 
that the GDR provided the best model for a united Germany was 
getting through, but propaganda campaigns needed to stress the 
concept of the GDR as fatherland, and the state’s 'historic mission.’ 
It was noted that the IMF would have to continue to monitor 
public opinion in this area.
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One question which appears to have originated from the public 
related to the name of the state. Among the submissions to the 
constitutional commission were suggestions to change the name to 
'Socialist German Democratic Republic,’116 'German Socialist 
Republic,' or 'Socialist Republic of Germany.’117 The commission 
considered the subject 'worthy of discussion,’ but decided to retain 
'German Democratic Republic' on the grounds that it had a 'good 
tradition, sounded honourable and was known worldwide, thanks 
to the patriotism of its citizens.' Furthermore, 'In every country 
and all corners of the earth.... people recognise this name and 
know it is the name of the good, peace-loving, democratic, socialist 
Germany.' Also, democracy was claimed to lie at the heart of 
socialism, while 'bourgeois democracy' was a contradiction in 
terms, hence 'the name GDR is totally appropriate for a socialist 
state of the German nation.' Finally, 'In 1946, the SED was the 
only German party to propose a constitution for a unitary "GDR." 
Therefore the good name of our republic is even today an 
obligation for us and all good Germans.' In any case, 'Socialist 
German Democratic Republic’ was considered to be too long.118
All in all, it seems likely that public opinion was being monitored 
in order to assess the level of popular acceptance of the official 
line on the nation, as laid down in the constitution, so that the SED 
could identify areas where propaganda needed to be improved. It 
would have been very unusual for the regime to have tailored its 
position to suit popular feeling.
The new socialist constitution was also designed to raise the GDR's 
international profile, in particular, to encourage the governments 
of other states to take up diplomatic relations with the GDR. The 
positive result of the referendum had apparently shown the world 
the legitimacy and sovereignty of the GDR, and that the only way 
to peace and security was via the normalisation of relations, which 
m eant recogn ition  and equal p a rtic ip a tio n  in g lobal
116 ZPA NL 182/1105
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organ isa tions.119 No doubt Moscow also wanted the international 
profile of its German ally raised to match that of America’s 
German ally, the Federal Republic, and to enhance the status of 
the Warsaw Pact as a whole. We know that Brezhnev was sent a 
copy of the proposed constitution,120 and there is no evidence to 
suggest that it did not meet with his approval.
c) Theoretical Input
While the constitutional commission did include some academics, 
they were heavily outnumbered by representatives from the 
Party, who ensured that the constitution was a totally political
document, which not only sought to define the GDR, but also laid 
out its political objectives for the future. Both academics and 
constitutional lawyers could see that it contained both all-German 
concepts and evidence of A b g r e n z u n g , but since the leadership 
was still keeping its options open and practising both, there was 
no way that these contradictions would be corrected. Alfred
Kosing m aintains that up to 1968, both politically  and 
theoretically, the view prevailed that the unity of the nation 
should be preserved, and knew of no suggestion to delete 
reunification as a long-term objective.121 However, due to the 
lack of progress and the unlikelihood of a confederation, theorists 
began question the validity of a theory which had grown out of 
the Soviet Union's original plan for a neutral, demilitarised,
unitary Germany. Furthermore, while Party functionaries had 
begun to think in terms of a much longer and more gradual 
process, even in the late 1960s, illusions continued regarding the 
prospects for social change in the Federal Republic.122
Among the reports of discussion of the draft constitution there are 
also questions raised by the intelligentsia. Some suggested that 
the new constitution would cement the division and make it
harder for the working class to reunite what the imperialists had
119 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1296
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121 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
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divided, as prophesied at the Seventh Party Conference. Also, not 
surprisingly, there was also confusion regarding Anndherung  and 
A b g r e n z u n g ,123 Generally, the public debate about the proposed 
constitution did provoke consideration of the German situation 
and the state of the nation, but theorists who openly criticised the 
official line, not because they did not share the desire to preserve 
the unity of the nation, but because it had become unrealistic, still 
risked being labelled disloyal and 'anti-national' and suffering the 
consequences, hence their ability to influence policy was 
lim ited .124
d) The 20th Anniversary of the GDR
On the first anniversary of the referendum, the Agitation 
Department proclaimed 'The constitution raised the international 
authority of the GDR as a sovereign state which shows the whole 
German nation the way into the future.’125 In October 1969, the 
SED and the people celebrated the 20th anniversary of the 
foundation of the GDR. Party propaganda stressed the 
achievements of the GDR and her claim to be a legitimate state, 
but still included all-German objectives. Officially, the intention 
was to strengthen the GDR, to fight against West German 
imperialism, and to demonstrate socialist internationalism and 
'moral and political unity of the people of the GDR.’126
Propaganda slogans devised for the anniversary included 'The SED 
and her allies are resolutely committed to a unitary democratic 
Germany,' 'Through the history of our people over many centuries, 
the GDR is the legitimate German state of peace, freedom, 
humanity and social justice,' and 'The GDR - homeland of the 
entire people. She is the socialist fatherland of us all.'127 In 
preparation for the anniversary, the A gitation Commission 
instructed the editors of Neues Deutschland  to emphasise 'so- 
called GDR-consciousness,' socialist internationalism as a practical
125 ZPA NL 182/1107
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task, a M arxist-Leninist world view, and to expose the real
en em y .128
The resulting celebrations sounded extremely nationalistic, with 
plenty of references to ’Germany’ and ’the Germans,' although 
peaceful coexistence was the immediate goal. Ulbricht proclaimed 
that the socialist German state was the conscience of the entire 
German nation.129 However, the amount of attention paid to 'GDR- 
consciousness' and the GDR as fatherland suggested that the 
realists were reasserting their influence, possibly through 
Lamberz, who was in charge of propaganda until 1908.
Afterwards, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was satisfied that the
20th anniversary had improved the worldwide image of the GDR 
as a secure, developed and dynamic socialist state, which had 
been reinforced by the demonstration of socialist patriotism and 
socialist state consciousness of the people.130 Ulbricht made a
great deal of the fact that the anniversary celebrations were 
attended by politicians and important persons from 84 countries, 
which he interpreted as a sign of the GDR's growing role in 
international life .131
Now that the GDR was officially a 'socialist state of the German 
nation,’ exactly what this meant for relations between the two 
German states was unclear. The leadership continued to accuse 
Bonn of using all-German pretences, especially German culture, to 
disguise their claim to sole representation of the nation. T o 
counteract this, Ulbricht wanted to step up the campaign to prove 
that the ’West German imperialists' had caused the division in the 
first place.132 He also launched a propaganda campaign with the 
aim of portraying West German nuclear policy as dicing with 
death and putting the future of the nation on the line.133
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Meanwhile, Ulbricht's stated short-term goal remained the same, 
namely the normalisation of relations between the two German 
states as the first step towards rapprochement. Moscow approved 
of this strategy, so long as it strengthened the international 
position of the GDR, served the interests of the community of 
socialist states and the long-term objectives laid out at the 
Seventh Party Conference, and generally secured socialism on 
German soil, and providing the government of the Federal 
Republic reversed its revanchist and militaristic policies.134
However, in spite of the all-German rhetoric, incidents between 
the two German states from the middle of 1968 until Autumn 
1969 suggest a policy of A b g ren zu n g  rather than A n n a h e r u n g . 
The GDR increased restrictions on travel between the Federal 
Republic and West Berlin; a huge row erupted over the proposed 
election of the Federal President in West Berlin; and a separate 
union of East German protestant churches was founded, severing 
ties with their West German counterparts.135 Furthermore, the 
presence of troops from the National People's Army during the 
crushing the Prague Spring increased the rift between the two 
s t a t e s . 136 The Czechoslovak experiment proved that an 
alternative socialism would not be tolerated by Moscow. This fact, 
soon to be known worldwide as the Brezhnev doctrine, also 
applied to the GDR, as Ulbricht was to about find out during his 
final years in power.
In short, by October 1969, the seeds of change in the SED's 
D eu ts ch la n d p o l i t ik  and the official line on the nation had been 
sown - at the Seventh Party Conference to be precise. However, in 
order to germinate, a change in the external climate was required, 
followed by a change of gardener, if the shoots of a new approach 
were to thrive. That new climate began within a month of the 
20th anniversary of the GDR.
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3: THE CHALLENGE OF BRANDTS OSTPOLITIK
al The SED's Initial Response to Brandt
In his governmental declaration of 28 October 1969, Brandt spoke 
of Tw o states of one nation,' and whether intentionally or not, 
effectively stole Ulbricht's argument. He declared his willingness 
to negotiate as equals, but ruled out full recognition because the 
two states existed under a kind of 'national umbrella* and could 
not be considered foreign to each other. As a result, a sudden 
change of tactics was necessary if the SED was to achieve its 
primary goal of recognition. However, although all the members 
of the ruling elite shared this goal, Ulbricht stood alone in 
believing that full recognition could lead to a relaxation of tension 
and A n n a h e r u n g .137 As a result, he still talked of 'the divided 
nation,' implying it could be reunited if the circumstances were 
right, whereas others now believed that it was time to concentrate 
on the future of the GDR. No doubt it pained Ulbricht to accept 
that the aim of a united socialist Germany had been just a dream, 
and to admit that socialism had not triumphed as he had 
predicted .
The SED's immediate response to Brandt's declaration was an 
increase in propaganda in support of recognition and the rejection 
of a special relationship between the two German states. The SED 
leadership claimed that in spite of his more flexible methods, 
Brandt was really just adhering to the principles of West German 
im perialism . They claim ed that Bonn's claim  to sole 
representation of the nation was still manifested in the use of 
D e u tsch la n d  as an abbreviation for the Federal Republic, in the 
failure to recognise the citizenship of the GDR, in their adherence 
to the borders of the German Reich of 1937, the use of phrases 
such as 'inner-German travel' and 'inner-German affairs,' in the 
blocking of the GDR's membership of international organisations, 
and even in the Deutsche Bundesbahn's treatment of Germany in
*37 Neues Deutschland. 24 October 1969.
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its en tirety .138 Reports in Neues Deutschland  were far from 
positive: The West German Federal Republic established itself as a 
separatist, imperialist state, while the GDR has developed into the 
socialist state of the German nation. "Germany as a whole" in the 
borders of 1937 only exists in the Federal Republic's weather 
fo recasts .'139 Members of the Central Committee must have been 
taken aback by an assessment of the new administration which 
read, 'Several times in his government declaration, Brandt 
conjured up the totally non-existent unity o f  the nation in order to 
arouse national feelings yet again.' His demand for self- 
determ ination for all Germans was counteracted with the 
argument that the citizens of the GDR had already exercised that 
right, whereas the West Germans had been denied it through the 
Paris Treaties.140
Erich Honecker was the first Politburo member to respond. He 
praised Brandt's acceptance of the existence of 'two German states 
within Germany' but still accused him of not really offering 
anything new (or rather, nothing of interest to the SED), on the 
grounds that in spite of the change of government, the Federal 
Republic was still a m onopoly-capitalist state and still 
ex p an sio n is t.141 Although he admitted that certain aspects of the 
declaration were worthy of consideration, Honecker suggested it 
would be better to concentrate on the objectives agreed at the 
Seventh Party Conference, namely on the all-round strengthening 
of the GDR and the campaign for international recognition, and to 
take a class-based view of the National Question. The SED's 
demands would remain unchanged, namely recognition of the 
GDR's sovereignty and equal status with the FRG.142 The prime 
minister, Willi Stoph commented that Brandt's recognition of the 
existence of two German states was a mere 20 years overdue, but
138 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1399
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nevertheless, was a sign of progress. However, they would judge 
Brandt not on his words, but on his deeds.143
Just how perturbed the SED leadership was by Brandt's approach 
is obvious from the amount of attention devoted to the subject at 
the twelfth meeting of the Central Committee in December 1969 
and during its preparation. It is surprising that it took a month 
and a half for an official response by Ulbricht, but naturally it had 
be agreed with the Soviet leadership first. In the first version of 
his speech to the Central Committee, Ulbricht accepted Brandt's 
idea of 'two states of one nation,’ - a concept he had himself 
advocated during the 1960s - but added, 'That means the German 
nation is divided.' Whether the division was permanent or only 
temporary, he did not make clear, although he accused Brandt of 
using the fact that both states were of the same nation as an 
excuse to interfere in the GDR's internal affairs, which implied that 
he personally still believed in the existence of that nation. 
However, while the 'one nation' aspect was of primary importance 
to Brandt, it was the existence of two states that was stressed by 
Ulbricht. He also suggested that maybe the reason why the 
Federal Republic accepted the Paris Treaties was because she no 
longer saw herself as a state of the German nation, implying that 
the GDR was still the one true German state, and referred to the 
constitutional aim of overcoming the division.144
The actual speech to the Central Committee was a mixture of 
familiar 'Ulbrichtisms' on the National Question, interspersed with 
new elements, in response to Brandt's governmental declaration. 
Ulbricht referred to the 'two very different states of the German 
nation,' and claimed that the fraternal relations between the SED 
and CPSU and the citizens of the two states were in accordance 
with the vital interests of the German nation, again implying that 
there was still only one. Furthermore,
As is written in our constitution, the GDR and its 
citizens are striving to overcome the division of
143 Willi Stoph, Rostock, 12 November 1969. Cited in Deutschland Archiv 2
(1969), p .1327.
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Germany, which was imposed by imperialism oh 
the German nation, and for the step-by-step coming 
together of the two German states until their 
reunification on the basis of democratic socialism.
That remains our clear national perspective. It was 
decided at the Seventh Conference of our party and is 
fully valid as before.145
Though he denied any special relationship, Ulbricht undermined 
this somewhat by saying, 'Certainly there can be special features 
in a normal diplomatic relationship between the GDR and the West 
German Federal Republic.... for example, politicians can negotiate 
with each other in their own language, although already, the 
extensive penetration of Americanisms into West German usage 
sometimes makes it difficult for us to understand this linguistic 
mixture.' However, in the same speech, he went on to make 
ambiguous statements such as,
Herr Willy Brandt himself has spoken of the existence 
of two states of the German nation.... This means Herr 
Brandt also knows full well that the nation is
divided  Herr Brandt was realistic enough not to talk
about the establishment of the unity of Germany. 
Apparently he also understands that with a Federal 
R epublic under the leadersh ip  of m onopoly
cap ita lists  the prerequisites for the unity of
Germany are lacking. 146
Ulbricht also included a large portion of a speech made at a 
meeting of Warsaw Pact members in Moscow ten days earlier 
regarding 'the enigmatic area of the term "Germany".’ He 
criticised the press of other countries for using the term 'Germany' 
in ways contrary to the SED's usage, for example, to refer to the 
Federal Republic alone, or as though a unitary state called 
Germany still existed. Furthermore,
In view of them having grown far apart, it is illusory 
to try to construct artificially a joint umbrella arching 
over the first German peace state, the GDR, and the
145 ZPA IV 2/1/402
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West German Federal Republic, which is ruled by 
militaristic and monopoly-capitalist forces, roughly in 
the sense of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
nation. 147
Interestingly, Ulbricht admitted that the bloc system in Europe 
determ ined the national question, not nation  theories. 
Consequently, the 'solution to the German Question1 was 'a 
regulated, peaceful existence next to each other on the basis of 
equality and mutual diplomatic recognition by the GDR and FRG.' 
Most importantly, he concluded, 'We regard the declaration by the 
government of the FRG regarding the existence of two German 
states as a step forward. It is de facto recognition of the GDR'.148
A few days after the meeting of the Central Committee, Ulbricht 
sent a letter to the new Federal president, Gustav Heinemann, in 
which he proposed a treaty between the two states which would 
normalise their relations on the basis of equality, and suggested 
they apply to join the UN.149 In his reply, Heinemann stated, 'The 
preservation of the unity of the German nation is our joint 
co n ce rn .'150 Brandt rejected Ulbricht's proposal in January 1970, 
and suggested instead the exchange of mutual declarations 
renouncing the use of force, but the latter responded by 
demanding diplomatic recognition of the GDR by the Federal 
Republic as a prerequisite. In a press article shortly after the 
letter to Heinemann, Hermann Axen went further, describing 
Bonn's proclaimed desire to preserve the unity of the nation as 
the same old revanchist 'claim to sole representation,' and 'cynical 
demagogy' by those who had originally divided the nation and 
then deepened and cemented it. Furthermore, 'Nationalistic talk 
of so-called "inner-German relations" and the allegedly still 
existing "unity of the nation" aims to stir up nationalism and to 
serve the ideological-political preparation of plans for the 
subjugation of the GDR.'151 Clearly Axen realised that the
147 ZPA IV 2/1/402
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adherence to the unity of the German nation was undermining the 
GDR's claim to be a legitimate sovereign state.
What motivated the SED's response to Brandt's declaration? The 
SED's official line was that in spite of a new vocabulary and more 
flexible methods, Brandt still had the same old goals, namely to 
continue the Federal Republic's claim to sole representation of the 
nation, to undermine the GDR, and to represent the interests of 
N A T O ,152 but even so, it seems that his declaration in October 
1969 deeply disturbed the leadership of the SED, and no doubt of 
the CPSU. Four factors can be identified which to varying degrees 
influenced the SED's reaction. However, these factors often 
worked against each other, hence inconsistencies in official policy 
continued. First and foremost, pragmatism, i.e. the need to refute 
anything that undermined the GDR’s claim to be an independent 
sovereign state, even the unity of the nation if necessary; 
secondly, Moscow's refusal to allow Ulbricht to make concessions 
to Brandt, which clashed with the third factor, namely Ulbricht's 
reluctance to accept that his dream of a united socialist Germany 
would never come true; and fourthly, the interest generated by 
Brandt among the citizens of the GDR. Let us briefly examine each 
of these factors in turn.
After waging war against the CDU/CSU for 20 years, the SED 
leadership welcomed their exclusion from government at long last. 
They portrayed the SPD's victory as indicative of West Germans' 
desire for a change of course, including regarding the German 
Q u estio n .153 However, following its participation in the Grand 
Coalition, the SPD was certainly not seen as an ally. Brandt's
Ostpolitik put the SED on the defensive, in fact, throughout his
first year in office, relations between the two states almost
functioned like a tennis match, though Brandt was always serving
and the SED receiving. His acceptance of the existence of two 
German states and proposals for an exchange of views on a non- 
discriminatory basis made it harder for the SED to decline talks, 
hence the latter stressed that the SPD was using new methods to
152 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1405
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achieve the same objectives simply because the old ones had 
fa iled .154
In reality, however, the time for utopianism and procrastination
was over, and the leadership would soon have to choose between 
adherence to the unitary German nation and non-recognition of 
the GDR on the one hand, and a more pragmatic approach on the
other, which necessitated the denial of the existence of one
German nation to support the claim of sovereignty. Naturally the 
Party leadership was bound to reject any proposals which they
believed undermined the GDR, although traditionalists like 
Ulbricht were reluctant to do anything that would completely rule 
out a unified socialist German state. Sadly records of discussion of 
this matter within the Politburo do not exist, but versions of 
speeches do, and they indicate uncertainty as to how to react to 
Brandt’s ideas, and a sense that the leadership was being
overtaken by events more quickly than it could formulate
responses to them. It seems that this may well have been the
turning point in the SED's policy on the German nation, or at very
least, it forced them to set off on the road leading to an
unavoidable choice between one German nation or two.
Naturally the leadership of the SED could not act without first
consulting Moscow. At the Warsaw Pact meeting in December
1969, Brezhnev warned that Brandt was working in alliance with 
other NATO states which sought to undermine the socialist 
com m unity, hence his m otives were not to be trusted.
Furthermore, Bonn had not really changed course:
Their phrasing is really demagogic - it is temptingly 
p resen ted  in increasing ly  foggy form s, and 
nationalistic.... The imperialists are afraid - they see 
the GDR developing further and becoming permanent, 
and know that the longer this development goes on, 
the more secure the GDR becomes. Therefore they are 
determined to penetrate the GDR and the feelings and 
thoughts of its citizens. 155
154 Lippmann, H onecker. p.209.
155 IPA NL2/32
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Bonn was apparently trying to split the socialist block via separate 
treaties with individual states, but Brezhnev reminded his allies 
that they were all in it together, and added, The image of the GDR 
is the result of our joint policies,' as was the new attitude of the 
Federal Republic, or so he claimed.156 This was a warning, in case 
U lbricht was considering independent initiatives. Finally, 
according to the Soviet leader,
Imperialism has divided Germany and the German 
people. Brandt's government is now trying to put its 
hope in the national sentiment of the Germans via 
s e lf - r ig h te o u s  su g g e s tio n s  o f a n a tio n a l 
rapprochement. But there can be no return to the 
past. As our German friends again declared, the 
reunification of Germany is only possible on the basis 
of democracy and socialism .157
After all that had been said, one wonders why Brezhnev even 
mentioned reunification, though he reinforced the fact that there 
could be no compromise here, or rather, that he would never 
allow it. At the same meeting, a suggestion from the Yugoslav 
delegation highlighted the ambiguity of the GDR's international 
position and the need for clarification. They suggested that at the 
European Economic Commission, the representatives of both 
German states would sit behind one sign bearing the word 
'G erm any.'158
Ulbricht's reluctance to give up his dream remained an obstacle, 
though he too must have realised by this time that a more 
pragmatic approach was required if the GDR was to gain 
recognition. However, as mentioned earlier, by agreeing that 
there were two states of the German nation, Brandt had stolen 
Ulbricht’s argument, thereby forcing the latter to look for a new 
one. At this stage, Ulbricht was attempting to keep his options 
open, hence his initial response was ambiguous, with frequent 
references to the divided German nation and the constitutional
156 IPA NL2/32
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aim of reunification , on condition that the 'dem ocratic 
transformation' of the Federal Republic took place.
East Germans were all the more receptive to Brandt's statement 
following a winter of shortages and low morale, and not 
surprisingly, hoped that a better understanding between the two 
German states would lead to greater freedoms.159 Consequently, 
the SED needed to take a firm line 'in order to put a damper on 
the detente-euphoria among the population.'160 Furthermore, it 
has been said that the political stance of top functionaries was 
determined by how much their own department was affected by a 
measure, and by how much they knew, especially concerning the 
public mood, hence Honecker's immediate, firm response was 
probably due to the fact that he knew talks with the Federal 
Republic could lead to unrest, unrealistic hopes and the 
destruction of the SED's carefully cultivated Feindbild.161 A report 
on the results of the ideological training year (P a r te i leh r ja h r )  
1969/70 admitted that the Party had failed to find convincing 
arguments to counteract the 'changed methods of the imperialists' 
fight against socialism as expressed by the "new O stpo l i t ik" . '162 
Clearly, even after 20 years, the independence and permanence of 
the GDR had not yet been established in the minds of the 
population, hence drastic measures would be required to sever 
the tie with the other German state for good.
b) Ulbricht's Rejection of the Unitary German Nation
On 19 January 1970, Ulbricht held a press conference in response 
to Brandt's recent 'Report on the State of the Nation.' For the first 
time, he unambiguously portrayed Brandt’s adherence to the 
unity of the nation as unrealistic and even hypocritical, in view of 
his adherence to the Paris Treaties which had apparently 
cemented the division, and as a device to avoid the normalisation 
of relations. Furthermore, 'The West German chancellor refuted
159 Lippmann, H onecker. pp.209, 213.
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his own rhetoric concerning the unity of the German nation, when 
he stated that there are two German states with opposing social 
orders, and when he justified integration into the western 
im perialist alliance system and expressly rejected a German 
n a tio n -s ta te .’163 Suddenly, Ulbricht seemed to have abandoned
his own argument of the national bond of the German working 
class. He even claimed that it was not possible to defend a unity 
that had not existed for 20 years,164 although that was what he 
personally had done until this point! Finally he questioned the 
Federal Republic's legitimacy as a German state, calling it merely 
'a capitalist NATO state' and 'a state with limited national 
sovereignty.' From this point, the GDR was officially called the 
'socialist German nation-state,' as opposed to the 'socialist state of 
the German nation.'165
Ulbricht welcomed the fact that Brandt had recognised a great 
deal - the existence of two German states, the fact that their 
relations were bad or rather non-existent, the fact that it would
not be possible to overcome the division for the foreseeable 
future, and that the western powers were not keen on the idea of 
a reunification anyway, and finally that two different social 
systems could not be merged. Nevertheless, he claimed it was 
regrettable that Brandt chose to 'avoid the consequences of this 
realisation,' i.e. that it was time for mutual recognition. However, 
true to form, he added, 'As our constitution says, we hope that the 
nation that was divided by imperialism, both German states and 
their citizens, will one day grow closer together on the basis of 
democracy and socialism, and maybe will find themselves 
together again.'166 According to Ulbricht, 'Since the foundation of
Bismarck's empire, the problem of the German nation  has
consisted of overcoming the feudal, militaristic, later monopoly­
capitalist and anti-democratic state order.'167
163 Neues Deutschland. 20 January 1970. For more detail on the press 
conference see Deutschland Archiv 3 (1970): pp.187-195.
164 Neues Deutschland. 20 January 1970.
165 Neues Deutschland. 20 January 1970.
166 Neues Deutschland. 20 January 1970.
167 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1416
127
What can we conclude from the press conference in January 
1970? Clearly many of Ulbricht's comments were pretty radical 
for him and indicate that even he had felt obliged to reconsider 
his position following Brandt's declaration. He adopted a 
noticeably more pragmatic approach, putting the interests of the 
GDR first, although his tendency to refer to the possibility of 
A n n d h e r u n g  and the constitutional imperative of reunification 
indicated just how hard it was for him to give up hope entirely. 
That his arguments were not always convincing or well thought 
out, no doubt had something to do with the fact that he had to 
respond so promptly. The intention may also have been to warn 
other Eastern Bloc states of the dangers of Brandt's more 
c o n c il ia to ry  a p p ro a c h .168 However, it must always be 
remembered that the GDR was never an independent actor on the 
international stage, as Ulbricht was about to find out.
Just what other members of the Politburo thought of Brandt's 
comments is hard to assess due to a lack of records and the fact 
that Ulbricht saw relations with Bonn as his own domain. Those 
close to Moscow, such as Honecker, had lost interest in the Federal 
Republic several years earlier, preferring to concentrate on 
consolidating socialism and securing international recognition of 
the GDR. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Otto
Winzer, the question of the unity of the nation was insignificant: 
'Mutual diplomatic recognition is an elementary condition for the 
establishment of relations between sovereign states. Whether 
they are nation-states, nationality-states or states whose 
population  includes ju s t part of a nation is en tirely
in s ig n i f i c a n t . '169 Hermann Axen stressed that the national 
question was a question of class and added, 'German imperialism 
divided the German nation and as long as imperialism rules West
Germany there cannot and will not be a unitary German nation,'
hence the unity of Germany was not on the political agenda.170 
For Albert Norden, who had been reprimanded by Ulbricht for 
questioning the unity of the nation prematurely, it was the ideal
168 Kupper, 'Political Relations,' p.297.
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opportunity to voice his long-held view. He claimed that out of 
pure class interest, the West German monopoly-capitalists had 
destroyed the unity of the nation and therefore one could not 
preserve what no longer existed.
c") Erfurt and Kassel
Brandt suggested negotiations on the exchange of documents 
renouncing force to Willi Stoph, eventually resulting in the historic 
meeting in Erfurt on 19 March 1970, which aroused great interest 
among the town's population. Ulbricht claimed that the aim of the 
talks was to achieve normal, peaceful, diplomatic relations and to 
relax tension between the two states,171 though doubtless he 
personally still hoped this would eventually bring them closer 
together. The fact that the meeting took place at all was quite 
something, indeed it nearly did not, due to a row concerning 
Brandt's plan to travel via West Berlin.172
Although many practical aspects of the relationship between the 
two states were also addressed in Erfurt, we shall concentrate on 
the issue of the German nation.173 In the first version of his 
speech (which was naturally prepared before he had heard what 
Brandt had to say), Stoph stated, 'It would be groundless to talk 
about a "unity of the nation" which, through no fault of our own, 
has not existed for a long time.'174 He seemed to be saying that 
the nation had been irrevocably torn apart by the foundation of 
the Federal Republic in 1949, which contradicted the line which 
had been official policy until the previous year. In the revised 
version, he did not deny that the populations of both states were 
both German, but argued,
It is futile to try to disguise the refusal to establish
diplomatic relations with the formula "we are still all
Germans." The issue is not so simple. Since the
171 Neues Deutschland. 19 March 1970.
172 See Ilse Spittmann, 'Deutscher Gipfel in Erfurt,’ Deutschland Archiv 3
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beginning of the last century, there have always been 
Germans who stood on the side of progress, the 
working class and working people, and others who 
stood on the side of reaction and capitalism .175
Nevertheless, he said the SED hoped for the victory of socialism 
everywhere, including in the Federal Republic, which could 
facilitate reunification, but this was not to be included in the 
negotiations on their relationship at E rfurt.176 This does seem 
rather strange after he had denied that anything connected the 
two states, but may have been included at the insistence of 
Ulbricht.
Stoph prepared an answer to all the possible arguments that 
Brandt might use to evade the establishment of normal relations, 
most significantly, the existence of one German nation. But there 
were signs that his position and its consequences had not been 
sufficiently thought through. Though the unity of the nation was 
denied, for some reason they did not go one step further to talk of 
two German nations or two entirely separate nations. Instead, the 
result of the ’division of the nation' was 'two autonomous states 
with opposing social orders.'177
Shortly before Erfurt, the press was instructed to emphasise that 
the recognition of the GDR and the maintenance of the status quo 
was in the interest of peace and security in Europe, that the 
national question was a question of class, and that West German 
imperialists were responsible for detaching the West German state 
from the 'German national union,' which in turn led to the 
'liquidation of the German nation.'178 These were strong words, 
with an air of finality that had not been present earlier, when 
propaganda had adhered to the line enshrined in the constitution. 
Even so, a day before the meeting in Erfurt, Neues Deutschland
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attempted to portray the SED's line as consistent.179 The press 
was also told to underline the danger posed to peace and security 
in Europe by the West German government's 'aggressive and 
revanchist policies,'180 and to emphasise that Erfurt had been the 
SED's initiative.181
After the meeting, Stoph concluded, 'There is no such state as 
Germany, therefore there can be no special or particular 
conditions in the relationship between our two states.’182 The 
Politburo discussed the problems arising from Erfurt in a closed 
session on 24 March 1970, but unfortunately there is no record of 
exactly what was said. The fact that Brandt was accompanied by 
the M inister for Inner-German Affairs and not the foreign 
minister was criticised by the leadership of the GDR as a sign that 
nothing had really changed.183 While Brandt had regarded Erfurt 
as proof of 'the reality of the unity of the nation,' Axen believed it 
showed the reality that there was no unitary German nation, but 
instead  two fundam entally  d ifferen t states which were 
independent of each other and sovereign.184 Like others, he 
seemed to be confusing nation and state - evidence of the lack of 
theoretical consideration of the state of the German nation. Axen 
also viewed Erfurt not as a meeting of two German heads of 
government but 'the first meeting, at the insistence and initiative 
of the GDR, between the socialist GDR and the monopoly-capitalist 
Federal Republic and their leaders.'185
A new set of guidelines for the press from the agitation 
department placed more emphasis on strengthening the GDR and 
the equation of the state and socialism with peace and security, 
and of the Federal Republic with revanchism and conflict. Brandt 
was to be portrayed as merely pursuing the same goals as the
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CDU/CSU before him, but with different methods. Peaceful 
coexistence rather than reunification seemed to be the main 
o b je c t iv e .186 However, the problem of the enthusiasm of the
crowd for Brandt had to be addressed. The Party claimed that the 
majority of the people on the streets were demonstrating in 
favour of the recognition of the GDR and supported the line of the 
Party leadership. West German journalists were accused of
organising the demonstration of support for Brandt, and of 
encouraging a minority of 'hostile elements' to cause trouble, who 
were 'mainly young people who had not been sufficiently
politically influenced by us.'187
After Erfurt, few people would have expected much to come of the 
meeting in Kassel two months later, not even Stoph himself, who 
had already prepared a closing speech assuming that Bonn had
refused to recognise the GDR.188 (In fact Brandt produced a 20 
point plan for the regulation of their relations on the basis of 
e q u a l i ty .189) In his opening speech, Stoph declared that the
destruction of the unity of the nation by imperialism could not be 
undone via 'conceptual constructions professing a fictitious 
continued existence of the unity of the nation' and he accused 
Bonn of 'misusing national feelings for non-peaceful purposes.' 
Furthermore, 'there will never be an "inner-German umbrella" 
through which NATO can enter the community of socialist 
s ta tes .'190
The State Secretariat for West German A ffairs prepared
arguments to counteract those that they expected Brandt to make 
in Kassel. If he said that by rejecting a special relationship, the 
GDR was contradicting its own constitution in which it was
described as a 'socialist state of the German nation,' Stoph was
simply to respond that imperialism had destroyed the unity of the 
nation and that independent sovereign states now existed on 
German soil. He would point out that according to the constitution,
186 ZPA IV 2/2033/33
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the unity of the nation would only be possible on the basis of
socialism, hence to talk about the possibility of reunification
would be totally unrealistic at this time. Therefore, it would be 
totally wrong for Bonn to try to use the constitution of the GDR to 
justify a special relationship between the two states.191 If Brandt 
argued that full diplomatic recognition was impossible due to the 
need to safeguard the unity of the nation, Stoph would reply that
it was impossible to safeguard something that did not exist, and
that due to their opposing social orders, the prerequisites for 
unification did not exist, hence peaceful coexistence was the best 
situation that could be hoped for.192 The counter-arguments were 
somewhat evasive, and Stoph also seemed to be using the division 
of Germany as a state, and the division of the unity of the nation 
interchangeably. But at least the SED's objectives and arguments 
were more compatible than they had been until this point.
After the meeting, the East German side blamed the inevitable 
lack of progress on Bonn’s intransigence and used the presence of 
demonstrators in Kassel to show the Federal Republic in a poor 
light. In an assessment of the meeting by the Politburo, it was 
seen as ironic that those who had destroyed the unity of the 
nation and made West Germany a foreign country to the GDR 
should use the formula of one German nation. They now called 
the GDR the 'socialist German nation-state' on the grounds that she 
had learnt the lessons of history, implemented the Potsdam 
Protocol and was ruled by the working class, who had apparently 
freely chosen to tread the road to socialism. In contrast, the 
Federal Republic was merely an 'im perialist N A TO -state.'193 
Brandt's use of 'the unity of the German nation’ was labelled a 
sign of nationalism and expansionism, which showed that Bonn 
was still trying to keep open the possibility of assimilating the 
GDR into the Federal Republic (which was essentially true of 
course).194
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Kassel also dominated the 13th meeting of the Central Committee 
in June 1970. The above arguments concerning the motivation 
behind Brandt's concept of the 'unity of the German nation' were 
voiced by several leading functionaries, who had less scruples 
about breaking with past positions than Ulbricht. Norden, a critic 
of the traditional approach, claimed Brandt's concept 'contradicted 
political and social reality,' and said that anyone who claimed that 
it corresponded to the position expressed in the constitution of the 
GDR obviously could not read, since it clearly stated that a unity 
would only be possible on the basis of democracy and 
soc ia lism .195 Stoph said that the concept falsified history and just 
aimed to deceive people, and that the unity of the nation had 
actually not existed since the foundation of the Federal Republic 
and the ratification of the Paris Treaties.196
It should be remembered, however, that Ulbricht was personally 
very keen to negotiate with Brandt. In his speech to the Central 
Committee he concentrated on the undeniable existence of two 
German states, but made no mention of the nation. Ironically he 
claimed that Bonn’s discrimination against the GDR and its citizens 
had 'constructed a barrier of hostility between the two German 
states, which was, so to speak, the cement with which the division 
was cem ented'!197 He attempted to play down features common 
to both states, such as language and culture, saying that 'one can 
no longer speak of a common German language - there is a huge 
difference between the traditional German language of Goethe, 
Schiller, Lessing, Marx and Engels, which is full of humanism, and 
language which has been contaminated by im perialism  and 
manipulated by capitalism .’198 He dismissed the significance of 
family ties with the argument that 'the two German states and 
their social orders are not related at all.' According to Ulbricht, 
decisive feelings were not those between relatives but feelings of 
hatred for imperialism, militarism, neo-nazism and the forces in 
the Federal Republic who had divided Germany and damaged the
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GDR whenever they could.199 He also refuted Bonn’s demand for 
the right to self-determination for all Germans with the argument 
that the citizens of the GDR had already used that right when they 
accepted the new socialist constitution.200
d) Explaining the Dramatic U-turn
Little was achieved at Erfurt and Kassel because both sides 
arrived with different objectives regarding the nature of their 
relationship. The leadership of the SED admitted that the 'central 
issue' ('Kern/rage') was the full diplomatic recognition of the GDR 
by the Federal Republic,201 and even Ulbricht publicly put the 
immediate goal of recognition before reunification, although later 
comments suggest that the latter remained in the back of his 
mind. At last the realisation that something would have to be 
given up seemed to be sinking in, at least to some members of the 
leading elite, and since Brandt based his argument for a special 
relationship which ruled out full diplomatic recognition on the fact 
that both states were of one nation, and could not consider the 
other foreign, it was this argument which had to be refuted. Even 
so, it was important that the SED was not seen as the inflexible 
party, or as endangering peace. However, their continuation of a 
policy of Abgrenzung  was highlighted by the fact that from July 
1970, all exports bore the words 'Made in the GDR,' as opposed to 
'Made in Germany.'
In actual fact, direct negotiations were probably doomed from the 
start because the Soviet leadership was opposed to the idea on the 
grounds that they contradicted the policy of A bgrenzung .  Those 
close to Moscow within the SED, such as Honecker, shared this 
view and thought nothing could be achieved in this way, although 
they were not able to say so openly while Ulbricht remained in 
p o w e r .202 Consequently, Moscow insisted that Stoph should 
represent the GDR - officially on the grounds that Brandt was not
199 ZPA IV 2/1/408
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the head of state, but no doubt also because they feared Ulbricht 
would try to find out how far Brandt would go towards a 
confederation and would give too much ground.203 However, 
Brezhnev, who wanted to emphasise the co-operation and unity of 
the SED and CPSU regarding the German question, regarded Erfurt 
as having at least achieved one thing, namely the acceptance of 
the existence of two German states by Brandt.204
It is widely believed that in the late 1960s, U lbricht was 
beginning to overestimate his own importance within the Warsaw 
Pact, even in relation to the Kremlin.205 However, due to recent 
experience, Moscow was no longer prepared to allow its satellites 
the freedom to act without prior consultation. Consequently, a 
confrontation occurred between Brezhnev and Ulbricht just before 
the Warsaw Pact meeting in August 1970, where the former made 
it clear to the veteran leader of the GDR, whose days were already 
numbered, that the Brezhnev Doctrine did not only apply in 
Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev’s aim was to cement the status quo in 
Europe, thus preserving the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, 
and Ulbricht’s dream of German reunification simply no longer 
fitted in with this plan. The impact of this meeting is apparent 
from the change of tone in Ulbricht's letters and speeches 
afterwards, in particular, the increased emphasis on the GDR's 
allegiance to the Soviet Union.
In an exchange between Brezhnev and Honecker from July 1970, 
the Soviet line was clear: there could be no form of unity between 
the socialist GDR and the capitalist Federal Republic. According to 
Brezhnev, nothing favourable came out of Erfurt and Kassel 
because 'Brandt has different goals to us regarding the GDR.' No 
doubt the Soviet leader had Ulbricht in mind when he criticised 'a 
certain air of superiority among you towards other socialist 
countries.... also towards us,' and he warned against unilateral 
action on the part of the GDR:
203 Interviews with Afred Neumann, Berlin, 7 April 1993, and Manfred 
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Erich - I'll be frank - never forget that without us, the 
Soviet Union, with our power and strength, the GDR 
would not exist. Without us there would be no GDR.
The existence of the GDR is in accordance with our 
interests and those of all socialist states. She is the 
result of our victory over Hitler’s Germany. Germany 
does not exist any^more and it is better that way.
There is the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG.
Why is there suddenly a problem?  The enemy will
try to drive a wedge between us, but will not be 
allowed to succeed.206
In August delegations from the SED and CPSU met to discuss the 
future of relations between the two German states and possible 
treaties with the Federal Republic. Brandt's concept of the unity 
of the nation was described as unrealistic: 'The destruction of the 
unity of the nation goes back to the military defeat of Hitler's 
Germany. It was finally laid down in the Federal Republic's Paris 
Treaties with the USA, Britain and France.'207 The key to policy 
was to be the sovereignty of the GDR, and Ulbricht had to agree 
that he would not behave in a conciliatory manner towards the 
Federal Republic,208 which meant abandoning his long-held hope 
of Annaherung , and agreed to cooperate fully with Moscow on the 
issue. It is alleged that during a tete-a-tete, Brezhnev warned 
Ulbricht that the GDR's economic ties to the Soviet Union would 
have to be strengthened if he wished to remain in office. Ulbricht 
had to accept this, but resented the attack on the GDR’s freedom to 
manoeuvre, saying, 'During cooperation we want to develop as a
t?eloruss»'a-
genuine German state. We are not Byelorus, we are not a province 
of the Soviet Union.’209 He is reported to have also said that 
although the CPSU had Lenin, his party and country had Marx and 
E n g e ls .210 Such comments were used by Honecker to lower 
Brezhnev's opinion of Ulbricht.
2°6 peter Przybylski, Tatort Politburo. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1992), vol. 1: Die Akte 
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After three months of negotiations, Brandt visited Moscow in 
August, resulting in the signing of a treaty to normalise their
relationship. In a separate 'Letter regarding German unity,' Bonn 
repeated that the treaty did not contradict the ultimate aim of
German reunification.211 In the East German press, the treaty was
officially hailed as a great success for the Soviet Union, and by 
accepting the inviolability of borders, including the one dividing 
the two German states, as laying the path for the normalisation of 
relations between the GDR and FRG.212
Ulbricht must have felt insulted by his exclusion from the
negotiations. In a letter from October 1970, Brezhnev warned him 
that Brandt's slogans such as the special character of relations 
between the two German states and the so-called unity of the
nation were just an attempt to shake the social and economic
foundations of the GDR, hence a consistent policy of Abgrenzung  
was the only answer to what he called 'the nationalistic and anti­
communist tendencies of the policies of the FRG.'213 Ulbricht had
little choice but to agree to support the campaign to secure
socialism in Europe and the GDR's permanent place in the socialist 
bloc, thus ending any chance of compromise with Brandt,214 
although he himself rarely used the term Abgrenzung .215
Nevertheless, in November Ulbricht conceded 'there is nothing 
"inner-German" left.' Furthermore,
When Herr Brandt speaks of the German nation, he 
speaks of some sort of fata morgana, so to speak, that 
floats somewhere in the sky. When one asks him what 
this nation actually consists of in his opinion, he cannot 
offer a single argument, because there is no common 
economic area, but two separate social orders, opposed 
in principle; there is no common state, but instead two, 
which are principally opposed to each other; and there
211 See Dokumentation zur Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung (Leek, 1988), 
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is no longer a common culture, for this squalid,
am ericanised W est German culture cannot be 
described as German culture. That is merely what 
Brandt earlier called 'the blue sky over the Ruhr.’ In 
place of 'the blue sky over the Ruhr,' he now calls it 
'nation.' 216
The contrast to Ulbricht's proclamations just over a year earlier is 
striking. Although it is hard to believe that he had really changed 
his mind, it illustrates the fact that he was prepared to give up his 
convictions to enhance the legitimacy of the GDR as a sovereign 
state, and to save his own skin.
Just how much public opinion affected the Party line on the nation
at this point is hard to judge. On the basis of opinion poll data and
the reaction of the population of Erfurt to Brandt, the SED must 
have known that even though reunification was looking 
increasingly unlikely, most people still hoped for a closer 
relationship with the Federal Republic, which for them was not 
just another neighbouring state. Opinion polls conducted in the
summer of 1970 showed that not everyone agreed that 
recognition was an essential prerequisite for an improvement in 
relations, nor were they convinced that socialism would triumph 
in West Germany, as the SED had always predicted.217
e) Theoretical Input
It does not appear to be the case that the SED's reaction to 
Brandt's statements was the result of a theoretical examination of 
the situation. More likely was that the leadership suddenly had to 
cobble together a response without having time for serious 
analysis or discussion, and there is no evidence that those best 
able to do this were consulted. Indeed it was only after the Party 
had changed course that their services were required, once the 
Party recognised the need for a theoretical justification for the 
dramatic change in policy.
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Albert Norden, who was not only a highly dogmatic functionary, 
but also a professor, now used a Marxist-Leninist argument to 
deny the unity of the nation, which was soon taken up by 
Honecker. Instead of Ulbricht's argument that the German nation 
was maintained by the working class in both German states, he 
argued,
The content of the National Question is determined by 
which class rules the nation.... National policy, in the 
fullest sense, consists of the liberation and leadership 
of the working-class, which itself forms the socialist 
nation. That is the path that the GDR has trod.
'National' means hitting out against social and political 
reaction. When we annihilated the hostile imperialism 
in our own state, we solved the National Question. 218
To refute the linguistic argument he said, 'Just because Messrs
Flick, Abs and Siemens spoke German, are the workers supposed 
to form a nation with them?! Hitler and Himmler also spoke 
German and murdered hundreds of thousands of German speaking 
communists, Social Democrats and progressive members of the 
bourgeoisie.'219 This association of 'good Germans' with the GDR, 
and 'bad Germans' with the Federal Republic was common.
On the whole, the uncertainty as to whether the line on the nation 
enshrined in the constitution was still valid, in the light of 
statements which appeared to contradict it, discouraged theorists 
from addressing the question of the German nation for fear of 
saying the wrong thing. Even the last Party Conference had failed 
to provide clear guidelines and the issue was not clarified until 
the Eighth Party Conference in 1971. Even so, academics
continued to consider the problem of the nation among 
themselves. Indeed, as reunification on the SED's terms became 
increasingly unlikely, and the difference between the two halves 
of Germany became more apparent, many had begun to
contemplate the effect this had on the German nation, and 
Brandt's acceptance of the existence of two German states further
218 ZPA J IV 2/2 A/1425
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encouraged such considerations. According to Kosing, they saw ’a 
new form of national community' emerging as a result of the 
increasingly obvious independence of the state, which many 
began to view as a potential nation in a Marxist sense.220
The only major work on the subject from this period identified 
four different kinds of nation using class-based criteria. Firstly, 
bourgeois nations arising in the pre-capitalist period such as 
Britain and France; secondly, socialist nations, namely the Soviet 
Union and the people's republics; thirdly, former colonies in Africa 
and Asia; and lastly, nations divided by imperialist powers allied 
with native reactionaries, such as the FRG, Korea and Vietnam.221 
Even so, the writer still claimed that the political division of 
Germany could be overcome in the event of the 'democratic 
transformation’ of the Federal Republic.222 Another article stuck 
firm ly to the concept of one German people, whose true 
representative was the GDR, and rejected W est German 
accusations that the GDR was 'un-German' or 'serving foreign 
interests.' Its authors claimed that the revolutionary German 
workers’ movement had never made room for national nihilism or 
the denial of the values of the history of the German nation. They 
listed many great Germans - Engels, Miintzer, Kant, Fichte, Herder 
and Goethe, adding, 'Their ideas for a future fatherland for the 
Germans must remain our hope and vision.'223 In 1969, a new 
Worterbuch der Marxis t isch-Leninist ischen Soziologie  was 
produced which stated: 'The nation as a form of community is 
characterised by the economic collaboration of the population of 
large territories on the basis of the development of the internal 
market, via the particular historic traditions of the people, via a
220 Interview with Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
221 Identified by E. Hiihns in Heimat - Vaterland - Nation (East Berlin 1969), 
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common lifestyle and language, in other words via the culture of 
the people,’224 which was reminiscent of Stalin's definition.
Around this time, at the request of the Sciences Department, a 
study was produced by historians at the Academy for Social 
Sciences in preparation for a comprehensive new German history, 
and they inevitably questioned whether there was still one 
German nation. To deny its existence fitted in well with the 
concept of A b g r e n z u n g  favoured by the Honecker faction, but 
since the line contained in the constitution was still officially valid, 
the study was never published.225 On the whole, research on the 
subject of the nation was not encouraged at Party institutions at 
this point, neither by the 'Academic Committee for Research into 
Imperialism' at the Academy for Social Sciences, which had to co­
operate with the D epartm ents of Sciences, Propaganda, 
International Contacts, and the West Department,226 nor at the 
German Institu te  for Contem porary H istory, which ju st 
concentrated on 'West German imperialism,' in particular, on 
Bonn's manipulation of the right to self-determination and her 
attempts to stir up nationalism.227
In spite of the lack of publications directly addressing the subject 
of the nation at the end of the 1960s, prompted by the Party, 
academics started to consider national consciousness in the GDR. 
This was partly as a result of indications of an imminent change in 
official policy regarding the state of the German nation, and partly 
because after 20 years of separate development from the Federal 
Republic, an East German identity of some sort had inevitably 
evolved, based on pride in their own economic achievements, and 
nurtured by the increasing unlikelihood of reunification. Western
224 W. Eichhom, Worterbuch der Marxistisch-Lcninistischen Soziologie. 
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journalists continued to confirm this,228 but their assertions were 
only based on observation and not scientific.229
Although the leadership very rarely allowed public opinion to 
influence policy, they knew that visible popular support for the 
regime and its policies was good for the image of the GDR abroad 
and thus for the campaign for recognition. Some prominent 
members of the SED believed that more accurate information 
regarding popular consciousness would increase their ability to 
control it. But others preferred not to hear negative opinions. 
N evertheless, from 1969, em pirical research into 'GDR- 
consciousness,' in particular, consciousness of history was 
undertaken by researchers at the AfG, which continued until 
1985. According to Professor Helmut Meier, who coordinated the 
project, it began while the line represented by Ulbricht was still 
valid. Questions asked included 'Should Germans shoot at 
Germans?' and 'Is the whole of Germany your fatherland or just 
the GDR?' The results showed that people no longer saw 
reunification as possible in the near future, which was interpreted 
negatively so long as Ulbricht's theory of the 'socialist state of the 
German nation' prevailed, but positively by those who wanted to 
abandon it and to emphasise the GDR as an independent entity.230
The Politburo acknowledged the contribution of the Institute for 
Public Opinion Research towards the leadership's ever increasing 
need for information about popular consciousness in the GDR.231 
Attention was also paid to the personality traits which were 
supposed to form part of GDR-consciousness, based on the socialist 
morality defined in the 1950s, and positive elements of the 
traditional German (and in particular, Prussian) character, such as
228 John Domberg claimed that nationalism was real in the GDR and that 
people were proud of their achievements. See Domberg, The Other 
Germany (Garden City, 1968), p.349; Andreas Kohlschtitter saw a 'GDR state 
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critical solidarity with the regime. See Kohlschtitter, 'Sie sagen "Ja" zu 
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hard work and obedience to authority, which obviously served the 
interests of the regime. In 1969, Alexander Abusch, a leading 
functionary in the SED's cultural institutions, wrote about the 
’spiritual and moral face of the new person in our republic,’ the 
key to which was 'pride in the GDR.' (DDR-Stolz).232 Officially this 
pride was allegedly derived from the material achievements of 
the GDR, its modern industries and technology, and the knowledge 
that not just the factories and land belonged to them, the people, 
but also a whole wealth of academic, spiritual, cultural and artistic 
values. However, due to the link with socialist internationalism, 
nationalism  and national narrow-mindedness was- apparently 
alien to them.233
In an article entitled 'The Human Face of our Socialist Society,' 
Bernd Bittighofer wrote of the aim to create 'all-round educated, 
and harmoniously developed socialist personalities.' This involved 
'the ability for creative and productive physical and spiritual 
activity; a socialist political-moral position and consistency of 
thought and deed in all areas of life; ....and also aspirations for 
performance, health and physical fitness.' Two areas were 
identified where people could actively participate to strengthen 
their 'GDR-consciousness,' namely sport and culture. Though the 
writer denied that the development of socialist personalities 
merely aimed to produce an able labour force for the 
requirements of the scientific-technological revolution, the SED's 
intentions were clearly to strengthen the GDR economically and 
internationally to aid the campaign for recognition. He concluded, 
'The most important characteristic of a socialist personality is the 
constant struggle to become more knowledgeable, clever and 
perfect, and in this way, more useful for socialist society.'234 
Another writer also did not deny that the strengthening of 
national consciousness in the GDR had the overt intention of 
increasing productivity.235
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In conclusion it must be said that the state of the German nation 
required more theoretical attention. Even Brezhnev recognised 
this in a letter to Ulbricht in which he outlined the 'ideological 
task' ahead:
In this context, working out the National Question 
from a M arxist-Leninist position is of primary 
im portance, in particu lar the basic p rincip les 
concerning the establishment of the socialist human 
community, the forging of socialist patriotism and
finally the formation of the socialist nation in the 
GDR. 236
But before the task could be completed, one obstacle had to be 
removed, namely Ulbricht himself.
4^  CONCLUSION
The period 1967-70 began with total adherence to the unity of 
the German nation as the official policy of the SED, and ended with 
its denial. In between was a transitional period when the 
traditional line overlapped with a more pragmatic, GDR-centric 
approach, manifested both by differences of opinion between
functionaries, and inconsistent statements by individuals. This 
was most apparent at the Seventh Party Conference.
The key factor was the GDR's struggle for legitimacy which 
eventually forced the leadership to choose between the unity of
the German nation and the chance for a united socialist Germany 
on the one hand, and international recognition as a sovereign 
socialist state on the other. Clearly no other government was 
going to recognise a state that appeared temporary or incomplete. 
Though the two German states had been growing apart for nearly 
two decades and the consequences of the division were already
deeply ingrained, a catalyst was required to force the SED 
leadership to make the decision between unity and recognition.
236 IPA NL2/32
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That catalyst was Brandt's notion of 'two states of one nation.' As 
a result, from January 1970, and not from the Eighth Party 
Conference in June 1971 as is often stated, pragmatism took 
precedence over the theory of the national bond of the German 
working class. Bonn had used the continued existence of the 
German nation to avoid full recognition of the GDR, hence the SED 
leadership had to deny this in order to gain the legitimacy and 
security they wanted so badly. No doubt several prominent 
members of the Politburo would have gladly set off on the 
pragmatic road earlier, but due to the power of the First Secretary 
and the desire to hang on to their own positions, they could not 
challenge the official line.
To varying degrees, four factors influenced how the concept of the 
nation functioned at the political level at the end of the 1960s: 
firstly and most importantly, the need for a pragmatic approach in 
the interest of the legitimacy of the GDR; secondly, the wishes of 
the Soviet leadership; thirdly, Ulbricht's ability to impose his 
personal view, most noticeable in the new constitution; and 
fourthly, (though to a lesser extent), public opinion. However, 
these factors were not always complementary. Ulbricht's long- 
held convictions often clashed with the more realistic views of the 
pragmatists, but ultimately he bowed to Soviet pressure and 
showed that he too could be pragmatic when the future of the 
GDR's socialist system, indeed, his own future, was at stake. The 
period provides a classic example of how the leadership of the 
GDR was not in control of its own destiny, but determined by both 
the wishes of Moscow and initiatives from Bonn. Interestingly 
later accounts from the GDR give the impression that the change in 
policy was in itiated  by Honecker at the Eighth Party 
conference.237
However, many of the arguments still seemed half-baked and the 
consequences of the demise of the unitary German nation had not 
yet been adequately thought through. This may have had 
something to do with the fact that at the political level, policy on
237 For example, Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, pp.246-247, though the 
author would have been well aware that this was not the case.
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the nation did not have the benefit of the views of theorists, 
philosophers, historians, social scientists, etc. It was not that they 
did not wish to contribute, nor that they had nothing to offer. 
They were simply not asked and rarely able to initiate debate 
themselves. In short, by 1970, pragmatism, as opposed to either 
theoretical consideration, or the basic principles of Marxism- 
Leninism , determined policy regarding the German nation. 
However, the last word on the subject was yet to be said.
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CHAPTER 4: THE SOCIALIST NATION IN THE GDR
-the
This chapter examines the dramatic changes in^ SED's position on 
the German nation under the new leadership of Erich Honecker. It
is divided into two sections: the first attempts to establish exactly
why the SED declared that a purely socialist nation was 
developing in the GDR; and the second section examines the 
practical consequences of the new concept, which were taken to 
extremes, as we shall see. What emerges is that during the early 
1970s, the leadership of the SED sought to legitimise the GDR as an 
independent sovereign state by denying the existence of a unitary 
German nation, and claiming that the GDR now possessed a nation 
of its own. However, they faced a dilemma as to whether that 
nation was a socialist German  nation or simply a socialist nation. 
To accept that it remained a German nation, in spite of the
increasingly permanent political division of Germany, preserved a 
link with the Federal Republic, and therefore undermined the 
legitimacy of the GDR. But to deny that it was German was hardly 
credible and could also have a negative effect by alienating the 
population. In spite of this risk, the SED initially chose the latter 
option.
In order to justify such a dramatic U-turn theoretically, the Party 
leadership required some convoluted arguments, and we now 
know that the theorists involved were sceptical about the idea of 
a non-German, socialist nation in the GDR. Nevertheless, it was 
their duty to make sense of the SED's radical new stance.
However, the fact that it was later officially replaced by the 
concept of the 'socialist G e r m a n  nation’ indicates that the 
leadership itself eventually recognised the lack of credibility of 
the socialist nation, and its shortcomings as a means to legitimise 
the state.
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1 ^  THH INVENTION OF A 'SOCIALIST NATION' IN THE GDR
a') The Beginning of the End for Ulbricht
gl«.rwv%sien of the Central Committee was the first of four 
which dealt with the preparations for the Eighth Party Conference, 
which was originally scheduled for April 1971, but actually took 
place in June. It has been common knowledge since before the 
collapse of the GDR that the 14th session of the Central Committee 
was the beginning of the end for Ulbricht. More recently, it has 
emerged that this had less to do with his economic policies, as was 
widely believed, and more to do with his Deuts ch land po l i t i k , in 
particular, its unacceptability to Moscow. Although Ulbricht was 
involved in the preparations, Erich Honecker was chairman of the 
commission responsible for the highly significant report of the 
Central Committee, which increased the rivalry between the
leader and his heir apparent. In the section below, it will emerge 
that the issue of the nation was rapidly becoming a pawn in the 
power struggle within the SED, and as a result, Ulbricht had to 
sacrifice the idea of one German nation in order to buy time for
himself, although, as it turned out, it was already too late.
Peter Przybylski interprets the fact that no guests were invited to 
the 14th session as a sign that the discussion was going to be more 
frank than usual.147 There, Ulbricht delivered a report on the 
meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw 
Pact states, (PCC), which had taken place nine days earlier.
However, the Central Committee heard a revised version of his 
speech to the PCC, and even the latter did not hear the original 
version that he had presented to the Politburo only a few days 
before. Originally, Ulbricht had described how the GDR had 
tirelessly fought for the re-establishment of a unitary Germany 
during the first twelve years of its existence, and said it was 
grotesque that those who had apparently wrecked the former 
unitary nation and who had written it off via the Paris Treaties 
were trying to avoid the recognition of current realities. He had
147 Peter Przybylski, Tatort Politbiiro. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1992), vol. 2: 
Honecker, Mittag und Schalck-Golodkowski, p.26.
149
also rejected 'inner German relations' and the idea of a 'common 
German umbrella.'148
Instead, the PCC heard him stress the sovereignty of the 'socialist
German national state' and its right to join the UN, socialist
solidarity with the CPSU and other sister parties, and his approval 
of the treaties Moscow and Warsaw had recently signed with 
Bonn. Large chunks referring to the 'former unitary German
nation' had been removed from the speech. A concluding 
declaration gave assurance that the SED would continue a policy in 
the interest of international security and detente, that they would 
further strengthen the 'German state of workers and farmers'
politically, economically, culturally and militarily, and that they 
would secure their membership of the community of socialist 
states, and totally fence themselves off from the imperialist FRG. 
Surprisingly, it was actually Brezhnev who referred to Bonn's 
attempt to create a 'national community of all Germans.'149 In his 
report of the meeting to the Central Committee, Ulbricht again 
stressed these goals, especially socialist solidarity, but made no 
reference to the German nation, and only this non-controversial 
version was published in the 'Documents of the SED' series.150
Exactly why references to the nation were removed, when on the 
surface they seemed in keeping with the new line, is open to 
speculation. Maybe it was thought that even to mention the 
'former unitary nation' would undermine the emerging theory of 
two irreconcilable nations on German soil, one socialist and the 
other bourgeois, and would arouse fears among Warsaw Pact 
member-states that its re-establishment was still desirable. It is 
widely believed that Ulbricht clashed with Brezhnev at the 
meeting as a result of differences between the two men which had 
been growing for at least a. month, particularly regarding a 
settlement over Berlin,151 andAis possible that the former came 
under pressure to stress the GDR's loyalty to the community of
148 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1481 (30 November 1970).
149 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1484 (8 December 1970).
150 Dokumente der SED. 22 vols. (East Berlin, 1972), vol. 13, pp.71-75.
151 Moreton, East Germany, pp.169, 174.
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socialist states. Maybe other leading functionaries wanted to 
distance him from the German Question altogether, in view of his 
past (and probably continuing) convictions. Clearly there were 
several influencing factors. However, it was not this speech that 
provoked active opposition to Ulbricht from within the Politburo, 
but his closing remarks at the end of the 14th Meeting of the 
Central Committee.
During the meeting, Erich Honecker reinforced the message that 
Bonn’s adherence to phrases such as ’the so-called unity of the 
nation' and 'special inner-German relations' were merely ploys 
which aimed to upset the social and economic foundations of the 
GDR. He stressed that a process of A b g r e n z u n g  and not 
Annaherung  (growing closer together) was taking place, and 
added that peaceful coexistence between states with opposing 
social orders and the non-conciliatory fight against bourgeois 
ideology were not incompatible, but were in fact two sides of the 
same coin.152 Here he was overtly demonstrating his allegiance to 
the Soviet line, since the concept of Ab g re n z u n g  had originally 
been dreamt up in Moscow.153 However, in spite of tangible 
differences between the two German states by this stage, 
Honecker’s claim that they were no closer than any two states 
with different political systems was hardly credible. Ironically he 
himself would later exploit the fact that a special bond did exist, 
particularly during the 1980s.
The report of the Politburo to the Central Committee reiterated 
the line taken by Honecker. It emphasised the character of the 
social order of a state as the decisive factor which determined her 
relationship with other states, and stated, 'The unity of the nation 
was destroyed as a result of the Second World War and above all 
by the division enforced afterwards by American and West 
German imperialists,' though the GDR was still described as the
152 Erich Honecker, Bericht iiber den Umtausch der Parteidokumente, 14. 
Tagung des ZK der SED, 9-11. Dez. 1970. Cited in Naumann and Triimpler, P er  
Flop, pp. 194-196.
153 See chapter 2. Some commentators fail to recognise that A b g r e n z u n g  
was not invented by the SED, for example, Naumann and Triimpler, P e r  
Flop, pp 69-70.
151
'socialist German national state.' The Politburo pledged support 
for the West German communist party, the DKP, and expressed 
confidence that one day, the way to socialism would be opened in 
the Federal Republic.154 Interestingly, this was omitted from the 
version of the speech published in Neues  D e u ts c h la n d , 155
presumably because it raised questions about what might follow if 
this occurred, and whether the SED had a closer bond with the DKP 
than with other communist parties. Even Giint^er Mittag's report 
on the economy repeated the now familiar message that a process 
of Abgrenzung  was taking place.156
In the discussion which followed it was clear that the Honecker 
faction was gaining the upper hand, and most speakers now 
expressed his GDR-centric' line and support for Abgrenzung , which 
complimented the campaign for recognition and the need to refute 
Bonn's claim that the GDR was less than an independent sovereign 
state. However, ambiguity remained as to whether A b g r e n z u n g  
would occur automatically, or whether it had to be actively 
implemented, and various unanswered questions remained. Franz 
Dahlem spoke of a new sense of pride among the population that 
was 'genuine patriotism based on a national feeling that people 
sense as citizens of the GDR,' but was interrupted when he began 
to speak about solidarity with the West German working class.
Another speaker, Alois Brautigam, recognised that,
Among sections of the population the view still exists 
that the two German states are growing closer 
together, and that through the treaty between the 
USSR and the FRG, better relations have been 
established between both German states, with the 
result that the security measures in the border region 
and restrictions on travel could be removed or
reduced  Therefore it is up to us to impress upon all
citizens that there can be no reunification or 
rapprochem ent between the socialist GDR and
154 ZPA IV 2/1/416 (11 December 1970)
155 Neues Deutschland. 12 December 1970.
156 ZPA IV 2/1/416
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im perialist W est Germany, but only diplom atic 
relations on the basis of equality and solidarity.157
Another member, Hans-Joachim Hertwig, committed a faux pas 
which illustrated the difficulties arising from the new line when 
he unwittingly described the GDR as the 'country of birth' 
( G e b u r t s l a n d )  of Marx and Engels, which was changed to 
'hom eland ' ( H e  i m a t l a n d ) in the published record of the 
proceedings.158
The most significant aspect of the session was the reaction of the 
rest of the Politburo to Ulbricht's closing remarks. Suddenly it 
was not only Ulbricht's long-held convictions that were being 
overturned - he was now also fighting for his political life. On the 
subject of the German Question, his remarks coincided with those 
of the other main speakers, apart from his inclusion of a reference 
to the GDR’s past efforts to achieve a confederation, and the 
absence of the word Abgrenzung, which no doubt failed to satisfy 
his opponents within the leadership. Now even he claimed that 
the Brandt/Stoph talks had led to a dead-end, due to Brandt’s 
attempts to undermine the GDR via the concept of 'inner-German 
re la tio n s.'159
However, it was the section concerning the economy which gave 
P o litb u ro  members an excuse to write to Ulbricht individually, 
urging him not to publish the version of the speech he had read to 
the Central Committee, on the grounds that it contradicted the 
report of the Politburo and recent utterances by Willi Stoph. This 
was an unprecedented occurrence and indicated that they all 
knew Ulbricht's days were num bered.160 Honecker attacked 
Ulbricht for saying that economic co-operation with the Soviet 
Union was necessary because the GDR lacked raw materials, 
instead  of saying it was an obligation of socialist
157 ZPA IV 2/1/415
158 ZPA IV 2/1/415
159 ZPA IV 2/1/415
160 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1489 (15 December 1970)
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in te rn a tio n a lism .161 Also there can be little doubt that Honecker 
and his supporters were intentionally using Ulbricht's comments 
to further undermine the reputation of the latter in Moscow by 
questioning his commitment to the socialist community, and 
hinting that he might unilaterally attempt to negotiate with Bonn.
It seems that for these reasons, rather than for his economic 
policies themselves, Brezhnev approved Ulbricht's removal, which 
was engineered by Honecker and his faction including Stoph and 
Verner. There is no evidence to suggest that Ulbricht tried to 
resist pressure to withdraw his remarks on the economy, with the 
result that only an edited version, without the controversial 
section, appeared in the published record and in N e u e s  
D e u t s c h l a n d .  Interestingly, Jurgen Hofmann's semi-official 
account of the evolution of the nation in the GDR, written in the 
late 1980s, only refers to Honecker's speech at the 14th session of 
the Central Committee, and makes no mention of Ulbricht at all,162 
a sign that according to official history, Ulbricht had already been 
written off.
Less than a week later, at a meeting of the Commission for the 
preparation of the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the SED, 
Ulbricht suddenly altered his position and for the first time, 
referred to Abgrenzung  and criticised Bonn’s attempts to approach 
the GDR via 'fictitious national common ground' (fiktive nationale 
Gemeinsamkei t ) .  At last he seemed to recognise that if the unity 
of the nation no longer existed, there must be two separate 
nations, speaking of 'the process of evolution of a socialist nation’ 
taking place in the GDR, and 'the old bourgeois German nation' that 
remained in the Federal Republic. However, his use of the 
ad jec tive  'G erm an ' rem ained som ew hat in c o n s is te n t.16 3 
Commentators have wondered what occurred that week to make
1 a 1 c nc(u101 Vormerkung der SED-Fuhrung iiber GesprSche mit Breshnev in Moseew
vom 20 August 1970. ZPA 41656, cited in Przybylski, Tatort vol. 2, p.348.
162 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.252.
163 Ulbricht, Sitzung der Kommission zur Vorbereitung des 25. Jahrestags 
der SED am 17. Dezember 1970, cited in Naumann and Triimpler, Per Flop, 
pp. 197-199.
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Ulbricht suddenly speak in such finite terms, but are unable to 
provide an answer.164
Politburo member Alfred Neumann does not accept that Ulbricht 
changed his mind regarding the nation, on the grounds that he, 
Ulbricht, had always maintained that there could be no unification 
of socialism and capitalism. In Neumann’s opinion, he was a 
pragmatist, and had merely switched tactics to suit the changed 
circumstances, which now dictated that the GDR needed to gain
equal status with the Federal Republic, in order to compete
economically and politically. In his view, 'The National Question
and the nation can only be the number one issue some of the 
time,... and in the second half of the 1960s, it was quite clear that 
the main concern was the recognition of the equal status of both 
German states at the international level. And when it is a matter 
of the recognition of both German states, one should not push the 
nation into the foreground.'165 He claims that Bonn had done so in 
order to undermine the GDR, but denies (incorrectly) that Ulbricht 
ever used the term A b g r e n z u n g , and he makes no mention of 
U lbricht’s feelings as a member of Germany’s communist old 
guard. His explanation should be treated with caution due his
unbending adherence to Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, his uncritical 
loyalty to Ulbricht, and the effects of the passage of time.
So how else can Ulbricht's new position be explained? The idea 
that if the unitary German nation no longer existed, there must be 
something else in its place, presumably two nations, seems logical, 
and one wonders why Ulbricht had not come to this conclusion 
earlier. Presumably this was because he did not want to admit 
that the division of Germany was irreversible. Certainly it would 
have been more characteristic for him to be motivated by 
pragm atic considerations than a genuine change of heart 
regarding the German nation, and his subsequent return to his 
previous stance after his removal from office supports th is.166
164 Naumann and Triimpler, Der Flop, p.72.
165 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 4 May 1993.
166 For example, at a Party conference in Berlin shortly after his removal 
from office, according to Helmut Meier, interview, Berlin, 15 March 1993.
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Some commentators see the change as more to do with personal 
rivalry, i.e. Ulbricht wanted to knock the wind out of Honecker’s 
sails and not be seen as an old has-been, merely expressing ideas 
that had been overtaken. But none of these reasons explain why 
he amended his stance when  he did. The most likely explanation 
is that realising how fragile his position had become, Ulbricht had 
to toe the Soviet line in view of the controversy over his recent 
speech before the Central Committee.167 Furthermore, even he 
was prepared to correct a position that was clearly no longer 
tenable and to abandon a goal that could not be achieved, when it 
was politically necessary.
At the end of December 1970, Ulbricht sent drafts of material on 
the National Question to the Soviet Politburo, which approved it, 
saying, 'As we in Moscow understand it, the main aim of the 
proposed publication is a complete, theoret i cal l y  jus t i f i ed  
orientation of Party activities regarding the development of the 
GDR as a sovereign socialist state and the people of the GDR as a 
socialist nation . '169 Unfortunately, the actual material is not 
available, but this comment indicates the line desired by Moscow, 
which inevitably became the official line of the SED. It is worth 
noting that the importance of 'theoretical justification’ was 
recognised from the start. The National Question had again 
become subordinate to other political objectives, to the extent that 
an individual's position regarding the nation had become an 
indicator of loyalty (or lack of it) to the Soviet Union and the 
socialist bloc. Furthermore, since the issue had been determined 
by political considerations, it had nothing to do with the will of the 
population of the GDR.
b) Ulbricht Fights Back
167 Naumann and Triimpler fail to recognise this factor in Der Flop.
1 According n to-Jiifgen Hofmann-, interview-, Berlin, 5 February- 1993
16  ^ Letter from Politburo o f the CPSU - unofficial translation for Honecker 
dated 21 January 1971. IPA NL2/31, my italics.
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At the 15th session of the Central Committee on 28th January 
1971, Ulbricht concentrated on domestic policy, in particular, his 
concepts of a ’developed social system of socialism' and the 
'socialist human society,'170 and advocated 'national solutions' to 
the GDR’s problems.171 The occasion is widely seen as an attempt 
by Ulbricht to regain some lost ground and he certainly seemed 
more confident.172 He had begun 1971 with a New Year message 
in which he publicly stated that 'in the GDR, we are experiencing 
the birth of the socialist German nation.’ Significantly, according 
to his understanding, this nation was firmly rooted in 'humanist 
and democratic German traditions,' unlike the Federal Republic, 
which had distanced itself from them and had been created to 
serve the purposes of American imperialism. He went on to list 
many people who he claimed had 'shaped our socialist German 
national state and its socialist national culture,' including Bach, 
Beethoven, Fichte, Kant, Marx, Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst 
Thalmann, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, and Bertolt Brecht.173
The main points of Ulbricht's speech to the Central Committee, 
were the campaign for recognition, and 'the development of the 
GDR into a socialist German national state, inextricably and forever 
bound to the Soviet Union and the community of socialist states, 
and its principled Abgrenzung  from the imperialist NATO-state, 
the FRG.’174 This description of the Federal Republic was often 
used to imply limited sovereignty and to negate the German link. 
He condemned Bonn's 'wishful thinking about "inner-German" 
relations, implying guardianship' (vormundschaftl iche gefarbten 
"innerdeutsche" Beziehungen j, and for the first time, stated that 
A b g r e n z u n g  had reached a point of no return.175 Here his 
'conversion' away from the idea of one nation existing in two 
states that would one day form a unity is apparent, but knowing 
the factors at work at the time, we can assume that he was being
170 Ilse Spittmann, 'Warum Ulbricht stiirzte,' Deutschland Archiv 4 (1971): 
p.568.
171 Moreton, East Germany, pp.177-178.
172 According to McAdams, East Germany, p. 113.
173 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1488 (15 December 1970)
174 ZPA IV 2/1/419 (28 January 1971)
175 ZPA IV 2/1/419
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pragmatic in the interest of recognition, although it must have 
been painful for him, in view of his previous grand designs for 
Germany as a whole. However, Ulbricht still used nationalistic 
language, in contrast to the class-based arguments put foreword 
by Honecker, who re-emphasised the need to sever links with the 
Federal Republic and to strengthen them with the Soviet Union 
and other socialist states.176
On 28th January 1971, Brandt issued another 'Report on the State 
of the Nation,’ in which he pointed out that in spite of its rejection 
of a special relationship, the GDR was more involved with the 
Federal Republic than with any other state.177 The fact that not 
only the population and media were preoccupied with the Federal 
Republic, but also that the Party still had special bodies such as 
the State Secretariat for West German Affairs, confirmed that the 
relationship was still far from ordinary. Quite justifiably, Brandt 
accused the SED leadership of wanting it both ways, distinguishing 
between the 'socialist nation' and the 'bourgeois nation,' but also 
using the phrases such as 'the remainder of the old bourgeois 
German  nation' and the 'socialist German  nation-state.’ He added 
that the shared national basis was causing the leadership in East 
Berlin not to relax its view of the East-West conflict but to over­
exaggerate it, and concluded, 'The nation is a question of 
consciousness and will. East Berlin’s polemics against the nation 
are evidence of the existence of a consciousness and will that have 
also been preserved over there.’178 Clearly there was plenty of 
truth in Brandt's comments, and some leading functionaries must 
have begun to realise how significant words such as 'nation,' 
'national' and 'German' were.
An assessment of the last two session's of the Central Committee 
by the Department of Sciences acknowledged that the problem of 
the nation had not yet been solved. It condemned West German 
manifestations of nationalism such as the celebrations of the
176 ZPA IV 2/1/419
177 Willy Brandt, Bericht zur Lage der Nation. 28 January 1971. Europa  
Archiv 26, (1971): pp.264-268.
178 Brandt, B erich t. my italics
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foundation of Bismarck's Reich in 1871 and Brandt's recent report 
on the state of the nation. It continued, 'The fact that today, in the 
heart of Europe, two autonomous states with opposing social 
orders exist, cannot be denied or concealed with nationalist 
phraseology.' Lenin's argument that the crucial factor of any 
national question was the nature of the social system(s), was used 
to show that 'there is no longer anything particularly national that 
characterises the relationship between the GDR and the FRG.' The 
assessment repeatedly stressed the need to get this message 
across to the population, especially to counteract West German 
attempts to convince them of the 'unity of the nation' and of 
'national common ground.' For once the need to create something 
in its place was recognised: 'At the same time, we must make our 
citizens proud to live in the GDR and to take part in its formation. 
As Walter Ulbricht stated at the 15th session, it is a matter of 
filling our people with socialist national consciousness and socialist 
patriotism for the socialist German nation-state.' But the problem 
of the West German proletariat remained. Adapting the famous 
phrase from three years earlier, the assessment concluded, 'As 
with the workers of other countries, we are bound to the working 
class of the FRG by the re la tionsh ip  of p ro letarian  
internationalism. However, this is no class-indifferent national 
relationship, but a relationship based on class.'179
The department was aware that the population was still unsure 
about the state of the nation. Research into discussion among 
university students and academics revealed that people were still 
asking what a nation actually was, what the difference was 
between the phrase 'socialist state of the German nation' and 
'socialist German national state' which superseded it, and whether 
25 years was long enough to say that the German nation no longer 
e x is te d .180 Reports from local Party secretaries reinforced the 
assum ption that people, including Party members, did not 
understand the dramatic change in official policy regarding the 
nation or why the GDR had to sever its ties with the Federal
179 'Die ideologischen Probleme bei den weiteren Auswertung der 14. und 
15. Tagungen der ZK,’ ZPA IV A2/904/13.
180 ZPA IV A2/904/13
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R e p u b l i c . 181 However, it was hardly surprising that the 
leadership’s brief and sudden statements on the subject had not 
satisfied many citizens, and the issue clearly required far more 
detailed attention to make the change in policy comprehensible 
and acceptable.
Meanwhile, Ulbricht continued to prepare for the Eighth Party 
Conference on the assumption that he would still be First 
Secretary, and planned to em phasise the GDR's national 
achievements, as opposed to those of the Eastern Bloc as a 
w h o le .182 Preparatory material reveals that for the first time, 
more detail was paid to the question of the nation. A resolution 
drawn up by the commission Ulbricht chaired, assisted by Kurt 
Hager and the Department of Sciences, stressed 'changes in the 
world situation which have arisen from the clashes between the 
socialist and imperialist world systems since the Seventh Party 
Conference.' The resolution was to highlight the motives behind 
Bonn's talk of 'the continued unity of the nation' and 'special 
inner-German relations,' and to encourage support for the SED's 
current objectives, i.e. the strengthening of the international 
position of the GDR and her application to join the UN.183 
Consequently, i t  took the line,
The bourgeois German nation, which formed in the 
process of the transform ation from feudalism  to 
capitalism, and which was torn apart into capitalists 
and workers, and which existed within the framework
of a unitary state from 1871-1945, no longer exists.....
The GDR is the socialist German national state, where a 
socialist nation is developing, which embodies all 
democratic and humanist national traditions. In the 
FRG the bourgeois nation exists under the conditions of 
the ruling state-monopoly system. 184
181 Naumann and Triimpler, Per Flop, p.79.
182 Moreton, East Germany, p. 183.
183 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1497 (5 February 1971)
184 ZPA IV VIII/17, my italics. This section originated from a paper by the
Strategic Working Party for Foreign policy and Overseas Trade, lead by
Axen, entitled 'The FRG in the class conflict of our time.'
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The same phrasing was used by Ulbricht in a speech at the 24th 
conference of the CPSU in March 1971, and again in April on the 
25th anniversary of the formation of the SED.185 However, in 
retrospect we know that 'socialist German  nation state' would soon 
be amended. The question of national culture was also addressed: 
'With the formation of its socialist German national culture, the 
social system of our GDR also sharply fences itself off from the 
Americanised philistinism (Unkultur)  dominant in the imperialist 
social system of the FRG.' Furthermore, it was a 'fundamental 
cultural task.... to make socialist culture the culture of the entire 
population, in order to contribute significantly to the formation of 
the educated socialist nation.'186
At the same time, a separate commission chaired by Honecker was 
preparing the Central Committee's report for the Party conference. 
The report emphasised the successful strengthening of the GDR 
since the previous conference and the bond of socialist 
internationalism. The issue of the nation was not addressed in 
early versions, but reference was made to 'the new socialist 
constitution - an expression of socialist reality and prospects,' in 
spite of the fact that the constitution still contained the aim of 
reunification. At a consultation meeting with the West German 
DKP and KPD, Honecker repeated his usual arguments against a 
'common German umbrella' and unitary nation, and stated that 
the parties needed a clear 'class position' on the National Question. 
He welcomed their declaration which stated that 'the National 
Question in the FRG consists of the conquering of imperialism.’ He 
hoped that the door to socialism would be opened for the Federal 
Republic, and in spite of the policy of A b g r e n z u n g , offered 
'in te rn a tio n a l fra te rn a l a ss is ta n ce ,’ but no th ing  m ore. 
Prophetically, he also promised that, 'At the Eighth Party 
Conference, we shall precisely formulate and justify everything 
from scratch, and shall answer the new questions that life 
poses.'187
185 ZPA NL182/798 and ZPA J IV 2/2A/1509 (15 April 1971)
186 ZPA IV VIII/17
187 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1504 (16 March 1971)
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Material now available proves that Ulbricht's revised vocabulary 
concerning the German Question was insufficient to save him, and 
that his past words and deeds had not been forgotten by his 
enemies and rivals. Just a week before the 15th session of the 
Central Committee, most of the Politburo were plotting against 
him. His independence of thought regarding relations between 
the two German states was used as the main reason why he 
should be removed before the eighth Party Conference:
Not only in domestic policy, but also in policy towards 
the FRG, Walter Ulbricht pursues his own personal line, 
to which he rigidly adheres. This constantly interferes 
with the reliable course of action that was co­
ordinated by the CPSU and the SED, and the 
agreements struck regarding the FRG.... Also he 
transfers his exaggerated estimation of himself onto 
the GDR, which he increasingly tries to manoeuvre into 
a role of model and example: 'After all, we, the GDR, 
are no Byelorussian Soviet Republic V188
Two further reasons why he had to go were given a month later: 
’a) Comrade Ulbricht has again and again raised questions and 
assessments which do not conform to the reality of the situation 
or our tasks and decisions; b) unfortunately his health and his 
physical state has become visibly worse.’189 While there can be 
no doubt that Ulbricht was not in good health, indeed Alfred 
Neumann says this had been the case since 1968, especially due to 
arteriosclerosis, which caused him to need frequent holidays,190 it 
seems that his rivals took advantage of this to exclude him, and in 
particular, to disassociate him from the German Q uestion.191 
Clearly by this stage, the real power was in the hands of those 
who put the interests not just of the GDR first, but also those of 
the Soviet Union, and who were happy to accept the destruction of 
the unitary German nation.
188 Letter by the Politburo of the SED to Brezhnev, 21 January 1971, IPA 
N L 2/32
189 Przybylski, Tatort. vol. 1, p. 304.
190 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 7 April 1993.
191 See Przybylski, Tatort vol. 2, p.32.
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Unfortunately we do not know the precise course of events which 
led to Ulbricht s resignation' announced at the 16th se ssion of the 
Central Committee. His fall had certainly occurred very rapidly 
and came as a complete surprise to GDR-watchers in the Federal 
Republic and the United States.192 The most likely explanation is 
that opposition to his economic policies and Deuts ch land po l i t i k  
had been growing within the Party's ruling elite for several 
months, but a change at the top would only occur once Moscow 
thought it necessary. However, during this period, Ulbricht's 
growing obsession with his own importance, his tendency to act 
autonomously with regard to relations with the Federal Republic, 
and his failure to acknowledge 'the major role the USSR had 
played as midwife to the GDR and guarantor of its security'193 
were causing the rapid erosion of support for him in the Kremlin. 
Ulbricht's defence of the interests of 'his' GDR was particularly 
unwelcome at a time when Brezhnev wanted to regain the Soviet 
Union's hegemony within the Eastern Bloc.194 Furthermore, there 
is no evidence that any leading members of the SED violently 
objected to his removal, since it was clear that his time was up, 
and that Honecker was now the favourite in Moscow.
It is widely accepted that the final straw was Ulbricht’s assertion 
of the GDR’s sovereignty, which threatened the speedy solution of 
the Berlin question that Brezhnev wanted.195 The fact that his 
removal could not even wait until the Eighth Party Conference in 
June, which would have been kinder to the veteran First 
Secretary, is a sign of the urgency of a change at the top, though 
opinions differ as to precisely when the decision was made.196 In
192 Melvin Croan, 'Meinungen zum Fiihrungswechsel in der SED,’ 
Deutschland Archiv 4 (1971): p.575.
193 Lippmann, H onecker. p.221.
194 Spittmann, 'Warum Ulbricht stiirzte,' p.569.
195 Moreton, Wettig and Lippmann agree. For a detailed analysis of the 
dispute over Berlin see Moreton, East Germany, pp. 160-174, 179-193, and 
p. 198, note 62; Gerhard Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist 
Camp. (London, 1975), pp.82-114.
196 Most commentators suggest dates in April following the 24th CPSU 
conference, for example, Spittmann opts for early April, (Spittmann, 
'Warum Ulbricht stiirzte,1 p.568), while Moreton and Wettig believe the 
decision was only made towards the end of the month. (Moreton, East 
Germany, p. 185; Wettig, Community and Conflict, p.94).
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short, 'His [Ulbricht's] definition of the GDR’s sovereignty on the 
one hand, and , Soviet international interests on the other, clashed 
over the very issue that had given him the opportunity to begin 
moulding the GDR's identity: Berlin. And it was his definition of 
the GDR’s needs that fell victim to the forces of change around 
him .’197 Although Ulbricht’s language had changed, he had failed 
to back up his words with deeds, and even though he had recently 
assured the CPSU, 'We have rejected a so-called "special 
German road to socialism ”,’198 his rhetoric was unlikely to 
convince Moscow that its satellite was safe in his hands.
Once Ulbricht had gone, the Soviet leadership could 'embark on 
the next phase of its German and European policy with a new man 
at the helm in the GDR - a partner more agreeable than Walter 
U lb rich t.'199 For Moscow, the German Question was a matter of 
strengthening the GDR with the aim of attaining equal status with 
the Federal Republic and continued Abgrenzung.  A new agenda 
for the Eighth Party Conference had already been drawn up, on 
the assumption that Honecker would be First Secretary, and with 
a new orientation in domestic policy based on the Soviet model.200
c) 'History' settles the National Question
On 18 May 1971, Honecker addressed the CPSU, outlining his 
position on the German Question. Naturally it was the view 
favoured by Moscow, since as Brezhnev pointed out, the GDR was 
the child of their joint parentage. Honecker attacked Brandt's 
argument that 'we are still all Germans and still belong to one 
German nation,' and his attempts to persuade other states to delay 
recognising the GDR on the grounds that it might disturb the 
'inner-German dialogue.’ Bonn's motive was clear, he said: 'They 
want us to move closer towards the FRG as a sign of apparent 
"national common ground." They want to embrace the GDR in 
order to crush her. After all, Brandt has visited Nixon five times
197 McAdams, East Germany, p. 115.
198 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1509 (15 April 1971)
199 Lippmann, H onecker. p.224.
200 Spittmann, 'Warum Ulbricht stiirzte,' p.569.
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since his election as Chancellor and agreed his Ostpoli t ik  there.' 
The most important goal was the GDR's entry into the UN, but he 
admitted that there was also work to be done at home: 'We will 
carry out active explanatory work among our population and will 
educate them in the spirit of class-based A b g r e n z u n g  from the 
FRG, whereby signs of negative tendencies both regarding the 
N ational Question and all-Germ an illusions w ill not be 
to le ra ted .'201
Throughout May and June, a commission was working on 
Honecker’s report for the Party Conference. Politburo member 
Hermann Axen, a firm believer in a class-based definition of the 
nation, was responsible for the section on the National Question, 
according to his personal adviser, Manfred Uschner. Uschner says 
that Axen had urged Honecker to pay more attention to the 
National Question in order to fight off the advances of the enemy, 
i.e. Bonn,202 but we can assume the basic concept of this section of 
the speech was agreed between them. However, early versions 
differ from the final draft. Honecker deleted the description of 
the national question as 'an extremely complicated problem,' 
preferring to say it had 'already been decided by history.' He also 
rejected Kurt Hager's suggestion to emphasise the 'bond with 
forces in the FRG who oppose the anti-national policies of the 
m onopoly-capitalists.’203
On 1st June a draft of the full speech was presented to the 
Politburo, which contained an interesting section which did not 
feature in the final version:
Therefore, two fundam entally d ifferent German 
nations exist on German soil, the developing socialist 
nation in the GDR, and the bourgeois nation in the FRG.
They will no doubt exist beside each other for a long 
historical period. The world-wide historical process of 
transform ation from capitalism  to socialism  will 
certainly not make a detour around the FRG in the long 
run. If sometime in the future the power of the
201 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1514 (20 May 1971)
202 Interview with Manfred Uschner, Berlin, 21 July 1993.
203 ZPA IV VIII/123
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monopoly-capitalists in the FRG is overthrown and the 
way to socialism is pursued, then a socialist nation
under the leadership of the working class will also
develop in West Germany. This would result in totally 
new historical conditions for the solution of the 
National Question on German soil.
It had also referred to the ’bourgeois G e r m a n  nation,' which, 
according to Lenin, actually consisted of two irreconcilable nations, 
the workers and their allies, and the monopoly-capitalists.204 By 
the 17th meeting of the Central Committee on lOWune, these 
comments had been removed from the speech, and knowing the 
strength of Honecker's position at the time, we can assume that 
this conformed to his wishes, or rather to his wish to please 
Moscow. During the meeting his only reference to the National 
Question was that it should be examined according to its class 
content. The main objectives for the immediate future were 'the 
further formation of the developed socialist society in the GDR,' 
A b g r e n z u n g  towards the Federal Republic, and entry into the 
U N .205 Clearly it was felt that any mention of the possibility of a
future change in the status quo would prejudice these aims. For
the same reason, the adjective 'German' was used increasingly
rarely .
The Eighth Party Conference was quite a contrast to the seventh. 
With power securely in the hands of Honecker and his immediate 
circle, there was now only one point of view regarding the 
National Question. By design, Honecker's style raised expectations 
that it was the beginning of a new era, with the emphasis placed 
on social policy and solidarity with the Soviet Union, though hopes 
of reform and liberalisation were soon to be dashed. The new 
First Secretary's speech provoked much interest in the West 
German media and among DDR-ologen ,  and is often incorrectly 
portrayed in secondary literature as the SED's first official 
rejection of the unity of the nation. He stated, 'All this talk in the 
West about the so-called unity of the German nation and the
apparent special nature of relations between the German
204 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1515 (1 June 1971), my italics.
205 ZPA IV 2/1/427 (10 June 1971)
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Democratic Republic and the FRG, is obviously supposed to 
encourage those whose policies still aim to undermine the social 
and economic foundations of our republic.' Instead, Honecker 
wanted to strengthen the GDR, hence he claimed that the opposite 
was true, declaring, 'On the subject of the National Question - it 
has already been settled by history,' and 'Assessments of the 
national question must always be based on its class content.' 
Furtherm ore ,
In contrast to the FRG, where the bourgeois nation 
continues to exist, and where the National Question is 
determined by the irreconcilable class contradictions
between the bourgeoisie and the working masses  a
socialist  nation is developing here in the German 
Democratic Republic, the socialist German state.206
The language used was significant, especially since the First 
Secretary's speech at the Party Conference was regarded by many 
as the definitive line in all policy areas, until it was superseded by 
the next one. However, many inconsistencies remained. On the 
one hand, the intentional use of 'German Democratic Republic' in 
full, compared with the abbreviation 'FRG,' implied that the GDR 
was the legitimate German state. On the other hand, from this 
point on, the term 'socialist nation' became the norm, as opposed 
to 'socialist German nation.' Again, only Brezhnev referred to 
'Germany' and 'the German people.'207 On the whole, however, it 
was the socialist aspect of the GDR that was stressed, its 'socialist 
national culture' and permanent place in the community of 
socialist states, giving the impression that the division of Germany 
had reached an irreversible stage.
As we know, the unity of the nation had been questioned since 
1969, but until this point the Party leadership had failed to state 
clearly what now existed in its place. One could interpret the 
switch to a 'socialist nation' either as a sign of new-found 
confidence, i.e. that the GDR itself was sufficiently legitimate to
206 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VIII Parteitages der SED. 2 vols. (East 
Berlin, 1971), vol. 1, p.49, my italics.
207 Zieger, Die Haltung. p. 136.
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drop the adjective 'German,' or alternatively that it continued to 
undermine the GDR and therefore would have to be given up. The 
latter argument certainly sounds more convincing bearing in mind 
the situation in 1971. Jurgen Hofmann sees the conception of the 
socialist nation as an acknowledgement by the leadership that 
there was such a thing as the National Question which could not be 
ignored, and that Abgrenzung  alone was not enough.208 However, 
the question of the nation was far more complex than the new 
leadership realised, not least due to its subjective elements, and 
differences of opinion regarding the definition of a nation, 
especially between Marxists and others. It would soon become 
clear that a few sentences were not sufficient to clear up the issue.
So how can this part of Honecker's speech be explained? Four 
important influences can be identified. Firstly, as McAdams has 
pointed out, Honecker had to do something drastic because the 
Federal Republic was getting dangerously close as a result of 
detente and Brandt's O s t p o l i t i k .209 Until this point, official 
statements had been a confusing and often contradictory mixture 
of old tenets and new responses to Brandt, which needed 
clarification. It was blatantly obvious that the GDR had gained 
nothing, and maybe even undermined itself, by maintaining the 
idea of the unity of the German nation and the aim of 
reunification via the socialist transformation of the Federal 
Republic. Consequently, it was logical to believe that there might 
be more to gain by giving up this long-standing, but ultimately 
unobtainable goal, and now that the existence of two sovereign 
states had more or less been accepted, it made sense to reconsider 
the notion of a 'national umbrella' arching over them. Thus it was 
not the case that the leadership gave up the aim of reunification 
and a unitary nation because they no longer desired it, but 
because it had become unrealistic and incompatible with the more 
pressing objective of securing the permanence of the GDR.
Secondly, strengthening the GDR's international position with the 
ultimate aim of UN membership had become the SED's primary
208 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
2°9 McAdams, East Germany, pp. 142-143.
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objective. Although there is no evidence that the SED ever used 
the claim that a separate nation existed in the GDR to support its 
application for UN membership (using instead the indisputable
existence of two independent states), failure to deny the unity of 
the German nation could have prejudiced their case. In a letter to 
the UN General Secretary, the Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer,
stressed the GDR's commitment to the UN's aims regarding the
preservation of peace: 'As one of the successor states of the
former German Reich, the GDR sees preventing another war from 
ever breaking out on German soil as its great historical task.'210
Thirdly, Honecker wanted to demonstrate his allegiance to the 
Soviet Union, particularly compared to his predecessor, who had 
become far too autonomous for Moscow's liking. As a result, he 
asserted the sovereignty of the GDR on the one hand, while at the 
same time subordinating it to Moscow on the other, as he had 
done at recent meetings of the Central Committee. It is unlikely 
that the Soviet leadership took much interest in the theoretical 
problem of the German nation, being more interested in 
cementing the status quo in Europe to preserve its sphere of 
influence. In fact, the introduction of the concept of the socialist 
nation may well have surprised the Soviet leadership,211 but since 
it served their interests, it should not have been unwelcome.
Fourthly, Honecker needed to promote himself as the man who 
would bring new policies and new success to the GDR. This must 
have been the reason why subsequent official accounts of the 
development of the nation in the GDR gave the impression that 
this was the turning point.212 However, it should be bom in mind 
that the National Question was not of primary importance to him, 
indeed he personally believed that A b g r e n z u n g  alone was 
sufficient, and intended to concentrate on new social policies.
210 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1519 (8 June 1971)
211 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993. ^
212 For example, Hofmann, Eine neues Deutschland, p .2 5 a lth o u g h  he is 
well aware that this was not the case: interview , Berlin, 11 May 1993.
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du
Whether or not fifth factor, namely public opinion influenced the 
new leadership's stance, is questionable. As we have seen, they 
were aware of popular confusion caused by different messages 
emanating from the Politburo, and of wide-spread enthusiasm for 
Brandt's new approach. But the leadership could hardly expect 
the population to turn their backs on their western neighbour, 
unless they were offered a credible alternative with which to 
identify, hence a replacement for the former unitary German 
nation was artificially created and called the socialist nation in the 
GDR. This concept was very much imposed from on high, more as 
an ideal desired by the regime, as opposed to being a reflection of 
the subjective feelings of the population. Nevertheless, it was 
hoped that the people would accept it, since one of Honecker's 
primary goals was to secure internal stability by making the GDR 
more appealing.
Therefore it can be seen that Honecker had good reasons for 
addressing the subject of the nation, but the question remains as 
to whether this was the right way to go about it. Leading 
theorists were shocked by the fact that a policy held for 25 years 
was given up in three sentences, without sufficient preparation or 
regard for the consequences, and merely stressing the political 
aspects, ignoring 'all the elements associated with the nation and 
everything national.'213 However, such simplified and abrupt 
answers were typical of Honecker, especially since he could hardly 
be described as an intellectual.214 Alfred Neumann, now able to 
say what he really thinks about Honecker, criticises the latter for 
having given up the fight regarding the National Question, and 
accuses him of misusing the concept of the socialist nation as it 
appears in the Communist Manifesto.215
A leading W est German commentator noted that the new 
leadership omitted factors which played a leading role in 
discussion of the nation in the Federal Republic, in particular the 
relationship between V olk  and nation, and the geographical
213 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 11 February 1993.
214 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
215 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 4 May 1993.
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borders of the nation. He concluded that they were more or less 
using whatever meaning of words such as 'Volk' and 'nation* they 
liked, in order to suit current policy objectives.216 One further 
indication that the new line was half-baked was ambiguity 
regarding whether the socialist nation was fully developed or still 
developing, resulting in inconsistencies in official statements. The 
primary reason for these short-comings was the leadership's 
failure to seek advice from people who were qualified to comment 
on the state of the nation, which will be discussed below.
U lbricht, now very much yesterday's man, was originally 
supposed to open the Party Conference. His draft speech echoed 
the tone of the new line, (although he still used the term 'socialist 
German national state'): 'The objective process of their [the two 
German states'] A b g r e n z u n g  from each other has reached the
point of no return  That the ruling classes of imperialism in the
FRG carry the mark of Cain, of national treason, on their foreheads, 
while the working class of the GDR have taken the solution of the 
National Question into their own hands, belongs to real historical 
fac t.'217 However, the Politburo rejected the draft speech, and not 
only did the actual version not refer to the German question at all, 
but it was read by Hermann Axen, since Ulbricht was not even 
present. It seems that his successor wanted to exclude both him 
and all reminders of his policies on the nation. It has even been 
suggested that the former conspired with Ulbricht’s doctors to 
prevent him attending the Party Conference.218
d  ^ Theoretical Considerations
The abrupt manner in which Honecker dealt with the question of 
the nation at the Eighth Party conference was a classic example of 
how the SED’s elite tended to make a political declaration and only 
afterwards sought to find a theoretical justification for it with the 
help of theorists. Alfred Kosing, who was already well known for
216 Ludz, 'Zum Begriff,' pp.21, 26.
217 ZPA IV VIII/18
218 Przybylski, Tatort. vol. 2, p.32.
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his work on the nation219 attributes this to Honecker’s 'small- 
minded smugness1 and his belief that he and his close associates 
knew best.220 While certain other members of the Politburo were 
slightly more open-minded in comparison, their own personal 
ambitions were sufficient to dissuade them from outright criticism 
of Honecker.
However, for several years, academics had privately begun to 
consider the effects of the division on the nation, but they could 
not openly challenge long-standing views until the leadership 
amended the official line,221 and because the political agenda 
determined the research agenda, the topic inevitably remained 
inadequately researched. As a result, Honecker’s declaration was 
entirely determined by pragmatism and raised more questions 
than it answered. Knowledgeable theorists such as Kosing thought 
this was not only a big mistake, but also an insult.222 Since 
theorists were encouraged to address the question of the nation 
only after Honecker had declared that it had been decided by 
history, objective thought on the subject was inevitably restricted.
Little theoretical work on the nation dating back to the period 
immediately before the conference exists, and it is difficult to 
assess the impact of what was written on official thinking. In 
December 1970, the Politburo received a paper produced by the 
Institute for Marxist-Leninism., (IML), the leading institute for the 
social sciences at the time, for the centenary of the establishment 
of the German Reich in 1871. However, since it had been 
commissioned by the Department of Sciences, the paper could 
hardly be described as objective. The final version took a large 
step in the direction of a class-based line on the nation and may 
well have influenced Honecker. It stated, 'A nation is neither 
eternal nor immortal nor something mysterious. It is a product of 
history, and like everything else in history and society, is subject
219 See Chapter 2.
220 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993; Interview with 
Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
221 Interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 28 May 1993.
222 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin 11 February 1993.
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to constant change and contradictory developments.'223 While it 
is common for nations to seek to establish a state of their own, 
this paper was one of several examples which reversed the 
argument, claiming that the existence of two sovereign states with 
different social orders, the GDR and the Federal Republic, proved 
the existence of two separate nations. It stated, 'Today there is no 
unitary German nation, but instead the socialist state, the GDR, 
which is inextricably bound to the community of socialist states, 
and the imperialist state, the FRG, which is bound to the inhuman 
imperialism of the USA and integrated into NATO.'224
In January 1971, a paper written by historians entitled 'The 
Development of the National Question in German History' was 
presented to the Politburo. Unfortunately, the actual paper is not 
on file, and even Jurgen Hofmann was unable to get hold of it, 
while writing his officially sanctioned account of the history of the 
national question in the GDR in the late 1980s.225 After discussion 
with the CPSU, Hannes Hornig, director of the Department of 
Sciences, reported that the paper generally conformed to the view 
of both parties:
Our Soviet comrades are in agreement with the
form ulation that the socialist German nation is
developing in the GDR. They recommend that this 
development should be even more strongly embedded
in the international struggle, and that we should show 
that together with the all-round development of the
socialist nation, the GDR is taking on and further 
developing all the progressive achievements and 
experiences of the German nation, so that the 
devaluation of national feeling or a slide into national 
nihilism can be avoided.226
However, the latter advice was soon ignored by Honecker, as was 
'the task of presenting the joint interests of the workers of the 
GDR and the working class in West Germany in the struggle
223 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1488
224 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1488 (15 December 1970)
225 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
226 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1500 (23 February 1971)
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against West German imperialism.' The CPSU also recommended a 
more extensive and theoretically accurate portrayal of the 
'development of the socialist German national state.'227 While 
some of these comments seemed to be a few years behind current 
statements of the leadership, notably in the continued use of the 
adjective 'German,' they indicate the SED’s obligation to consult 
Moscow regarding the concept of the nation, and show that 
Moscow saw the National Question in Germany as merely one 
small part of the larger international conflict between socialism 
and capitalism.
An article for the Soviet journal 'Communist' defined the 'positive 
characteristics of the socialist nation' as 'socialist sovereignty, a 
socialist policy for peace, the political and moral unity of the 
people, the fraternal bond to the Soviet Union and friendship with 
socialist sister countries and with nation-states liberated from 
im perialism .'228 It seems unlikely that this detached, unemotional 
approach would persuade people to give up their identification 
with the traditional German nation, and the article recognised the 
difficult theoretical task ahead:
The solution of the National Question in the GDR 
demands that the SED and the socialist state creatively 
work through all the basic problems of the German 
people and the socialist nation. That includes the 
formation of the socialist social system, the economic 
and state system of socialism, the conflict with West 
German imperialism and with bourgeois ideologies in 
all areas, the examination of German history from the 
point of view of historical materialism, of socialist 
philosophy and the history of philosophy in Germany, 
of socialist education, socialist lifestyle, morality and 
ethics, of socialist architecture, literature and a r t.229
227 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1500
228 'Die Griindung des sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaats und die 
Entwicklung der sozialistischen deutschen Nation,' C om m unist (1971), 
author unknown, located in ZPA NL 182/1362.
229 ZPA NL182/1362
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In other words, the redefinition of the nation also made it 
necessary to redefine everything that could be considered 
national, which was no small task.
In summary, it must be said that at the Eighth Party Conference, 
the Honecker faction had applied a political solution to the 
theoretical and subjective problem of the nation, with no regard 
for the consequences. Honecker tried to deal with the nation as 
swiftly as possible so as to avoid controversy. However, while the 
vacuum left by the abandonment of the unitary German nation 
had been filled, it was hardly sufficient just to declare that the 
National Question had been decided by history, and that a socialist 
nation (no longer the socialist German  nation), was developing in 
the GDR.
Not surprisingly, Honecker's drastic attempt to settle the national 
question for good confused the population, and horrified theorists 
who found that academic research was being determined, even 
hindered, by the needs of the Party. However, within a few years, 
the leadership evidently realised that the creation of a credible 
concept of the nation would require considerably more work, and 
called upon the services of East German philosophers, social 
scientists and historians to devise a theoretical framework and a 
'national' consciousness and history for the socialist nation in the 
GDR.
2^  THE SOCIALIST NATION IN THE GDR IN PRACTICE
While examining the SED's efforts to prove the existence of a 
socialist nation in the GDR, following the Eighth Party conference, 
we should bear in mind that it was not merely an end in itself, but 
a means to achieve other objectives, in particular, international 
recognition and ultimately membership of the UN. Honecker 
wanted to be rid of the national question once and for all, in order 
to concentrate on his new social policies and to achieve internal 
stability. However, since the concept of the socialist nation in the 
GDR was an objective or ideal desired by the leadership which
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failed to take into account the subjective feelings of the people, it 
was unlikely that they would identify with it right from the start.
al The 'De-Germanisation' of the GDR
Honecker's declaration of the development of a purely socialist 
nation in the GDR immediately raised the question of whether the 
state and its population were still German. Many functionaries 
tended to take the words of the First Secretary very literally, and 
as a consequence, a highly unsubtle purge of the words ’German' 
and 'Germany' was implemented. While certain name changes 
were justified, for example, in the case of institutions unique to 
the GDR, the schizophrenic application of this 'de-Germanisation' 
policy highlighted the fact that it was purely a political tactic with 
no credible argument behind it. As we shall see, this extreme 
form of Abgrenzung continued until 1975, when the distinction 
between nation and nationality was accepted.
In July 1971, the State Secretariat for West German Questions was 
abolished, presumably because it indicated that a relationship 
existed between the two states that was different to that between 
any other two states. In the Federal Republic, this was 
interpreted as a further indication of the SED's desire for 
A bgrenzung  and a reflection of 'the consistent continuation along 
the road to a total separation of both parts of Germany pursued 
by the G D R.'230 In November 1971, the radio  station 
Deutschlandsender was renamed 'Voice of the GDR.' In this case, 
the change was not just cosmetic, but coincided with a change of 
role. A report from the Central Committee's 'West Department' 
stated that in view of the GDR's total Abgrenzung  from the FRG 
and the prospect of diplomatic relations between the two, it was 
no longer appropriate for the station to try to influence the West 
German population, although ideological work directed at the 
Federal Republic should not be given up , altogether, since West 
German communists relied on it. It was also decided to cease 
production of publications which had dealt with internal 
developments in the Federal Republic for distribution there,
230 ZPA IV A2/2028/122
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although material about the GDR would still be distributed.231 
Following criticism  and ridicule from Bonn, the SED later 
attempted to justify these changes, arguing that, ’We did not 
replace the D e u t s c h la n d s e n d e r  with the "Voice of the GDR" 
because the word "Germany" disturbed us. Like the termination 
of broadcasts by the forces' channel, this step was more an
expression of the fact that we do not want to interfere in the
internal affairs of the FRG.'232 The following February, the
television corporation ’Deutscher F ernsehfunk'  became 'Fernsehen  
der DDR.'
In May 1972, Honecker himself suggested that the D e u t s c h e  
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin  (DAW) should be 
renamed to express 'the increased social standing of the academy 
in the GDR.' As a result, it became the A ka d e m ie  der  
Wissenschaften der DDR (AdW) in September. This made sense 
since it was not a pan-German institution. The ruling council of 
the Academy stated, 'This new name is in accordance with the 
social developments of recent years.' According to a report of a 
plenary session of the academy, 'The discussion expressed the
great duty towards socialist society that the Academy has taken 
on with its new name....'233 In some cases, the renaming of 
institutions was also an opportunity for 'de-Ulbrichtisation,' for 
exam ple, the 'D eutsche  A kadem ie  der  S ta a t s - und  
Rechtswissenschaft Walter Ulbricht/  dropped both the adjective 
’German' and the name of the man it had originally honoured.234 
In connection with this, academic m anuscripts were even 
scrutinised before publication to check that the word 'Germany' 
did not crop up too often.235
The hard-line Interior Minister, Friedrich Dickel, decreed that on 
official forms and documents such as passports, etc., people should 
give their nationality as 'GDR,' which particularly enraged the Sorb 
minority. As was typical of the power structure in the GDR, those
231 ZPA IV A2/2028/42
232 ZPA IV 2/1/460 (12 October 1972)
233 ZPA IV B2/904/43
234 Krisch, 'Official Nationalism,' p. 116.
235 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
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at middle levels tended to enforce the Party line particularly 
rigidly, always fearful of antagonising their superiors, hence they 
strictly implemented the ban on the word 'German.' Even the 
Hotel Deutschland  in Leipzig was renamed Interhotel Leipzig. 
From January 1974 East German vehicles were obliged to carry
neu>
the letters 'DDR' in place of 'D,' and from September A bank notes 
were inscribed with 'Mark der DDR’ in place of 'Mark der 
deutschen Notenbank/
Such policies confused and alienated the population, who 
wondered whether or not they were still German. They 
discredited the regime and reduced the level of popular support 
that was essential for the stability and success of the state. 
Furthermore, it handed the Federal Republic a great propaganda 
victory and reinforced the latter's claim to sole representation of 
the German nation, since the SED appeared to be rejecting German 
culture, literature, music, tradition etc. Finally, in spite of the 
political divide, the populations of the two German states were 
still related to each other, and not surprisingly considered 
themselves and their relatives 'over there' to share the same 
nationality, namely German, and to deny this fact laid the 
leadership open to ridicule. It was also hard to deny that the 
populations of the GDR and FRG both spoke German, although 
some people did claim that a S p r a c h s p a l tu n g  had developed, 
though in practice, this seems to have been confined to political 
v o c a b u la ry .236 Consequently, the significance of the common 
language would simply have to be played down. All in all, it was 
clear that this extreme form of Abgrenzung  would soon have to be 
m odified.
All the major theorists concerned with the concept of the nation in 
the GDR found the policy of 'de-Germanisation' absurd. Alfred 
Kosing privately thought that the leadership was making itself a 
laughing stock, appearing to have completely lost touch with
236 gee Elise Ricsel, Der Stil der deutschen Alltagsrede (Moscow, 1964), p.7, 
cited in Erhard Hexelschneider and Erhard John, Kultur als einigendes 
Band? (East Berlin, 1984), p. 66; Schweigler, National Consciousness, pp. 46, 
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rea lity .237 So why did they do it? One could perhaps argue that 
the SED's apparent wish to sever its ties with the German nation 
was a sign that the leadership was now sufficiently confident to
o t\
present the GDR purely as a socialist state, that no longer reliedAits 
German credentials to prove its legitimacy. However, the fact that 
it later reversed this policy and began to draw heavily on what 
were regarded as progressive elements of German history seems 
to disprove this theory. A more likely explanation is that the 
leadership was insecure and still saw 'Germanness,' that is to say, 
the ’Germanness' shared by both the GDR and the Federal 
Republic, as a threat to the legitimacy of the former, and a 
propaganda weapon for the latter.
In retrospect, we can see that the German connection clearly did 
undermine the GDR, but the leadership of the SED was naive to 
believe that the removal of words would be sufficient to break the 
subjective bond of German nationhood felt by the population. 
Evidently it was perceived by some members of the leadership as 
a quick solution, with no regard for the consequences. However, 
there was no question of changing the name of the state, (although 
usually only the abbreviated form 'DDR' was used in order to play 
down the adjective 'German'), nor of the Party, which was, after 
all, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei  Deutschlands , nor of the 
newspaper Neues Deutschland. The inconsistent implementation 
of this policy proves they wanted to keep the historic link when it 
suited them. Furthermore, the fact that the word 'German,' still 
sometimes cropped up in speeches, especially with reference to 
'the two German states,’ revealed continuing uncertainties even 
among the leadership itself.
Unfortunately a decision by the ruling elite, explicitly ordering the 
deletion of the words 'German' and 'Germany' is not to be found, 
but we can be sure that the idea must have originated from 
Honecker’s close circle and that it had his blessing. Also, we now 
know enough about how the Politburo functioned not to expect 
any debate, let alone disagreement with a policy suggested or at 
least approved by the First Secretary. Since Honecker was himself
237 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
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born on West German soil, it is rather puzzling that he advocated a 
policy of 'de-Germanisation,' though it may have been an extreme 
demonstration of his commitment to socialist internationalism. 
The most likely explanation is that his reasons were purely 
political. The idea probably originated from leading functionaries 
who were naive enough to believe that a complicated issue 
involving the deep-rooted, subjective feelings of the population, 
could be solved with word games. Alfred Kosing does not believe 
Kurt Hager was responsible because he was too intelligent and is 
known to have derided it, saying 'We are not Zulus, we are still 
Germans.' Unfortunately he lacked the courage to challenge 
Honecker on the issue.238 Jurgen Hofmann suspects that it may 
have originated A Joachim Herrmann in the Propaganda Department, 
a close colleague of Honecker, and certainly no intellectual. Others 
may also have had reservations about it, but as usual, they were 
silenced by the ever present East German virtue of obedience to 
au tho rity .239
b) Public Opinion and Propaganda
In the early 1970s, the Party leadership still took the trouble to 
monitor public opinion regarding the state of the nation, and more 
specifically, whether or not the population identified with the 
socialist nation in the GDR. As before, this was not because they 
wanted to incorporate the views of the population into the new 
concept but in order to identify areas where the Party's message 
was not getting across and where propaganda needed to be 
improved. Presumably if people did identify with the socialist 
nation, they would also accept the GDR as their nation-state and 
be more willing to help increase its prosperity and international 
standing, instead of looking westwards and dreaming of German 
reunification. During the negotiations with Bonn, which 
culminated in the Basic Treaty of 1972, this was particularly 
important, since there was a risk that people would interpret the 
negotiation process as a sign that the two states were growing 
together, whereas the regime saw it as proof that the two were
238 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 11 February 1993.
239 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
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now totally separate. Also, any indications of dissent might be 
noticed by the outside world, which could damage the SED’s claim 
to legitimacy and thus discourage other states from recognising 
the GDR. A further reason why public opinion was monitored was 
that in the Politburo, agitation and propaganda was the 
responsibility of Werner Lamberz, who recognised that in order to 
produce successful propaganda, it was necessary to know what 
people actually  thought. U nfortunately  o ther leading 
functionaries preferred not to know, and as a result, the reputable 
Institute for Public Opinion Research (IMF) was immediately 
abolished following Lamberz' sudden death in 1978.
Information about popular opinion was gathered in several 
different ways. Firstly, secretaries from each administrative 
district or B e z i r k  would regularly send reports of views 
articulated by the public to the Agitation Department. Secondly, 
polls were undertaken by the IMF and also by the Academy for 
Social Sciences, which concentrated on historical consciousness 
among the population. Thirdly, discussion at academic 
institutions, such as the Academy of Sciences, was monitored and 
reported back to the Department of Sciences every month.
Research revealed a serious degree of incomprehension regarding 
the nation following the Eighth Party Conference. An opinion poll 
conducted by the IMF in workplaces in East Berlin in January 
1972 asked respondents whether they would agree that the FRG 
was 'an imperialist foreign country' (imperialistisches Ausland) 
and that there was no longer a unitary German nation. 54.6% 
disagreed and only 31.6% agreed, while 13.8% could not give an 
answer. For some reason, only 37% disagreed and 49.1% agreed in 
the provinces, but even so, these were not the results that the 
leadership  wanted to hear.240 Reports from the regions 
immediately after the Party Conference indicated that although 
many people accepted the existence of two German states, they 
failed to see how this affected the unitary German nation.241 A n 
assessment of 'the effectiveness of political and ideological work
240 ZPA 14350
241 ZPA IV A2/902/158
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to secure socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism in 
the consciousness of the workers' by the Academy of Sciences 
acknowledged that with regard to the National Question, people 
over-valued historic, linguistic, and cultural factors and failed to 
appreciate the significance of class.242
Another report stated that many Party members had not given 
sufficient thought to Honecker’s answer to the National Question 
and therefore failed to understand it, which resulted in 
uncertainties such as whether one should speak of a divided 
German nation, what a nation actually was, and whether the 
struggle to unify Germany would be resumed. Some Party 
members were apparently addressing the question of whether a 
unitary nation still existed by simply applying Stalin's already 
d isc red ited  c rite ria , w hile ignoring  so -called  'h is to ric  
d ev e lo p m en ts .'243 The opinion polls into historic consciousness 
conducted by the AfG revealed that even people who accepted the 
GDR as their fatherland failed to understand why the GDR needed 
to cut itself off from the Federal Republic.244
Such doubts were not confined to the working-class. Reports from 
the Humboldt University in East Berlin from 1971 confirmed that 
'all-German illusions’ persisted, particularly among non-Party 
members, who were always singled out in such reports.245 The 
following year, it was noted that while students generally no 
longer found the question of a unitary German nation relevant, 
they had difficulty giving a Marxist-Leninist explanation as to 
why this was so.246 In 1973, some students were still asking 
whether the common past shared by the two German states 
should be considered, while others thought that the discussion 
about the nation should cease until the opportunity arose to 
construct a unitary socialist German nation.247 Furthermore, a 
major investigation conducted for the Department of Sciences
242 ZPA IV B2/904/13
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criticised the ’bourgeois ideas about the nation' which prevailed at 
the Academy of Sciences, apparently as a result of 'insufficient 
attention to the theory of Marxist-Leninist tradition.’ It stated 
that emotions were getting in the way, and some academics were 
trying to work out a definition of a nation that was 'politically 
value-free,’ hence they uncritically accepted the 'social-democratic 
motto "We are all Germans."248 It was also noted that some 
academics and researchers at the Academy still adhered to a 
traditional bourgeois concept of the nation, while others mixed 
bourgeois and Marxist concepts, though it was hoped that these 
misconceptions could be dispelled. Several members were also 
raising awkward (though valid) questions such as why there were 
nations within socialism at all, and why it was necessary to 
discuss the topic, now that the Federal Republic had more or less 
recognised the GDR. Some scientists had even suggested that the 
socialist nation was just a temporary and functional concept, 
specifically  designed to reinforce the SED's policy of 
Abgrenzung , 249 which was basically true of course.
Research also revealed that the purge of the word 'German' had 
not altered the self-perception of the population as the regime 
had hoped. The virtual ban on the word was in fact more likely to 
turn people against the regime because they felt that their 
nationality was being taken away from them. This was especially 
true of the Sorbs, who were afraid of being forced to become 
simply 'citizens of the GDR' along with everyone else. Also, people 
did not understand why the border to Poland was open, but not to 
the Federal Republic since they still believed 'We are all Germans.' 
Members of the Academy of Sciences wondered why the word 
'Germany' was suddenly taboo, but also noticed how inconsistent 
the purge w as.250 While many institutions were renamed,
h
Deutsche Post, Deutsche Reichsbahk and Neues Deutschland  
remained unchanged, (though not for long in the case of the 
former). Even the need to change the name of the Academy itself 
to Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR was questioned by some
248 ZPA IV B2/904/13
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(again, by non-Party members in particular), for ’there are still 
enough other areas where the word "German" occurs, such as 
"Deutsche Reichsbahn," etc., and one should observe tradition.' 
Students at the Humboldt University were continuing to ask 
questions such as 'What is a German?' The case of a group of 
students who were punished for singing the 'D e u t s c h l a n d l i e d 'Die  
alten G e r m a n e n and 'Kurfiirst Friedrich von der Pfalz ' during a 
party in a hall of residence illustrates just how far the ’de- 
Germanisation’ campaign was taken. They were reported by an 
FDJ official, who claimed to have dutifully challenged them 
regarding the content of the songs.251
One event that warrants attention due to its impact on popular 
opinion is the negotiation and eventual signing of the Basic Treaty 
in 1972, which defined the basis of the relationship between the 
two German states. The treaty was agreed after 60 meetings 
between the two sides and over a thousand hours of 
n ego tia tion .252 Exactly why the SED agreed to negotiate at all is 
open to speculation. Four reasons have been identified: firstly, the 
desire for international recognition and greater access to world 
markets; secondly, Soviet pressure; thirdly, due te increasing West 
German intrusions into the Eastern Bloc; and fourthly, as a  resuk  
■ef an increase in the regime's confidence in the socialist mentality 
of East German citizens.253 With the signing of the Basic Treaty, 
the Federal Republic had almost recognised the GDR, but not quite, 
hence Honecker could claim that it more or less had, while Bonn 
could claim that a special relationship still existed. The SED's chief 
negotiator, Dr. Michael Kohl, adhered to the line on the National 
Question articulated by Honecker at the Eighth Party Conference 
as the basis for his arguments, and dismissed Bonn's attempts to 
take advantage of the SED’s earlier pro-unification stance.254 
While details of the negotiations and the resulting treaty have 
been adequately described elsew here,255 the accompanying
251 ZPA IV B2/904/29
252 Hofmann, Ein neucs Deutschland, p. 277.
253 Identified by Pletsch, The Socialist Nation,' p.344.
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'Letter on German Unity' from the West German government 
warrants attention.
During negotiations, Honecker had stated clearly that the GDR 
would not sign a treaty which made reference to the nation or to 
reunification. Consequently, Bonn attached a letter which stated 
that the German question remained open, that the treaty did not 
amount to diplomatic recognition of the GDR as a foreign country, 
and that the question of citizenship had not been settled.256 As a 
result, the SED could later argue that, 'No mention is made of the 
unity of the nation or the unity of Germany or of Germany as a 
whole in the treaty, or in a supplementary document. That 
corresponds to historic fact and to the line that was formulated by 
the Eighth Party Conference.'257 The acceptance of permanent 
representations and not proper embassies was officially explained 
as 'in the interest of a constructive outcome of the negotiations' 
and it was stated that the undermining of their tasks as 
diplomatic missions would not be perm itted.258 Whether the 
Basic Treaty amounted to recognition by the Federal Republic or 
not hardly mattered to Honecker, since for him it was a means to 
an end, namely to achieve his ultimate objectives - international 
recognition and membership of the UN. According to some 
commentators, it was sufficient to make Honecker temporarily 
relax his policy of A b g r e n z u n g ,259 although as we shall see, the
new constitution of 1974 reverted to a separatist line.
Although the SED leadership interpreted the Basic Treaty as proof 
that the two German states were entirely separate from each
other, research showed that many East Germans not surprisingly 
interpreted it as a sign of rapprochement between the two states, 
and hoped that it might lead to greater things. During the
negotiations, the SED's continuation of a policy of A b g r e n z u n g  
caused confusion, since it seemed to contradict the aim of
256 Diemer, ed. Kurze Chronik. p.91.
257 Wemer Lamberz, 16 November 1972, ZPA 11527.
258 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p. 282-283.
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im proving re la tions.260 Indeed, polls revealed that even those 
who accepted that a unitary German nation no longer existed did 
not understand the need for A b g ren zu n g  or for a stronger bond 
with the Soviet Union.261 The opinion poll from January 1972 
mentioned earlier asked respondents whether the GDR should be 
more accommodating towards the FRG, to which 67% of
respondents from East Berlin said yes. Furthermore, nearly 40% 
of respondents disagreed with the statement, ’Nothing binds us to 
the imperialist FRG, but everything binds us to the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries.' Finally, 50% agreed with the 
statement, 'Both states are inhabited by Germans and there are
many family ties. That gives the relationship between the GDR and 
FRG a special character and one cannot speak of such a strict 
demarcation as exists between other states with conflicting social 
orders.' (Meanwhile, 22% were in complete agreement with 
A b g r e n z u n g , and 20% totally against). However, the same 
questions provoked less extreme responses in provincial areas.262 
For a regime with a low level of tolerance for dissent, such figures 
were pretty  grave. The estab lishm ent of perm anent 
represen tations as opposed to em bassies was naturally  
interpreted as a sign that a special relationship between the two 
states still existed.263
Not surprisingly, most people were not interested in Marxist- 
Leninist arguments as to why there was no longer one German 
nation or a special relationship, or why A b g r e n z u n g  was a 
necessary aspect of the class struggle. They were more concerned 
with the practical consequences that directly affected them, for
example, their inability to visit relatives 'over there.' Many had
hoped that the Basic Treaty would bring freedom to travel to the 
Federal Republic, but were to be disappointed because the Party 
soon found ways to reduce contact between the populations of 
both states, such as the dramatic increase in the minimum amount 
of money West Germans had to exchange to visit the GDR in
260 ZPA IV A2/902/158
261 ZPA 14350
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November 1973. Clearly the leadership had very different 
reasons for celebrating the ratification of the Treaty to the 
population of the GDR and the West German government. 
However, in spite of the SED's claims to the contrary, the practical 
measures and regulations that do not usually exist between two 
states proved that their relationship was still far from ordinary.
Research also revealed yet another hindrance to the SED's 
propaganda campaign, namely that most East Germans thought 
that Brandt was basically a good chap, in spite of the SED's 
attempts to convince them otherwise. A report entitled 'The 
Ideological-Political Situation at the Humboldt U niversity ' 
acknowledged 'widespread illusions about Brandt and his policies,' 
and that the Party organisation had not yet succeeded in 
convincing people that the conflict with the Federal Republic was 
a class-conflict.264 In a note to Honecker regarding the opinion 
poll mentioned earlier, Hans Modrow, then head of the Agitation 
Department, specifically referred to the population's failure to 
recognise what the SED claimed were Brandt's true intentions,265 
hence Honecker must have been aware of popular feeling. In 
1972, Modrow also wrote to Lamberz, pointing out that compared 
to the previous year, there had been a marked increase in the 
percentage of people giving the answers the regime did not want
KeoJ"
to A regarding the German Question. He said that the influence of 
'the enemy's arguments’ was reflected in increased illusions about 
Brandt, with only about half of respondents 'correctly' assessing 
the role of Brandt and of A b g r e n z u n g , and an increase in the 
number of people unable to give an answer to such questions, 
which was a sign of widespread confusion.266 However, these 
were not only the views of working-class people. Members of the 
Academy of Sciences had apparently expressed the view that the 
Basic Treaty 'functioned as a chamber for an imaginary German 
unity,' that the alleviation of personal restrictions would lead to
264 ZPA IV B2/904/29
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266 ZPA 14350
187
rapprochement, and that it would no longer be appropriate to 
speak of two German nations.267
Thus, in spite of the fact that a certain GDR-consciousness had 
developed, the negotiations and resulting treaty revived ideas of 
one German nation which arched over the two states like a huge 
umbrella, with the result that 1973 marked the ’high point of 
illusion' regarding the German nation.268 Although the treaty did 
pave the way for international recognition of the GDR, which had 
apparently revived the 'state consciousness of the citizens of the 
G D R ,'269 this was no replacement for national consciousness, and 
the susceptibility of East Germans to the attractions of the Federal 
Republic was obvious, as was the need to make the GDR more 
attractive to its citizens, and to create a stronger emotional bond 
between citizen and state.
Another event which provoked all-German sentiment during this 
period was the 1972 Olympic games in Munich. The regime no 
doubt saw it as an opportunity for the GDR to prove itself on the 
world stage, to strengthen patriotism at home and to outshine the 
Federal Republic. (Normally it was forbidden to raise the flag of 
the GDR in the FRG, but Bonn had to make the games an 
exception). The fact that there were now two separate teams 
from the GDR and Federal Republic would be a clear sign to the 
rest of the world that they were separate states, (and in the eyes 
of the SED, two separate nations). According to the 'West 
Department,' 'The class conflict has reached such an extent that it 
is in principle no different to the military level.'270 But did the 
population share this view? Apparently not, since the Agitation 
Commission noted as common the view, 'Whether GDR or FRG - 
we’re keeping our fingers crossed for all Germans and will 
celebrate every one of their victories,' and the belief that since 
both states had good chances of winning medals, if they had a 
united team, Germany could win the most medals overall. The
267 ZPA IV B2/904/13
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games also raised the sensitive issue of who would be permitted 
to travel to Munich.271
In summary, we can draw two conclusions from these reports of
public opinion from the early 1970s. Firstly, that there was
widespread confusion regarding the state of the German nation in 
spite of Honecker's hope that the issue was over and done with, 
and secondly, that the leadership was aware of this. Archive 
material shows that Honecker himself received and read regular 
reports on public opinion from Hans Modrow, thus he was
personally aware of the level of incomprehension on this issue.272 
Unfortunately, however, the material collected only made the 
regime try harder to promote its own version of the socialist
nation in the GDR, as opposed to accepting the will of the people. 
It was clear that people still wanted to be part of the German 
nation, even if they had come to terms with living in a socialist 
state. The SED was wasting its time claiming that the unitary
German nation no longer existed or that the nation in the GDR was
no longer German, when the opposite message was emanating
from the Federal Republic, to which the majority continued to be
bound via family ties.
The attempt to 'de-Germanise' the GDR was a very crass and
simplistic attempt to propagate the notion of a socialist nation.
The SED also launched a major campaign to get the basic idea
across to the masses, which indicates how important it was that 
the new concept was accepted. The Department of Propaganda 
was in charge, assisted by the Department of Sciences on so-called 
'ideological and theoretical questions.' A report from the
Department for Propaganda stated,
Particularly in this area, extensive theoretical and 
ideological work must be undertaken so that every 
citizen completely understands the class content of the 
national question, its historic developm ent, the 
objective process of Abgrenzung  by the socialist GDR 
from the imperialist FRG, leading to the formation and
271 ZPA IV 2/2106/20; also ZPA IV B2/904/29
272 ZPA 14350
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development of a socialist nation on the soil of the GDR 
as a result of a hard and unavoidable class struggle 
spanning several decades.273
The development of the socialist nation in the GDR within the 
community of socialist nations and states was also to be
emphasised. In November 1972, a conference was held on the 
'T asks of A gita tion  and P ropaganda for the fu rther 
Implementation of the Resolutions of the Eighth Party Conference,' 
organised by Werner Lamberz. The conference is interesting
because there, problems arising from the propagation of the
socialist nation were admitted. It was recognised that the concept 
of the socialist nation needed to be better explained and that 
insufficient theoretical work had been produced. For the first
time it was acknowledged that the main hindrance to the
effectiveness of propaganda was W est German television. 
Apparently, it le^d to a blurring of the 'friend-foe image,’ to an 
underestimation of the dangers of West German imperialism, to 
illusions concerning the true intentions of the SPD, especially 
regarding detente, to the return of thoughts of the unity of the 
German nation, and to hopes of a better understanding between 
the two states, ^of freedom to travel to the Federal Republic which 
would pave the way to reunification. This was apparently 
confirmed by frequent comments such as 'Brandt will manage it - 
Brandt will bring us reunification.' It was also acknowledged that 
W est German television provoked illusions about a special 
relationship  between the two states, and incom prehension
regarding the need for A b g r e n z u n g ,  which was particularly 
prevalent amongst people watching sport, who tended to see
victories for West German athletes as 'our victories,' because 'We 
are all still Germans.'274
To counteract such thoughts, propaganda was devised to
encourage alternative views such as, 'The socialist GDR is my 
fatherland and its prosperity depends on me, but also offers me 
permanent social and political security,' 'The future belongs to
273 ZPA IV A2/903/5
274 ZPA 11533
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socialism,' and 'Whoever stands on the side of the Soviet Union is 
always the historic victor.’ Propaganda would also need to turn 
the agreements between the GDR and Federal Republic to the SED's 
advantage. According to Lamberz,
Tourism, family visits and other regulations take place 
not because we have given away part of our 
sovereignty or the democratic character of our society 
for the benefit of something or other common to us. 
Rather, it is because the FRG has had to recognise our 
sovereignty and independent developm ent as a 
socialist state.... Even if Hans from the Heckert factory 
in Karl-Marx-Stadt and Fritz von Conti from Hanover 
visit each other, that does not alter any power 
relationships. Hans works in and for socialism, while 
Fritz remains exploited until the day when the West 
German working class liberates itse lf.275
However, from the report, it is clear that the problem was not just 
that people were still thinking in all-German terms, but that they 
were not convinced that socialism best served their interests,
particularly  when they could see the alternative on their 
television screens.
Events were organised by local branches of the SED, where 
socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism and the socialist 
nation were addressed, in an attempt to immunise the population 
against 'W est German im perialism .' Honecker sent top 
functionaries to such gatherings to represent and justify his 
stance, for example, Hermann Axen gave an important speech 
entitled 'The Eighth Party Conference on the Socialist Nation in the 
GDR' at a so-called 'theoretical conference' organised by the SED in 
Berlin in June 1973. That two years had already passed since the
conference suggests that it was taking a long time for the
population to get the message. Axen, who always took an interest 
in the issue, used many familiar arguments, for example, that the 
socialist nation was united, whereas bourgeois nations were 
divided by internal class antagonisms, and that the National
Question was a class question. (Communists, he claimed, had
275 ZPA 11533
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never concealed the fact that the solution of the National Question 
was subordinate to the interests of the revolution and the 
interests of socialism). Obviously aware of the awkward question 
of ethnicity, Axen said that ethnic characteristics should not be 
underestimated, but did not determine the nature of a nation or 
its socio-economic class structure.276
It is clear from the speech that the SED wanted to create what 
Axen actually called 'GDR consciousness' and to arouse patriotism, 
in spite of their claim to despise nationalism. But talk of the need 
for 'love of our socialist fatherland' and 'willingness to defend our 
homeland' all sounded pretty nationalistic, substituting the word 
'socialist' in place of 'German.' Indeed, Axen claimed that national 
nihilism and cosmopolitanism were just as alien to the Party as 
bourgeois nationalism, and concluded, 'The rebirth of peoples that 
has been achieved under socialism , the developm ent and 
flourishing of socialist nations and nationalities, and their success 
in all fields, gives rise to an upturn of national consciousness and 
strengthens national pride and patriotism.' The message was that 
socialist nationalism or patriotism was acceptable, but not German 
nationalism, especially since the former was supposedly linked to 
proletarian internationalism. However, Axen did also use the 
phrase 'socialist German nation state,' and referred to 'the 
progressive traditions of German history as a whole,' which
highlighted the contradictions in the SED's arguments.277
However, the amount of attention paid to the nation in official
propaganda com pared to other issues should not be 
overestimated. It was very much a subject that Honecker wanted 
to sweep under the carpet so that he could concentrate on 
economic and social consolidation. Indeed, many theorists thought 
that the regime paid too little attention to it and just gave
simplistic answers, which encouraged confusion. However, we can 
assume that popular acceptance of the socialist nation was
CLftd (
important because the regime sought popular legitim acy, internal
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stability and realised that people would work harder to 
strengthen the state if they felt allegiance to it.
cl Official Justifications for the New Line
Many functionaries and Party members judged the importance of 
an issue according to how often the First Secretary addressed it. 
Honecker's references to the German nation were usually brief 
and without detail, suggesting a reluctance on his part to address 
the issue at all, presumably because by doing so, he would 
acknowledge the existence of a problem that had allegedly been 
settled. For Honecker, the National Question was a class question 
and he hoped that everything tied up with the nation could be 
converted into aspects of the class struggle. The policy of strict 
A bgrenzung  from the Federal Republic seemed to have paid off, 
since only two years into his leadership, he could boast that 82 
states had established diplomatic relations with the ’socialist state 
of workers and farmers,’ the GDR. Only at the end of 1974 did 
Honecker recognise that his virtual silence on this difficult subject 
had not erased it from people's minds, but instead had nurtured 
incom prehension.
The rare occasions when Honecker mentioned the topic attracted 
much coverage by the West German media, for example, his 
speech during an inspection of troops in Riigen in January 1972. 
There he stated,
There is no unity between the socialist GDR and the
imperialist FRG and there can never be a unity.....
Constant talk about the unity of the nation’ does not 
change this. Moreover, it is an attempt to interfere in
the internal affairs of the GDR.... The FRG  is a
foreign country, and furthermore, -she is an imperialist 
foreign country. 278
At a consultation meeting with local functionaries and members of 
the Central Committee in January 1973, Honecker also addressed 
the issue, this time quite extensively, apparently in response to
278 Zeiger, P ic Haltung. p. 137.
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Brandt's recent governmental declaration. Again Brandt had put 
Honecker on the defensive by stating that it was not normal for a 
border to divide members of the same people (Volk).
According to Honecker, Brandt was 'intentionally overlooking the 
fact that it was not a case of a border dividing members of the 
same people, but one between sovereign states that were 
independent of each other and which had different social 
systems.' That, for Honecker, was the decisive factor. He added, 
'the German bourgeoisie has always spoken about the unity of the 
nation when pursuing aggressive objectives.' Furthermore,
At the centre of this policy of 'A n n a h eru n g '  during 
the past few years, stood the notion of the German 
nation, which apparently exists unchanged. In fact 
there are two German nations, the socialist one, or as 
they occasionally say in the West German press, the 
‘GDR-nation,’ and the capitalist nation in the FRG. 279
It is noticeable that he did not object to the term 'GDR-nation,' 
presumably because it implied acceptance that there were now 
not just two separate states on German soil, but also two separate 
nations. However, the problem of finding a replacement for the 
adjective 'G erm an' rem ained. 'E ast Germ an,' which was 
commonplace in the West was never accepted by the SED. 
Although Honecker claimed that 'the German Question’ no longer 
existed, on this occasion, he still referred to 'both German states' 
and even 'two German nations,' which highlights a problem that 
remained unsolved, namely what had happened to everything 
German, now that the German nation apparently no longer existed.
Honecker's next reference to the nation occurred during the ninth 
session of the Central Committee in May 1973. The very fact that 
he returned to the subject, albeit dismissively, suggests that 
contrary to his claims and wishes, it was still an issue. He accused 
Bonn of trying to use the recent Basic Treaty to its advantage. Yet 
again he seemed to be responding to Brandt's government, which 
had justifiably accused the SED of trying to run away from their
279 ZPA IV 2/1/471 (25 May 1973)
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shared culture, history and language. However, he had clearly not 
formulated the arguments he used himself, but instead adopted 
those of other functionaries such as Axen and Norden, which are 
discussed below. On the subject of the common German language, 
he borrowed Norden's argument that just because citizens of 
Switzerland, Austria, the GDR and Federal Republic all spoke 
German, it did not necessarily follow that they all belonged to the 
same nation. He stressed that it was not language and culture that 
had drawn a border between the GDR and Federal Republic, but 
their different, even conflicting social and political structures, 
adding that ’the common language cannot magically change this 
reality. Apart from that, such things in common have not been 
equated with a joint state or a joint nation for a long time.'280 
However, he did acknowledge the fact that East Germans had the 
option of tuning in to West German television and radio if they 
wished, resulting in the need for more home-grown counter- 
propaganda, together with an improvement in programme quality.
Somewhat defensively, Honecker counteracted Bonn’s accusations 
that the SED was trying to run away from their shared history,
culture and language with the argument, 'German history was.....
always a history of class struggles.' Furthermore, 'Today, the GDR 
is the state that embodies the best traditions of German history, 
the peasants' uprising of the Middle ages, the struggle of the 
revolutionary democrats in 1848, the German workers' movement 
founded by Marx and Engels, Bebel and Liebknecht, and the heroic 
acts of the anti-fascist resistance fighters.'281 Presumably this 
was to counteract the Federal Republic's claims to be the only 
legitimate German state to emerge from the Nazi period. Also, the 
Basic Treaty had made the position of the GDR more secure, so 
Honecker could now afford to refer to the past without 
undermining the GDR. He even used the phrase 'the two German 
states' several times, for example, 'Thus today there are two 
German states that embody the essential contradiction of our time, 
the essential contradiction between capital and workers, and
280 Erich Honecker, 'Ziigig voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der 
Beschliisse des 8. Parteitages,' Reden und Aufsatze. 12 vols. (East Berlin,
1975), vol. 2, pp. 239-242.
281 Honecker, 'Ziigig voran,' p.241
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between imperialism and socialism.'282 Finally, he criticised the 
Chinese leadership for believing in the idea of a unitary German 
nation and the possibility of reunification, and accused them of 
collusion with Bonn.283 However, somewhat disingenuously he 
added, 'In which form the peoples of Europe arrange their co­
existence once Western Europe, including the FRG, has travelled 
down the road to socialism, only time will tell.'284
Much to the annoyance of theorists on the subject of the nation, 
most members of the Politburo followed Honecker's lead and 
avoided the subject. Those closest to the First Secretary, such as 
Giintjier Mittag and Joachim Herrmann, were hardly intellectuals 
and tended to adopt a purely pragmatic approach to such issues, 
rather than trouble themselves with theories and justifications. 
However, there were exceptions, in particular, Kurt Hager, 
Hermann Axen and Albert Norden, who put some flesh onto the 
bare bones of the new official position, though their arguments 
often sound decidedly contrived. The sudden increase in attention 
to the subject was undoubtably caused by renewed hopes among 
the masses that the two German states would grow closer together 
as a result of the Basic Treaty. Consequently, a further blurring of 
the already fuzzy line between propaganda and academic work 
occurred. However, while top functionaries could ignore the work 
of academics if they wished, the latter ignored the former at their 
peril. Even so, they all had to adhere to the basic line expressed 
at the most recent Party conference in order to safeguard their 
positions and future careers.
This was particularly true of the head of the Department of 
Sciences, Kurt Hager, who was certainly one of the more intelligent 
members of the ruling elite, but had previously supported 
Ulbricht's line on the nation. Hager played a significant role due 
to his overall control of academic institutions, and via the 
Department of Sciences' Central Research Plan and consultations 
with those responsible for elaborating upon and propagating the
282 Honecker, 'Ziigig voran,' p.241.
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official line. However, Hager had apparently rather carelessly 
commented that Honecker was an intellectual lightweight, which 
was conveyed to the latter by a third party. After this 
indiscretion, Hager did not dare to challenge Honecker, even 
though he must have been aware that the idea of a purely 
socialist nation was being taken to ridiculous lengths. Certain 
academics found such cowardice unforgivable for a man of Hager's 
in te lligence .285 However, his opinion of Honecker was not totally 
unfounded, hence the latter needed experienced, educated people 
like Hager to flesh out policies. Due to the power structure within 
the Department, Hager's deputies rigidly enforced the line to 
which he himself was obliged to adhere, which placed great 
restraints on the work of theorists, and resulted in the 
reproduction of the views and mistakes of the leadership.
In a speech on the tasks of social scientists following the 
conference, Hager was the first leading functionary to elaborate on 
the concept of the socialist nation. He claimed that far from being 
eternal and unchanging, nations were products of social 
developments and the class struggle. After all, as Marx, Engels 
and Lenin had stated, the socialist revolution would lead to the 
renewal of all forms of existence in human society. Hager went on 
to list the main characteristics of the socialist nation: state power 
in the hands of the working class and their allies; socialist means 
of production; socialist thinking and action; and the bond with the 
Soviet Union and other socialist states. The GDR was described as 
the 'socialist nation-state' that was sovereign and inviolable, and 
the only mention of the word 'German' was with reference to the 
Federal R epublic 's 'national dem agogy' and 'ideo log ica l 
subversion,' demonstrated by her attempts to spread rumours 
about the continued existence of a unitary German nation. The 
implications for academia were made clear:
The Eighth Party conference of the SED orientates the 
theoretical and ideological work of social scientists 
tow ards a convincing  debate w ith bourgeois 
nationalism. Next to anti-communism, nationalism is
285 Interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 15 March 1993.
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the other main strand of the struggle by West German 
imperialism against socialism in the GDR. 286
A draft version of a speech by Hager to functionaries in 
Brandenburg in September 1971 stated, 'It must not be forgotten 
that for Marxist-Leninists, the socialist nation is not the ultimate 
goal. The flourishing of socialist nations is logically accompanied 
by their growing closer together and in the long term will lead to 
their merging together.'287 This was a permanent dilemma for 
both functionaries and theorists, but the fact that it was removed
from the final version suggests that Hager realised it would be
going too far.
One prominent functionary who had been critical of Ulbricht’s line 
on the nation for several years was Albert Norden. His ideas first 
appeared in a book entitled 'Questions in the Fight against 
Imperialism,’ and subsequently cropped up in numerous speeches 
and articles made by himself and others, including Honecker.
Norden adopted Marx and Engels' idea that by taking over the 
leadership of a nation, the proletariat would become the national 
class and therefore would itse lf  constitu te the nation.
Correspondingly, since power was said to be in the hands of the
working class in the GDR, they and their allies had created a
socialist nation-state and themselves constituted the nation.288 He 
claimed that economic and social factors defined a nation, not the
factors previously identified by Stalin, and in any case, the
absence of a common German territory and common economy, the 
differences in the psychological and moral characteristics of the 
populations of the two states, in their lifestyle and way of 
thinking, and the lack of common contemporary culture disproved 
the claim that the unitary German nation still existed. Even a
286 Kurt Hager, 'Die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft, Aufgaben der 
Gesellschaftswissenschaften nach dem 8. Parteitag,' E inheit 26 (1971): p. 
1231.
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288 Albert Norden, 'Zwei deutsche Nationalstaaten,' Deutschland Archiv 5 
(1973): p. 417.
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shared history apparently no longer united them, due to their
different interpretations of it.289
Norden considered the idea that a common language was an
indicator of nation, but dismissed it, since the members of several 
different countries spoke German.290 After all, no-one would
suggest that all English or Spanish native speakers around the 
world should form one nation, so why should this be the case for 
all German native speakers? According to Norden,
With reference to this argument of the common 
German language - it is well known that the Austrians 
also speak German, and the people in large parts of 
Switzerland, Luxembourg and Eastern France too.
With this argument of a common language, one comes 
dangerously close to the greater German concept of
Hitler, who justified his first annexations with the 
need for all German speaking people to belong 
together in one state. But the Russian speaking 
workers of Moscow, the English speaking miners of
Scotland, the French speaking work force at Renault, 
and Italian farm labourers are a thousand times closer 
to us than the German speaking Messrs Siemens, Abs 
and Krupp. 291
Norden used the—same - argument -on - numerous occasions:
-fa s t- because—Messrs -Flick ,—Abs—and—Siemens—spoke- . 
German,--are- the- workers supposed- to--form a nation
w ith- them? Hitler -and- Himmler ■ also—spoke -German
and—murdered—hundreds—of—thousands— of—German
spe-aking com m unists, s-oc-ia l dem ocrats and
progressive members- o f -th e- bourgeoisie,--?^ 2
289 Albert Norden, Fragen des Kampfes gegen den Im perialism s. (East 
Berlin, 1972), pp. 22-23. Cited in Zimmermann, ed., DDR Handbuch. vol. 2, 
pp. 924-926.
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While he did have a point, by insisting that nations could be 
defined in purely objective terms, Norden neglected the subjective 
aspects which continued to be a significant component of the 
national consciousness of the citizens of the GDR.
The question of the so-called ethnic factors and their relationship 
to social and economic factors was tackled by Hermann Axen, the 
Politburo member responsible for overseas affairs, in a mass- 
produced booklet entitled The Development of the Socialist Nation 
in the GDR,’293 which was based on his speech at the Party’s 
theoretical conference mentioned earlier. Until the bitter end, 
Axen adhered to the line that he had written for Honecker's 
speech at the Eighth Party Conference, and only admitted that he 
might have got it slightly wrong after the 1989 revolution.294 In 
the booklet, Axen attempted to make use of classic works of 
Marxism-Leninism to support the SED’s claim that a socialist 
nation was developing in the GDR, which at times sounds 
somewhat contrived. Here and on several other occasions, he 
argued that the solution of the National Question was subordinate 
to the interests of the revolution and of socialism: 'What we call 
"national" (das Nationale) does not stand above the class struggle - 
instead class relations and the class struggle determine the nature 
of the development of the nation and the national question.'295
His arguments were in stark contrast to those of the 1960s. The 
development of two separate nations was now portrayed as an 
inevitable consequence of the division of Germany into two states. 
Gone were the references to the bond of the working class on both 
sides of the inner-German border and their task of reuniting what 
imperialism had divided, since as far as the GDR was concerned, 
the National Question had been settled. In retrospect it seems 
ironic that Axen (and others) pointed to the Soviet Union as a 
shining example of how national problems could only be overcome
via 'the solution of the social question by the working class,'296 in
293 Hermann Axen, Zur Entwicklung der Sozialistischen Nation in der DDR. 
(East Berlin, 1973) p.16.
294 Interview with Manfred Uschner, Berlin, 21 July 1993.
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view of the barbaric methods used to achieve this, and the fact 
that they ultimately failed, as the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and recent ethnic conflicts show.
Turning to the question of so-called ’ethnic factors \ Axen accused
the W est Germans of 'bourgeois nationalism ’ and 'neo-
rev an ch ism m an ifested  by their attempts to use these factors to
prove that a unitary German nation still existed.297 These 'ethnic
factors' included language, way of life, traditions, and customs,
which originated long before the establishment of capitalist
driver*
nations. He stressed that, 'The classic of Marxism-Leninism
* A.
always understood "national" to be a dialectical unity of social, 
economic, class-based, historical and ethnic factors, but as a unity 
in which economic and social relations, and above all, class, takes 
p r io rity .'298 Although he said Marxist-Leninists did not, indeed 
should not underestimate such ethnic factors, 'they do not 
determine the nature of the nation and its social, economic and 
class-based structure.'299
The common language was a particular problem, firstly because it 
was hard to deny (though some functionaries tried to), and 
secondly because it was considered important by Engels, Stalin 
and Lenin. Thus while Axen admitted that Lenin had attached 
great importance to 'the unity of language' as a prerequisite for 
the trade that would facilitate the victory of capitalism over 
feudalism, he had apparently always been aware of the primary 
role of social factors in the formation of nations.300 Like Norden, 
Axen also took advantage of the numerous examples of separate 
nations who shared a common language to support his argument 
that they did not automatically have to form a unitary nation, not 
even if they had similar economic and political systems:
The historic fact of the existence of the socialist GDR 
and the capitalist FRG differentiates these two 
Germ an-speaking states according to class, and
297 Axen, Zur Entwicklung. p. 26.
298 Axen, p. 15.
299 Axen, p. 15.
300 Axen, p. 15.
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therefore in a more principled way than is the case 
between the FRG and other German-speaking states, 
for example, between the FRG and Austria.301
However, in case people did not accept the argument that ethnic 
factors did not determine nations, he added that they too would 
gradually evolve and change as a result of the political and social 
transform ation in the GDR.302 Finally Axen refuted Bonn’s 
accusation that the socialist nation in the GDR was geschichtslos, or 
lacked a history, describing it as firmly rooted in the history of 
the German people, and by implication, legitimate.303 However, 
like other functionaries including Honecker, he was inconsistent in 
his use of the adjective 'German '.
Few other members of the Politburo attempted to clarify the 
concept of the socialist nation, since their leader clearly did not 
want it to become a high-profile issue. However, so long as Bonn 
used the alleged existence of the German nation to justify its 
refusal to recognise the GDR as a separate sovereign state, the 
subject could not be ignored. The most common arguments used 
can be summed up as follows: the unity of the German nation had 
not been written off at the Eighth Party Conference because it had 
already ceased to exist long before. Instead, a socialist nation was 
developing in the GDR, in stark contrast to the internally divided 
bourgeois nation in the Federal Republic. The National Question 
was portrayed as a 'class question \  as Marx and Engels had 
claimed, but in reality, the class struggle in the Federal Republic, 
and what had previously been portrayed as the 'national task of 
the German working c l a s s h a d  been given up in favour of 
Abgrenzung, once the two had become incompatible. One could 
almost say that the leadership of the SED had abandoned the West 
German proletariat in favour of the interests of the GDR, in other 
words, they had put their own state before proletarian solidarity, 
and accepted the notion of a separate 'GDR-nation'.  Consequently,
301 Hermann Axen, 'Zwei Staaten - zwei Nationen: Deutsche Fraee existiert 
nicht mehr.' Deutschland Archiv 5 (1973): p. 415; Axen, Zur Entwicklung. 
p.24.
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303 Helmut Meier, in a review of Hermann Axen's, ’Zur Entwicklung der 
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the W est German working class was rarely  m entioned, 
presumably to avoid complicating the issue with the idea of a 
unitary German proletariat. They themselves had to settle the as 
yet unresolved National Question there.304 In the GDR at least, the 
’National Question, in the sense of the historic mission of the 
working class,' had apparently been resolved.305
Functionaries also argued that talk in Bonn about a unitary 
German nation was just an attempt to undermine the GDR as a 
sovereign state, to dissuade third states from recognising her, and 
to block her acceptance into the UN.306 According to N e u e s
Deutschland,
in  the FRG, demagogic, nationalistic propaganda is 
being conducted around the 'unity of the nation.' The
conjuring up of 'common' traditions, the flogging to 
death of the unscientific concept of the 'unitary 
K u l t u r n a t i o n ,' the call to mobilise all 'mental and
spiritual forces' for the preservation of one nation, 
until a solution 'in freedom' is possible - these are all 
attempts to sustain the fiction of a unitary nation, to 
obscure the conflict between socialism and capitalism, 
to deny the the objective process of the development 
of a socialist nation in the GDR, and to win ideological 
influence over the workers in the GDR. 307
Even if ethnic similarities did exist, a fact that could hardly be
denied, it was emphasised that they paled into insignificance 
compared with 'objective' factors, such as social, economic and 
political factors, which, it was claimed, ultimately determined the 
character of a nation. All in all, the leadership left many 
questions unanswered. Though they had plenty of arguments to 
support the view that the unitary German nation no longer 
existed, they said little about the actual characteristics of the 
socialist nation in the GDR - that task was left to social scientists 
and philosophers.
304 ZPA NL281/85
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d) Scholarly Activity and the Socialist Nation
The case of the National Question demonstrates how the political 
agenda shaped the research agenda for academics in the GDR. In 
spite of the lack of theoretical debate before the Eighth Party 
conference, a few days afterwards, it was decided that the 
Department of Sciences should consult social scientists from Party 
institutions, the Akademie der Wissenschaften  (AdW), and 
universities to discuss the ’tasks of the social sciences' arising 
from the conference.308 Such consultations highlight the fact that 
these institutions were seen by the Party leadership as having an 
important role to fulfil in the class struggle, as opposed to being 
centres for independent and objective scholarship. A month later, 
the Secretariat of the Politburo examined the implications of the 
conference for both theoretical research and for agitation and 
propaganda - areas which were closely linked in the GDR. The 
Department of Sciences and social science institutions were to be 
responsible for working out 'problems of the further evolution of 
the socialist nation in the GDR.' The Ministry of Culture, the 
Academy of Arts and artists' organisations were made responsible 
for 'the development of socialist national culture in the GDR as an 
objective process of Abgrenzung  from the imperialist philistinism 
of the Federal Republic.'
A publication plan for theoretical articles evaluating the Eighth 
Party Conference in the central press organs addressed 'the class 
content of the National Question and the role of nationalism in the 
ideological subversion of imperialism.' The plan stated that in 
articles,
the nationalistic theories of the Federal Republic’s 
imperialism - 'inner-German relations' and the 'unity 
of the nation' - are to be exposed, and the objective 
process of A b g re n z u n g  that is taking place between 
the socialist GDR and the imperialist FRG, the class 
character of the National Question, the inevitable 
demise of the bourgeois nation and the rise of the
308 ZPA J IV 2/3A/2035 (25 June 1971)
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socialist nation are to be worked out. Thereby it 
should be clearly expressed that between the GDR and 
the FRG, only relations of peaceful coexistence like 
those between sovereign states with different social 
orders are possible.309
The Department of Sciences' 'Central Research Plan for the 
M arxist-Leninist Social Sciences,' which was the result of 
consultation with the directors of the leading institutions and 
chairpersons of academic councils, appeared in January 1972. It 
stated that the task of social science research was 'to develop the 
theoretical content of the Eighth Party Conference and to make it 
usable in the work of the Party.' Consequently, views held earlier 
would have to be corrected. Though the debate with bourgeois 
im perialism , and in particular, the struggle against an ti­
communism and nationalism was encouraged, the amount of 
attention paid to such issues compared to others was not great, 
and there was no direct mention of the topic of the socialist 
nation. This omission is rather hard to explain. Maybe so soon 
after the Party conference the shortcomings of the over-simplified 
concept had not been fully realised. Or maybe Honecker's 
comment that history had decided the National Question had been 
taken quite literally.
Whatever the reasons, there were soon enough indicators to prove 
that this was not the case and that clarification was necessary. 
Theorists had believed for several years that it was necessary to 
consider the effects of the existence of two German states on the 
German nation and to offer the population something positive to 
counteract the negative effects of years of A b g r e n z u n g . They 
resented the fact that they had not been consulted before major 
policy changes regarding the concept of the nation were 
announced, although it was not unusual for the leading elite only 
to make use of the enormous intellectual potential housed in the 
state academies after the announcement of a change of policy 
which then needed to be justified. Furthermore, at a major 
conference on socialism and the nation in Moscow in October
309 ZPA J IV 2/3A/2049 (28 July 1971)
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1973, the East German delegation m erely consisted of 
functionaries who had previously paid little attention to the 
topic.310
From 1971, theorists suddenly had to explain why the nation in 
the GDR was just socialist and no longer German, although the 
author has the impression that none of them personally agreed 
with this. Even so, when Jurgen Hofmann examined the 
development of the concept of the nation in the GDR, he found no 
evidence of protest from intellectuals.311 It was this shift from 
'socialist German nation' to simply 'socialist nation' that was the 
primary cause of incomprehension among the population at large, 
especially since the aim of a united socialist Germany, led by the 
working class, had been drummed into them for over 20 years.
However, several factors hindered scholars' ability to devise new 
theories freely and objectively. Firstly, there were the general 
control mechanisms described earlier which prevented deviation 
from the official line.
A second factor was the obligation to conform to the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism and the latest ideas from the Soviet Union. 
However, in spite of the fact that Soviet material was required 
reading for East German academics in all subject areas,3 12 
relatively few references to theoretical work on the nation by 
Soviet academics are to be found, and tend only to be concerned 
with Marxist-Leninist theory about nations in general.313 This 
was presumably because the amount of ideas that East German 
theorists could borrow from their Soviet counterparts was limited, 
due to the fact that the GDR and the Soviet Union were attempting
310 Papers from the conference were published in Sozialismus und Nation. 
(East Berlin, 1976).
311 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
312 For example, the members of the AfG consulted P.N. Fedosseyev, 
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1972), (ZPA NL182/922), and Jurgen Hofmann mentions Bromlei and 
Kaltachtschjan. Interview with Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
313 Kosing discusses many throughout Nation in Geschichte. for example, 
Burmistrowa, Kulitschenko, Bromlei, Kaltachtschjan, Gleserman, and 
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nation-building under very different and unique circumstances, 
i.e. the population of the former was just part of the previously 
unitary German nation, while that of the latter consisted of many 
different ethnic nations. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
suggest that Soviet theorists were interested in the German case. 
Theorists at the Academy for Social Sciences did have access to 
western publications and, although they were obliged to criticise 
people like Karl Deutsch, they did also gain ideas from such 
m ateria l.314
The case of Alfred Kosing is typical of the situation for theorists 
working in this area at the time. He claims that he returned to the 
subject of the nation in response to ’extraordinarily muddled 
conceptions within the political leadership f;315 and although he 
would certainly claim today that he did question the validity of 
the official line, this is not immediately apparent from his work.
Like others, he could not contradict the line represented by
Honecker at the Eighth Party Conference without jeopardising his
career prospects. However, unlike the brief pronouncements of 
the leadership, he tried to ensure that his arguments were well 
founded if rather contrived, due to the need to adapt Marxist- 
Leninist principles to the unique East German situation. It was 
not the concept of the socialist nation itself that he objected to, but 
the fact that it was declared before it had been thoroughly 
thought out and was overtly political and lacking in historical 
fo u n d a tio n .316 Nevertheless, due to the control mechanisms that 
governed academic activity, Kosing and others were obliged to 
insert quotes by the First Secretary, even if they considered them 
to be simplistic, if not totally ridiculous.317
Apart from the speeches by functionaries which have already 
been mentioned, little was published on the subject of the socialist 
nation until 1974. Presumably this was due to lack of 
encouragement from above and the sensitive nature of the
314 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
313 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
316 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
317 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 5 February 1993.
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subject. However, in 1974, an influential article by Kosing and the 
historian, Walter Schmidt, appeared in the journal E in h e i t ,  
entitled The Formation of the Socialist Nation in the G D R w h i c h  
noticeably contradicted Kosing's article in the same journal in 
1962, which was examined in the second chapter.
In 1962, he had argued that the unitary German nation still
existed, but at two different levels of development, and criticised 
the West German Karl Jaspers for suggesting that two separate
nations were forming in the same way as had occurred in 
Germany and A ustria.318 Now he and Schmidt were almost
agreeing with Jaspers, though using M arxist-Leninist criteria, 
arguing that a socialist nation existed in the GDR, while the old 
bourgeois nation continued in the Federal Republic, and that the 
two were totally irreconcilable. This division of the nation was 
portrayed as 'the result of bitter class conflicts between socialism 
and imperialism during the decades since the Second World War.' 
Apparently, by forming 'an imperialist separatist state ', Bonn was 
entirely responsible for tearing apart the unitary German state, 
which resulted in the destruction of the unity of the nation,
whereas the SED had campaigned for an 'anti-fascist, united,
democratic German republic' for a decade.319
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the article is the
description of the factors which apparently determined the
substance and character of the socialist nation in the GDR:
socialism; socialist conditions of production; political power in the
hands of the working class (under the leadership of their Marxist- 
Leninist party); the authority of Marxist-Leninist ideology; and
integration into the community of socialist states, led by the
Soviet U nion.320 The removal of class antagonism within the 
nation was supposed to lead to friendly co-operation for the
318 Alfred Kosing, 'Illusion und Wirklichkeit in der nationalen Frage,1 
Einheit 17 (1962): pp. 15-22.
319 Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, 'On the Evolution of the Socialist 
Nation in the GDR,' in Arthur W. McCardle and A. Bruce Boenau, eds., East 
Germany: a new German Nation under Socialism? (Lanham and London, 
1984), pp.4-5.
320 Kosing and Schmidt, 'On the Evolution,' p. 13.
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common good and the homogenisation of thought, desires, actions 
and goals, while at the same time a convergence of socialist 
nations would occur.321
To those of us unaccustomed to Marxist-Leninist definitions of 
what constitutes a nation, many of the arguments used by Kosing 
and Schmidt sound somewhat contrived and to have little to do 
with what we understand by the word 'nation.' The question of 
the 'Germanness' of the GDR continued to be a problem, and the 
authors used the adjective 'German' rarely and somewhat 
inconsistently. While they did not totally ignore the awkward 
question of ethnicity, to dismiss it as relatively insignificant 
com pared with social factors was hardly a satisfactory  
explanation. Although we may accept the claim that the 'social- 
psychological components of our national life' were changing as a 
result of 'new economic, social, political and ideological 
c o n d itio n s ,'322 the assertion that 'ethnic components’ were also 
changing was dubious, and clearly an attempt to counteract the 
idea of a Z usam m engehor igke i tsge f i ih l  linking the two German 
states, which had been advocated by Brandt. Even so, the fact 
that Honecker himself had recently raised the question of a future 
all-German socialist nation, in the (unlikely) event of a socialist 
transformation of the Federal Republic somewhat contradicted 
th is .323 It implied that there was still a link between the two 
states after all, though maybe the very improbability of such a 
revolution taking place meant he could make such a comment, 
knowing that there was no risk involved.
It was also unclear what stage the socialist nation in the GDR had 
reached - whether it was established or still developing, although 
the authors seemed to be implying the latter. Certainly later 
articles tried to paint a more credible and realistic picture, making 
it clear that a new nation could not be created overnight. Finally, 
exactly what was meant by the convergence of socialist nations 
was not explained. According to the authors, with the further
321 Kosing and Schmidt, pp.8-9.
322 Kosing and Schmidt, p. 11.
323 Kosing and Schmidt, p. 12.
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development of mature socialism and its gradual transition to 
communism, the specific importance of the international element 
increased, without pushing aside or even eliminating ’the national 
e lem en t.'324
Kosing now justifies his U-turn with the argument that by the 
early 1970s, the situation had changed to an extent that he could 
not have foreseen in 1962, in particular the further integration of 
the two German states into hostile alliances, and their 
consolidation as states with conflicting political and economic 
systems. Furthermore, it seemed as though the division had 
become a permanent reality, which was not the case ten years 
earlier. He says he wanted to reflect on the state of the nation to 
the best of his ability, even if that meant admitting he had 
previously been wrong. He still criticises Jaspers' logic for looking 
backwards into the past instead of looking at the current and 
potential development of the nation. In spite of the subsequent 
reunification of Germany, for some reason, Kosing does not claim 
to have been right in the first place, but instead blames the inner 
contradictions and weaknesses of the social system for the 
collapse of the GDR.325 Close associates suspect that he gave up 
his original theory very reluctantly,326 which seems to support 
the hypothesis that Kosing and other theorists were obliged to 
devise a justification for the new official line, however implausible 
it was, and even if this meant retracting a previous position.
The second edition of the Kleines politisches Worterbuch w as 
published in 1973, and Kosing's entry for 'nation ' was 
considerably altered. Gone was the reference to 'the German 
nation that is currently composed of the populations of two states,' 
the GDR as the representative of the entire German nation, and 
how the division could be overcome.327 Instead, the new edition 
sta ted ,
324 Kosing and Schmidt, p. 14.
326 Interviews with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 5 February 1993 and 7 July 1993.
326 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
327 Kleines Politisches WQrterbuch. 1st ed., p.428.
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Since the socialist and the bourgeois nation are based 
on conflicting social, political, economic and ideological 
foundations, there can be no unity of the nation 
between the GDR and the FRG, instead only a
relationship of peaceful coexistence, the prerequisite 
for which is the diplomatic recognition of the GDR. The 
claims of an apparently still existing 'unity of the
German nation' are directed against the unavoidable 
diplomatic recognition of the GDR, and are in pursuit of 
the goal of the subjugation of the masses of the GDR to
the rule of the imperialist forces of the FRG. 328
Stalin’s definition of the general characteristics of a nation was 
still used, namely a common economy, territory, language, culture 
and social psychology, although he was not credited for the 
definition, and certain specific references to the German situation 
were omitted.329
Thus we have seen that although the notion of a socialist nation in 
the GDR could not be challenged, theorists did their best to justify 
it, as the Party required of them. In a report on research at the 
Academy for Social Sciences in 1972, the Department of Sciences 
concluded,
The Marxist-Leninist theory of the National Question 
and its usage at the Eighth Party Conference was 
adopted and applied to the history of the German 
people. Work was centred on the Marxist-Leninist 
conceptions of the emergence and development of the 
bourgeois German nation, and the findings about the 
formation of the socialist nation in the GDR, which in 
principle were worked out at the Eighth Party 
conference. In addition, the most recent Soviet 
discussion on the problem of the nation was assessed.
As a result, the inseparable connection between the 
formation and development of nations, and the class 
struggle of the working class and working strata was
328 Karl-Wilhelm Frick, 'Kleines Politisches Wdrterbuch politisch 
revidiert,' Deutschland Archiv 6 (1973): p.756. Kosing's contribution to 
another reference book, Philosophisches Wtirterhuch. 8th ed., 2 vols. (East 
Berlin, 1971), is almost identical. Cited in Koenen, Nation und
N ationalbew uBtsein. pp.18-19.
329 Koenen, p. 18.
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made clear, and it was proved that the formation and 
development of both bourgeois and socialist nations is 
always to be seen as governed by historic and world­
wide processes. 330
Over the next few years, the subject rarely featured in reports. 
An assessment of the fulfilment of the tasks of the Central
Research Plan recognised that the Academy for Social Sciences had 
achieved new insight into ’the dialectic of "national” and
"international" in the policies of the SED and in the history of the 
GDR' and into ’the historical development of the National Question 
and the formation and evolution of the socialist nation in the GDR.’ 
Furtherm ore,
Much attention was paid to the portrayal of the 
historic tradition and international character of the 
GDR's socialist national culture as well as to its role in
the formation of the socialist nation  In the field of
historic research, knowledge about the history of the 
SED and the GDR, about the formation of the socialist
nation in the GDR, and about the historic consciousness
of the working class and their farming comrades has 
been deepened, and arguments against bourgeois 
historical accounts strengthened.331
The Central Research Plan for 1976-80, drawn up in 1974, did not 
mention the concept of the nation in the GDR specifically, but 
instead concentrated on 'the prospects for the political, economic, 
ideological and cultural development of the peoples and states of 
the socialist community, the formation and development of 
socialist nations, and their further growing together,’ and the 
relationship between 'national and international elem ents.'332 
However, reports from specific disciplines showed how the new 
line on the nation had far reaching consequences for many other 
areas of East German academia. In its report for 1973, the Council 
for Linguistic Research stated, 'The linguistic processes resulting 
from the transformation of the bourgeois nation into the socialist
330 ZPA IV B2/904/90
331 ZPA IV B2/904/90
332 ZPA IV B2/904/67
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nation were emphasised as a topical and new problem for 
linguistics in the GDR '?33
e") The New Constitution of 1974
One of the most illuminating examples of Honecker's leadership 
style, compared to that of his predecessor >was the revision of the 
constitution in 1974, and^ more specifically, the way in which it 
was done. As we saw in the previous chapter, the original 
constitution of 1949 was changed in 1968 after consultation with 
the population, followed by a referendum, and resulted in 
significant changes to the section on the nation. This time, the 
leadership's intention to change the constitution was announced at 
the twelfth session of the Central Committee in July 1974. It had 
been drawn up by Honecker and a few of his close colleagues, and 
was then presented for ratification by the V olkskam m er  as a. f a i t  
accompli.  No academics were consulted, and according to Alfred 
Neumann, even the majority of the Politburo simply received the 
finished artic le.334 The result was the ultimate example of the 
purge of references to the German nation, even the word 'German' 
itself. In Article 1, the GDR was no longer a 'socialist state of the 
German nation ', but simply a 'socialist state of workers and 
farm ers '. The aim of overcoming the division of Germany in 
Article 8 was completely removed. Finally, the new Article 6 
stressed that the GDR was 'for ever and irrevocably bound to the 
Soviet Union '335
Officially these amendments were justified  by the tangible 
changes which had taken place in the GDR since the beginning of 
the decade, and by changes in her 'international relationships ',336 
The most obvious reason, however, was that the old constitution 
clearly contradicted Honecker's stance at the Eighth Party 
Conference, and also earlier statements - indeed, one wonders 
why it was not altered earlier. It is likely that this precise
333 ZPA IV B2/904/115
334 Interview with Alfred Neumann, Berlin, 4 May 1993.
336 Zeiger, Die Haltung. p. 188-189.
336 Hofmann Ein neues Deutschland p .263
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moment was chosen to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the 
founding of the GDR.337 In an extremely brief speech to justify 
the change, Honecker merely expressed the need to bring the 
constitution in line with 'the life and the level of political and 
social development of our socialist state of workers and farmers, 
and with the basic ideological position of our people.' Although 
certain specific articles were mentioned, no reason was given for 
the dramatic change to Article 8, and the only time Honecker used 
the word 'nation' was with reference to the socialist nations 
drawing closer together. The emphasis was placed on the GDR as a 
developed socialist society, though Honecker did add that its 
people were continuing the 'revolutionary traditions of the
German workers' movement.'338
Undoubtably there were also other, unstated reasons, for example, 
to counteract the effects of increased personal contact between
East and West Germans following the Basic Treaty, and as a 
response to the West German Federal Constitutional Court's ruling 
that the treaty did not violate the idea of one German nation and 
the aim of reunification enshrined in the Basic Law.339 While it 
made sense to bring the constitution in line with Honecker's 
stance, the removal of the word 'German' provided ammunition 
with which the West German government could attack the SED,
sole
and which reinforced its claim to the soul right of representation 
of the German nation. It accused the SED of 'abdication from the
nation,' 'taking flight from German history,' and of making the GDR
a 'socialist non-entity.'340 The West German minister for Inner- 
German Relations stated that a nation could neither be founded 
nor abolished simply via a specification in the constitution.341
337 ZPA IV B2/904/13
338 Erich Honecker, 'Errungenschaften und tiefgreifende Veranderungen 
im Leben des Volkes miissen in der Verfassung Ausdriick finden,' Rede zur 
Begriindung des Gesetzes zur Erganzung und Anderung der Verfassung der 
DDR, 27 September 1974, Reden und Aufsatze (East Berlin, 1976), vol. 3, pp. 
105-110.
339 Zieger, Die Haltung der SED. p. 187.
340 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.265
341 Zieger, Die Haltung der SED. p. 188.
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Unlike in 1968, the public had no opportunity to participate in the 
drafting of the constitution and, not surprisingly, they wondered 
why. One probable reason was that the leadership knew that they
would not have supported the removal of all references to the
German nation .342 Certainly reports of public reaction to the 
change seem to support this theory, and show that the notion of a 
purely socialist nation in the GDR was still causing problems, 
especially since the SED's previous adherence to the unity of the 
German nation had not been totally forgotten.343 At the Academy 
of Sciences, members were raising questions such as: Is the 
division of Germany now permanent? Why are efforts being
made to reunite Korea but not Germany? Is there no longer a
German nation? Are we still Germans? Do the two states not still 
have a great deal in common? Does the formation of the socialist 
nation in the GDR negate German history in its entirety?344 T hese 
were all valid questions for which the SED had failed to provided 
satisfactory answers - a situation which would have to be 
remedied, if the Party was to achieve what it had set out to do by 
denying the unity of the nation.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have seen how the SED attempted to enhance 
the legitimacy of the GDR and its right to international recognition 
via the claim that the population constituted a nation in their own 
right, which was socialist and completely separate from the 
bourgeois nation in the Federal Republic. Thus the long-standing 
notion of the national bond of the German working class had 
finally been abandoned. Political objectives clearly determined 
the official line on the state of the nation during this period, and 
theory had to be adapted accordingly.
However, the extreme concept of the non-German socialist nation 
in the GDR was domestically untenable and reinforced the Federal 
Republic’s claim to be the legitimate representative of the German
342 Zieger, p. 190.
343 ZPA IV B2/904/21
344 ZPA IV B2/904/13
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nation. The fact that the SED reversed its policy of 'de-
G erm anisation’ the following year indicates that even they 
eventually realised that the policy was destructive and had the
opposite effect to what was intended. What was required was an 
argument that would both avoid accepting West German claims 
that one German nation still existed, and a loss of face for the
leadership. However, as we shall see, the ruling elite did not
manage to find a way out by itself.
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CHAPTER 5: THE "SOCIALIST GERMAN NATION1 ■
FROM CONSOLIDATION TO CRISIS
Clearly the concept of a socialist nation in the GDR that was no 
longer German was a desperate attempt to prove that nothing 
linked the state with its western neighbour, and consequently that 
the GDR was a legitimate entity in itself. It is hardly surprising 
that such a bizarre and sudden change was greeted with dismay 
by the population and mocked by the West German government. 
In the first section of the following chapter, we shall see how the 
SED was provided with a solution, or rather an 'ideological 
l o o p h o l e ' 1 by theorists via the distinction between nation, 
nationality and citizenship. As a result, the concept of a socialist 
nation in the GDR was replaced by the more credible 'socialist 
German  nation.' This appeared to be the most acceptable solution: 
the SED was satisfied because the 'socialist German nation' was 
still socialist, while the population was relieved to know that it 
was still German. Therefore the Party believed that a 
Nationskonzep t  had finally been found which really would serve 
to legitimise the state, and thought (for the second time) that the 
National Question had been settled once and for all.
In the second section of this chapter we shall examine the 
consequences of the new concept. Firstly, the leadership's efforts 
to prevent the reopening of debate on the subject, now that an 
acceptable solution had apparently been found, and the futile 
attempts of theorists to keep the issue alive. Secondly, the SED's 
re-evaluation of the state's relationship to German history, which 
had been made both possible and necessary by the 
acknowledgement of the Germanness of the GDR. However, it was 
not only the past which was to raise questions regarding the 
relationship between the two German states, and ultimately, 
regarding the state of the German nation, but also official and 
popular concern regarding world peace and the nuclear arms race 
during the 1980s, which was particularly relevant to them, being 
on the front line of the Cold War.
1 Timothy Gartgtfi Ash, In Europe*s Name (London, 1993), p. 189.
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The third section examines the sudden return of the nation to the 
political agenda in the late 1980s, and as a result, to the academic 
agenda. The issue had been simmering away beneath the surface 
during the early 1980s, and the advent of President Gorbachev to 
the Kremlin changed the SED's attitude towards socialist 
internationalism, though the final turning point appears to have 
been Honecker's highly symbolic official visit to the Federal 
Republic in 1987. The period is a classic example of how the SED 
attempted to suppress the problem of the German nation, while 
simultaneously attempting to use certain aspects to legitimise the 
GDR and for economic gain. It also shows that although the Party 
controlled academic work on the subject, it also relied on it to 
provide the arguments to back up policy. In reality, however, the 
SED had merely brushed the idea of the German nation under the 
carpet, where it continued to erode the legitimacy of the GDR, until 
the opportunity arose for it to resurface, due to events beyond the 
SED's control.
n  THE 'SOCIALIST GERMAN NATION' IN THE GDR 
a) Nationality: German: Citizenship: GDR
ptervww
At the 13th session of the Central Committee in December 1974, 
Honecker first made the distinction between nation, nationality 
and citizenship, which finally put an end to the leadership's 
paranoia regarding the word 'German.' This has been interpreted 
as an attempt to distinguish the GDR from the Federal Republic 
without abandoning all of her heritage,2 and as a sign of a more 
relaxed position on A b g re n z u n g , and of Honecker's more elastic 
stance on the subject compared with other functionaries such as 
Norden and Axen.3 However it is unlikely that Honecker himself 
devoted much attention to the subject, merely adopting the 
distinction because the denial of the Germanness of the GDR and 
its citizens was clearly untenable.
2 McAdams, East Germany, p. 146.
3 Fred Oldenburg, 'Blick zuriick nach vom. Zum 13. Plenum des 
Zentralkomitees,' Deutschland Archiv 8 (1975): p.2.
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It is a little known fact that the distinction actually originated 
from the theorists, Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt. Though 
they favoured a class-based definition of a nation, they were 
outraged by the 'de-Germanisation' of what was, after all, still the 
German Democratic Republic, and took it upon themselves to work 
out a sensible concept of the socialist German nation. Here we 
have a good example of the major difference between Party 
propaganda, which merely stated what people were supposed to 
believe, and the work of academics, who, in spite of the control 
mechanisms governing their behaviour, genuinely wanted to 
devise credible theories to justify official policy. However, since 
they naturally wanted to retain their academic positions, they 
were careful not to contradict the stance of the Eighth Party 
Conference. Thus, Kosing and Schmidt did not seek to undermine 
the GDR but instead hoped it would become more acceptable to 
the population and more credible in the eyes of the wider world.
Their theory was first published in the in-house journal of the 
Academy for Social Sciences, and somehow came to the attention 
of Honecker. The basis of their carefully formulated argument 
was that people were first and foremost citizens of the GDR, but 
also possessed German nationality, apart from a small number of 
Sorb nationality. Since nations were defined by class, both 
German and Sorb citizens belonged to the socialist nation in the 
GDR. The article stated, ’The socialist nation in the GDR is withoyt 
doubt of German nationality, and it goes without saying that £he 
encompasses those ethnic and social-psychological peculiarities 
that have arisen from the history of the German people, which 
goes back more a thousand years. Due to specific historical
former unitary capitalist German nation.'4 This seems to be the 
first occasion where the distinction was made between nation and 
nationality, which at last put a stop to the controversy and 
craziness concerning the word ’German.’ The authors also warned
4 Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, 'Uber die Dialektik von 
Intemationalem und Nationalem,' Thematische Information und 
Dokum entation 32 (1974): p. 80, my italics.
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against underestimating the strength of ethnic factors, including 
language, origin or background, customs, practices and traditions.
Stealing the theorists’ argument, Honecker told the Central
Committee, ’Our socialist state is called the German Democratic 
Republic because the vast majority of her citizens are of German 
nationality. Therefore, there is no cause for confusion when filling 
out the forms that are necessary now and then, for example for 
marriages and the reunion of families. The answer to such
questions is simple, clear and unambiguous: citizenship: GDR;
nationality: German.' After m aintaining a policy of 'de-
Germanisation' for several years, Honecker now claimed, 'As 
Germans we have a claim to German history in the same way that 
as Europeans, we have a claim to European history.' He added 'In 
contrast to the FRG, we represent the socialist Germany,' but made 
it clear that, 'In our socialist German state, there is naturally no 
place for 'excessive Germanness' (Deutschtiimelei).  He predicted 
that socialism would not make a detour around the Federal
Republic, but did not go as far as to predict the eventual
establishment of a united socialist Germany.5
Kosing and Schmidt were asked by Hermann Axen, (no doubt with 
Honecker’s consent6) to write a popular version of their article for 
Neues Deutschland.1 Even though it was their idea, the obligation 
to quote the First Secretary’s remarks from the recent session of 
the Central Committee gave the impression that he had devised
the theory himself. On the awkward issue of ethnicity they
stated ,
Shared ethnic characteristics certainly do play an
important role in the formation of nations, but it is not
they which integrate the classes and strata of a
population into a nation, but economic, social, political 
and ideological relationships.... This whole complexity 
of ethnic characteristics, traits and features of a
population is described as 'nationality.' Therefore the
5 ZPA IV 2/1/495 (13th Central Committee session, December 1974)
6 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
1 Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, 'Nation und Nationalist in der DDR,' 
Neues Deutschland. 15/16 Feb 1975, p. 10.
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concept of nationality is narrower than the concept of 
the nation, because it includes only one of the
components of the nation, and what is more, not the
most decisive. The concept of the nation is essentially 
more comprehensive because it includes the totality of 
socio-historic factors, together with ethnic ones.8
The authors even claimed that ethnic characteristics would change 
over time and develop socialist content with the consolidation of 
the socialist nation. On the relationship between national and
international elements, the authors explained that the working
class was an international class,
iVS
but in the first instance, shfc must carry out her 
campaign for liberation from exploitatio^ and class- 
rule primarily within the perimeters of Jaef own nation 
against her 'o_jvn' bourgeoisie.... with the aim of 
transforming Jjef own nation via a socialist revolution 
and the construction of a socialist society, to develop it 
into a socialist nation. 9
According to Kosing, German nationality was to the socialist nation 
in the GDR, what Russian or Ukrainian nationality was to the 
Soviet socialist nation. While the socialist nation in the GDR was 
relatively young, its nationality had a history stretching back over 
400 years.10
Although no precise data can be found on the level of acceptance 
of the distinction between nationality and citizenship, the new 
theory was generally well received, and people were relieved to 
know that they were still Germans, especially since many were 
hardly enthusiasts for a stronger bond with the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact states, which Honecker always encouraged. The Sorb 
minority were also relieved to hear that they would not be forced 
to take on the same socialist nationality as the rest of the 
population of the GDR, thereby losing considerable minority rights 
that they had hitherto enjoyed in the areas of culture and
8 Kosing and Schmidt, p. 10.
9 Kosing and Schmidt, p. 10.
10 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 11 February 1993.
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education. The distinction put an end to the crazy ’de- 
Germanisation' campaign which had done so much harm to the 
regime's credibility both at home and in the eyes of the world, 
and people could now use the word 'German' freely again, without 
fear of the consequences.
All the leading East German theorists on the subject of the nation 
approved of the leadership’s acceptance of the GDR's German 
nationality, and it may have been no coincidence that Kosing and 
Schmidt were awarded the prestigious National Prize of the GDR in 
1975. However, the obsession with theorising on the nation 
during the 1970s suggested that the populace had not yet 
accepted the official concept. According to information from the 
West German authorities, two-thirds of East Germans refused to 
label the Federal Republic a foreign nation.11 At the end of the 
day, the SED could not win, since the German connection also 
undermined the legitimacy of the GDR. This was an inevitable 
result of an attempt to create a new nation artificially, while the 
memories, if not the reality, of its predecessor lived on.
In 1976, Kosing's book Die Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart 
('The Nation in History and the Present') was published, which 
warrants particular attention because it remained the definitive 
account on the subject until Hofmann's Ein neues Deutschland soli 
es sein ('It will be a New Germany') appeared in 1989. At 306 
pages, it was by far the most comprehensive work on the subject, 
and thus secured Kosing's position as the leading authority on the 
subject in the GDR. The book was an attempt to explain both 
general Marxist-Leninist nation theory and the unique case of 
what was now again called the socialist German  nation in the GDR. 
It reflects its author's belief that such a complicated issue as the 
socialist German nation required a proper explanation, and could 
not simply be declared by the Party leadership like a new 
economic plan. However, it did not go unnoticed that Kosing had 
been a 'vehement advocate of Ulbricht’s confederation plan' in 
1962, but was now (at least publicly) a 'relentless champion of
11 Ludz, The SED's Concept,' pp.214, 208.
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Honecker’s course of A bgrenzung .'12 This was presumably due to 
the fact that Kosing, a member of the Party since 1946, held a 
chair in Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the AfG and no doubt 
wanted to keep it.
Due to its length, it is not possible to analyse every point in detail, 
and much was an elaboration of ideas Kosing had recently 
introduced in theoretical journals.13 Kosing tackled the historic 
development of the socialist German nation, its class-character, 
the international dimension, the question of ethnicity, the 
distinction between nation and nationality, socialist national 
consciousness and prospects for the future. The basic hypothesis 
of the book was that according to a Marxist-Leninist definition of 
a nation, the two halves of the German nation had become so far 
apart, both socially and politically, and their international 
relationships so diametrically opposed, that two separate and 
irreconcilab le  nations now existed. Furtherm ore, these 
developments could not have been foreseen by the author, by the 
SED leadership, nor indeed by anyone during the early 1960s. 
While some people might argue that the subsequent reunification 
of Germany disproves Kosing’s hypothesis, others would argue 
that the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the old and 
new B u n d e s l a n d e r  and their populations actually proves him 
right.
Kosing acknowledged the fact that the SED had earlier sought the 
reunification of the nation in a unitary state, and admitted that in 
1962, he himself had written that the division of Germany as a 
state would not lead to the establishment of two separate nations. 
His excuse for this dramatic U-turn was that historic development 
often changed circumstances, making previously realistic goals 
unrealistic, and making it necessary to reconsider theories, and 
sometimes even to correct them. After all, had not leading West 
German politicians altered their stance regarding the status of the
12 Gunther HolzweiBig, 'Der bestrittene Positionswechsel in der nationalen 
Frage,’ Deutschland Archiv 9 (1976): p. 1189.
13 For example, Alfred Kosing, 'Theoretische Probleme der Entwicklung der 
sozialistischen Nation in der DDR,’ Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophic 23 
(1975): pp.237-261.
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GDR as an independent state? He believed that the time would
come when they would also have to accept the existence of an
independent socialist German nation, which was a permanent 
member of the community of socialist nations.14
Kosing made it clear from the start that the idea that the GDR was
not a German state was absurd, but aware of the consequences of 
negative comment about the regime, he carefully directed his 
criticism at Bonn's accusations that the SED was taking leave of the 
German nation, as opposed to the Party's actual policy, which had 
been precisely that.15 All the elements undeniably shared with
West Germans, such as culture, language, etc., were conveniently
explained as aspects of nationality, which was of secondary 
importance to social and economic factors. Stalin's definition was 
considered inadequate because it was merely a list of fixed
characteristics and paid no attention to 'the social function and 
historic role of the nation.'16 Instead, Kosing concentrated on the 
work of Erigels and Lenin in an attempt to prove that the 
'c lassic  a of M arxism ’ had also distinguished between 
membership of a nation on the one hand, (which was socially 
determined), and of an ethnic community on the other, that is to 
say, between nation and nationality.17
According to Kosing, 'Ethnic factors, which have arisen from 
German history in its entirety, have joined forces with the
qualitatively new social content of the nation. They alone cannot 
justify a national unity, although they are decisive for nationality, 
which should not be confused with nation.'18 However, according 
to Lenin, the common language had played a particularly 
important role long before the establishment of nations, as a 
facilitator of trade within a limited area, but had apparently been 
superseded by economic, social and political factors which 
currently determined nations.19 Kosing interpreted Engels' theory
14 Kosing, Nation in Geschichte und Gcgcnwart (Berlin, 1976), pp.19-20.
15 Kosing, p. 18.
16 Kosing, p. 39.
17 Kosing, pp. 169, 175.
18 Kosing, p. 152.
19 Kosing, pp. 115-116.
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that the borders of nations should be determined by 'language 
and sympathies' to mean that wherever possible, the borders of 
nations should coincide with the borders of nationality or 
ethnicity, but like Lenin, he stressed the primacy of social factors 
in the formation of nations.20 He cited Engels' example of the 
inhabitants of Savoy, who opted to join the Italian nation instead 
of France, and also the case of the people of Alsace and Lorraine, 
who, in spite of their German nationality, chose to join the French 
nation for social and political reasons.21 All in all, Kosing's 
treatm ent of ethnicity was not entirely convincing, and his 
attempts to adapt the work of Engels and Lenin to fit the unique 
case of the GDR seems somewhat laboured. Furthermore he 
ignored the question of race or blood, and to this day, takes issue 
with the idea that ethnicity has anything to do with race.22 As 
has been noted elsewhere, he failed to explain adequately the 
relationship between the working class in the GDR and their 
counterparts in the Federal Republic, and whether or not two 
nations were developing there, one socialist and the other 
bourgeois.23
On the subject of 'socialist national consciousness in the GDR,' 
Kosing wrote, 'The GDR represents the socialist Germany, in which 
the German past was practically, theoretically and morally 
eva luated .'24 This socialist national consciousness was still based 
on socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism as before. 
It was portrayed as rooted in the social system of the socialist 
nation, with little mention of German aspects, which was in 
keeping with his class-based concept of the nation. Kosing 
criticised W est German attempts to nurture an all-German 
consciousness, and, obviously aware of the dangers they posed, 
sta ted ,
In view of such attempts to undermine the socialist 
community with the help of a flexible nationalism,
20 Kosing, p.31.
21 Kosing, pp. 169-171.
22 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
23 Ludz, The SED's Concept,' p.223.
24 Kosing, Nation in Geschichte. p. 281.
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extremely careful ideological work to deepen socialist 
Germ an national consciousness, (w hich unites 
patriotism  and internationalism, and knows neither 
national arrogance nor national n ihilism ), is a 
permanent task of the M arxist-Leninist Party, all 
social organisations and especially of educational 
institutions in the GDR.25
He cited several western commentators who had identified a 
unique GDR-consciousness since the late 1960s, including Gebhard 
Schweigler, John Dornberg and Jean Edward Smith.26
However, at the very end of the book, Kosing stated that, T he 
question of whether in the future, when a socialist revolution has 
triumphed in the FRG and a socialist nation arisen, a unitary 
socialist German nation could again develop, cannot be positively 
or negatively answered from the present situation.'27 This 
contradicted what he had argued throughout the book, although 
Honecker himself had dropped a similar hint in 1973,28 and would 
do so again. Inevitably, Kosing’s theories were 'designed to 
fashion a concept of the nation to suit the domestic functions of 
legitimacy and political stabilisation.’29 In conclusion it must be 
said that he did his best to justify the almost unjustifiable, a task 
that most leading functionaries were either in tellectually  
incapable of doing, or saw little need for. The result has been 
called 'a combination of historic materialism and communication 
theory .’30 He had to perform a theoretical juggling act with Party 
statements, Marxist-Leninist principles and ideas of his own, and 
as a result, personified the dilemma between the interests of the 
Party and scholarship in the GDR (though he still claims to have
26 Kosing, p. 283
26 Kosing, p. 282. See chapter 2.
27 Kosing, p. 305.
28 Erich Honecker, 'Zugig voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der 
Beschliisse des 8. Parteitages,' Reden und Aufsatze. 12 vols. (East Berlin, 
1975), vol. 2, p.241.
29 Ludz, 'The SED's Concept,' p.216.
30 Meuschel, L egitim ation , pp.280-283. Meuschel summarises Kosing's 
main points but does not evaluate his arguments or elaborate on the 
constraints of the system.
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declined privileges to avoid paying the price of further 
com prom ises.31)
b) The New Party Programme of 1976
By 1976, the Party Programme was thirteen years old, and both 
the Party's objectives and reality had dramatically changed. The 
fact that there were two, seemingly irreconcilable, German states 
had been confirmed by their full participation in the CSCE in 1975 
and their acceptance of the Helsinki Final Act. Also that year, the 
SED had signed a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and mutual 
Assistance with the Soviet Union, which according to Axen, 
'strengthened the objective process of growing together among 
socialist nations, and the evolution of the socialist nation and 
irrevocability of the victory of socialism in the GDR.'32
Clearly there was a need to bring the Party Programme in line 
with the Eighth Party Conference and with subsequent 
developments, indeed one wonders why this was not done earlier, 
especially since the issue was raised as early as July 1972.3 3 
According to Honecker, it had become necessary to revise the 
Party Programme because the GDR was entering a new phase of 
her social development,34 hence a Commission was formed to 
draw up a proposal, not surprisingly chaired by the First 
Secretary himself. Input form the rest of the Politburo was 
apparently  m inim al. In contrast to the hurried, undemocratic 
way in which the new constitution had been rushed through in 
1974, a draft was published in Neues D eutsch land35 and the 
population was invited to submit suggestions as to how it might 
be improved. The reasons for this remain unclear, although it 
implies a new feeling of confidence on the part of the regime. 
Party representatives visited work places and local organisations
31 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 July 1993.
32 Hermann Axen, 'Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Nation in der 
DDR,’ Probleme des Friedens und Sozialismus 3 (1976): p.291, cited in 
Meuschel, Legitim ation, p.279.
33 ZPA J IV 2/2A/1606 (4 July 1972)
34 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 9. Parteitages (East Berlin, 1976), p.32.
33 Neues Deutschland. 14 January 1976.
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to answer questions about the draft and naturally to propagate 
the Party line.36
The Secretary for Agitation, Werner Lamberz, monitored public 
acceptance of concepts such as the socialist German nation. In an 
assessment of the role agitation and propaganda had played in 
realising the declarations of the Eighth Party Conference, he 
concluded that the ’state consciousness' of the citizens was now 
secure, and that a 'socialist national consciousness' was 
developing. He added that the international recognition of the 
GDR had increased citizens' pride in the GDR and their 
identification with it, and that it had been possible to dispel the 
idea of a unitary German nation, (which implies that this was not 
a natural process, but an actively implemented policy). However, 
Lamberz was realistic enough to recognise that due to a 'mass 
nationalistic campaign by the enemy,' illusions concerning the 
things common to both German states persisted. Also, more 
emphasis on the 'two irreconcilably conflicting class-lines in 
German history' was required 'to counteract imperialistic claims of 
a common German history.'37 Public discussion of the proposed 
new Party Programme had highlighted the prevalence of what 
Lamberz called 'woolly ideas' regarding the socialist nation. Thus 
a clearer explanation its nature and future was necessary, even 
though it was apparently 'developing according to p lan.’ 
Ideological work needed to stress the idea that he claimed was at 
the heart of the Treaty with the Soviet Union, namely the drawing 
closer together of the socialist nations, and to counteract West 
German claims that the socialist nation was merely invented by 
the SED to form a basis for conflict between the GDR and the 
Federal Republic.38
Of 1,695 submissions from the public to the Programme 
Commission, 38 related directly to the question of the nation, 30 
of which were in some way incorporated into the finished item.39
36 Hofmann, 'Studien zur Entwicklung,' p. 106.
37 ZPA IV 2/2033/4
38 ZPA IV 2/2033/1
39 ZPA IV B2/2024/11. The submissions are examined in detail in Hofmann, 
'Studien zur Entwicklung.' Hofmann now maintains that the number of
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As was the case with the drafting of the new consititution in 1968, 
it seems unlikely that people responded of their own initiative, 
and more likely that local party organisations encouraged them to 
do so. From these, and from reports of public discussion, four 
particular problem areas connected to the concept of the socialist 
German nation were identified. Firstly, the sentence 'By taking 
power, the working class establishes itself as the nation' had 
caused confusion regarding the position of other social strata. 
Since the SED always portrayed the bourgeois nation in the 
Federal Republic as class-divided, it was understandable that they 
should want to portray the socialist nation in the GDR as free from 
all class antagonism, hence in the final version, the sentence was 
changed to 'By taking power, the working class created the 
decisive prerequisites for the formation of the socialist nation,' 
and other strata, such as intellectuals, were said to be allied to
it.
Secondly, there was concern about the claim that the socialist 
nations were growing together, and some even asked whether this 
meant that the GDR would eventually become a republic of the 
Soviet U nion.41 Also, the importance attached to socialist 
internationalism  in propaganda not surprisingly made people 
wonder w hether socialist patriotism  was becom ing less 
im p o r ta n t .42 The leadership does not appear to have had an 
answer to this, but it seems inconceivable that even Soviet 
sympathisers such as Honecker himself would have supported a 
total merging of all the socialist nations in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union.
Thirdly, in spite of the distinction between nationality and 
citizenship, people still noticed inconsistencies in the use of the 
word 'German' in the names of institutions, etc. It was suggested 
that the SED should be renamed 'Communist Party of the GDR'
submissions was of little significance, since people could no longer be 
bothered to oppose the leadership. Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, 
Berlin, 5 February 1993.
40 ZPA IV B2/2024/11
41 ZPA IV 2/2033/1
42 ZPA IV 2/2033/4
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because 'as there is no such thing as "Germany," there cannot be a 
"Socialist Unity Party of Germany".'43 However, this was rejected 
by the Programme Commission on the grounds that 'the name has 
arisen historically, therefore it would be politically incorrect to 
change it.'44 The issue arose so often that a detailed article was 
published in Neues Deutschland to clarify the Party’s stance:
Whoever has a good name does not want to lose it or
give it up  The name SED preserves the memory of a
historic event in the history of the German workers'
m ovem ent  According to the meaning of the
individual words, the name is totally appropriate. 
'Socialist' is fitting because we are forming a 
developed socialist society. 'Unity Party' is correct 
because the SED is the united party of the working 
class in our land. 'Of Germany” is right, because our
party represents the socialist Germany  But our
name does not only mean something to us - it also 
enjoys recognition and prestige far around the
world  The organ of the Central Committee also has
precisely the right name: Neues Deutschland. It is the 
leading newspaper of the leading party in the socialist 
Germany, the GDR, and she is the new Germany in 
comparison to the FRG, the old Germany, which 
remains on the level of capitalism.45
Furthermore, the suggestion that 'German Democratic Republic' 
should be renamed 'German Socialist Republic’ was rejected 
because it too had apparently arisen historically and expressed 
the socialist character of the state. It was also suggested that 
'socialist German nation' should be replaced by 'socialist nation of 
the GDR,' but this was dismissed, as were all examples of 'national 
nihilism ,’ which showed that the SED was keen to retain the 
benefits of national sentiment when it suited them. 46
Finally, the goal of overcoming the division of the German nation 
which appeared in the 1963 programme was not surprisingly
43 ZPA IV B2/2024/12
44 ZPA IV B2/2024/11
43 Neues Deutschland. 7/8 Feb 1976.
46 ZPA IV B2/2024/11
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questioned, and the Programme Commission decided that the 
objective had been overtaken by history.47 However, since the 
proposal mentioned the inevitable transformation of all countries 
to socialism, some people assumed this included the Federal 
Republic and that a chance for reunification still existed.48
Although academics were given the opportunity to contribute to 
the new Party Programme, their main task was to examine and 
explain the document once it had been accepted by the Party 
C o n fe ren c e .49 Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt composed a 
proposal for the section on the socialist German nation, which 
Kosing felt was historically and theoretically justified and also 
politically tenable, but they were not members of the Programme 
Commission and their proposal was not used, although Kosing was 
pleased that the leadership had given up the incredible ideas of 
the early 1970s that were theoretically unfounded and entirely 
politically motivated.50
The finished article incorporated the changes to the GDR's status 
and to the concept of the nation which had occurred during the 
1970s. It was apparently based on the ’fundam ental 
interrelationship between the revolutionary renewal of society 
and national remodelling and formative processes.'51 The socialist 
German nation was said to be historically rooted in the struggle of
the German people for social progress over several centuries. Its
'Germanness' was accepted, as was the German nationality of the 
majority of the population, apart from the Sorb minority, although 
its permanent membership of the community of socialist states 
was emphasised. Furthermore, 'The SED is leading the process of
the further development of the socialist nation in the GDR
according to plan, which is flourishing on the social foundation of 
socialism and growing towards the other socialist nations.' A 
socialist national culture was said to be growing, which
47 ZPA IV B2/2024/11
48 ZPA IV 2/2033/1
49 Das Partciprogramm und die Wisscnschaft. Sitzungsberichte der AdW 
(East Berlin, 1976), p. 16.
50 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 11 February 1993.
51 Hofmann, ’Studien zur Entwicklung,' p. 117.
231
incorporated the progressive and humanist heritage of German 
history, and the achievements of world culture, in particular, 
those of the Soviet Union, as was a socialist national consciousness 
w hich consisted  of socia list patrio tism  and p ro letarian  
internationalism, organically bound together.52
The Party Programme was accepted by the Ninth Party 
Conference in May 1976. There Honecker himself used the 
phrases 'socialist German  nation' and 'two independent sovereign 
German  states.' However with reference to the German question, 
he stated 'Nothing about it is open - history had her say a long 
time ago.’53 And so it seemed at the time. The GDR had come a 
long way since the Eighth Party Conference, and people were
beginning to come to terms with the socialist nation, now that 
they were sure that they it was still German. However, it still 
provided a link with the state on her western border, and 
however much the SED tried to deny it, the two German states 
were clearly not as foreign to each other as most states. For the
time being, it seemed that the issue was closed, although
Honecker's ambiguous remarks about the possibilities following 
the socialist transformation of the Federal Republic suggested 
otherwise. They were soon to crop up again, and increased contact 
with Bonn in the 1980s, suggested that he too accepted that a 
unique relationship did exist between the two states, and that 
there was more to be gained by recognising that fact.
2) PROBLEM SOLVED?
a) The Political Implications of the 'Socialist German Nation'
From the late 1970s, the leadership of the GDR rarely mentioned 
the question of the nation, an indication that the line represented 
in the new Party Programme of 1976 was the last word on the 
subject. Honecker himself said that terms such as 'nation' and
52 Programm der SED (East Berlin, 1976), pp. 56-57.
53 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des 9. Parteitages (East Berlin, 1976), p.42, 
my italics.
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’fatherland1 had acquired new meanings through socialism .54 
Even so, after three decades, the legitimacy of the GDR still could 
not be taken for granted, especially since the absence of 
democracy and economic short-comings continued to undermine 
what legitimacy it did have. The state remained extremely 
susceptible to changes in its surroundings, both in relation to the
Federal Republic and its allies in the Warsaw Pact, which could
reopen the question of the GDR's raison d’etre.
In 1980, Honecker’s ’Gera demands'55 for the normalisation of 
relations between the two German states, including the 
transformation of their respective Permanent Representations into 
proper embassies, and the recognition of GDR citizenship by the 
Federal Republic marked a hardening of the SED's attitude to 
German-German relations from 1980. They were repeated at the 
Tenth Party Conference in 1981, where he also claimed that the 
people of the GDR had formed a socialist German nation.' 
However, compared with the previous decade, his frequent use of 
the adjective 'German' was striking, (for example, 'the two German 
states' and 'German soil').56 Only a few months earlier, he had 
aroused the attention of the West German media when he warned 
Bonn, 'One day socialism will knock on your door, and when the 
day comes when the workers of the Federal Republic set about the 
socialist transformation of the FRG, the question of the unification
of the two German states will be a different matter.'57
These apparent inconsistencies are hard to explain. While it has 
been suggested that Honecker’s bizarre reference to unification 
was a sign that the SED still harboured all-German designs,58 it 
seems more likely that Honecker was just being provocative or
54 Erich Honecker, 'Die Aufgaben der Partei bei der weiteren 
Verwirklichung der Beschliisse des 9. Parteitages,' 17 February 1978, cited 
in Erich Honecker, Die Kulturpolitik unserer Partei wird erfolgreich 
verw irklicht (East Berlin, 1982), p.191.
55 For details see Zieger, Die Haltung. pp.207-210; Garton Ash, In Europe's 
N am e, p. 164; McAdams, East Germany, pp.170-172.
56 Protokoll des 10. Parteitags der SED (East Berlin, 1981), pp. 28, 46.
57 Neues Deutschland 16 February 1981, cited in DDR Handbuch ed. 
Zimmermann, v o l^  p. 926.
58 Zieger, Die Haltung. p.211.
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disingenuous towards the Federal Republic, especially since the 
warning was not repeated, whereas the uncompromising 'Gera 
demands' were. The fact that East Germans knew they had an 
automatic right to citizenship of the Federal Republic reinforced 
the notion that one German nation still existed and undermined 
the credibility of the proclaimed 'socialist German nation' in the 
GDR. Hence the leadership frequently accused Bonn of violating 
normal diplomatic practice by recognising the GDR as a state, but 
not the citizens of that state.
From the early 1980s, the tactical nuclear weapons debate made 
the link between the two German states even more difficult to 
ignore. It created a sense of a shared fate, but also a shared 
responsibility for peace, and led to a commitment to ensure that 
war would never again break out on German soil.59 This implied 
that 'German soil' as a concept still meant something. Honecker 
himself spoke of the need for the two German states to form a 
'coalition of sense' (Koalition der Vernunft)60 in the interest of
peace in general, and of the two German states in particular.
Furthermore, the leadership had to confront the issue due to 
growing concern among the population regarding the nuclear 
threat, in particular the sudden increase in environmental groups 
and peace initiatives. Such organisations were unprecedented in 
the GDR, but were encouraged by the rise of the West German 
peace movement, visible on their television screens.61 The result 
was a considerable increase in contact between prominent
representatives of the GDR and the Federal Republic, including a
meeting between Honecker and Helmut Schmidt in 1981, which
59 This idea was expressed by Schmidt and Honecker in 1981, and in a joint 
declaration by Kohl and Honecker on 12 March 1985. See Garton Ash, In 
Europe's Name, pp. 166, 170.
6® See Honecker's report to the 9th session of the Central Committee, 
November 1984. Honecker, Reden und Aufsatze. vol. 10, p.366. Hermann 
Axen claimed that Honecker had coined the phrase himself at an 
international academic conference on 'Karl Marx in our time' in East 
Berlin, in April 1983. Hermann Axen, 'Sozialistische Klassenstandpunkt 
und Menscheninteressen - friedliches Koexistenz heute,’ E inheit 44 (1989): 
p.45.
61 See John Sandford, 'The GDR and the German Question: the unofficial 
debate in the peace movement,' in Studies in GDR Culture and Society 7 . ed. 
Margy Gerber (Lanham, New York, and London, 1987), pp.221-236.
2 34
inevitably raised hopes regarding detente. During the early 
1980s, various subjects were discussed on many separate 
occasions by numerous officials from both sides, including credit 
for the GDR, the inner-German border, humanitarian questions 
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe.62
Such contacts highlighted the fact that the relationship between 
the two German states was far from normal, although their 
reasons for entering into dialogue were completely different. The 
SED denied the unity of the nation to support its claim that the 
GDR was an independent sovereign state. Bonn, on the other hand, 
almost recognised the GDR as a means to improve relations, which 
it hoped would preserve the national bond.63 Honecker was 
happy to take advantage of Bonn's willingness to pay substantial 
amounts of money to the GDR in order to achieve this, though he 
insisted that the German Question was closed for good. Ironically, 
it was the veteran GDR-hater, Franz-Josef StrauB, who negotiated 
an increased credit limit for the GDR in 1983. His apparently 
contradictory actions so outraged a handful of right-wing CSU 
politicians that they left to form a new party, the Republikaner.
Honecker seemed to believe that the 'GDR-nation' was sufficiently 
secure and socialist that its Germanness was now no longer a 
threat, but an asset. In 1983, he demanded a Europe without 
nuclear weapons 'in the name of the German people,'64 and in 
1984, addressed the population as Germans, as opposed to 
'Citizens of the GDR.'65 And not only were they Germans - the 
leadership seemed intent on proving that they were the best 
Germans, for example, in 1983, a headline in Neues Deutschland
62 The content of the dialogue has been documented elsewhere, for 
example, Zieger, Die Haltung. pp.214-219; Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. 
Meuschel, Legitim ation, pp.292-294. For a populist East German version, see 
Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, pp.289-294.
63 Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 163.
64 Neues Deutschland. 10 October 1983, cited in DDR Handbuch. ed.
Zimmermann, p. 926.
65 Neues Deutschland. 8 October 1984, cited by F. Trommler, 'The Creation of 
History and the Refusal of the Past in the GDR,' in Coping with the past:
Germany and Austria after 1945. eds. K. Harms, L.R. Reuter, V. Durr (London
and Wisconsin, 1990), p.79.
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proudly proclaimed 'First German in space is a citizen of the 
G D R ! '66 This apparent reversion to 'national argumentation' 
reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s has been interpreted as a 
means for a more offensive Deutschlandpoli t iky made possible by 
new circumstances which were more favourable for the GDR.67 At 
the end of the day, it is most likely that the leadership of the GDR 
was well aware that the relationship between the two German 
states was inevitably abnormal, and therefore decided to exploit 
the situation for the GDR's financial gain, in return for fairly minor 
humanitarian concessions. The instability in neighbouring Poland 
at the beginning of the decade may have also encouraged the SED 
to prioritise patriotism as opposed to internationalism. Until this 
point, the regime had tirelessly stressed the need for solidarity 
with the working classes in other Eastern Bloc states, but it was a 
different matter when those workers were striking and organising 
to demand better conditions, and were on the GDR's doorstep.
b) Academic Implications
The early 1980s were characterised by a constant battle between 
theorists, who believed that it was dangerous to neglect the
problem of the nation, and their superiors, who did not wish to 
antagonise the leadership by raising awkward questions. The
Politburo had not expressly stated that the issue should be
avoided, but their silence was sufficient to make minor
functionaries fearful of the consequences if they raised it. 
Therefore, to keep the subject alive, members of the Academy for 
Social Sciences tried to win the support of its director, Otto 
Reinhold, who was a member of the Central Committee. Though 
he may have been sympathetic to their cause, his deputies posed 
a major obstacle between Reinhold and scholars at the institution, 
though he in turn had to conform to the wishes of the head of the 
Department of Sciences, Kurt Hager.68
66 Neues Deutschland. 26 August 1983.
67 Zimmermann, ed., DDR Handbuch. p. 926.
68 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
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Academics knew that the way to guarantee the future of research 
was to ensure that the subject featured in the 'Central Research 
Plan for the Social Sciences.' Fortunately for them, the 
Propaganda Department suggested that the plan for 1981-86 
should contain more material on socialist patriotism, socialist 
national consciousness and on 'the estab lishm en t and 
development of the socialist nation, and the conflict with counter­
revolutionary theories such as the "openness of the German 
question" and the "continued existence of the unity of the German 
n a tio n " .'69 This implies that the Department was aware that the 
message regarding the 'socialist German nation' had not yet got 
through. As a result, a new field of research (Forschungsbereich)  
on 'The Socialist Nation and History' was established at the 
Academy for Social Sciences, which facilitated new research. The 
initiative had originally come from theorists themselves, but 
official permission was always required before such a body could 
be formed.
The campaign to keep the nation alive as a subject for academic 
discourse was taken up by Jurgen Hofmann, a younger member of 
the Academy for Social Sciences, who eventually succeeded Alfred 
Kosing as the leading authority on the nation in the GDR. In 1983, 
he completed a doctoral thesis on the evolution of the 'socialist 
German nation' and the national policies of the SED, supervised by 
the very individuals who had been responsible for elaborating on 
the SED's line on the nation, Kosing and Schmidt. The same year, 
an academic committee was formed by individuals with an 
interest in the problem of the nation, chaired by Hofmann. Such 
committees had to be adopted by a state-run academic institution 
and required the approval of its senior directors, which could take 
a long time. In this case, official permission was only granted due 
to Politburo member Hermann Axen's personal interest in the 
subject. Some of its members had hoped for such a committee 
after the dramatic Eighth Party Conference in 1971, but as usual, 
it was impossible to get permission to address a topic that the 
leadership considered settled. However, even after its formation, 
the future of the committee was always uncertain due to the
69 ZPA IV B2/904/67
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sensitivity of the topic, and it was dissolved twice by its members' 
superiors, which led to the withdrawal of financial and human 
resources. Kosing and Hofmann had hoped that the formation of 
the committee would enable them to conduct empirical research 
into the level of acceptance of the concept of the 'socialist German 
nation,' but permission was refused.70
In spite of the lack of encouragement, behind the scenes, some 
theorists continued to address the subject, although little 
appeared outside academic circles after the publication of the 
Party Programme in 1976 until the end of the 1980s, shortly 
before the end of the GDR itself. Due to these difficulties, others 
turned their attention to less controversial subjects, in particular, 
those currently favoured by the leadership such as the 
reinterpretation of German history. During this period, only one 
article devoted to the 'socialist German nation' appeared in the 
journal E in h e i t ,71 and one short book addressed the subject.72 
However, several articles did appear in the Academy for Social 
Science's own journal,73 and handful of doctoral dissertations were 
produced.74
A group from the Academy, which included all the big names on 
the subject of the nation - Kosing, Schmidt, Hofmann and Meier - 
produced a paper with the cumbersome title 'Problems in the 
Development of the Socialist German Nation and in the Conflict 
with new Tendencies towards Bourgeois Nationalism in the 
Imperialist Policies and Ideology of the FRG,' which was sent to 
Kurt Hager shortly before the Tenth Party Conference in 1981.
70 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993; interview with Jurgen 
Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
71 Alfred Kosing and Walter Schmidt, 'Geburt und Gedeihen der 
sozialistischen deutschen Nation,' Einheit 34 (1979): pp.1068-1075.
72 Gerhard Riege and Hans-Jurgen Kulke, N ationalist Deutsch. 
Staatsbiirgerschaft DDR (East Berlin, 1979).
73 For example, Dietmar Sauberlich, 'Das Problem der Nation in der 
Strategie und Taktik der SED in der ersten Halfte der 60er Jahre,' 
Thematische Information und Dokumentation 48 (1985); G. Benser, 
'Sozialistische Nation und Nationspolitik in der Geschichte der DDR,' 
Thematische Information und Dokumentation 47 (1984).
74 For example, Hofmann, 'Studien zur Entwicklung' and theses by Peter 
Rentsch, Wilfried Trompelt and Marianne Braumann.
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They also produced a paper during preparations for the Eleventh 
Party Conference in 1986, in which they expressed the opinion 
that ignoring the issue of the nation would lead to uncertainty. 
However, because of this comment, it never reached the upper 
echelons of power - even Axen never received it - and Hofmann 
believes it was locked away because the deputy director of the 
institution feared the consequences of passing on material that 
could be interpreted as criticism of those responsible for agitation 
and propaganda.7 5
All these pieces of work contained similar ideas, partly because 
the same individuals (or students under their supervision) were 
responsible for them. Naturally the basic line had already been 
defined and accepted into Party documents, leaving little room for 
variation, and absolutely none for criticism. Leading theorists 
were reasonably happy with the Party's current stance (since they 
had helped to modify it in the mid-1970s), though most felt that 
certain qualifications were required, and attempted to slip them 
into their work.
After 30 years, with no sign of the long promised socialist 
revolution of the FRG, it was difficult to ignore the fact that the 
'socialist German nation’ was only developing in one part of the 
territory previously occupied by the unitary German nation. This 
contradicted the notion that the transformation of bourgeois 
nations into socialist nations was natural and inevitable, and the 
idea of a national bond linking the proletariat in both German 
states that was particularly prevalent in the 1960s. Though 
theorists now accepted the reality of the situation,76 it was never 
adequately explained, presumably because it could be seen as a 
failure on the part of the SED to achieve its original aims. Indeed
76 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, 1 March 1993 and 11 May 1993; 
interview with Helmut Meier, 28 May 1993, Berlin.
76 ’Probleme der Entwicklung der sozialistischen deutschen Nation und der
Auseinandersetzung mit neuen Tendenzen des btirgerlichen Nationalismus
in der Politik und Ideologic des Imperialisms in der BRD - Studie,'
(AfG/IfGA, 1980), in ZPA IV B2/2024/4. This paper was produced by a 
collective consisting of all the main theorists on the subject, Walter 
Schmidt, Alfred Kosing, Jurgen Hofmann, Helmut Meier and Alfred 
Loesdau, and was labelled confidential.
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one theorist claims he was instructed not to mention how long the 
Party had struggled to preserve the unity of the nation in an 
a r tic le .77 Instead, so-called West German imperialists and their 
allies were blamed for the continuation of the 'bourgeois German 
nation' in the FRG, and in this way, history had resolved the 
National Question.78
Theorists were pleased that the regime had finally accepted that 
the socialist nation in the GDR was German, having denied this fact 
for several years, which they believed had had a damaging effect 
on national consciousness. However, they still maintained that 
ethnic factors determined a person's nationality, not which nation 
they belonged to, which was a matter of class. Consequently, 
peaceful co-existence, not 'national common ground' (na t iona le  
G em einsam ke i ten )  was the basis of the relationship between the 
two German states.79 On the one hand, it was claimed that in the 
GDR, socialism had merged with German ethnicity, resulting in the 
formation of a 'socialist German nation,’ which was becoming 
increasingly distinct from the 'bourgeois German nation’ in the 
FRG. On the other hand, the assertion was also made that customs, 
traditions, life-styles, etc., had been affected by socialism, hence 
'in the reality of our socialist nation, the concept "German" is 
acquiring a richer content, bearing the hallmark of socialism.'80 
However, theorists admitted: The fact that both in the case of the 
socialist nation in the GDR and the capitalist nation in the FRG, we 
are dealing with German nations makes the objective process of 
embedding ethnic elements into the structure of the socialist 
nation more difficult.'81 Consequently, it would be useful to find 
out just how strongly German ethnic elements and socialist 
elements had become bound together, and to assess the impact of 
customs and events unique to the GDR on national consciousness,
77 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 11 May 1993.
78 Kosing and Schmidt, 'Geburt und Gedeihen,’ p. 1069; ’Probleme der 
Entwicklung,' p.20.
79 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.22.
80 Kosing and Schmidt, 'Geburt und Gedeihen,' p. 1074.
81 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.30.
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such as anniversary celebrations and secular replacements for 
marriage and confirmation ceremonies.82
The most important innovation in academic work on the concept 
of the nation in the GDR during the early 1980s was the 
recognition of the fact that the evolution of the nation was a long 
process, and that the distinction should be made between the 
foundation (Konstituierung)  and consolidation (Konsolidierung)  of 
the nation.83 It was argued that the foundation of the ’socialist 
German nation’ had occurred with the establishment of the GDR as 
a state of workers and farmers in 1949. However, the process of 
consolidation was not yet com plete, though it had been 
accelerated by the international recognition of the GDR's status as 
a sovereign socialist German nation-state.84 Theorists accepted 
that the process would only be completed several generations 
later, and that it was hindered by the presence of a bourgeois 
German nation next door,85 though it was noted that in the case of 
Austria, the nation was very quickly consolidated.86
Here, as usual, theorists were taking a more realistic view than 
functionaries, who for political reasons, had often stated that a 
socialist nation had already developed in the GDR. But it also 
provided a convenient explanation for the weaknesses of the 
’socialist German nation' which would apparently be resolved in 
time. In fact, as Jurgen Hofmann admits, the socialist nation was 
more of a goal or vision, than a description of the current 
s i tu a tio n .87 However, it was assumed that the goal would be 
achieved, regardless of whether or not it was shared by the 
population.
Five elements were identified as necessary for the completion of 
this process. Firstly the securing and further development of a
82 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.33.
83 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.29.
84 'Probleme der Entwicklung,’ p.30.
86 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.300; Schmidt, 'The National Question,' 
p .169.
86 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
87 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
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socialist society in the GDR; secondly, the merging of socialist and 
ethnic German elements; thirdly the strengthening of national 
consciousness; fourthly (and rather paradoxically), ever closer 
relations with other socialist nations; and finally, further fencing 
off from the Federal Republic and continued attempts to discredit 
Bonn's concept of the unitary German nation.88
Theorists believed that of these, the most important task was to 
ensure that the population of the GDR perceived itself as a 
separate nation, especially in view of the state's unique and 
vulnerable position. W ithout a 'socialist German national 
consciousness,' the 'socialist German nation' was incomplete. 
However, this was something the leadership was reluctant to 
admit. In spite of all the rhetoric about the 'socialist German 
nation,’ and the claim that 'Contempt for what is national (d a s  
N a t io n a le  ) is just as alien to us as chauvinism towards other 
peoples and those of a different skin colour,’89 national 
consciousness was still defined as socialist patriotism, allied to 
proletarian internationalism. Although Honecker talked about 
'national pride,' 'das nationale Selbstverstandnis des Volkes der 
D D R /  (in essence, how the people of the GDR saw themselves), and 
’the national honour of our socialist fatherland,’90 to him, ’national’ 
was synonymous with socialist or GDR-wide, and failed to 
provided an emotional alternative to ’German.’
Theorists were particularly concerned about the lack of empirical 
data on national consciousness, but permission to undertake 
empirical research was hard to obtain. Until the mid-1980s, 
historians at the Academy for Social Sciences, led by Professor 
Helmut Meier, investigated historical consciousness among the 
population, including the level of knowledge of German history, its 
significance for national consciousness and allegiance to the state, 
and for perceptions of the Federal Republic. While this research 
was officially sanctioned, there remained the problem of how to
88 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.33.
89 BeschluB des Politburos, 18 May 1977, Einheit 33 (1978): p.782.
90 17 February 1978. Honecker, Die Kulturpolitik. pp. 192-193.
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make the leadership take notice of the findings.91 The Institute 
for Youth Research in Leipzig continued to monitor the views of 
young people, in particular, students, but again, the results were 
not sufficiently favourable for publication, and the leadership 
preferred not to know the truth.
Furthermore, it was around this time that the Institut fu r  
M einungs forschung  (IMF) was abolished following the death of 
Werner Lamberz, who was one of the few Politburo members to 
recognise its importance. Joachim Herrmann, Lamberz' successor, 
disbanded it, arguing that it had fulfilled its purpose, and anyway, 
'We form public opinion ourselves.’92 No doubt the real reason 
was that the findings rarely corresponded to what the leadership 
wanted to hear. Even though the findings showed that two-thirds 
of the population identified with the socialist nation in the GDR, 
this was no^where near enough to satisfy the Party leadership.9 3 
All the prominent theorists on the subject were outraged by the 
dissolution of the IMF, after all, how could the national 
consciousness of the population be strengthened if no-one knew 
how strong it was already? Alfred Kosing claims to have 
personally tried to persuade the director of the institute, Lene 
Berg, to go directly to Honecker and to ask him to save it, but says 
she lacked the courage to do so.94
However, it was obvious that some form of state consciousness 
had developed in the GDR, as even western commentators 
acknowledged, and by the 1970s, the number of people who 
claimed that the GDR was their fatherland, as opposed to the 
whole of Germany, had doubled compared to the late 1960s.95 
But it rem ained a rather vulnerable and unsentim ental 
Leistungsbewufitsein,  dependent on a reasonable level of material 
comfort, which could not be guarantied. It lacked the necessary
91 Interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 15 March 1993. See also 
Braumann, 'Zum Zusammenhang.'
92 Interview with Alfred Kosing, 3 March 1993; interview with Jurgen 
Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993; interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 15 
March 1993.
93 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
94 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
95 'Probleme der Entwicklung,’ p.34.
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emotional ties that national consciousness usually implies, and 
merely existed alongside German ethnic consciousness, failing to 
rival or incorporate it. Theorists believed that what was required 
was the transformation of the socialist German nation from a 
'Nation an sich ' into a ’Nation fu r  sichl as Marx himself had 
reco g n ised .96 The importance attached to national consciousness 
suggests that they may well have been influenced by the work of 
western scholars such as Karl Deutsch, which they had access to at 
the Academy for Social Sciences. However, they criticised 
’bourgeois ideologues’ who attempted to prove the existence of a 
nation based exclusively on national consciousness.97
Factors which were believed to have a positive effect on national 
consciousness were a high quality of life, both materially and 
spiritually, and the GDR’s success on the international stage, 
including diplom atic recognition of the state, its policies 
apparently in the interest of peace, and sporting achievements. 
However, Bonn's 'ideological subversion' and campaign to preserve 
the unity of the nation, family ties and visitors from the Federal 
Republic were perceived as having a negative effect on the 
development of a national consciousness unique to the GDR.98
In short, the main points that theorists were trying to impress 
upon the leadership was that the nation was a living and 
developing organism, which required constant attention and 
should not be dropped from political and research agendas. 
Furtherm ore, effective propaganda was only possible if the 
current level of acceptance of the socialist German nation was 
known. The problem was that on the whole, the leadership did 
not want to hear suggestions which implied that there was a 
problem, or more often than not, minor functionaries assumed 
that they did not, and intercepted material before it could reach 
the decision-makers. All the leading theorists on the concept of 
the nation in the GDR complain of the frustration of wanting to
96 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.35; also Schmidt, The Nation in German 
History,' p. 170.
97 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.299.
98 'Probleme der Entwicklung,' p.29.
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help but not being listened to. However, a major development 
was the leadership's new interest in the GDR's relationship to 
German history, which was an attempt to dispel the charge that 
the 'socialist German nation ' was rootless and therefore 
illegitim ate, and was seen as a way to strengthen national 
consciousness among the population. By telling the story of the 
socialist revolution on German soil, from its origins in the days of 
feudalism till its ultimate triumph in the GDR, it was believed that 
the 'national pride' of the population as citizens of the GDR would 
be strengthened.
c ) The GDR: 'Heir to Everything Progressive in the History of the 
German People'
The new Party Programme of 1976 not only acknowledged that 
the socialist nation in the GDR was German, but also emphasised 
that its 'socialist national culture' was 'duty bound to the rich 
heritage that was created during the entire history of the German 
people.' The SED itself was 'the inheritor of everything 
progressive in the history of the German people.'99 Thus the GDR 
was no longer to be portrayed as a complete break with the 
German past, but as its high point, the ultimate achievement of 
the German people, (or at least some of them). While it is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to examine all the books, articles, 
rehabilitations and celebrations which resulted, a task which has 
already been undertaken by numerous other western scholars,100
99 Programm der SED (East Berlin, 1976), pp. 52, 5.
100 An extensive literature exists both in English and in German, o f which 
only a selection is included here. For example, Wolfgang Biischer, 
'Geschichte als Denk- und Spielraum. Die DDR Historiker im Lutherjahr,' 
Studies in GDR Culture and Society 4, ed. Margy Gerber (Lanham and 
London, 1984), pp.243-253; I.R. Mitchell, The Changing Image of Prussia in 
the GDR,' German Life and Letters 37 (1983); Meuschel, L egitim ation . 
pp.285-291; Jan Herman Brinks, Die DDR Geschichtswissenschaft auf dem 
Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Frankfurt and New York, 1992); Gert-Joachim 
Glaessner, 'Sozialistische Neohistorismus?' in Die DDR in der Ara Honecker. 
ed. Glaessner (Opladen, 1988); G. Iggers, Marxist Historiography in 
Transformation. New Orientations in recent East German History (New York 
and Oxford, 1991); Gunther Heydemann, Geschichtswissenschaft im 
Geteilten Deutschland (Frankfurt, 1980); Hasko Hiining, 
'G eschichtswissenschaft zwischen Fachhistorik und
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it is important to understand why this occurred and how it was 
then used to enhance the image of the 'socialist German nation.' 
Five factors can be identified which appear to have facilitated the 
re-assessment of German history.
Firstly, it appears that at long last, the SED accepted the commonly 
held view that a nation should have a 'national biography'101 or 
'historic personality .'102 Until this point, the SED had based its 
concept of the nation on an idealised version of the present, which 
did not match the reality of the situation in the GDR, and on a 
utopian vision of the future, which few believed the regime could 
deliver, indeed, a small circle within the ruling elite itself knew 
that they could not. Thus the leadership had a good pragmatic 
reason to focus on the past. Furthermore, 'History was of vital 
importance in East Germany in attempts to represent (and hence 
legitimise) the present as the inevitable culmination of the past, 
the goal towards which all of German history had been 
tend ing .'103
West German governments had constantly accused the SED of 
'taking leave of German history' to re-enforce the Federal 
Republic's own claim to be the only legitimate successor of the 
former unitary German state and the sole representative of the 
German nation. Thus by reclaiming German history, the SED 
aimed to prove not only that the GDR was German and historically
Geschichtsphilosophie?1 in Die DDR in der&Era Honecker. ed. Glaessner, 
pp.574-588; Dorpalen, German History.
101 On the relationship between nations and history see Mary Fulbrook, 
'Introduction: States, Nations and the development of Europe,1 N ational 
Histories and European History ed. Mary Fulbrook (London, 1993), pp. 1-20; 
Teich and Porter, The National Question: Anthony D. Smith, N ational 
Identity (London, 1991), pp. 160-165; Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds.. The  
Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge, 1993); Leonard Krieger, 'Germany,' in 
National Consciousness. History and Political Culture in Earlv Modem 
Europe ed. Orest Ranum (Baltimore and London, 1975), pp.67-97; F. Hertz, 
Nationality in History and Politics (London, 1944); Manfred HSttich, 
NationalbewuBtsein und StaatsbewuBtsein (Mainz, 1966), pp.20-23.
102 Shoup, 'The National Question,' p. 124; Benedict Anderson, Im agined  
Communities (London and New York, 1983), p. 124.
103 Mary Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918-1990. The Divided 
Nation (London, 1991), p.300.
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legitimate, but that it was more so than the Federal Republic, 
which was reminiscent of its stance during the 1950s.
Secondly, the SED had finally accepted the fact that the population 
of the GDR and the FRG shared the same nationality. Since it was 
claimed that this did not mean that the unitary German nation 
still existed, it seems that the leadership believed they could 
safely take advantage of selected aspects of German nationality 
such as German history, without undermining the claim that a 
socialist nation existed in the GDR. This would have been 
unthinkable in the days of strict A b g r e n z u n g , when the Party 
rejected everything shared by the two German states in an 
attempt to prove the legitimacy of the GDR and therefore its right 
to international recognition.
Thirdly, the regime may well have been motivated by a desire to 
distinguish the GDR from other members of the Warsaw Pact, 
particularly during the unrest in Poland in the early 1980s, to 
deter people from copying their socialist brothers and sisters 
there. Later in the decade, even the Soviet model would be 
played down in favour of GDR-style socialism in an attempt to 
avoid reform.
Fourthly, even though the Institute for Public Opinion Research 
had been abolished, the Party could still assess the public mood on 
the basis of the applications of those wishing to emigrate to the 
west and on reports of the Stas i .  Information regarding the 
unofficial peace movement in the 1980s must have given an 
indication of the strength of all-German feeling aroused by the 
nuclear debate. However, this can be interpreted in two different 
ways. On the one hand, the regime may have recognised that the 
'socialist German nation,' and therefore the GDR, lacked legitimacy, 
and identified its ambivalent relationship with the German past as 
both a cause, and a potential solution. They also realised that 
people have a natural desire to discover and learn about their 
ancestors. And if the population still believed in their German 
roots, it would be better for the SED to give them what they 
wanted by proving the German roots of the socialist nation in the
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GDR, than for them to keep looking westwards in search of their 
heritage. An alternative view is that the regime believed that the 
GDR was now sufficiently secure that there was no longer any 
need to worry about being German and about the impact of 
German history. The only other option was to ignore the GDR's 
German roots, but the SED had already tried that in the 1970s, 
apparently with only limited success.
While it is difficult to establish which of these was the true 
scenario on the evidence available, it is possible that the regime 
believed that while popular allegiance to the GDR needed to be 
strengthened, a sufficiently firm foundation of GDR-consciousness 
already existed which could be further enhanced by a revival of 
interest in German history. However, later events, such as 
Honecker's sentimental behaviour while in the Federal Republic in 
1987, and the SED’s sudden panic about the German nation in the 
late 1980s, suggest a considerable degree of uncertainty 
regarding the validity of the 'socialist German nation' on the part 
of top functionaries, which, in view of the artificiality of the 
concept, is hardly surprising. What is certain, however, is that the 
leadership clearly believed that the advantages of linking the GDR 
to its German past outweighed the disadvantages, as the 
lavishness of the subsequent celebrations and architectural 
renovations showed.
Finally, it appears that there was considerable enthusiasm for a 
more com prehensive exam ination of German history from 
h isto rians them selves.104 In a confidential study by leading 
theorists and historians from two state academies on the 
'Problems with the Development of the Socialist German Nation,’ 
which was sent to Kurt Hager in 1980, the authors expressed the 
view that the GDR was very much rooted in German history and 
stressed the need to increase research and education regarding 
'the historical roots, genesis, nature and historical role of socialist 
German national consciousness' as a means to strengthen people's
104 Alfred Kosing, (interview, Berlin, 3 March 1993), Walter Schmidt 
(interview, Berlin, 3 June 1993), and Helmut Meier (interview, Berlin, 15 
March 1993) all claim that this was the case.
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identification with the 'socialist German nation,' and by 
implication, with the GDR itself. Interestingly, they warned 
against over-emphasising regional histories, such as Prussian 
history, which could fragment 'national' consciousness in the GDR.
The fact that the study also paid considerable attention to the
s'new trends of bourgeois nationalism' practiced by the 'imperialist 
FRG' highlighted the reactive nature of GDR policy on the nation, 
which was evident throughout the lifetime of the state.105
Until this point, the history of the GDR was very much that of the 
German workers' movement and only included 'progressive' 
figures, such as Thomas Miintzer, Ernst Thalmann, Karl Liebknecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg. More controversial characters had been left 
for the Federal Republic. This fitted the SED’s claim to be 
continuing progressive and revolutionary German traditions, while 
the Federal Republic was the continuation of the imperialistic and 
militaristic strand of German history. It also supported the claim 
that there were now two separate states and two separate nations 
on German soil with nothing in common. However, due to the 
tragic course of German history, particularly in the last century, 
this meant that the SED was giving away a rather larger chunk of 
history than the parts it wanted to keep. Until this point, 
historians in the GDR had portrayed figures and events very much 
in black and white, either as totally good or totally bad, with no 
shades of grey, and without mention of the positive results of 
events considered essentially bad. This obviously limited the 
range of subjects historians could write about, and encouraged 
them to stick to 'safe topics' for fear of the consequences of 
tackling more controversial events, or of being labelled 'bourgeois' 
and thus ostracised from the community of professional 
academics.
In 1978, a declaration from the Politburo stated:
The encouragement of citizens’ pride in their socialist 
fatherland, their consciousness of the flourishing of the 
socialist German nation, its historic development and
105 'Probleme der Entwicklung,1 p.36.
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achievements, and its great prospects is a political task 
of the utmost importance. It is the logical result of 
class struggles and the greatest achievement of the 
workers in the entire history of the German people.
The more this socialist national consciousness 
develops, the more it also functions as the impetus for 
active participation in the strengthening and defence 
o f  the GDR, and for the growing together of the 
socialist nations.106
Thus the true intentions of the party were obvious. However, in 
the SED’s defence, it could be argued that:
Any cursory glance at education policies and 
controversies in quite different regimes, democratic as 
well as non-democratic, will reveal the key political 
importance of history in promoting a certain version of 
the nation’s historical mission, its national myths about 
its past and its role and identity in the present.107
The new task of historians at state institutions such as the 
Academy of Science’s Institute for History, the Academy for Social 
Sciences and the Institute for Marxism-Leninism (IML) was to 
portray 'the whole of German history as the national history of the 
GDR,' though a significant distinction was made by historians 
between 'heritage' (E rbe) ,  which was shared by both German 
states and included both good and bad episodes, and 'tradition,' 
which referred only to aspects considered to be progressive, and 
which were supposedly only continued by the GDR. This idea 
appears to originate from an article by Horst Bartel in 1981,108 
and it soon became standard practice for East German historians 
to make the distinction. By paying attention to both the good and 
the bad strands of German history, the GDR could be shown to be 
the climax of the progressive strand, the triumph of good over 
evil, whereas the Federal Republic was portrayed as continuing 
the mistakes and injustices of the past.
106 'BeschluB des Politburos iiber die weitere Aufgaben der politischen 
Massenarbeit der Partei,’ Einheit 33 (1978): p. 1227, my italics.
107 Fulbrook, 'States, nations,' p.8.
108 Horst Bartel, 'Historische Erbe und Tradition,' E inheit 34 (1981), pp. 272- 
278.
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Although subjects that were not officially considered to be a part 
of the history of the GDR had been discussed within academic 
institutions, their publication was impossible, hence historians had 
tended to avoid them. However, from the late 1970s, they were 
able to address periods and events which the SED had previously 
disowned, which appears to have been appreciated after the 
limitations of the previous decade. However, the objectivity of 
East German historians should not be over-estimated, since they 
always had to perform  a balancing act between serious 
scholarship on the one hand, and Parteil ichkeit  on the other, and 
were well aware of the editorial powers of their superiors. While 
they may have wished for a better, more credible GDR, they never 
had the intention of destabilising i t .109 Indeed, many were 
leading historians of the GDR who had not got where they were on 
merit alone. The overt aim of new text books and biographies was 
to form 'an important basis for a broad G e s c h ic h t s p r o p a g a n d a  
which will have an effect on the masses.'110
The publication of the Grundrifi der deutschen Geschichte in 1979 
provoked a sudden flood of books and articles which for the first 
time covered events and personalities other than the workers' 
movement and the class struggle in Germany.111 Until this point, 
German history had been divided into two traditions: firstly, the 
authoritarian aspects of Prussian history which had culminated in 
the Third Reich and which were apparently continued by the 
Federal Republic; and secondly, the traditions of the peasant wars, 
the revolution of 1848, the KPD of the Weimar Republic and the 
anti-facist resistdnce which supposedly lived on in the GDR.112 As 
a result of this uncharacteristic, non-M arxist treatm ent of 
Prussian military heroes, who were commemorated not only by
109 Interview with Walter Schmidt, Berlin, 3 June 1993.
110 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.298.
111 Major biographical works appeared, for example, Ingrid Mittenzwei, 
Friedrich II von PreuBen. Eine Biographie (East Berlin, 1979); K-H. Bflmer, 
Wilhelm I: Deutscher Kaiser und Konig von PreuBen. Eine Biographie (East 
Berlin, 1984); E. Engelberg, Bismarck: Urpreusse und Reichsgriinder (East 
Berlin, 1975). An official account was even published in English: H.
Heitzer, GDR. A Historical Outline (Dresden, 1981).
112 Iggers, Marxist Historiography, p. 11
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the written word, but also with monuments and exhibitions, the 
GDR was again labelled ’Red Prussia.'
Although articles in the theoretical journal 'E inhe i t ' belonged to 
the grey area between serious scholarship and propaganda,
tending more towards one or the other, depending on the author's 
profession and status, an analysis of the contents of the journal 
from the late 1970s till the mid-1980s indicates the extent to 
which German history took priority over other subjects. In 1978 
and 1979 it was one of the most frequently addressed topics,
particularly in connection with the 30th anniversary of the 
foundation of the GDR, and was even the subject of a special 
edition. It is hardly necessary to examine each article, since they 
tended all to be based on the same arguments and written by the
same few individuals such as Walter Schmidt and Horst Bartel,
and were reproduced in other journals.
A typical example was Bartel's 'Historical Heritage and Tradition,' 
which attempted to explain the new line on German history and 
its significance for the socialist nation in the GDR. However, it also 
unintentionally highlighted the many paradoxes of the new 
stance. The writer claimed that the existence of a socialist nation 
in the GDR was becoming increasingly noticeable, which both 
allowed for, and called for 'a more comprehensive, richer, and 
more creatively critical relationship to everything that our people 
and humankind have achieved during their entire history.' It was 
apparently for this reason that the leadership of the Party and 
state had recently devoted particular attention to 'questions of 
heritage and tradition.'113 Why this should now be the case and 
not before was not addressed. Bartel recognised the need to 
uncover the roots of the 'socialist German nation,’ which were 
buried deep in the past, the need to publicise them, and to make 
them relevant to the present and the future. This would involve 
'facing the entire inheritance of German history with all its 
contradictions, and developing, preserving and continuing the 
whole wealth of traditions of the GDR.'114
113 Bartel, 'Historische Erbe,' p.272.
114 Bartel, p.272.
252
Though it could not be denied that German history was common to 
both states, the East German approach to it was contrasted with 
that of the Federal Republic:
In their hatred for socialism and for the flourishing of 
the socialist German nation, and without scruples, the 
ideologues of imperialism and social reformism in the 
FRG falsify history. They try to pass the GDR off as 
som ething w ithout a h istory , and ignore her 
indissoluble rootedness in German history. They deny 
the objective historical role of the GDR as the 
legitimate heir to everything progressive in German 
history. 115
Clearly the writer was aware of potential 'all-German illusions' 
that might arise, hence he concluded,
The GDR's view of history and tradition is the result of
partisan academic analysis of German history. It is
diametrically opposed to the FRG’s conception of
history and tradition. Between the GDR and FRG there
exists neither a shared relationship with the past, nor „ , . . , f$xr,«''tv 'eS€SiT isome sort of historical all-German br-aekets around
them. As Kurt Hager explained, 'in this respect, the
German Question is not open. The GDR stands in the
line of con tinu ity  of everything p rogressive ,
hum anistic and revolutionary in earlier German
history. The ruling exploitative class in the FRG has no
right to refer to the traditions of those forces and
movements, who were always attacked, suppressed
and often assassinated by that same exploitative class,
in order to legitimise its policies. 416
yAnother article comparedA East and West German militarism, and 
attempted to portray the former as 'heir to all the progressive 
m ilitary traditions of the German people,' and serving the 
interests of peace.117
115 Bartel, p.273.
116 Bartel, p.278. See also Kurt Hager, Die Gesellschaftswissenschaften vor 
neuen Aufgaben. (East Berlin, 1981).
117 Horst Kiihne, 'Die NVA: Legitimer Erbe aller progressiven 
militaristischen Traditionen des deutschen Volkes,' E inheit 36 (1981): p .156.
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In short, while accepting its German history, warts and all, 
negative or controversial episodes were contrasted with a positive 
image of the GDR in order to make the establishment of the state 
seem like a great triumph over the reaction, imperialism and 
militarism of the past, which had apparently not been achieved 
by the Federal Republic.
The 30th anniversary of the GDR in October 1979 was a 
demonstration of the SED's enthusiasm for the idea that the 
'socialist German nation' was firmly rooted in German history in 
its entirety. The event bore the hallmark of Werner Lamberz,118 
the State Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda, who recognised 
the potential of the state's German roots to transform a rather 
colourless GDR-state consciousness into a more emotive national 
consciousness, which in turn would reinforce the legitimacy of the 
state, both dom estically and internationally. Lamberz had 
coordinated the preparations until his death in 1978. However, 
the SED appeared to want it both ways: 'Our socialist state 
embodies the continuation of everything good in German history, 
while at the same time embodying a radical break with 
everything reactionary.'119
A particularly striking aspect of the regime's new enthusiasm for 
German history was Honecker's personal interest in the subject. 
Whether this had anything to do with the fact that he was himself 
born on West German soil is debatable, though it would have been 
out of character for him to have put sentiment before 'the class 
struggle.’ On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the GDR, 
Honecker used language reminiscent of Walter Ulbricht, even 
calling the state 'the new, socialist Germany.' The foundation of 
the GDR was proclaimed as 'the turning point in the history of the 
German people and of Europe,' and 'the beginning of the triumphal 
march of socialism in the country o f  birth of Marx and Engels’!120
118 According to Helmut Meier, interview, Berlin 15 March 1993.
119 'Aufruf zum 30. Jahrestag der DDR,' Einheit 34 (1979): p.637.
120 Erich Honecker, ’Der Siegeszug des Sozialismus auf deutschem Boden,' 
Einheit 34 (1979): pp.899-900, my italics.
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He now also accepted that socialist national consciousness would 
be strengthened 'when we uphold and tend the progressive 
historical traditions of the entire history of the German people.'121 
In short, Honecker seemed to have reverted to the argument that 
the GDR was the  legitim ate German state, but the problem 
remained that the Federal Republic made this claim too.
Although he had previously been denounced for subservience to
the princes, Martin Luther was the key figure in the SED's
campaign to provide the 'socialist German nation' with a history,
and subsequently to legitimise the GDR. The intention was both to
win over the population, particularly Christians, who were
becoming increasingly involved in the peace movement, and also
to enhance the international reputation of the GDR and its leader.
Honecker personally set up the Martin Luther Committee in 1980,
calling the GDR the state that was realising 'the ideals of the best
sons of the German p eop le .'122 The celebration of the 
£
quincentenary of Luther's birth in 1983 alm ost became a 
com petition between the two German states as they both 
attempted to claim Luther for their own, though the GDR had a 
distinct advantage in that the most important historical sites of 
the reformation were on her territory. Suddenly the Federal 
Republic's claim to German history in its entirety was under 
threat. Helmut Kohl called the lavish celebrations in the GDR 'a 
subtle attempt by the SED to use Luther to bind the concept of 
nation with that of socialism, as if there were a direct line of 
continuity from Frederick the Great to Erich Honecker,'123 which 
was precisely what the Party was trying to do. The SED's 
explanation for its new, more favourable portrayal of Luther was 
that 'the working class now exercises power, and has a wider view
121 Erich Honecker, 'Die Aufgaben der Partei bei der weiteren 
Verwirklichung der Beschliisse des 9. Parteitages,1 17 February 1978, cited 
in Honecker, Die Kulturpolitik. p. 192.
122 Erich Honecker, 'Martin Luther und unsere Zeit,' 13 June 1980, cited in 
Honecker, Die Kulturpolitik. p.257.
123 Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, 28 
June 1983, p. 637, cited in R.F. Goekel, 'The Luther Anniversary in East 
Germany,' World Politics 37 (1984): p.125.
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of the past than the working class which was in the midst of the 
struggle for power.'124
Honecker was challenged on this total reversal of official opinion 
regrding figures such as Luther and Clausewitz in an interview 
with Robert Maxwell in 1980. The latter pointed out that Luther 
had previously been reviled in the GDR for betraying the peasants' 
uprising, and Clausewitz had been a firm supporter of the 
monarchy. Honecker explained,
It could be said that the world of ideas of Marx and 
Engels would be unimaginable without the creative 
exam ination of all the in tellectual values that 
humanity had produced up to that point.... When we 
acknowledge the historic achievements of Martin 
Luther and Carl von Clausewitz, that is quite in 
keeping with the traditions of Marx, Engels, Lenin, the 
German workers’ movement and our history since 
1945. However, we in no way ignore the limitations of 
these and other personalities of German history, their 
negative traits, their contradictory behaviour, or the 
historic tragedy in which they became entangled. An 
understanding of the objective, factual course and 
entire dialectic of history conforms with our view of 
the world. A view of the greatness and limitations of 
prominent personalities in history is a part of that. 125
Asked whether or not there was an element of risk involved when 
both the GDR and FRG celebrated the same national heroes, 
Honecker replied,
’In our opinion it is not a question of risk, but one of 
our basic position  regarding German h is to ry .1 
Apparently Lenin had claimed that one could not be a 
communist without analysing all human knowledge, of 
which communism was a result. In any case, he 
continued, ’our approach to history and the past is
quite different to that of the Federal Republic  We
cannot possibly run the risk of celebrating the same 
national heroes as the FRG since you will search in
124 Goekel, The Luther Anniversary,1 p. 128.
125 Erich Honecker, Aus meinem Leben (East Berlin, 1981), p.436.
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vain for institutions bearing the names of Nazi greats 
in our country.' Finally, when asked whether the 
breakthrough had occurred with the publication of a 
major biography of Frederick the Great, Honecker 
denied that this had been a breakthrough, claiming 
instead that it was 'the result of our position regarding 
our heritage.'126
Thus, Honecker left many questions unanswered, most noticeably 
why this treatment of German history, which was suddenly 
regarded as correct and necessary, had not been undertaken 
before.
To what extent was the rooting of the 'socialist German nation' 
in German history in its entirety a good idea? Obviously there 
were some advantages to be gained, and at the same time, some 
risks, but little had been gained by the denial of the German roots 
of the state and its population during the previous decade. Since 
there was no longer an institute which monitored public opinion, 
no precise data on the resonance among the population exists, so 
we can only speculate. Research into historic consciousness was 
conducted by historians at the Academy for Social Sciences until 
1984, but even if the results were available, they may well have 
been 'im proved' to make them more palatable to the 
au th o rities .127
On the positive side, it did provide the GDR with the 'national 
biography' and 'historic personality,' which until now had been 
seriously lacking, and gave people a sim ilar opportunity to 
consider and celebrate their historical roots as their West German 
cousins. Presumably this reduced the resentment and confusion 
caused by denying people their heritage, which may have led 
some to view the Federal Republic as the true German state. 
Furthermore, it was hoped that it would enhance the concept of
126 Honecker, p.437.
127 Interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 15 March 1993. For an 'improved' 
account, see also Braumann, 'Zum Zusammenhang.' For a West German 
view see Johannes Kuppe, 'GeschichtsbewuBtsein in der DDR,' in 
GeschichtsbewuBtsein der Deutschen. Materialen zur Spurensuche eine 
Nation ed. Werner Weidenfeld (Cologne, 1987), pp. 175-177.
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the 'socialist German nation,' and put an end to its rivalry with the 
historical ethnic German nation. Thus the SED was effectively 
saying that identification with both the GDR and the ethnic 
German nation was no longer incompatible, which was reminiscent 
of Johann Gottfried Herder, who had stated that the idea of the 
German V olk  was compatible with loyalty to the Prussian or 
Bavarian state.128 All this completely contradicted the view that 
ethnicity was insignificant compared to class, the view advocated 
during the 1970s, and highlighted the political motivation behind 
changes in policy regarding the nation.
However, the danger was that the population would be reminded 
of things they shared with West Germans, and it seems more 
logical that this would be the case, thus reinforcing the national 
bond, and even a latent desire for reunification. Furthermore, the 
SED's use of historical figures such as Luther for political ends was 
not very subtle, and was in sharp contrast to their previous 
position. However, it was probably better for the Party to offer its 
own version of events than to let Bonn get away with influencing 
the citizens of the GDR via West German television, and to be seen 
to have 'taken leave of history' as it appeared. After all, the GDR 
could hardly be the greatest achievement in the history of the 
German people if it bore no relationship to that history.
Ultimately, the intended effects of the GDR's new relationship with 
its past were bound to be limited, because the Party was trying to 
prove something illogical, and that a substantial proportion of the 
population did not believe, namely that there were two separate 
German nations, one socialist, the other bourgeois, with certain 
things in common, such as history, but nothing of real significance, 
because their social and political systems determined their 
relationship, or lack of one. Even so, by accepting that the GDR 
was a German state, as was the Federal Republic, the SED really 
had little choice but to address the issue of the state's relationship 
to its history. The episode highlighted the fact that in spite of the 
regime's claims that the GDR was an independent, sovereign state, 
with a (socialist) nation of its own, the ethnic German nation
128 Fulbrook, 'States, nations,1 p.6.
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continued to threaten the legitimacy of the GDR. While it had 
retained certain rather old-fashioned German traits which had 
been diluted by Americanisation and cosmopolitianism in the 
Federal Republic, the GDR could never be the 'best' German state 
when the yardsticks were econom ic success and liberal 
democracy. Thus the existence of the Federal Republic continued 
to challenge the GDR's raison d’etre, while the reverse was never 
the case. Meanwhile, the leadership was about to be attacked on a 
second front, with the beginning of a new era in Moscow, which 
we now know marked the beginning of the end for the socialist 
German state.
31 THE SUDDEN RETURN OF THE NATION TO THE POLITICAL 
AGENDA
In the early and mid-1980s, the SED had stubbornly adhered to 
the line that the nation was not negotiable, in spite of tangible 
links between the two German states, which had been highlighted 
by the peace issue. While a considerable amount of attention had 
been paid to German history, theorists had little success in their 
attempts to keep the ’socialist German nation' alive as a subject 
for debate, and it was not mentioned at all at the Eleventh Party 
Conference in April 1986. Suddenly however, in 1988, an internal 
working party on 'the question of the nation,’ chaired by a 
member of the Politburo, was established, followed a year later by 
an 'Interdisciplinary Academic Committee for Research on the 
Nation' at the Academy for Social Sciences and a flood of articles 
addressing the topic. This officially sanctioned interest was in 
stark contrast to the leadership’s indifference to the issue for over 
a decade, and as before, it was no accident, as we shall see. It 
proves not only that the problem of the nation still threatened to 
destroy the GDR, but also that the leadership believed it could be 
the state's salvation if handled correctly.
Three reasons for the return of the subject to the political agenda 
can be identified: firstly, Gorbachev's reforms and the challenge 
posed to the status quo in Europe; secondly, Honecker's official 
visit to the Federal Republic in 1987; and thirdly, internal
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p r o b le m s .129 While the German component of the 'socialist 
German nation' had always raised doubts about the legitimacy of 
the GDR, both when it was emphasised and when it was denied, 
now even its socialist character, until now taken for granted by 
the leadership, was becoming a liability, due to unwelcome 
changes within the socialist bloc and the increasingly obvious 
economic crisis at home. But it was its socialist aspects which 
differentiated the 'socialist German nation' from the 'bourgeois 
German nation' in the Federal Republic, indeed it was the only real 
justification for the existence of the GDR at all. In short, the very 
foundations on which the GDR-nation had been constructed, 
socialism and Germanness, were both being eroded by forces 
beyond the SED's control, hence a response was unavoidable, 
though ultimately in vain.
a) The Challenge of Perestroika and Glasnost
The SED disapproved of both Gorbachev's internal reforms and his 
ideas for the future of Europe. The concept of a 'common 
European home' was particularly worrying, firstly, because it 
raised questions about the sovereignty of the states concerned, 
and secondly because it implied that Moscow was questioning the 
status quo in Europe, including the existing solution to the German 
Question. As the only guarantor of the future of the GDR, it was 
feared that Gorbachev would be willing to do a deal with the West 
against the wishes of the SED leadership.130 Thus the latter 
maintained that the 'common European home' as merely a 
mechanism  for security and peace-keeping, com prised of 
sovereign states, which would always have a socialist wing and a 
capitalist wing.131
129 This question has already been briefly addressed in a paper by Stephan 
and Kiichenmeister, entitled 'Die nationale Frage in der Politik der SED am 
Ende der 80er Jahre,' (1993), from whom the author received a copy in 
advance of publication. They argue that the subject was revived due to the 
economic situation and as a response to Gorbachev's idea o f a 'common 
European home.'
130 On Gorbachev's rethink o f Soviet German policy, see Mike Dennis,
Social and Economic Modernization in Eastern Germany from Honecker to 
Kohl (London and New York, 1992), p.23.
131 Jurgen Hofmann and Gerhard Basler, 'Zwei deutsche Staaten und 
Nationen im europaischen Haus,' Einheit 44 (1989): p. 171.
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However, the one aspect of Gorbachev's approach that the 
leadership did approve of was the idea that each socialist state 
was free to determine its own brand of socialism, and that what 
was right for the Soviet Union would not necessarily be right for 
o th e rs .132 Gennardy Gerasimov called this the 'Sinatra doctrine,' 
i.e. doing it 'my way.’133 For 15 years, Honecker, an ardent 
believer in proletarian internationalism, had proclaimed that 'To 
learn from the Soviet Union, is to learn to win,' and that the Soviet 
model was the only model. But that was in the days of the 
communist old guard, with whom Honecker felt akin. Now he was 
keen to take up Gorbachev's offer of socialism a la carte, on the 
grounds that 'The development of socialism in individual states 
must be in keeping with national conditions.’134 Precisely what 
these were is unclear, but the intention was to avoid reform. As 
Kurt Hager put it: 'Just because your neighbour puts up new 
wallpaper in his flat, would you feel obliged to put up new 
wallpaper in your own flat?'135
Another problem was the impact of the charismatic Gorbachev on 
the East German population. His popularity was demonstrated 
during the 750th anniversary of Berlin, celebrated on both sides 
of the Wall in June 1987, when a large group of young people 
gathered near the Brandenburg Gate, shouting 'We want 
Gorbachev' and 'The wall must go.’136 By stressing the national 
before the international, the Party hoped to dissuade people from 
turning eastwards for hope, just as they had looked westwards 
until this point. This strategy was also perceived as a means to 
distance the state from other socialist countries, particularly 
Poland, in order to reduce the risk of unrest spreading to the GDR, 
which had worried the leadership since the beginning of the
132 27th Conference of the CPSU, March 1986, cited in Barbara von Ow, 'Der 
Vogel in Moscows Kafig,’ in Konrad L6w, ed., Beharrung und Wandel: Die 
DDR und die Reformen von Michail Gorbatschow (Berlin, 1990), p. 10.
133 The Guardian. 26 October 1989, p.8, cited in Garten Ash, In Europe's 
Name, p.4.
134 ZPA IV 2/1/685, 18 August 1988 (Honecker in conversation with Oskar 
L a fo n ta in e)
135 Neues Deutschland. 10 April 1987.
136 Zieger, Die Haltung. p.233.
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decade. Just to play down the events would not be sufficient 
because, as Honecker himself acknowledged with unusual candor: 
’All negative occurrences in socialist countries immediately enter 
the GDR via West German television. The West is not happy with 
the calm in the GDR. We must tackle the problem ideologically.’137 
Therefore, in spite of verbal adherence to the principle of socialist 
internationalism, in practice, the SED took full advantage of the 
opportunity to take a more nationalistic stance, resulting in the 
rather poorly thought out concept of 'Socialism in the colours of 
the GDR.’
The phrase had been introduced by Honecker at the seventh 
session of the Central Committee in 1988, and was often heard 
during the final year of the GDR's existence. There he admitted, 
’Developments in the socialist world are more varied than many 
people previously believed ' 138 (himself included). The concept 
was not his own invention, but borrowed from the leader of the 
French communist Party, Georges Marchais. Ironically, the SED 
had criticised him during the mid-1970s for his advocation of 
'socialism in French colours.’ Honecker was probably persuaded to 
adopt a similar idea by his personal adviser and script-writer, 
Frank-Joachim Herrmann, who in his eyes could do no wrong, but 
who failed to impress others.139 The concept was also reminiscent 
of Anton Ackermann's idea of a 'German road to socialism' dating 
back to 1946. However, whereas the latter intended to keep out 
Stalinism, the new version was more of 'a phrase to repel 
reform .... in which reality and fiction became increasingly 
b lu rred .'140
Though the motivation behind the concept is obvious, just what 
these so-called 'colours' were is rather less so. Far from being 
anything likely to arouse emotion and a specifically East German 
national consciousness, they were simply described in terms of
137 ZPA IV 2/2039/64. Report of a speech between Erich Honecker and W. 
Medwedjew, 24 August 1988.
138 ZPA IV 2/1/692.
139 Alfred Kosing certainly has a very low opinion of him. Interview with 
Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
140 Meuschel, L egitim ation , p.304.
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the tangible achievements of the state, such as 'a highly developed 
work and production culture, a working class that has matured 
over several generations, a relatively high standard of general
education, the development of science and technology  social
security, full employment, the solution of the housing problem, 
and complete equality for women,' combined with the traditions 
and experiences of the German workers' movement.141 As Kurt 
Hager rather dishonestly explained, 'When we speak of ''Socialism 
in the colours of the GDR," what we mean is that we have gone our 
own unmistakeable way, that we have adapted Marxism-Leninism 
to fit our conditions, and that here, socialism bears the hallmark of 
characteristics that conform to our traditions, preconditions, 
experiences and possibilities.'142 Responding to criticism from the 
West, one writer concluded,
When we talk about establishing socialism in the 
colours of the GDR, the intention is not to fence
ourselves off from other socialist countries, as some 
people west of the Elbe have implied, but actively to 
introduce our own unmistakable contribution for the 
greatest benefit of all in the community of socialist 
states, entirely in the sense of the unity between 
socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism .
In this way, the colour red, and the red banner of the 
working class, always was, is and remains vital and
imperative for the political identity of the G D R.143
The transparency of the notion of 'socialism in the colours of the 
GDR,' helps us to understand the reasons for the revival of interest 
in the concept of the nation. However, whether or not it was a 
good idea is debatable. The word 'colours' was somewhat
inappropriate, and could have put the idea of the German 
s c h w a r z - r o t - g o l d  into people's minds, with its all-German
connotations. While theorists on the nation believed that the 
unique characteristics of the GDR should be emphasised, including
141 Bruno Mahlow, 'Patriotismus und Intemationalismus in der Politik der 
SED,' Einheit 44 (1989): pp.548-549. The concept was the special topic for
the sixth edition of the journal that year.
142 Kurt Hager, 'Die Geschichte und das VerstMndnis unserer Zeit,' E inheit
44 (1989): p.599. Here Hager listed what he considered these 'colours' to be.
143 Mahlow, 'Patriotismus,' p.549.
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its Germanness, they remained unconvinced of the validity of this 
particular concept due to its emphasis on concrete achievements, 
or rather, alleged achievements, while neglecting the subjective 
feelings of the population.144 It was an attempt to arouse a state 
consciousness divorced from (German) nationalism. The very next 
year it became clear that even in 'the colours of the GDR,' it was 
socialism that was the problem, and soon there was no socialism 
and no GDR, and only the colours schwarz-rot-gold remained.
b> Kohl Throws Down the Gauntlet
As we have seen, during the 1980s, the National Question had 
been simmering in the background for several years. According 
to the last pleader of the GDR, Egon Krenz, what finally caused the 
pot to boil over was Honecker's official visit to the Federal 
Republic in September 1987, which was highly symbolic for both 
sides. During talks the West German side re-opened the question 
of the nation, forcing it back onto the political agenda, after 
several years during which it had lurked just beneath the surface 
due to the peace issue.145 The main reason why the Party finally 
accepted that rather than simply to ignore the issue, it would be 
better to go on the offensive, was the fact that contact with the 
Federal Republic was now not only unavoidable, but vital for the 
survival of the GDR itself.
There were two reasons for this. The first was the belief that if 
the two German states did not actively strive to prevent a nuclear 
war, they would be the victims or even the cause of it, which had 
brought them together in the form of a 'coalition of good sense’ in 
the early 1980s, as mentioned earlier. As Honecker himself 
pointed out, 'Neither can have their peace by themselves.'146 The 
high point of this coalition was a historic paper, jointly produced 
by representatives of the SED and the West German SPD, entitled 
'The Conflict between Ideologies and Common Security.' It
144 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993; interview with 
Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
145 Interview with Egon Krenz, Berlin, 15 July 1993.
146 Literally 'Keiner kann seinen Frieden allein haben.' Die Zeit. 11 
September 1987.
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aroused much interest within intellectual circles on both sides of 
the divide, and was referred to in the GDR as 'the new thinking,' 
since it questioned the notion that only socialism could guarantee 
peace. However, it sent a confused message to the masses, who 
had been led to believe that the SPD were imperialists just like 
the CDU/CSU, and because talk about 'no more wars on German 
soil’ suggested that 'German soil' still meant something. The paper 
did not mark a shift in policy on the nation, but had arisen out of 
necessity, like the 'coalition of good sense.' Even so, the fact that it 
was produced at all was quite remarkable. Unfortunately the 
'new thinking' was short-lived and although the paper was 
published in Neues Deutschland in 1987, it was then quickly and 
intentionally forgotten by the Party leadership before it could 
have very much impact beyond Party and academic circles.147
The second reason for more contact was that those in the highest 
echelons of power in the GDR knew that it was economically 
bankrupt, and that ironically, only financial assistance from the 
very state that disputed its right to exist could bail it out, and thus 
guarantee its continued existence in some form.148 This would 
inevitably lead to increased contact and co-operation between the 
two states, but there seemed to be a shortage of alternatives, 
especially at a time when the Party leadership was playing down 
its commitment to the socialist bloc.
We now know that a very select group within the ruling elite, led
by the head of 'Commercial Co-ordination,’ (K o K o ), Alexander 
Schalck-Golodkowski, had been contemplating greater economic 
reliance on the FRG and even a future confederation if it was the
only means of salvaging something of the GDR.149 This obviously
put the 'developed socialist society' in doubt, which had been the 
essential framework within which the 'socialist German nation' 
had evolved.150 But, as mentioned earlier, without socialism, 
there would be no 'socialist German nation,' and no justification
147 Meuschel, L egitim ation , p.300.
148 Alexander Schalk-Golodkowski in Die Zeit. 11 January 1991, p. 11.
149 Schalk in Die Zeit. 11 January 1991. He claims to have discussed the idea 
with West German politicians Gerhard Schiirer and Siegfried Wenzel.
150 Stephan and Ktichenmeister, 'Die nationale Frage,' pp.3-4.
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for a separate socialist German state. The theorist, Jurgen 
Hofmann now believes that this unavoidable official contact was 
the reason why the leadership hoped the masses would forget 
about the National Question in the early 1980s. The functionaries 
concerned thought it would be better suddenly to produce a new 
trump card. Any on-going ideological reflection of the question 
would make the task of explaining a dramatic change in the 
official line more complicated.151 This again highlights the fact 
that the leadership saw the concept of the nation as something 
that could just be altered to suit the political and economic 
requirements of the moment.
Official contact with Bonn had both benefits and drawbacks. On 
the one hand, it enhanced the image of the GDR as a state of equal 
status to the Federal Republic and a more important actor than 
other 'inferior' members of the socialist bloc. But on the other 
hand, in spite of the fact that the two states did not have a shared 
present, they did have a shared past, and a joint responsibility for 
the future, which inevitably revived the National Question. The 
SED had pronounced it dead many years earlier, but in reality it 
was only sleeping, and unbeknown to all, would soon reawaken.
Honecker’s visit to the Federal Republic was an odd demonstration 
of what linked the two German states and what divided them, 
with Bonn naturally stressing the former and the SED the latter. 
The SED portrayed the visit as the ultimate indication that the GDR 
was a separate sovereign state from the Federal Republic, 
demonstrated by the fact that Honecker was to receive the same 
treatment and honours as the head of any other foreign country. 
Furthermore it was to be a sign of the two states’ commitment to 
peace. Beforehand, Hermann Axen called the visit 'one of the 
strongest blows against revanchism in history.’ Apparently, the 
first blow was the foundation of the GDR in 1949, the second was 
the erection of the so-called 'protective wall' in 1961, the third 
was the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972, followed by the 
admission of the GDR into the UN. Honecker's visit would 
constitute the fourth blow. In was billed as the boldest
151 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
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demonstration of the fact that two German states now existed, 
whose relationship could only be one of peaceful coexistence.152
In his after-dinner speech in Bonn, Honecker adhered to the line 
that socialism and capitalism, and by implication, the GDR and the 
Federal Republic, were as difficult to combine as fire and 
w a te r .153 In contrast, Kohl expressed Bonn's commitment to the 
unity of the German nation, and the continued openness of the 
German Question. He referred to 'both states within Germany,' 
and stressed his hope that the division could be overcome 
peacefully. The Federal President, Richard von Weizsacker had 
welcomed Honecker 'as leader of the GDR, but also as a German 
among Germans, in the sense of a history under which he 
[Honecker], had suffered as a German.'154 The joint communique
issued by both heads of state emphasised the equality and
independence of both states and concentrated on the further 
development of 'normal, good-neighbourly relations in accordance 
with the Basic Treaty,' while at the same time acknowledging that 
there were still differences of opinion, including regarding the
National Question.155
Afterwards, the SED portrayed the visit as a great victory, and as 
Bonn's acknowledgement that the GDR was a sovereign state, just 
like any other. Much was made of the use of protocol as was 
normal practice during an official visit by a foreign head of state, 
such as the raising of the East German flag and the sound of her 
national anthem on West German territory. These symbolic acts 
were portrayed as a sign of Bonn's recognition of the GDR's 
sovereignty and equal status, and of the normal character of their 
relationship in accordance with international law. They
apparently highlighted the discrepancy between the 'all-German 
illusions' featured in the Basic Law, and the reality of the
152 ZPA J IV 2/2A/3045, (report by Axen of a discussion with the CPSU, 4 
August 1987).
153 Erich Honecker, Reden und AufsStze. 12 vols., (East Berlin, 1988), vol.
12, p.518.
154 ZPA J IV 2/2A/3054, (report to the Politburo on Honecker's official visit 
to the FRG).
155 Neues Deutschland. 7 September 1987.
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situation .156 According to the East German side, Kohl’s references 
to the ’unity of the nation' would do nothing to change this,157 and 
it was the need to secure peace, not some sort of 'national bond' 
that formed the basis for the relationship between the two 
German states.158 However, the attention paid to the continuing 
problem of the nation suggested that Honecker had been 
considerably unnerved by Kohl's references to it, especially since 
it was clear that the GDR literally could not afford to fence itself 
off from its western relation.
How much truth was there in the SED's claims regarding the visit? 
While it was true that Honecker was superficially treated like any 
other visiting head of state, many of the gestures were purely 
symbolic, and while not insignificant and considered acts of 
treason by some West German conservatives, they could not hide 
the fact that the relationship was still far from normal. 
Furthermore, it was somewhat ironic that the SED attached so 
much importance to the sovereignty of the GDR, when as a 
member of the socialist bloc, it had only very limited sovereignty, 
especially in foreign policy. Due to their common German past, 
the range of subjects discussed went far beyond those discussed 
by two states who just happened to be neighbours. It included 
undeniable matters of common interest, such as peace and 
environmental protection, but also voluntary co-operation in 
many areas, indicating both parties' willingness to increase contact 
- not just at a governmental level but also between citizens. 
Topics discussed included communications, travel arrangements, 
cultural exchanges, sporting events, Berlin, AIDS research and 
to w n -tw in n in g .159 According to the West German interpretation, 
all the agreements that resulted from the visit were a sign that 
the two states were still linked by a national bond, and were seen 
as a means to preserve it.
156 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.291.
157 ZPA J IV 2/2A/3054, (report to the Politburo on Honecker's official visit 
to the FRG).
158 Hofmann, Ein neues Deutschland, p.292.
159 ZPA J IV 2/2A/3054.
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While it goes without saying that economic motives lay behind 
Honecker's willingness to co-operate, the opportunity only existed 
due to the national connection, regardless of whether or not the 
SED acknowledged it as such. Furthermore, his nostalgic visit to 
his birthplace in the Saarland totally discredited the claim that
nothing linked the two German states.160 There he must have 
been aware that the relationship between the two states was
special, in spite of all the rhetoric to the contrary. Therefore, for
the first time, the leadership appeared to recognise that it was 
pointless, even destructive, to deny the national bond, when it 
could be put to good use to benefit the GDR. This realisation 
finally ended the Party’s policy of silence on the nation and gave 
the green light for renewed discussion on the subject.
c) Domestic Concerns
The intention of Honecker's official visit to the Federal Republic 
was not just to prove the legitimacy of the GDR to the West 
German government and on the international stage. It was also an 
opportunity to demonstrate to the East Germans that their state 
was just as legitimate as the Federal Republic, and that it was 
making an active contribution towards peace. It was hoped that 
this would strengthen their pride in the GDR as an alternative to 
ethnic German consciousness. This was urgently required to 
counteract the effects of potentially threatening events now 
occurring on both sides of the state, and to discourage domestic 
unrest, which had become organised in the form of the unofficial 
peace movement, and was further encouraged by Gorbachev's 
more flexible attitude.
But there was also another reason why the regime needed to win 
the allegiance of the population, namely the fact that the economic 
basis on which the 'socialist German nation' was founded was in
160 For western descriptions of the visit see Anne McElvoy, The Saddled Cow. 
Ezst Germany's Life and Legacy (London and Boston, 1992), pp. 87-88; D ie  
Zcit. 11 September 1987, pp. 1,3; Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History 
of West Germany. 2 vols., (Oxford and Cambridge M.A., 1989), vol.2:
Democracy and its Discontents 1963-88, pp. 489-490.
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c r is is .161 Patriotism became all the more vital for the economic 
strengthening of the GDR, but the economic situation was so 
serious that the existing Leistungsbewujitsein  or pride in economic 
achievements could be shattered at any time. With two of the 
GDR’s most essential characteristics, namely her Germanness and 
her commitment to the socialist bloc, already risky as means to 
enhance GDR-consciousness, now even the economic and social 
system could no longer be relied on as a source of national pride. 
As a result, a rapid rethink of the concept of the nation in the GDR 
was unavoidable.
d) Theorists Hear the Call
In February 1988 an internal working party, chaired by Hermann 
Axen, was set up to address ’the question of the nation,' which had 
not been officially debated since the publication of the Party 
Programme in 1976. All those theorists who had previously been 
involved with the topic were literally called upon to participate, 
whether they liked it or not, though most were willing, viewing it 
as an opportunity to reactivate discussion on the subject after 
their futile attempts at the beginning of the decade. The 15 
members included Alfred Kosing, Walter Schmidt, and Jurgen 
H ofm ann, o ther social sc ien tis ts  and h is to rian s, and 
representatives from the Department of Sciences and Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.162
Honecker sanctioned the formation of the working party, which in 
itself showed that the subject needed to be taken seriously, for 
reasons already explained. However, exactly how interested he 
really was is debatable. Some commentators claim he took a 
personal interest in the group's activities,163 but insiders say the 
project was very much Axen's own initiative, and that Honecker 
may have had an ulterior motive for giving the group his blessing. 
Axen's personal adviser, Manfred Uschner, claims that his boss, 
who was officially responsible for foreign affairs, had been
161 For details, see Dennis, Social and Economic Modernization, pp.27-50.
162 ZPA IV 2/2035/16 (Biiro Axen)
163 Stephan and Kiichenmeister, 'Die nationale Frage,' p.3.
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'shunted into a siding' by Honecker, who had more or less taken 
over foreign policy. Therefore he needed to carve out a new niche 
for himself, and offered to tackle the problem of the nation in the 
light of Bonn’s challenge. This offer was accepted by Honecker, 
not least because it would give Axen something to do and thus 
serve as a consolation prize for excluding him from foreign 
a ffa irs .164 The topic provided an ideal opportunity for Axen to re­
assert himself, not only because it had been in urgent need of 
attention since Honecker's official visit to the Federal Republic, but 
also because his interest in the subject dated back to the early 
1970s.
However, there is no evidence that any other members of the 
Politburo were interested in the subject. Though Axen sent them 
copies of the paper produced by the working party, according to 
Krenz, it was never formally discussed, because it was still a 
sensitive issue and the others did not want to be bothered with 
i t ,165 presumably believing that if the problem was not discussed, 
it would cease to exist. A special double edition of the Party 
journal Einhe i t  to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the 
foundation of the GDR in October 1989 included articles by many 
leading functionaries, but only Hermann Axen even mentioned the 
word nation.166 Others, including Honecker, chose to emphasise 
the concept of 'Socialism in the colours of the GDR,' which was a 
poor substitute for a real national identity, especially since the 
short-comings of socialism were becoming apparent not only in 
the case of the GDR, but in the Eastern bloc as a whole.
The academic members of the working party had several reasons 
not to expect it to achieve very much.167 Though they had been 
called upon for their expertise, this was in order that it could be 
put to good use to serve the Party. While Axen was apparently
164 Interview with Manfred Uschner, Berlin, 23 July 1993; Manfred 
Uschner, Die Zweite Etage. Funktionsweise eines Machtapparates (Berlin,
1993), p.60.
166 Interview with Egon Krenz, Berlin, 15 July 1993.
166 Hermann Axen, 'Die DDR - fest verankert in der neuen sozialistischen 
Welt,' Einheit 44 (1989): pp.814-815.
167 Alfred Kosing was under no illusions about what could be achieved. 
Interview with Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993.
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less dogmatic than other members of the leading elite, he too was 
totally out of touch with real life in the GDR, and was hardly 
young and dynamic. Ideologically, he still basically adhered to the 
class-based definition of the nation, dating back to the Eighth 
Party Conference in 1971, which he had helped to formulate. 
Furthermore, he was afraid to rock the boat by confronting 
Honecker with unfavourable findings or appearing to criticise 
those closest to him due to an inferiority complex, and his reliance 
on elite privilege for health provision for his ailing wife.168 While 
it was possible to have a reasonably frank discussion within the 
working party, for the reasons mentioned above, the reports that 
were passed on to the Central Committee were inevitably 
m odified .169
During its first meeting in February 1988, the working party 
recognised that the SED's increased contact with Bonn during the 
early 1980s had led to uncertainties regarding the state of the 
nation, and made people question the validity of the line
expressed in Party documents. This was not only true of the
masses, but also of Party functionaries and propagandists.170
Therefore plans were made for a new offensive with two main 
components - an increase in academic work on the subject at 
Party institutions, and more effective propaganda to enhance 
people’s 'national self-perception' (nationales Selbstverstandnis)  
as citizens of the GDR.171
To achieve the former, it was proposed to establish a new field of 
research into the nation at the Academy for Social Sciences, and to 
ensure the topic was addressed in the Department of Sciences’ 
'Central Research Plan for the Social Sciences' for 1991-1995. 
Subjects identified as in need of attention included the 
relationship between the 'socialist German nation' and the
'capitalist German nation, (an unusual admission that there was a 
problem ), and their historic 'comm unity of responsibility '
168 Interview with Manfred Uschner, Berlin, 23 July 1993.
169 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
HO ZPA i v  2/2035/16. This meeting took place on 3 February 1988.
171 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
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(V e ra n tw o r tu n g sg e m e in sc h a f t ) ,  and also the dialectic between 
national and European elements in the light of the concept of the 
'common European home.' Clearly the SED was on the defensive 
and being forced to react to developments in its relationship with 
the Federal Republic on the one hand, and in Moscow's foreign 
policy on the other.
To improve the population's identification with the socialist 
German nation, an extensive list of journal and newspaper articles 
was planned, particularly to coincide with the 40th anniversary of 
the GDR in October 1989. Responsibility for the production of 
these articles was shared by institutions such as the Academy for 
Social Sciences and the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, and the 
Propaganda Department. The intention was to ensure that the 
population not only understood that the unitary German nation no 
longer existed, but also who was responsible for the division, (i.e. 
'West German imperialists'). It was hoped that this would dispel 
illusions that the two German states were growing closer together 
again, which, it was admitted, had arisen as a result of the 
increased contact between their leaders. Furtherm ore, the 
question of the nation was to be included in foundation courses in 
Marxism-Leninism and addressed in the forthcoming ideological 
indoctrination programme or Parteilehrjahr  in preparation for the 
next Party Conference.172
A detailed paper was produced by academic members of the 
working party in the spring of 1988, entitled 'Questions regarding 
the Development of the Socialist Nation in the GDR and the Debate 
with Contemporary Nationalism in the FRG .'173 The precise 
purpose of the paper is unclear. According to Jurgen Hofmann, 
who was the group's 'academic secretary,' there were several 
points that the authors particularly wanted to get across: the 
importance of national consciousness, the significance of all- 
German elements for the 'socialist German nation,' the fact that 
the development of a nation was a long process, and finally that
172 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
173 'Studie: Fragen der Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nation in der DDR 
und der Auseinandersetzung mit dem gegenwSrtigen Nationalismus in der 
BRD,’ (AfG/IfGA, February 1988). ZPA IV 2/2035/16
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the issue was far too complex to be dealt with in a couple of 
sentences, as the Party leadership had tried to do in the early 
1970s. However, these points needed to be phrased carefully so 
as not to appear too critical.174 Theorists also wanted to find out 
whether or not a national consciousness unique to the GDR had 
evolved. With thousands of citizens applying for permission to 
leave for the Federal Republic, the evidence suggested otherwise.
In spite of constraints, the actual paper was relatively realistic 
and the theorists managed to include most of their main points. 
Unlike published work, which described the nation that the Party 
desired, as though it was already a reality, it highlighted several 
problem areas: firstly, the need to formulate better arguments to 
ensure the masses understood the concept of the ’socialist German 
nation’; and secondly, the need to counteract West German claims 
regarding the unity of the nation and 'the openness of the German 
question.' Proletarian internationalism was mentioned, although 
for the first time, the point was made that while socialist nations 
were growing closer together economically, it did not follow that 
national distinctions would merge or that national structures 
would dissolve.175
The paper was sent to Honecker by Axen with a letter stating that 
it was time to expand on the line expressed at the Eighth Party 
Conference in 1971 and in the Party Programme, because a large 
proportion of the population was too young to remember the SED's 
alleged struggle on behalf of the entire German people for a 
'united, peace-loving, democratic Germany' and a unitary socialist 
German nation. It was also necessary to ensure that the history of 
the GDR and the SED was portrayed in a professional and coherent 
manner. Axen added that the working-party sought the First 
Secretary's approval and that it would adhere to the line he had 
taken in his recent after-dinner speech in Bonn.176
174 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
175 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
176 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
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The second, and, as it turned out, last meeting of the working 
party in September 1988, concentrated on the state of 'socialist 
national consciousness' in the GDR, and how theoretical work on 
the subject of the nation could be encouraged. At last empirical 
research was planned in order to identify the most common 
misunderstandings. Obviously this was not just out of interest, 
but also to make it easier to devise effective propaganda to 
correct them. The intention was to collect data on popular opinion 
by examining letters to the press and applications by those 
wishing to leave the country, and by conducting a proper opinion 
poll. In this way they hoped to establish which factors furthered 
the development of a national consciousness unique to the GDR 
and which hindered it. Factors to be taken into consideration 
included German history and culture, family ties, ethnic and 
linguistic factors, the foreign policy of the GDR, and last but not 
least, the effects of Bonn's claim that the unitary German nation 
still existed. They also intended to establish whether the 
population understood how the 'revolutionary transformation' of 
the GDR had radically changed the foundations of the nation, 
whether they identified with the socialist system and were proud 
of its achievements, and whether they were prepared to defend it 
m ilitarily if necessary. Research in the early 1980s had 
apparently shown that the population had failed to grasp the SED's 
explanation as to why Germany was divided. A better 
understanding of the Party's earlier efforts to preserve the unity 
of the nation (which had been played down since the 1970s), was 
also felt to be necessary to justify her present stance on the 
National Question.177
Unfortunately, it took a long time for any proposal to be put into 
practice in the GDR, since nothing could be done without official 
permission at various levels. Furthermore the members of the 
working party could not have known just how little time they, and 
the state itself, had left. A questionnaire on national 
consciousness was drawn up and later reworked by both Axen 
and the Department of Sciences before the latter approved it in 
April 1989. Then it had to be registered with the Central
177 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
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Authority for Statistics, which only gave the green light for it in 
September 1989,178 by which time it was already the beginning of 
the end for the GDR, and events answered many of the questions 
before they could even be asked. This is indeed a shame, since 
many of the questions invited answers that the leadership usually 
chose not to hear. The results were to be confidential and it was 
Axen and Kurt Hager who would decide what was to be done with 
them. Their response when confronted with the truth would have 
been interesting.
The questions concerned the respondents' levels of agreement 
with the official concept of the 'socialist German nation' and the 
factors which determine nations in general, and with the SED's 
account of how Germany came to be divided. They were also to 
be asked whether they believed the German Question was still 
open, and for their opinion of the Federal Republic and its people, 
and of the GDR’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Other 
questions included what made them proud to be citizens of the 
GDR, what they understood by national culture and 'Heimat,' what 
aspects of history most interested them, and even their views on 
the considerable efforts made to preserve Sorb culture.179 
Although the poll was never conducted, the fact that it was 
permitted at all can be interpreted as an indication that the 
leadership had finally recognised the seriousness of the threat 
posed by the revival of the National Question to the legitimacy of 
the GDR. The fact that such questions needed to be asked showed 
how insecure the leadership still was regarding the level of 
popular acceptance of the 'socialist German nation.'
The working party also agreed that the problem of the nation 
required more theoretical attention. The best way to guarantee 
this was to set up an officially recognised committee at a Party 
institution, hence it was proposed that an 'Interdisciplinary 
Academic Committee for Research on the Nation' at the Academy 
for Social Sciences, and a new field of research into the 'socialist 
German nation’ at the Institute for the History of the Workers'
178 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
179 ZPA IV 2/2035/16
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Movement (IfGA) should be established. The Secretariat of the 
Central Committee agreed in December 1988, on the grounds that 
T he needs of social development and ideological work call for the 
continuous, long-term formulation and propagation of the creative 
position of the SED regarding the development of the socialist 
nation in the GDR,’ though no extra funding was to be made 
available. This was apparently all the more pressing due to the 
recent increase in international interest in the ’so-called German 
question' and its role in the long-term strategies of the West 
German government.180
Due to its unusual interdisciplinary nature, the new academic 
committee was greeted with enthusiasm by those who had been 
trying for years to keep the nation alive as a subject for research 
and debate. Along with several familiar names, such as the chair, 
Jurgen Hofmann, it included experts on the Sorb community and 
K o re a .181 The first meeting in May 1989 was also attended by 
Hermann Axen and Otto Reinhold, the director of the Academy of 
Sciences - an indication of its importance. Hofmann claims that 
the committee was far more academic than the working party, 
which had been formed with the specific purpose of producing 
more effective propaganda.182 However, while the discussion may 
have been freer and more intellectual, the possibilities should not 
be overestimated. The usual constraints on Party institutions 
applied, and the leadership had not permitted the committee 
simply out of kindness. In retrospect one almost feels sorry for 
those who had struggled for so long to establish such a body, and 
then when they finally achieved their goal, it was too late. By the 
summer of 1989, there was little point in theorising about how 
long the consolidation of the 'socialist German nation’ would take 
when the opposite process was happening on the streets of Leipzig 
and East Berlin.
A flood of publications on the subject of the nation followed in 
1988 and 1989, in accordance with the plan drawn up by the
180 ZPA J IV 2/3A/4668
181 For a full list of participants see Stephan and Kiichenmeister, 'Die 
nationale Frage,' footnote 36.
182 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin, 1 March 1993.
2 7 7
working party. The fact that both specialist journals and the 
popular press were targeted highlighted the intention of reaching 
as many sections of the population as possible. Most of the 
articles were written by members of the interdisciplinary 
committee and/or the working party. Even the veteran theorist, 
Alfred Kosing, was called upon to address the subject for the first 
time since the beginning of the decade in a lengthy piece written 
in the Spring of 1988. But by the time it was published in the 
Autumn of 1989,183 it had already become embarrassingly 
irrelevant due to events on the streets and state borders. Kosing 
argued that just because people were critical of the GDR, they did 
not necessarily want to abolish it all together. Instead they were 
demonstrating that they were not indifferent to the state, and 
may even have become quite attached to it. Likewise, he argued, 
their criticism was not necessarily a rejection of the existence of a 
separate 'socialist German nation.'184 But even if it had not been 
their original intention, they soon began to do just that.
The writers still could not contradict the position on the socialist 
German nation contained in the Party Programm e, which 
remained official policy. Even so, the material produced was more 
realistic in tone, and drew on the ideas and problems that had 
been outlined in the paper produced for the working party. 
Though the Marxist-Leninist theory that nations were primarily 
determined by social factors was still maintained, this view was 
somewhat modified, even contradicted by increased emphasis on 
non-Marxist aspects of nations. Consequently it was argued that 
the establishment of two separate states with incompatible social 
orders had led to the development of two completely separate 
n a tio n s ,185 and that increased contact between them was not an 
indication that the German Question was still open,186 but merely
183 Alfred Kosing, 'Sozialistische Gesellschaft und Sozialistishe Nation in 
der DDR,’ Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 37 (1989): pp.913-924. He also 
produced several populist pieces for Neues Deutschland.
184 Interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 3 March 1993; interview with 
Walter Schmidt, Berlin, 3 June 1993.
185 Jurgen Hofmann, 'Zur Entwicklung der sozialistischen deutschen 
Nation in der DDR,' Einheit 43 (1988): p.738.
186 See for example Klaus-Uwe Koch, 'Warum es keine offene deutsche 
Frage gibt,' Einheit 44 (1989): p.274; Otto Reinhold, 'Zur
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a device to secure peace.187 Considerable attention was also paid 
to subjective factors such as national consciousness and 
id e n tity ,188 and the fact that the GDR was a product of German 
history in its entirety.189 In addition to this, more was made of 
the SED's earlier attempts to preserve the unity of the nation for 
as long as this remained a realistic goal, and as usual, its inability 
to do so was entirely blamed on ’West German imperialism.'190
One writer pointed out that the SED's 'clear position on the nation' 
at the Eighth Party Conference in 1971 had helped to achieve the 
treaties and subsequent international recognition of the GDR,191 
(which had been the intention of course). In private, however, all 
the leading theorists thought Honecker's sudden declaration of a 
purely socialist nation in the GDR had been absurd, and they now 
stressed that the development of a nation was a lengthy process. 
This process of consolidation could apparently be accelerated not 
just by the strengthening of a 'socialist German national 
consciousness' in the GDR, but also by 'intensifying and mastering 
the sc ien tific-techn ica l rev o lu tio n ,'192 which was evidently 
floundering. However, just how long this process was supposed to 
take, and how one would know when it was complete was not 
explained.
Undoubtably the most significant publication resulting from the 
renewal of interest in the nation was Jurgen Hofmann's Ein neues
Gesellschaftskonzeption der SED,' Einheit 44 (1989): p.486; Hager, ’Die 
Geschichte,' pp. 601-602.
187 Basler and Hofmann, 'Zwei deutsche Staaten, p. 175.
188 Hofmann, 'Zur Entwicklung,' p.741; Kosing, 'Sozialistische Gesellschaft,' 
p.920.
189 Kosing 'Sozialistische Gesellschaft,' p.913. The excitement over the 
reassessment of German history had died down by this stage, and the claim 
that the GDR was rooted in German history in its entirety was 
commonplace. However, historians continued to discuss the idea among 
themselves, which resulted in the publication o f Helmut Meier and Walter 
Schmidt, eds., Erbe und Tradition in der DDR. Die Diskussion der Historiker. 
(East Berlin, 1988).
190 Hofmann, 'Zur Entwicklung,' pp.736, 738; Jurgen Hofmann, 'Solange es 
eine Chance fur die Einheit gab,' Berliner Zeitung. 24 June 1989; Kosing, 
'Sozialistische Gesellschaft,' p.914; Hager, 'Die Geschichte,' p.601.
191 Hofmann, 'Zur Entwicklung,' p.739.
192 Hofmann, p.741.
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Deutschland soli es sein, the first major work on the subject since 
Kosing’s famous 'The Nation in History and in the Present' dating 
back to 1976. Mass-produced as a paperback, with a coloured 
cover which was very modem-looking by GDR standards, the book 
served the requirements of the Party before those of serious 
scholarship. Hofmann himself had difficulty getting permission 
for the title because the rector of the Academy for Social Sciences 
thought it might cause too much trouble, but the latter was 
overruled by Hermann Axen who allowed it.193
In 1988, the revised fifth edition of the official Kleines Politisches 
W orterbuch  appeared. As before, the entry for 'nation' appears 
to have been penned by Alfred Kosing, though since the first 
edition in 1967, it had grown from four columns to eight. The 
basic line was still that of the Party Programme, with considerable 
detail on the relative insignificance of nationality in the 
development of nations, compared with social factors. According 
to the writer, 'The unitary German nation is a thing of the past. 
The socialist German nation and the capitalist German nation have 
a common history in the past, it is true, but no common present or 
future.' However, this was all somewhat contradicted by the lines, 
'The question of whether at a later date, when the working class 
of the FRG, together with all working people, has won the socialist 
transformation of society and the capitalist nation, a unitary 
socialist German nation can arise, remains unanswerable at 
p re s e n t. '194 This appears to indicate that although the German 
Question was officially settled, the dream of a united socialist 
Germany had not entirely faded away, however unlikely it was to 
m aterialise.
One further indication that the short-comings of the 'socialist 
German nation' were a matter of concern for the leadership was 
that the subject was on the agenda for the Twelfth Party 
Conference, scheduled for May 1990. This was highly significant 
because apart from featuring in the Party Programme, the
193 Interview with Jurgen Hofmann, Berlin 11 May 1993.
194 Entry for 'Nation,' Kleines Politisches WQrterbuch vol. 8, (East Berlin, 
1988), pp.648-652.
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problem had not been directly addressed at a Party Conference 
since 1971. M embers of Axen's working party were 
commissioned by the Department of Sciences to produce analytical 
material in preparation for it. However, individuals such as 
Hofmann and Meier were aware that radical new ideas could not 
be included if the papers were ever to end up in the hands of 
those with influence.195 Papers were to address the development 
of the 'socialist German nation,’ 'national peculiarities' unique to 
the 'developed socialist society' in the GDR, and the preservation 
of heritage and tradition. The usual arguments of the period were 
repeated, together with the need to sustain the attack on Bonn's 
'all-German' doctrines, and to conduct more empirical research on 
the subject.196
From this we can conclude that for the first time in nearly 20
years, the nation would almost certainly have been addressed at
the next Party Conference, which is further evidence of the 
leadership's concern about the issue, following Honecker's visit to 
Bonn in 1987. This assumption is supported by the amount of 
attention paid to the subject during the 1989/90 P arte i lehr jahr ,  
although at this stage, there had been no suggestion to radically 
alter the official line. Instead, propagandists were instructed to
emphasise the stance on the nation expressed in the Party 
Programme and at the Eighth Party Conference, although in
reality , the former had superseded the latter due to the 
acceptance that the socialist nation in the GDR was German. The 
undeniable existence of two German states and nations and their 
significance for the balance of power in Europe was also to be 
stressed .197 Official contacts with the Federal Republic were to be 
portrayed as purely in the interest of peace, as opposed to being a 
result of any special relationship, and people were to be reminded 
of the fact that that socialism and capitalism were as difficult to
195 Interview with Helmut Meier, Berlin, 15 March 1993.
196 ZPA IV 2/2035/4
197 'Guidelines for Propagandists,1 Parteilehrjahr der SED, Studien- und 
Seminarhinweise zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der DDR unter Fuhrung 
der SED (East Berlin, 1989), p.102.
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combine as fire and water, as Honecker had stated in Bonn in 
1987 .198
4) CONCLUSION
While a small group of functionaries and theorists contemplated 
how to improve the concept of the nation in order to make it more 
effective as a device to legitimise the GDR, other delegitimising 
factors continued to gnaw away at the foundations of the state, in 
particular, the deepening economic crisis, which was far worse 
than even many top functionaries realised, and the brutal 
methods employed by the regime to suppress dissent. Whereas 
economic shortcomings and the lack of democracy were nothing 
new, during the 1980s, the SED faced two additional problems in
Q.
its attmpts to legitimise the state and its system. Firstly, since 
\
Gorbachev had become installed in the Kremlin, even Soviet
citizens seemed to be enjoying a period of relative openness, at
least compared with the 'socialism in the colours of the GDR' 
endured by East Germans. Secondly, there had been a marked 
increase in interest in the shared past and the common, yet 
uncertain future of the two German states, both at an official and 
a popular level.
Although the SED had denied that the German Question was still 
open, for economic reasons, it was forced take advantage of Bonn's 
continued belief in the German national bond in the form of credit 
from the Federal Republic, which simultaneously sustained and 
undermined the GDR. The reinterpretation of history also showed 
how the Party was willing to make U-turns, and to take advantage 
of the German roots of the state when there was more to be
gained than was the case by denying them.
The concept of the 'socialist German nation,' originally conceived 
by theorists, had proved to be the most acceptable option, 
certainly more so than the purely 'socialist nation’ of the early 
1970s, even if it was rather a contradiction in terms. It was the 
ultimate example of how theorists had to produce work in
198 Studicn- und Seminarhinweise. pp.97-99.
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accordance with the current needs of the Party, but also how the 
latter relied on them to solve its ideological dilemmas.
But before conclusions about the state and future of the ’socialist 
German nation' could be drawn, the ailing GDR was suddenly 
released into the international community by its guardian, and 
left at the mercy of highly contagious capitalism, and what was 
more, capitalism with a German face. And without socialism, all 
that would apparently remain of the 'socialist German nation' 
would be a German nation, without a justification for a state of its 
own. 1989 proved that the SED had attempted to legitimise the 
GDR by manipulating the very element which continued to 
undermine it, namely the nation.
283
CHAPTER 6; CONCLUSION
In the course of this thesis it has been shown that the concept of 
the nation advocated by the ruling communist party in the GDR, 
the SED, underwent several major transformations over the years, 
hence the Party leadership could justifiably be accused of 
inconsistency. However, what did remain constant was the 
underlying motivation behind official policy regarding the nation, 
namely the need to counteract the negative effects on the 
legitimacy of the GDR which arose from the lack of democracy and 
freedom , economic shortcom ings, and overt sovietisation. 
Consequently, pragm atic or opportunist considerations took 
precedence over widely held theories concerning nations, even 
over the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism, and most 
noticeably, over the feelings of the population. While the Party 
leadership always determined the basic N a t i o n s k o n z e p t , the 
details were then filled in by theorists, including social scientists, 
historians and philosophers. This was no easy task due to 
dramatic changes in the Party line, due to the need to conform to 
Marxist-Leninist principles (or at least to appear to do so), and 
due to the uniqueness of the German situation.
However, because the state was engaged in 'an unusual national 
com petition ,'1 using nationalism to legitimise the GDR was a risky 
strategy. If it failed, it could have completely the opposite effect 
and serve to reinforce the German national bond. In retrospect, it 
appears that rightly or wrongly, the population continued to 
believe that one German nation did still exist, and that its best 
political representative was not the socialist GDR, but the Federal 
Republic. While it would be naive to claim that this belief was the 
primary cause of the collapse of the GDR, (a subject we shall 
return to later), unlike other Eastern Bloc states, such as Poland 
and Hungary, it ensured that the state itself could no longer exist, 
following the collapse of communism.
1 Ernst Plock, East German-West German Relations and the Fall o f the GDR 
(Boulder, Colorado, 1993), p. 127.
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n  THE FOUR PHASES OF THE OFFICIAL LINE
As we have seen, the SED's attempts to use various concepts of the 
nation and national sentim ent to legitim ise an otherwise 
illegitimate state can be divided into four phases. The first begins 
with the transformation of the Soviet Occupied Zone into the GDR 
in 1949. The GDR was described by the ruling party as the one 
true state of the German people, since power was (in theory) in 
the hands of the working class, and was somewhat idealistically 
portrayed as the basis or model for a future united socialist 
Germany. So soon after the war, the continued existence of the 
German nation was not yet in doubt, and during this period, the 
party proclaimed itself to be the defender of the unity of the 
German nation, and accused 'Western imperialists' of trying to 
destroy it, in order to support the assertion that the GDR was the 
only legitim ate representative of the entire German nation. 
However, the Federal Republic was also making a similar claim, 
with several obvious advantages, such as western economic aid 
and a democratic political system.
By the beginning of the 1960s, it was clear that the SED had 
overestimated the appeal of the GDR - not just to the citizens of 
the other German state, but also to its own population, and in spite 
of the leadership’s all-German words, its deeds, in particular the 
building of the Berlin Wall, appeared to cement the division 
between the two German states. Consequently, the SED needed an 
argument to prove that socialism and national unity were 
compatible. The result, originally devised not by the Party 
leadership, but by a leading theorist, Professor Alfred Kosing, was 
that the nation was at two different stages of development in the 
two German states - united in the GDR, but class-divided in the 
Federal Republic. Furthermore, in spite of the political division, it 
was claimed that the national bond was preserved by the unity of 
the German working class in both German states, who together 
constituted the nation. Using this argument, the SED could still 
portray itself as a national party with national, i.e. all-German 
objectives, and that the GDR was the model for a unified socialist
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German state, though ’national' was used to mean 'of the entire 
German working class.'
By the late 1960s, it had become increasingly obvious that the 
SED's vision of a united socialist Germany was unlikely to be 
realised, hence a reconsideration of what could realistically be 
achieved became necessary. During the second identifiable 
period, from 1967 until 1970, a contradictory dual policy evolved, 
consisting of continued official adherence to the notion of a 
unitary German nation on the one hand, and an escalation of the 
campaign for the recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state on 
the other, manifested by strict Abgr en zu ng  or 'fencing o ff from 
the Federal Republic. In fact, within the Politburo itself, two 
conflicting views on the national question were emerging, with 
several members advocating a more 'GDR-centric line,’ which 
emphasised the independent development of the GDR as 'our 
socialist fatherland,' as opposed to the traditional all-German 
view. This raised doubts concerning the unity of the German 
nation. However, with the ageing Ulbricht still at the helm, the 
GDR remained the 'socialist state of the German nation,' as 
enshrined in the new constitution of 1968, and he continued to 
hope that the working class in the two German states would 
reunite what 'imperialism' had apparently torn apart.
Obviously this professed belief in the unity of the German nation 
and the inevitability of reunification undermined the GDR's claim 
to be an independent sovereign state, and it became clear that a 
choice would soon have to made between reunification and 
recognition. The final catalyst for change was Chancellor Willy 
Brandt's new approach to relations with the GDR, based on the 
notion that there were 'two states of one nation,' that nation being 
sustained by a 'feeling of belonging together' shared by the 
populations of both German states. Because Brandt would not 
grant full recognition of the GDR as a foreign country for this 
reason, it became apparent that the SED would have to prove his 
'two states of one nation' idea wrong, if they were to achieve their 
primary objective of recognition of the sovereignty and legitimacy 
of the GDR. The fact that both Brandt and his ideas were so
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warm ly received by the East German population made 
clarification of the SED’s position regarding the state of the nation 
a matter of urgency.
The most dramatic period in the history of the official concept of
the nation runs from 1970 until 1974. At the Eighth Party
Conference in 1971, the new General Secretary of the SED, Erich
Honecker, declared that a social ist  nation was developing in the 
GDR and that the national question had been decided by ’history.' 
The reasons behind this total reversal of a policy officially held for 
20 years were complex. In fact, contrary to popular belief, the
turning point had occurred earlier, and it was actually Ulbricht 
who had first denied the unity of the German nation. That this so 
obviously contradicted his previous position suggests that Ulbricht 
was merely being pragmatic and trying to discredit Brandt's 
argument not only to support the SED’s primary political objective 
of international recognition of the GDR, but also to reassert his 
own position. But for him it was too late, and we now know that 
Ulbricht’s stance on the national question was the main reason 
why he was replaced in 1971.
By claiming that the population of the GDR now constituted a 
nation in itself, Honecker intended to reinforce the claim that it 
was a permanent, independent sovereign state. Furthermore, the 
'GDR-nation' was merely described as socialist and no longer 
German, which was reflected in the revised constitution of 1974. 
This was clearly a desperate attempt to prove that the GDR was a 
complete and legitimate entity in its own right, following the SED's 
failure to defeat the Federal Republic's rival claim to be the sole 
legitimate German state and to bring about reunification as a 
socialist Germany. However, the idea of a socialist nation in the 
GDR was an artificial concept, devised for political purposes, with 
no theoretical basis and no consideration of the subjective feelings 
of the population.
However, the Party soon realised that the question could not be 
solved in a few sentences, and that a more detailed explanation of 
the concept would be required, if it were to be comprehensible
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and credible to the population. Consequently, theorists and even 
some leading functionaries devised complex arguments which 
aimed to prove that nations were determined by class, and a 
major propaganda campaign was waged to get the message across 
to the population via public meetings and official publications. 
Carefully selected quotes from classic works of Marxism-Leninism 
were adapted to fit the SED’s arguments and the East German 
situation. Awkward characteristics shared with the population of 
the Federal Republic, such as language, culture and traditions, 
were defined as ethnic factors, which were apparently of 
secondary importance, and therefore not decisive in the formation 
of nations.
By clearing up the problems arising from the earlier contradictory 
policy of adherence to the unity of the German nation, while 
simultaneously claiming that the GDR was a legitimate sovereign 
state in its own right, the SED was now effectively undermining 
the legitimacy of the GDR in another way, namely by denying its 
roots and appearing to deny people their national identity. This 
caused much confusion among the population and provoked 
ridicule in the West.
A way out of this dilemma was provided by theorists, who first 
made the distinction between nation, nationality and citizenship in 
1975, marking the beginning of the fourth and final period, which 
ended with the demise of the state. They argued that according to 
class-based criteria, a socialist nation did indeed exist in the GDR, 
but this did not alter the fact that the majority of the population 
were of German nationality. Thus while the population were 
citizens of the GDR and therefore members of the socialist nation, 
their nationality remained German or occasionally Sorb. As a 
result, ethnic factors shared with West Germans could be classed 
as aspects of nationality, and therefore of secondary importance to 
the nation, which was determined by class. Honecker himself 
accepted this distinction and from 1976, the phrase 'socialist 
G e r m a n  nation in the GDR' became official. This was a classic 
example of the leadership's inability to formulate policy on the 
nation effectively without the assistance of theorists, although due
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to the constraints of the system, the latter could not actually 
contradict the basic Party line.
Following the SED's acceptance of the distinction between nation, 
nationality and citizenship, the subject disappeared from the 
political agenda. The Party gave up its paranoid fear of all things 
German, which led to a major reassessment of German history and 
a re-evaluation of the GDR's traditional roots. Theorists believed 
that due to the state's volatile position and the unstoppable flow 
of West German influence, it would be foolish to let the issue drop, 
but their concerns fell on deaf ears.
In 1987, the leadership suddenly renewed its interest in the 
nation in response to external events, which proved that the 
national question had not been resolved after all. Since the early 
1980s, the issue had been quietly simmering due to the nuclear
debate, which had highlighted the unique and dangerous position 
common to both German states, their shared fate in the event of a 
nuclear conflict, and their subsequent responsibility to preserve
peace. However, the event which finally brought the issue to the
boil was Honecker's official visit to the Federal Republic in 1987. 
In addition, the leadership's desire to distance itself from 
Gorbachev led to the reassertion of the independence, and even 
the Germanness of the GDR. The SED suddenly called on theorists 
who had previously worked on the subject to take a fresh look at 
the 'socialist German nation' and national consciousness in the 
GDR.
However, by this stage, it was too late. The SED had failed to 
recognise that the key to successful nation-building was
democracy and prosperity. Had they been able to provide these 
supports, then maybe a more viable 'GDR-nation' could have 
developed over a long period of time, but it was only the separate 
economic and political system that had justified the existence of a 
second German state in the first place, and the Cold War that had 
maintained it, as its rapid demise from November 1989 appears to 
indicate.
289
2) THE PARADOXES OF OFFICIAL NATIONALISM IN THE GDR
It could be argued that the SED attempted to legitimise the East 
German state and its system by utilising the very factor that was 
most likely to raise questions about its right to exist, namely the 
nation and national consciousness. This immediately raises two 
important points. Firstly, although many states struggle to gain 
international recognition, few have to go to such lengths to gain 
the allegiance of their own population - indeed, few have to 
literally fence them in, in order to prevent mass defection. In 
particular, the SED’s desperate efforts to create a separate nation 
in the GDR from 1970 indicate that the leadership knew that the 
GDR lacked legitimacy - after all, while it is common for 
governments to encourage nationalism to gain support for costly, 
often controversial undertakings, such as wars, there is a big 
difference between stirring up the latent nationalism felt by the 
members of an established nation, and attempting to prove the 
existence of a nation which even its alleged members dispute. 
Furthermore, by its very nature, nationalism should be a popular 
movement, from the bottom up, as opposed to something imposed 
from above like any other government policy, or at least a 
combination of the two. However, as we have seen, the GDR was 
in a particularly vulnerable position, hence the SED could not draw 
on the usual sources of legitimacy.
Originally doubts regarding her legitimacy stemmed from the way 
in which the state and its political system came into being, in 
particular, the absence of democratic elections and the role of the 
Soviet Union. For similar reasons, other regimes in the Communist 
Bloc also attempted to combine socialism with the vocabulary of 
nationalism to gain the allegiance of the population. For example, 
leaders such as Mao discovered that appealing on behalf of 'the 
nation’ was a means of achieving the homogeneity that their 
highly centralised, totalitarian systems required.2 Similar tactics 
were also employed by Ceausescu in Romania. However, while all
2 P. Shoup, 'The National Question and the Political Systems of Eastern 
Europe,' in Eastern Europe in the 1970s. eds. S. Sinanian, I. Deak, P-C. Ludz 
(London and New York, 1972), p. 124.
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the Warsaw Pact states suffered from the delegitimising effects of 
economic shortcomings, particularly shortages of consumer goods 
and fresh foods, the SED had to face the additional problem that 
East Germans could look longingly into the well-stocked shop 
windows of the West via West German television. The latter 
played a paradoxical role in the story of the GDR. In the long­
term, it undermined the state by showing East Germans that the 
grass was greener on the other side of the border, but it also 
satisfied a demand that the SED could not meet and improved the 
quality of life for ordinary East Germans, and showed some of the 
negative aspects of capitalist society such as crime, hence the 
regime gave up the practice of dispatching members of the Free 
German Youth to turn round west-facing TV aerials very early 
on.3
In the end, neither the political and economic system, nor the
Berlin Wall and death strips could change the fact that they 
shared a language, culture and history stretching back for several 
centuries with the population of the larger, more prosperous 
German state. Finally, and most poignantly, those who were 
labelled the enemy, and from whom they were parted were not
just their countrymen and women, but also blood relations
Secondly, in theory, the SED should not have been concerned with 
the (ethnic) nation and nationalism at all, since there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between socialism and nationalism,
and one either believes that human populations are arranged 
according to class, or according to nationality, and that their 
relationships with others are determined accordingly. Even the
most acceptable solution, the 'socialist German nation in the GDR' 
was a contradiction in terms. In practice however, the SED and its 
loyal theorists tended to pick and choose only the aspects of 
M arxist-Leninist theory regarding the nation that fitted current 
objectives, and the arguments of the latter often sounded 
distinctly contrived. For example, earlier emphasis on the unity of
3 A bibliography on the role of West German television in the GDR can be 
found in Roland Bleiker, Nonviolent Struggle and the Revolution in East 
Germany (Cambridge M.A., 1993), pp.50-51
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the German working class was soon dropped once the SED began
to assert the legitimacy of the GDR as a complete state in its own
right, and during the 1970s, the importance of factors such as 
language in the formation of nations had to be explained away by 
theorists, in spite of the fact that it was considered to be an 
important factor according to classic Marxist-Leninist teaching.4
In order to harness nationalism for their own purposes, the SED 
tried two strategies. F irstly, they tried to make 'national' 
synonymous with 'of the entire German working class' and 
therefore compatible with 'socialist.' This was most visible during 
the first decade of the GDR's existence, when the SED used the 
word 'national' extensively in order to support its objective of a 
united socialist Germany. The second strategy was to rename
what was essentially nationalism 'patriotism.' The encouragement 
of the latter was justified on the grounds that it was 'socialist 
patrio tism ,' which was inextricably linked to proletarian
internationalism. This prevented it from becoming chauvinism or 
im perialism , as was the case with 'bourgeois nationalism .' 
However, far from being two sides of the same coin, as was 
claimed, the two clearly contradicted each other, and in practice, 
the SED’s obsessive emphasis on the need for friendship and 
solidarity with the Soviet Union greatly undermined its claim to 
represent the nation. Furthermore, the SED maintained that all 
the socialist states were growing together, but just how far this 
would go was never adequately explained.
Although communist states claimed to have solved the 'national 
question,' the case of the GDR epitomises the conflict between class 
solidarity and national loyalty that Marx and Engels themselves 
failed to resolve. Though faced with the opposite problem, being 
states trying to integrate many different nationalities, the fate of 
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia highlights how both 
M arxist-Leninist theorists and regimes greatly underestimated 
the power of ethnic nationalism. As one notable scholar of
4 For more detail on this issue, see Joanna McKay, 'The SED's Concept of the 
Nation: the Problem of Language,' in P. Dunleavy and J. Stanyer, eds., 
Contemporary Political Studies. Proceedings of the Political Studies 
Association's Annual Conference. 2 vols. (Belfast, 1994), vol. 2, pp.973-986.
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nationalism has concluded, 'When communism and nationalism 
have been wedded in the popular mind, communist movements 
have found broad acceptance. When communism and nationalism 
have been perceived as at odds, such movements have tended to 
be spurned.'5 Thus, while in theory it would be preferable for 
communist regimes to kill off nationalism, if this was not possible, 
it would be better to appeal to it and therefore to seem 'national.'6
3  ^THE CONCEPT OF THE NATION IN WEST GERMANY
While it is not the intention of this thesis to examine how
successive West German governments handled the question of the 
nation, a brief look at the subject highlights the contrasting ways 
in which leaders of the two German states tackled the same 
problem. Both states constituted only part of the geographical 
area and population of the former German Reich. However, as 
m entioned earlier, the Federal Republic did have several 
advantages from the start, namely by being larger, by recovering 
from the war quicker, thanks to Marshall Aid, and by gaining 
international recognition as 'Germany,' even from former enemies. 
These factors helped successive West German governments to 
pursue a far more subtle and consistent policy regarding the
German nation than their East German counterparts.
The continued existence of one German nation was enshrined in 
the Basic Law, along with a commitment to the ultimate goal of 
reunification. The Federal Republic confidently claimed to be the 
sole legitimate representative of the nation, and this was accepted 
by the majority of the West German population, by the 'free 
world' and apparently even by a large proportion of the citizens of
the GDR. By clearly stating the official position regarding the state
of the German nation and then quietly, but resolutely, adhering to 
it, Bonn was able to minimise doubt and controversy regarding 
the issue, and could concentrate on making the Federal Republic a
5 Connor, The National Question, p.584.
6 P. Shoup, 'The National Question,1 p. 123.
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country people were happy to live in and to identify with.7 In 
contrast, the SED's numerous policy changes encouraged confusion 
and reduced the credibility of the Party’s arguments. Although 
Willy Brandt's acceptance of 'two states of one nation’ appeared to 
conservative W est German politicians to challenge these 
assumptions, which had been taken for granted for 20 years, it 
did not fundamentally alter the Federal Republic's own status, and 
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that it did not contravene 
the Basic Law.
Unlike in the GDR, there was no active policy designed to create a 
separate West German nation. Instead, a specific West German 
identity or Selbstverstandnis  gradually evolved of its own accord. 
Far from being based on ethnic nationalism and chauvinism, 
which had been discredited by the experience of the recent past, 
this new, specifically West  German identity was primarily based 
on allegiance to the democratic constitution and economic 
prosperity (which gave rise to the terms Verfassungspatr iot ismus  
and Deutschmarkpatriot ismus).
The nationalist element of this West German identity was also 
tempered by the fact that it was firmly tied to a wider European 
consciousness and a commitment to closer integration among the 
members of the European Union. Indeed, since reunification, 
Helmut Kohl himself has sought to allay fears of an enlarged, 
dominant Germany among her Eastern and Western neighbours 
by stressing his government's desire for a 'European Germany' as 
opposed to a 'German Europe.'
However, while German nationalism of the pre-1945 variety was 
not encouraged, identification with the Federal Republic did not 
actually preclude identification with the ethnic or historical 
German nation. Indeed, the recent increase in racially motivated 
attacks and rowdy celebrations of H itler's birthday, and the 
electoral success of parties with an overtly nationalist programme,
7 For a bibliography on this subject see Hans-Joachim Veen and Carsten 
Zelle, ’National Identity and Political Priorities in Eastern and Western 
Germany, German Politics 4 (1985): p.25, note 3.
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show that a disturbingly large minority do hold right-wing or 
nationalist views. Generally, however, they seem to be either 
disgruntled youths, in particular, under-achievers, who remain on 
the fringe of prosperous W est German society, or elderly 
traditionalists. Furthermore, before making assumptions about 
the rise of German nationalism, it should be noted that support for 
right-wing views is on the increase elsewhere in Europe.
Fortunately, most people in the old L a n d e r  appear to have 
willingly identified with West German affluence and with the 
peace-loving, democratic character of the Bonn-state. However, 
they did not cease to view themselves as Germans in an ethnic 
and historical sense, and although one can speak of a unique West 
German identity, it does not appear to have been the case that a 
unique West German nation was evolving as an alternative to the 
traditional German nation. Instead, traditional German elements 
and new characteristics arising from the post-war experience 
became fused together. Thus, what was actually meant in the 
Federal Republic by 'German' was considerably transformed over 
the years, to such an extent that already by the end of the 1960s, 
observers commented that the GDR was more traditionally 
German than the Federal Republic.8 Also, content with their lot, at 
least in a material sense, West Germans had less reason to concern 
themselves with the national question than East Germans, and the 
existence of a second, albeit communist, German state did not alter 
their own self-perception.
Presumably, however, as the chances for reunification receded, 
whether or not the populations of the two very different states, 
which called themselves German, still constituted one nation 
became rather irrelevant. Although difficult to prove, it is 
possible that West Germans of the post-war generation realised 
that the divide between the two German states was more than 
superficial. Many viewed the citizens of the GDR in the same way 
that the latter viewed Poles and Russians, i.e. as profoundly
8 A view supported by West Germany's senior representative in Bonn's 
diplomatic mission in East Berlin during the 1980s, Gunther Gaus. See Gaus, 
Wo Deutschland liegt (Munich, 1986).
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different and even inferior, and their enthusiasm for their eastern 
cousins from 1989 was either half-hearted or extremely short­
lived, as they were soon to find out. These attitudes may have 
been a result of anti-communist propaganda in the West, or of 
observations during visits to the GDR, or it may have simply been 
the case that younger West Germans were indifferent to the GDR, 
which to them was just another member of the Eastern Bloc, 
whose citizens happened to speak German.
In short, the existence of the GDR was not nearly so much of a 
problem for West Germans as the existence of the Federal 
Republic was for East Germans and their rulers. Furthermore, the 
new concept of 'Germanness' that had developed in the Federal 
Republic seemed unaffected by events in the GDR, and much to 
the disgust of many East Germans, this has remained the case, in 
spite of the reunification of the two German states, which says 
something about the resilience and level of acceptance of this
West German concept.
However, in spite of the fact that the West Germans do not seem 
to have had a problem being both Germans and citizens of the 
Federal Republic (unlike their East German counterparts), this did 
not mean that they had answered all the questions regarding
what it meant to be German, some of which stemmed from the
need to come to terms with the Nazi era, while others had 
concerned intellectuals for centuries. This was most clearly 
illustrated by the H i s t o r i k e r s t r e i t  of the 1980s, which was 
essentially a bitter disagreement between conservative historians, 
who maintained that the Germans were not uniquely evil, and
therefore had no reason to be ashamed of their national identity, 
and liberals, who regarded this as white-washing or justifying the 
Nazi period.9
9 Mary Fulbrook, 'Nation-state and political culture in divided Germany 
1945-90,' in The State of Germany, ed. John Breuilly (London and New York, 
1993), p. 127. For more detail on the Historikerstreit see among others, 
Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the 
attempt to escape from the Nazi Past (London, 1989); Christian Maier, The  
Unmasterable Past: History. Holocaust and German National Identity 
(Cambridge, M.A., 1986); Thomas Herz, 'Der Historikerstreit,' in Aufbruch in 
die Neunziger. ed. Christian W. Thomsen (Cologne, 1991), pp.358-382; James
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4) THE COLLAPSE OF THE GDR
Although this is not the place for a detailed account of the collapse 
of the GDR and subsequent reunification of Germany, which can be 
found elsew here,10 the events of 1989/90 do tell us something 
about the impact, or rather the ineffectiveness of the SED’s 
strategies regarding the nation, even without consulting data on 
public opinion, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. East 
German enthusiasm for reunification was clearly an indication of 
their rejection of the system and the dictatorship of the SED, and 
shows that both the SED's initial attempts to convince them that 
the GDR was the best model for a future unitary German state, and 
later claims that it was in itself legitimate and an entirely 
separate entity from the Federal Republic, had not been accepted. 
It is tempting to assume that the East German population was 
motivated by the conviction that they and the citizens of the 
Federal Republic constituted one nation, and that they had 
rejected their state precisely for this reason. However, before 
jumping to such a conclusion, we must remember two important 
factors. Firstly, the collapse of the GDR occurred as a result of 
changes in the international situation, which began outside the 
GDR. Secondly, in retrospect, the experiences of the first five 
years in the life of a reunified Germany have shown that the 
division of Germany went far deeper than its superficial 
manifestations, such as the Berlin Wall. However, only via the 
removal of the real wall could the Germans on both sides find out 
just how solid the psychological wall dividing them had become.
Let us briefly consider the first of these factors. The collapse of 
the GDR was part of a process sweeping across the entire Eastern 
Bloc. For 40 years, Bloc cohesion had been maintained via a 
combination of Soviet strength and internal pressure to conform.
Knowlton and Truett Cates, Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original 
Documents o f the Historikerstreit. the Controversy concerning the 
Singularity of the Holocaust (New Jersey, 1993).
10 For a useful bibliography see Bleiker, Nonviolent Struggle, pp.44-45, or 
Jonathan Osmond, ed. German Reunification: a Reference Guide (London, 
1992).
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However, rather like a set of Christmas tree lights, the individual 
members relied on the power supply from Moscow, and as we
have seen, it was a case of 'one out, all out.' Although the fall of
the Berlin Wall was without doubt the most remarkable and 
symbolic single event in the democratic transformation of Eastern 
Europe, both heralding an acceleration in the pace of change and 
signalling the irreversibility of it, the beginning of the end of the 
GDR actually started in Hungary, where the Iron Curtain was first 
breached on the border with Austria, providing East Germans with 
an escape route to the Federal Republic. Ultimately of course, the 
origins of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe can be 
traced back to the Kremlin, starting with Gorbachev's replacement 
of the BreEhnev doctrine with the so-called 'Sinatra doctrine.' This 
culminated in the absence of Soviet intervention in the event of 
popular unrest in most of the Eastern Bloc states, which left them 
to fend for themselves and to face the challenge of the West alone. 
By his inaction, Gorbachev was effectively switching off the life 
support machine which had sustained communism in Eastern 
Europe for 40 years.11
There can be no doubt that the main reasons why thousands of
people demonstrated on the streets of East German cities in the
Autumn of 1989 were similar to those of their counterparts in 
other Eastern Bloc states, namely to demand basic rights such as 
democracy and freedom of movement, which they had hitherto 
been denied. Indeed, it is questionable whether the first 
demonstrations had anything to do with German nationalism at 
a ll,12 and initially the demand was for a new German Democratic 
Republic which lived up to its name.
11 For more detail on Gorbachev's role, see E. Kuhn, Gorbatschow und die 
Deutsche Einheit (Bonn, 1993), especially the chapter 'Gorbatschow als 
Ziehvater der DDR-Revolution.’
12 On this question see among others, John Breuilly, 'Nationalism and 
German Reunification,' in The State Of Germany ed. Breuilly, pp.224-238; 
David M. Keithly, The Collapse of East German Communism (Westport and 
London, 1992), pp.41-58; Karl-Rudolf Korte, Die Chance genutzt? Die Politik 
zur Einheit Deutschlands (Frankfurt and New York, 1994), pp.82-88. In 
Plock, East-German West-German Relations, pp.93-123, the author looks at 
the strength of all-German consciousness in both German states, but does 
not consult primary data.
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What they certainly were rejecting was the SED-state and 
everything associated with it, in particular, the lack of personal 
and political freedom, economic short-comings and of course, the 
S t a s i . 13 In the event, the 18 year old leadership of Erich 
Honecker, and even the Berlin Wall itself, crumbled far more 
quickly than anyone inside or outside the country would have 
believed possible, and more remarkably still, without bloodshed. 
However, the new found freedom to enter the West also meant 
freedom to window-shop, which not surprisingly generated a 
desire to possess the goods they were seeing at first hand for the 
very first time. Furthermore, the revelations which followed the 
end of the SED-dictatorship, concerning the extent of surveillance, 
of elite privileges and of the economic crisis, showed people that 
there had been a lot more wrong with the GDR than they had 
realised. This provided the yeast which gave rise to the belief 
that the GDR was irreformable, and that reunification with the 
Federal Republic was the only solution.14 And once the idea of 
reunification had surfaced, there was no way that it could be 
submerged again.
In view of the fact that the GDR had so many short comings, and 
of the speed with which the two 40 year old German states 
became one, it seems appropriate to ask not only why the GDR 
collapsed, but also why it had lasted for so long. Indeed, it 
appeared to outsiders that East Germans had become relatively 
content with their lot, which compared favourably with that of 
their socialist neighbours, not least thanks to credit and 
preferential treatment from Bonn, which sought to preserve the 
national bond and to undermine the GDR, but in this way actually 
helped sustain it. Honest GDR-watchers admit that they did not 
foresee what was coming. Four factors which upheld the GDR for 
40 years can be identified, namely the Cold War, elite cohesion,
*3 That reunification was not an issue during the early days of the 
revolution is born out by empirical research conducted by former 
members o f the Academy for Social Sciences in Detlef Eckert, Jurgen 
Hofmann and Helmut Meier, Zwischen AnschluB und Ankunft. 
Identitatskonflikte und Identitatssuche der Ostdeutschen auf dem Weg zum 
Bundesbiirger (Potsdam, 1992), pp.7-8.
14 Eckert et al., Zwischen AnschluB. p. 10.
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the incorporation or expulsion of dissent, and a minimal 
satisfaction of needs. However, once the first three of these had 
disappeared, the socialist German state was doomed.15 From then 
on, two elements dominated the course of events, namely popular 
feeling and the policies of the West German government, although
uJQ-re-
the latter \yatf soon leading the former.16
5) OFFICIAL VERSUS UNOFFICIAL GDR-CONSCIOUSNESS
Accepting the fact that the population rejected the East German 
state in its undemocratic, communist form, the question arises as 
to whether they were also rejecting the notion of a specific East 
German national identity, believing instead that they were still 
simply Germans. Although we cannot know precisely what they 
were thinking as the foundations of their state collapsed around 
them, or how important national sentiment was compared with 
other issues, the rejection of the state was an indication that all
the SED's efforts to legitimise it had failed, including their claims
regarding the nation. The leadership's various N at io n sk o n z e p te , 
especially the invention of a purely 'socialist nation' in the GDR, 
had merely been ideals or goals, to be achieved like economic 
targets. In fact, during the 1970s, when severing the German
national bond became the SED's primary objective, their nation- 
building strategies could be more accurately described as 'nation- 
d e s tro y in g . '17 Furthermore, to deny the unity of the German
nation was one thing. Explaining what now existed in its place 
proved rather more difficult for the Party leadership.
As a consequence, many of the Party's arguments regarding the 
nation were seriously flawed, which greatly reduced their 
effectiveness as tools to legitimise the state. They can be 
criticised on five counts. Firstly, the Party leadership mixed 
mutually exclusive concepts, namely M arxist-Leninist arguments 
on the one hand, and traditional elements associated with the
15 Fulbrook, 'Nation-state,' p. 170.
16 Breuilly, 'Nationalism,' p.228.
17 Walker Connor, 'Nation-Building or nation-destroying?' World Politics 24 
(1972): p.336.
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historic or ethnic German nation on the other, in order to construct 
the kind of nation it wanted the population to identify with. Then, 
as we have seen, theorists were called upon to provide credible 
arguments which aimed to enhance and expand upon the official 
line. Secondly, the Party's ideas regarding the nation concentrated 
on objective factors, and the power of subjective elements and 
em otional ties was seriously underestim ated. Thirdly, the 
question of ethnicity, blood and family ties was never adequately 
dealt with. Fourthly, the official 'GDR-nation' was virtually 
synonymous with a state which remained so unloved, and while a 
certain state consciousness was developing, it was based on 
shared experiences, many of which were negative, and therefore 
could not easily be transform ed into a positive national 
consciousness to replace German national consciousness. Finally, 
as Johann Gottfried Herder had argued, the development of 
nations is essentially a natural process, not a policy imposed from 
above ,18 a factor which the SED either failed to recognise or chose 
to ignore.
In normal circumstances, these short-comings might not have 
mattered so much, but the circumstances which had given birth to 
the GDR and which sustained it were far from normal. As a 
consequence, even though from 1961 until 1989 the majority of 
the population could not choose which German state to live in, 
they could make a mental choice between two political systems, 
two life-styles and even two contrasting views regarding the state 
of the German nation, and once they were given the opportunity 
to choose, they immediately opted for the West German model, 
though many may regret that decision now.
In spite of, or maybe even because of the SED's attempts to 
convince the East Germans that regardless of their ethnic 
background, what really mattered were their socialist values and 
membership of the international working class, it appears that 
even the post-w ar generation still regarded them selves as 
Germans first and foremost, since 'If not German, then what are
18 See Isiah Berlin, Vico and Herder (London, 1976), pp.83: 58-1.
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w e ? '19 Significantly, the SED never did find a suitable
replacement for the emotive adjective 'German.' After all, one 
could hardly refer to something as 'DDRsch .' While the notion of a 
’socialist German nation,’ introduced in the mid-1970s, had been 
the ’least worst’ concept for all concerned, since it acknowledged 
the German nationality of the majority of the citizens of the GDR, 
all the things the population wanted to be rid of - the lack of 
political and personal freedom, and economic short-comings - 
were associated with the word ’socialist,’ while their opposites -
dem ocracy, freedom of movement and prosperity  - were 
associated with the word ’German,’ or more specifically, with 
’West German.’
In reality, the GDR was still quite German in an old-fashioned, 
Prussian sense, and had an everyday culture that was very 
different from the materialistic, universal American culture to be 
found in the Federal Republic. In fact, in the 1980s, the SED 
seemed to be winning the battle to prove which state was the 
most German in a traditional sense. This sense of Germanness was 
also manifested in a sense of superiority towards their socialist 
neighbours, demonstrated both by ordinary East Germans, and by 
their leaders, in spite of all the rhetoric concerning proletarian 
internationalism. However, to the regime's credit, there was no 
attem pt to 'Germ anise' the Sorb minority, who numbered
approximately 100,000 around the river Lausitz. On the contrary, 
the Party went to great lengths to preserve their language and 
culture, maybe even beyond the call of duty, since the ability to 
speak Sorbisch  was not much use to a young person in the GDR. 
This commitment may have been for propaganda purposes, i.e. to 
demonstrate how well the GDR treated minority groups, but 
probably originally arose from a genuine desire to make amends
for the Nazis' treatment of minorities.
Even if the population of the GDR did not embrace the official 
national identity prescribed for them by the SED, it is widely
19 A point made by Gerbard Schweigler in 'Whatever happened to 
Germany?' in The Foreign Policy of West Germany, eds. Krippendorff and 
Rittberger (1980), cited in Plock, East-German West-German Relations. 
p .127.
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believed that an unofficial GDR-consciousness had become 
established, and the difficult process of reconciliation between the 
populations of the two German states appears to confirm this.20 
While it was impossible for western researchers to acquire
accurate data on national consciousness in the former GDR, even in 
the late 1960s, non-German observers in particular recognised a 
S e l b s t v  e r s t a n d n i s  or self-perception peculiar to the East 
G erm ans.21
Rather than being based on the principles which had been
ceaselessly advocated by the SED, in particular, socialist patriotism 
and proletarian internationalism, in reality, GDR-consciousness 
appears to have been based on the experience of day-to-day life 
in the GDR and solidarity in the face of hardship, combined with 
traditional Prussian values. However, while it did not correspond 
to the official version of GDR-consciousness advocated by the 
regim e, it corresponded even less to the W est German
consciousness now firmly established in the Federal Republic.
Furtherm ore, while West German culture may have seemed
desirable from a distance, East Germans remained ignorant of 
many of the negative aspects of a competitive capitalist society.
The Federal Republic was still constitutionally committed to the 
establishment of one state for the entire German nation, although 
unofficially, it had long been accepted that this goal was probably
20 Numerous post-unification books address the complicated subject of East 
German identity today, for example, Werner Weidenfeld, ed., Deutschland - 
Eine Nation. Doppelte Geschichte (Cologne, 1993); Erwin K. Scheuch, W ie  
Deutsch sind die Deutschen? Eine Nation wandelt ihr Gesicht (Bergisch 
Gladbach, 1991); Christian Meier, Die Nation, die keine sein will (Munich 
and Vienna, 1991); Werner Weidenfeld and Karl-Rudolf Korte, D ie  
Deutschen - Profil einer Nation (Stuttgart, 1991); Veen and Zelle, 'National 
Identity,' pp. 1-26, especially note 3, p.25.
21 The best attempt to assess national consciousness in the GDR was Gebhard 
Ludwig Schweigler's National Consciousness in Divided Germany (London 
and Beverley Hills, 1975). Schweigler, a pupil of Karl Deutsch, accepted the 
limitations of his data but nevertheless believed that the question was no 
longer whether or not one German nation still existed, but whether or not 
it could be resurrected. Only with difficulty, he believed, since the answer 
to the German question appeared to be 'two Germanies, not one.'
Schweigler, National consciousness, pp.277-281. For other views from the 
period, see Apel, DDR 1962: Hangen, The Muted Revolution: Smith, Germany 
bevond the W all: Domberg, The Other Germany.
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unobtainable. Thus, although it would be an exaggeration to say 
that West German governments actively pursued policies designed 
to bring about reunification, indeed Adenauer was often accused 
of having abandoned the East Germans in favour of integration 
into the West, and Brandt's Ostpolitik was seen as treachery by 
many conservatives, the consistent attempts by Bonn to preserve 
the national bond at a personal level, for example, by 
autom atically giving citizens from the GDR W est German 
passports, were clearly effective east of the Elbe.
Then, through no effort on their own part, the opportunity for 
reunification was simply handed to Bonn, or more specifically to 
Helmut Kohl. The latter had more or less been pronounced 
politically dead, but was suddenly presented with the chance to 
join Adenauer and even Bismarck as one of the key figures in the 
making of modern Germany.
Having gained political freedom, the East Germans then wanted 
what they believed was a major by-product of western-style 
democracy, namely prosperity, and Kohl wasted no time in telling 
them that this too could be theirs. Thus on the grounds that . 
the citizens of both German states still constituted one nation, he 
offered the dazed, politically naive population of the GDR an easy 
way to achieve their objectives and reinforced his message by 
giving them each 100 Deutschmarks. He succeeded in equating 
the Federal Republic with all the positive things East Germans 
desired, and to which they believed that they, as Germans, also 
had a right, hence they willingly accepted his offer, as 
demonstrated in the elections of 1990. Thus right from the start, 
the citizens of the GDR were given a financial incentive to identify 
themselves purelyand simply as Germans, akin to the population of 
the old Federal Republic, and to abandon their specific East 
German identity.
In short, it seems that reunification was 'not so much a nationalist 
idea as a route for East Germans to an imagined world of 
p rosperity  and freedom ,' which was soon condemned by 
intellectuals on both sides of the divide as 'Deutschm ark
3 0 4
patrio tism .’22 So long as there was no chance of reunification, the 
issue had laief dormant. However, by offering unlimited supplies 
of consumer goods and exotic fruits in the name of the unitary 
German nation, Kohl reawakened the latent sense of German 
nationalism in the citizens of the GDR. They believed that the 
Germans still constituted one nation because he said so, and 
because at that point in time, they wanted to believe it. Thus, 
although it was not German nationalism which originally brought 
East Germans onto the streets in 1989, being German did still 
mean something, and more importantly, in people’s minds, it was 
associated with success, material well-being and ’freedom,’ which 
West German politicians were then able to play on. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the change in the slogan 'We are the people' 
to 'We are one people' originated not from the East German 
dem onstrators themselves, but was introduced, or at least 
encouraged, by the West German government.23
In retrospect, we can see a number of further reasons why we 
should not autom atically jump to the conclusion that the 
reunification of the two German states was an indication that the 
German national bond had been unaffected by the political 
division. Firstly, while Kohl managed to convince the newly 
liberated East Germans that the populations of the two German 
states still belonged together, his attempts to encourage West 
Germans to share that feeling appear to have been considerably 
less successful. Secondly, the practical hardships encountered by 
the East Germans themselves in the form of unemployment, high 
prices, W est German prejudice, and the loss of previous 
certainties, both good and bad, have led to disappointment and 
disorientation. They have now recognised that there was more to 
the GDR than its corrupt political system and lack of freedom to 
travel abroad ,24 and want the West Germans to know that. 
Indeed, the post-unification experience seems to have reinforced 
their identity as East Germans, manifested in nostalgia for the past
22 Breuilly, 'Nationalism,' p.231.
23 Author's interview with Alfred Kosing, Berlin, 7 July 1993.
24 Eckert et al, Zwischen AnschluB. p.37. On East German attitudes during 
the immediate post-reunification period, see the section 'Ossi und Wessi - 
oder neue Graben nach der Mauer,' pp.28-35.
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(Ostalgie)  and increased support for the PDS, who are seen as 
the only voice the East Germans have in the Bundestag. 
Furthermore, the experience of the last five years also highlights
the fact that economic factors do matter, and that although class
does not determine nations, as the SED and Marxism-Leninism 
claimed, it does affect relationships within nations. Thus many 
may now be reconsidering their earlier assumption that the 
German national bond remained intact. Few in either part of 
Germany would still say 'Wir sind ein Volk/  indeed some would 
probably deny ever having said it.
Some East German researchers have concluded that in the GDR,
attitudes towards the national question were both very varied 
and often contradictory, and that neither the notion of the 
unbroken unity of the nation, nor the policy of Abgrenzung  found 
total acceptance during the 1970s and 1980s.25 However, in the 
end, the desire on the part of East Germans for reunification as a 
m eans to achieve freedom , dem ocracy and p rosperity  
immediately was so strong that they chose to overlook what 
differentiated the populations of the two German states. They
overestimated both what they had in common, and West German
solidarity towards them, and believed what they wanted to 
believe (during the euphoric days of the revolution at least), 
namely that the Germans still constituted one nation. H ow ever 
John Breuilly sums up the situation thus: 'Nationality as a latent 
sense of identity inherited from the existence of a nation-state
between 1871 and 1945, as a commitment by the Federal 
Republic to the GDR, and as a fixation on the Federal Republic 
shared by many GDR citizens is turning out to be something very 
different from nationality as actual habits and values and ways of 
living together.’26
Therefore, the conflict East Germans experienced between their 
official citizenship and their subjective identity in the GDR may 
not have been resolved in the new enlarged Federal Republic. 
Indeed, it would be unrealistic to expect two communities to
25 Eckert et al, p .l l .
26 Breuilly, 'Nationalism,' p.235.
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recover from 40 years of separation overnight, as Willy Brandt 
recognised when he said, ’What belongs together is now growing  
to g e th e r .’27 Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that they 
would want to go their separate ways again, not least because 
they did not choose to in the first place.
6) THE EAST GERMAN EXPERIENCE AND NATION-THEORY
Having looked at what the collapse of the GDR can tell us about the 
level of acceptance of the Party line regarding the nation, and 
about the illegitimacy of the state, let us now briefly consider 
what it can tell us about nations generally. Firstly, it shows that 
nations neither appear nor disappear overnight, but develop 
gradually, (a fact often ignored by the SED, though recognised by 
theorists). Therefore, while it would be extremely difficult to 
prove that a fully-fledged national identity had become 
established in the GDR, it is certainly true that a certain cultural, 
even political identity not shared by the West Germans had 
developed. Furthermore, the example of Austria shows that in 
certain circumstances, it is possible for two separate civic- 
territorial nations to evolve out of one ethnic-genealogical 
n a tio n ,28 which gradually acquire cultural characteristics of their 
own, and it is conceivable that a separate nation could have 
eventually evolved in the GDR in the same way. The key factors 
appear to be generational change and the passage of time, (though 
for particular reasons, this occurred unusually rapidly in the 
Austrian case).
However, precisely when the point of no return has been reached 
is very difficult to establish.29 If we accept Anthony Smith's 
general definition of a nation as being ’a named human population
27 Willy Brandt, Was ZusammengehQrt.... (Bonn, 1993), j?.36.
28 These two types o f nation have been identified by*eminent scholar of 
nations and nationalism, Anthony D. Smith. See Smith, National Identity 
(London, 1991).
29 According to Walker Connor, four factors contribute to the problem: 
nationhood is a mass, not an elite phenomenum; it is a process; the process 
may not necessarily achieve nationahood; and it is not tangible or 
measurable. Connor, 'When is a nation?' Ethnic and Racial Studies 13 
(1990): p.92.
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sharing a historic territory, common myths and historic memories, 
a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal 
rights and duties for all its members,'30 it appears that we can 
neither say that two separate nations had evolved on German soil, 
nor that the unitary German nation continued to exist unchanged. 
In view of the events of 1989/90, we must conclude that the 
embryonic nation in the GDR had not reached the point of no 
return, and that its citizens still believed that the German national 
bond had not been severed beyond repair, and that they and the 
West Germans continued to have more in common than not, 
although they may actually have been wrong in this respect.
This brings us to our second point about nations, namely that they 
are defined by a combination of objective and subjective criteria. 
If one believes that objective criteria alone define nations, one 
could argue that two separate nations existed on German soil. If 
on the other hand, one is of the opinion that nations are primarily 
defined according to subjective criteria, then the most important 
factor in the German case was what Brandt had called 'a feeling of 
belonging together' ( Z u s a m m e n g e h d r ig k e i t s g e fu h l ) .  With the 
benefit of hindsight, the German experience appears to confirm 
that nations are defined by both objective, tangible factors on the 
one hand, and subjective elements, or national consciousness on 
the other. However, objective factors change more quickly than 
subjective ones, a process which can also be encouraged 
artificially, and this was the case during the 40 year separation
experienced by the two German states. But because subjective
elements change very slowly, they had not yet reached the point 
where one could talk of two com pletely separate and 
irreconcilable national consciousnesses, hence the German national 
bond had not quite been broken forever, although this might have 
occurred in time.
The theory of a discrepancy between the nation, which in
objective terms, had become deeply divided after 40 years, and a
subjective national consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness of 
being German, which had not yet been totally eroded, is supported
30 Smith, National Identity, p.43.
308
by the evidence of the past five years, and today one could talk of 
a difference between the unity of the nation in theory and the 
disunity of the nation in practice. Consequently, reunification has 
proved very problematic at a personal level. While the East 
Germans wanted to believe that the Germans were still one nation, 
(and that this was sufficient to guarantee them material 
happiness), in objective terms, the populations of the two German 
states had become very different. While the two Germanies have 
been called ’twin states,’31 this requires qualification, since they 
were certainly fraternal, and not identical twins, and raised by 
different foster parents, grew up to be extremely dissimilar.
The third point we can make about nations in general is that 
national identity is by definition something positive. It implies a 
sense of pride in the nation and a feeling that there is something 
to be gained by being a member of that nation. The citizens of the 
GDR clearly had good (economic) reasons to identify themselves as 
Germans first and foremost, and at the time of reunification at 
least, had no desire to defend their East German identity, although 
recent experiences appear to have changed this. Had the GDR 
become more successful in satisfying the needs and desires of its 
people, within a few generations, it is possible that the situation 
would have been different.
A fourth point about nations is that it is highly desirable for the 
borders of a nation to coincide with those of a state. Even though 
the two German states became well established and apparently
permanent, the memory of the unitary German nation-state of the 
past lived on, and continued to be seen as natural, even though, in
real terms, it was not.32 In a genuine nation-state, of which there
are very few, attributes of the nation and the state become fused, 
and eventually a fusion of national and state consciousness also
occurs, resulting in a highly resilient entity. The case of the GDR 
shows what happens when nation and state do not coincide, and 
when two states compete for the loyalties of one people, namely 
that the most successful state wins.
31 Fulbrook, ’Nation-state,' p. 196.
32 Breuilly, 'Nationalism,' p.229.
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As was discussed in the first chapter, most regimes have three 
devices at their disposal to enhance the legitimacy of the state, 
namely dem ocracy, economic success, and by successfully 
appealing to a sense of nationalism. However, a deficiency in any 
of these three may have the opposite effect and may well 
undermine the state. Unwilling or unable to offer the first two of 
these factors, the SED attempted to make use of the third device, 
albeit in several different forms over the years. However, in the 
absence of the first two factors, and due to the vulnerable position 
of the GDR, this strategy proved inadequate to legitimise a state 
that was essentially illegitimate, and proved that it is very 
difficult to create a nation from scratch without popular support.
In the end, the Party's various positions regarding the nation were 
not accepted by the population, in spite of the efforts of those 
whose task it was to make them credible. Not only was it too soon 
for a GDR-nationality to replace the Germanness which continued 
to link the two German states - the Federal Republic also scored 
more highly on the other criteria, namely democracy and 
economic success. Had the GDR been able to match these 
achievements, then maybe it could have survived, particularly 
once those who preserved the ethnic national bond had died out, 
and once the word 'German' had lost its significance. But as a copy 
of the Federal Republic, the GDR would have lacked a raison d'etre. 
As Otto Reinhold, the rector of the Academy for Social Sciences 
and a member of the Central Committee, conceded in the summer 
of 1989:
The GDR is only conceivable as an anti-fascist and 
socialist alternative to the FRG. What justification 
would a capitalist GDR have next to a capitalist Federal 
Republic? 33
33 ZPA IV 2/1/699. See also A. James McAdams, Germany Divided. From the 
Wall to Reunification (Princeton, 1993), p. 194.
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In other words, in the absence of two artificially imposed, 
ideologically incompatible political systems on German soil, all 
that would remain would be one people and one nation.
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